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Front cover: Sailors and Marines aboard rigid-hull inflatable boat and MH–53E Super Stallion approach USNS Laramie taking part in enhanced certification exercise (U.S. Navy/Scott Youngblood). Table of contents shows (left to right) Soldiers man M1A1 Abrams tank (U.S. Army/Brandi Marshall); sea spray washes across deck of USS Winston S. Churchill (U.S. Navy/Shane McCoy); Marines aboard amphibious assault vehicles land on beach during exercise Phibex (U.S. Marine Corps/Caleb D. Eames); and KC–10 Extender takes off to provide air refueling for NATO aircraft participating in Operation Unified Protector (U.S. Air Force/Andra Higgs).
To the Editor—On Friday, October 7, 2011, my friend and mentor, General John M. Shalikashvili, was laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery. General Shalikashvili, or simply Shali as his friends knew him, served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to 1997. He was the first foreign-born officer to become Chairman, the pinnacle of the American military, and the first to have done so having begun his military career as a conscripted private. As Chairman, Shali was President Bill Clinton’s principal military advisor.

At the induction ceremony, President Clinton noted Shali’s ability to take command of the room without speaking a word. His calm, steely gaze was all that was needed. The President also spoke of Shali’s candor and integrity, saying that too often Presidents are told what others think they want to hear, rather than what they need to hear to make sound decisions. General Shalikashvili, said Clinton, “never minced words, he never postured or pulled punches, he never shied away from tough issues or tough calls, and most important, he never shied away from doing what he believed was the right thing.”

Before becoming Chairman, General Shalikashvili served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe along with several other prestigious commands. Yet for me, his most important command was the 1st of the 84th Field Artillery, 9th Infantry Division, at Fort Lewis, Washington, from 1975 to 1977. At the time, he was a lieutenant colonel and I was a mere private first class and served as his aide and driver. Our entire time together was less than 2 years. Yet, as lowly as my role was and as brief our time together was, it set me on the path I walk today, 36 years later.

For days and weeks at a time, I was with Shali on various military exercises conducted across the Pacific Northwest and, on one occasion, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The heat, cold, dust, and fatigue were sometimes grueling. One time, after weeks living outside in the broad expanse of eastern Washington state, I recall returning to my barracks and thinking how odd it felt to be inside a building.

On another occasion, some thought Shali and I were dead, killed by a “shorthand” from one of our own howitzers. The battalion had 155mm and 8-inch howitzers, very large and deadly instruments of destruction. One evening as Shali and I were leaving an observation post during a live-fire exercise, the air was ripped by the sound of a nearby explosion. The timing of our departure was everything. Just minutes before, we had left the safety of the fortified concrete bunker from which we had observed the fury of a battalion-wide, time-on-target round of shelling. All available “tubes,” spread miles apart, synchronized their fire to create a near simultaneous explosive maelstrom in the designated impact area in the small valley spreading out below. The impact area was where artillery rounds were supposed to land. That didn’t always happen.

Following the time on target, Shali and I got in our jeep and drove down the quarter-mile rutty two-lane road leading from the observation post to a larger gravel road. As we reached the turn onto the larger road, an airburst from a 155mm exploded short of the impact area and approximately where he and I had just been a few minutes before. An airburst involves a fuse setting that causes the steel shell to rip apart in the air over a target. The resulting white-hot shrapnel pulverized almost everything in its path. The radio from the observation post crackled, “Cease fire! Cease fire!” Everyone was relieved to hear Shali on the next radio transmission ask, calmly but firmly, for an explanation of what had just happened. Had we left just a minute or two later, we would have been under the rain of shrapnel.

Shali once arranged for the entire battalion to come to Washington, DC, following a long field exercise at Fort Bragg. That was my first visit to Washington, and I loved every minute. One day, as then Lieutenant Colonel Shalikashvili and I drove around what I know now to be Washington Circle, he pointed toward The George Washington University and said, “That is where I went to graduate school. I got my master’s degree there.” I remember looking toward the campus not knowing that at that moment I was being introduced to the university where I would devote, so far, 20 years of my life.

