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Overview
Experience has shown that conflict resolution requires the
application of all elements of national and international power—
political, diplomatic, economic, financial, informational, social,
and commercial, as well as military. To resolve conflicts or crises,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should adopt
a Comprehensive Approach that would enable the collaborative
engagement of all requisite civil and military elements of international
power to end hostilities, restore order, commence reconstruction,
and begin to address a conflict’s root causes. NATO can
provide the military element for a comprehensive approach. Many
other national, international, and nongovernmental actors can
provide the civilian elements.
In May 2007, the Royal Danish Embassy in Washington,
DC, and the Center for Technology and National Security Policy
at the National Defense University held an informal workshop
of experts from across the Alliance to explore options for creating
an international comprehensive approach to postconflict
stabilization and reconstruction. This paper is the product of
that workshop and subsequent collaborations. It endeavors to
describe the major requirements for conflict resolution, what
NATO has learned from its post–Cold War experiences to date
in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and how a more
effective program of international civil and military engagement
can be put in place.
Much work remains to be done to flesh out the initiative,
but already it is clear that military efforts in the field must
be complemented throughout any operation by nonmilitary
means that bring to bear the expert civil competencies of
other actors, both national and international. In the Balkans
and Afghanistan, NATO engaged with other actors belatedly
through ad hoc, situational arrangements. Not knowing in
advance what roles and which participants will eventually
come into play results in longer and more costly conflict resolution
in terms of lives, treasure, and ultimate effectiveness.
The adage that “NATO works in practice better than in
theory” has become a convenient excuse for not reaching muchneeded
comprehensive agreements on civil-military cooperation,
from the top levels down to face-to-face relationships in the field.
More than enough operational experience has been gained to
indicate that it is past time to replace expedient constructs with
systemic, institutionalized procedures for cooperation on what, as
is widely agreed, must be accomplished quickly and effectively.
The last remaining core task of NATO transformation is to
link the Alliance’s military capabilities effectively with the indispensable
nonmilitary elements of power essential to successful
conflict resolution. Failure to finish that work hampers and at
times frustrates success in the field by operational personnel,
civilians, and military across all organizations who are simply
trying to get the job done.
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