Yet Shali introduced me to even more. It is correct to say that he was the first true intellectual I met. He spoke several languages and was quite obviously brilliant. Indeed, in the years since, I have rarely met his equal. During the many hours we spent bouncing around in military vehicles during wargames, I learned about European history, politics, and international affairs. With Shali’s encouragement, and when the demands of constant training permitted it, I also attended college part-time. It was not unusual for me to have an M–16 assault rifle in one hand and a textbook in the other.

Yet what has remained with me from all those years ago are not the facts and ideas I may have learned, whether in the classroom or from Shali, but rather a way of being. I learned the beauty of a life devoted to public service, to leading and inspiring young people, and to learning. Shali never stopped learning, evolving, and thinking. After his retirement, indeed even after his first physically debilitating stroke, his thinking continued to evolve. His mind remained as bright and active as ever.

As I listened to Shali on those rare occasions when he spoke of his life as a 16-year-old war refugee coming to a new country, I learned the meaning of endurance, commitment, honor, and principle. I also learned of humility and grace. I rarely saw him lose his temper, and I certainly never heard him shout even when artillery rounds landed short of the intended target. In these ways he provided a model of living that has guided me all these years. I have too often fallen short of my goals, but because of him I have always had a clear sense of what my goals should be.

In 1977, at my request, Shali arranged my transfer to West Germany where I began an exploration of the world that continues to this day. As Shali rose in the ranks and I continued my education, eventually becoming a professor at the university he so admired and in the international affairs program from which he graduated, our friendship deepened. I think we took mutual pride in our
respective accomplishments. The last time I spoke with him was 2 months before his death. I called him as I left to travel in several difficult parts of Africa as part of a research project. His last words to me were, “Don’t get yourself killed.” He was always taking care of his troops, and his friends.

On occasion over the years, some of my former students have told me that I have played a role in their lives that sounds similar to the one Shali played in mine. That is a great gift, one that I cherish. It is, indeed, my purpose in being here. Teaching facts and ideas is only the start. Mentoring young people is the deeper purpose. Mentoring is an invitation to participate in a dialogue about our place in the world. It involves questions about how to live a vibrant and consequential life. It is about ways of seeing the world and understanding one’s place in it. With time, most theories and facts whither and fade from memory. But approaches to life endure. General Shalikashvili’s legacy extends well beyond his stamp on history. It lives in the lives of the many thousands of people he touched along the way.

—Dr. Steven Livingston
Professor
The George Washington University

To the Editor—Having written on the subject myself (Christopher J. Lamb and Edward Marks, Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration, INSS Strategic Perspectives, No. 2 [Washington, DC: NDU Press, October 2010]), I can only commend Peter Phillips and Charles Corcoran for their article on “Harnessing America’s Power” in JFQ 63 (4th Quarter, 2011), especially as we share perspectives. However, there are two points that might usefully be brought to the attention of the authors as well as readers. The first is fairly minor, one of correction. In noting the question of “authority,” the article states that the only two entities in the bureaucracy with the authority to direct interagency efforts are Chiefs of Mission (resident Ambassadors) and the Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, or National Security Advisor (NSA). That statement is true for Chiefs of Mission, but I believe if you check the law, it will state that the National Security Council (NSC) itself, much less the NSA, has only advisory, not executive, authority. The executive authority referred to belongs only to the President. Effective NSAs have enormous influence, of course, and do have an important responsibility for coordination, but they do not have executive authority. If anyone has any doubt about this, he can merely ask anyone who has held this office.

The second point is more substantive. The authors’ primary organization recommendation is the creation of “[r]egional, civilian-led . . . interagency bureaus charged with applying all U.S. instruments of power, including military, within their geographic areas.” I applaud this recommendation—not surprisingly, as I proposed something similar in an article entitled “The Next Generation Department of State.” However, the authors do not say where these bureaus would be located. Are they to be freestanding “agencies” reporting directly to the President? Probably not, as this would only turn the White House and NSC into an operational entity in competition with the departments. Yet they have to be fixed somewhere in the Federal bureaucracy and have to report to someone. The obvious answer is, of course, location within a reorganized Department of State, where they would function as department-located, Washington-based “regional teams” analogous to the Country Teams operating in specific countries. And the question of authority is managed by delegating to the President appointees heading these “bureaus” the appropriate rank and a version of Chief of Mission authority. Unlike to be adopted, if only because of resistance from at least some departments—no names, no pack drill—this approach is actually quite practical as it builds on current practice and organization, and is therefore an incremental, not revolutionary, reform.

—Ambassador (Ret.) Edward Marks

The authors’ response to Ambassador (Ret.) Edward Marks—We concur with your first point on the authority issue. We did not intend to mislead the reader. The “Assistant for National Security” is, by law, simply an advisor. However, we made the logical assumption that an effective advisor is directing interagency efforts on behalf of the President.

On your second point about regional teams within the Department of State, we believe this concept is certainly a valid option, but it is not what we envisioned. Rather, we prefer an “outside the beltway” and “outside any one agency” approach more comparable to current combatant commands. Just as the various military Services provide forces to combatant commands, the various executive agencies would provide “forces” to the regional interagency chief (RIC). The RIC is appointed by and reports directly to the President. Executive agencies serve as force providers for the RIC, filling “organize, train and equip” roles similar to the military Services.

—Peter C. Phillips and Charles S. Corcoran
From the Chairman

Putting Our Nation First

One of the great joys of my office remains the privilege of presiding over the promotion ceremonies of those who serve the Nation. As family and friends proudly gather, surrounded by brothers and sisters in arms who bear witness, I cannot help but stand a little taller during this unique rite of passage.

But amid the proud traditions and tender moments that often accompany these ceremonies, the centerpiece remains the oath that each Servicemember takes as he or she moves onward and upward. As I administer that oath, I am always reminded that our military is different—different from any other in the world. We do not swear allegiance to a person or a party but to the Constitution and the living ideals inherent in it.

Our nation expects us to embody those highest ideals in every sense; it is one of the ways we preserve the trust that the American people place in all of us. As a profession, we must protect and guard that trust jealously, and never do anything to erode it.

That is why in my recently released Strategic Direction to the Joint Force, one of my focus areas is renewing our commitment to the profession of arms. It calls for us to understand, adapt, and promote the knowledge, skills, and attributes that define us as a profession.

As the Nation prepares to choose its next President and other elected leaders this year, it is particularly important to remember that one of the core tenets of our profession is that we serve apolitically under civilian authority, regardless of which person or political party is in power. We do not pledge to protect blue states or red states, Republicans or Democrats, but one nation indivisible. We must also understand why our military as a profession embraces political neutrality as a core value.

The Framers of the Constitution went to great lengths to ensure the military’s subordination to civilian authority, regardless of what person or which political party holds sway. Validated through centuries of willing yet neutral service to the state, we show fidelity to the Constitution every day by embracing this foundational principle. We are not elected to serve; rather, we elect to serve.

Just as profoundly, I believe that a professional armed force that maintains its separation from partisan politics—remaining apolitical at all times—is vital to the preservation of the union and to our way of life. Samuel P. Huntington, author of the seminal work The Soldier and the State, put it this way: “Politics is beyond the scope of military competence and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism.”

General George C. Marshall understood this inherently. An instrumental advisor to President Franklin Roosevelt during World War II, he made sure that he engendered an ironclad relationship of trust with the Commander in Chief by staying out of the business of partisan politics. General Marshall took to heart the advice given to him by a colleague to “understand the ways of politics without becoming involved in them.” His apolitical posture was a major contributor toward his effectiveness during one of the most trying times in our nation’s history.

This does not imply that we forego the right to have a private opinion or a preference on the civic issues of the day. As citizens we should stay informed, and we are, of course, entitled to exercise our right to vote. But understanding the issues, even understanding the candidates, is different than advocating for them. When duty calls, neither friend nor foe cares about our personal political views; we are simply American Servicemembers—nothing more and nothing less. This is true even in the virtual world. Technology and social media make it seductively easy for us to broadcast our private opinions far beyond the confines of our homes. The lines between the professional, personal—and virtual—are blurring. Now more than ever, we have to be exceptionally thoughtful about what we say and how we say it.

We should always remember that serving in our profession is a privilege, a noble calling that requires us to subordinate our personal interests and desires to the greater principles of our profession. At our best, we
represent service to the Nation, impartial to political partisanship. Our lifeblood is the will and support of the American people—we must never forget that. Nor can we act in a way that would undermine their confidence in us or fray our relationship of trust.

So let us renew our commitment to selfless—and apolitical—service not only this election year but also every day we serve. By doing so, we take a big step in ensuring that the American people never question what those who wear the uniform put first: our nation. JFQ

MARTIN E. DEMPSEY
General, U.S. Army
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Sailor hugs family after returning home from deployment aboard USS Abraham Lincoln
We have the most technologically advanced, versatile, and diverse force in the history of warfare. The American fighting man and woman serve in a profession that is constantly engaged in defending freedom in virtually every time zone on the planet. As operational tempo declines, our force will readjust to a more garrison-oriented environment. As we reshape this battle-tested force, it must remain ready, relevant, trained, and educated on a tighter budget than enjoyed in previous years. Moreover, to maintain our fighting edge, we must be holistic in our approaches. Thus, resiliency is one of those lifeline ingredients that must be intertwined in every aspect of the military profession.

I have the privilege to serve as one of the senior enlisted point men for a new doctrinal effort. As defined, Total Force Fitness (TFF, pronounced tough) is a state in which the individual, family, and organization can sustain optimal well-being and performance under any condition. For additional clarification, let us address some of the core principles. TFF:

- is a common doctrinal framework that supports Service-specific fitness programs
- implores leaders to take a holistic approach to accommodate Servicemembers, their families, organizations, and communities
- spans a complete lifecycle of Servicemembers starting before enlistment and beyond retirement or honorable separation
- recognizes the military family as the cornerstone of warfighter success
- places an emphasis on leadership, parenting, and mentoring
- depends upon valid and reliable metrics for ongoing program evaluation and improvement.

One of the most important core principles that I must stress is that this effort does not replace or duplicate existing Service programs, such as Semper Fit, Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, Airman Fitness, and so forth. In fact, it was built by the leaders of the individual Service fitness programs to serve as a common framework where best practices could be exchanged, augmented, or enhanced.

The methodology is simple: as an individual, family, or command dives into the various domains of Total Force Fitness (see figure), it takes a concerted and focused
toughness to get there and remain. That does not mean we hold things in. If a tank develops a crack in the armor, we do not simply slap a coat of paint over it. We pull that system in for maintenance, and likewise we maintain the fitness of the force. Regularly checking on people and taking the steps to prevent little problems from becoming big problems is the key to maintaining TFF.

TFF is not a medical manual. Think of it in a broader way that encompasses both art and science. There are required medical (science) inputs as to the best methods to overcome an adverse condition, but, as described in the core principles, we place major emphasis on the leader (art) and on active leadership engagement.

From the battlefield to the classroom to the hospital ward to transitioning out of the military into veteran status, overcoming adversity and change requires discipline, determination, and toughness. Once resources or avenues to recovery are identified, they must be applied in concert with warfighters, their families, and their Services. Ideally, we would all like to have the ability to predict adversity or misfortune so as to remain on the left side of the incident (prevention). Sometimes that is possible, but other times misfortune arrives unannounced. Strong organizations build on the mutual support of every member of the unit. This is the essence of leadership. Managing during times of ease is straightforward. Leading is something practiced by those who are constantly working against challenges and adversity by bringing out the best in all their people.

I have found it quite easy to advocate for something that works as it has for my family and me. Like most, we are the average garden-variety American military family, so I am confident that the various domains offered in Total Force Fitness can be active ingredients to the daily menu of all Servicemembers, their families, and organizations.

From the surgeon to the sergeant and from the commander to the case worker, each plays an important role in maintaining health and readiness of the Total Force. It is truly a team effort.

You can learn more about Total Force Fitness by visiting www.facebook.com/TotalForceFitness, visiting http://humanperformanceresourcecenter.org/total-force-fitness, and viewing the Chairman’s Instruction 3405.01. JFQ

Figure. Shield of Health
Navigators for generations have been trained to use a sextant to keep track of where their ship or aircraft is in relation to celestial objects. Used in large aircraft in the U.S. Air Force such as bombers, tankers, and transports long before the advent of global positioning satellites, these tools had a small bubble of gas that indicated to the operator that his instrument was properly aligned. Important to the angles being calculated, if this bubble disappeared from view, the navigator would know his sighting would be inaccurate, or more simply he was said to have “lost the bubble.” This phrase has crept into common usage among military personnel from all Services, which is one indication of the depth that jointness has achieved.

The key idea that this phrase imparts is the requirement for one to maintain a close watch on a reference point in order to determine where we are and then figure out where we need to go. Especially in times such as these where so much is in a state of change, not losing the bubble is a difficult challenge. From the closeout of U.S. involvement in Iraq to the recent Defense budget announcement, there is no doubt that major muscle movements of change are in motion in all parts of the joint force.

Equally dramatic are the ongoing changes in the international landscape. This edition of Joint Force Quarterly offers a number of articles to assist in keeping track of where the force is, while keeping watch for emerging challenges and opportunities. As the election of 2012 approaches, General Martin Dempsey reminds us that voting is both an important right and one that requires special considerations for those in uniform. The Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman, Sergeant Major Brian Battaglia, and his guest coauthor, Colonel Christian Macedonia, USA, the Medical Science Advisor for the Office of the Chairman, begin a conversation on resiliency of the joint force, which JFQ will continue in our next edition with articles on different aspects of this important area of focus for all of us.

The Forum provides us with a set of thought-provoking articles that offer a number of recommendations on how to deal with the future in Afghanistan, how to better understand Pakistan and Indonesia, how to see the future fight against terrorism, and how we might think about predicting enemy plans. Trying to find the answer to a fundamental question in Afghan society, Colonel Michael D. Fortune, USA—fresh from command of a National Guard Agribusiness Development Team in Nangarhar Province—suggests that a focus on developing transformational Afghan leaders is necessary. Adding to our growing community of international contributors, Julian Lewis, a Conservative Member of Parliament in the United Kingdom, explores the future of the global battle to defeat terrorism. Attempting to help a Western audience understand Pakistan, Captain Michael E. Devine, USN, sees an explanation to the inherent instability in its system of government by measuring it against the model of a Westphalian state. A Foreign Area Officer, Major Andrés H Cáceres-Solari, USMC, then provides his unique “hiking boots on the ground” article on life in the countryside of Indonesia. With operations in Iraq ended and the road ahead for U.S. combat forces in Afghanistan growing shorter, Zachary Shore from the Naval Postgraduate School and Stanford recommends military planners and diplomats take a new look at predicting an enemy’s future operations. Interestingly, the use of scientific modeling is not high on his list of useful tools. These articles reinforce the need to focus on the human dimension of future warfare.

In our Commentary section, as promised in the previous edition of JFQ, Brigadier General Naef Bin Ahmed Al-Saud of the Royal Saudi Army returns to discuss how his nation is using social media to protect against threats of terrorism in the Kingdom and beyond. Given the globalization of conflict as we go forward, Lieutenant General C.V. Christianson, USA (Ret.), believes that commanders will demand and expect precision and rapidity on the part of our logistics capability in order to sustain such dispersed operations, but this may not be easy to accomplish without significant reorganization of command and control of this support. Seeing the need to better our focus on strategy in general in a period of austerity, T.X. Hammes asks an important question: “Does counterinsurgency have a future in the U.S. military?” Reporting on another path to a more peaceful world being championed here at the National Defense University, Lewis Stern describes the successful efforts led by Vice Admiral Ann Rondeau and her NDU team to engage the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in a military-to-military relationship, one of dozens that strengthen our ability to operate worldwide.

The Features section offers insights from the highest levels of our joint force as well as from those who used their time in joint professional military education (JPME) well. Using a nautical metaphor, Admiral James Stavridis and Commander Elton Parker suggest a different way to consider all things cyber, which the admiral and his staffs at U.S. Southern Command, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe have put into practice to positive impact. Of all recent combatant commanders, few would be able to claim a higher level of leveraging social media of all kinds to forward the mission. Suggesting how the U.S. Navy will operate in the foreseeable future, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert believes the fleet should continue to be a force that is operating forward meeting our national security strategy while further strengthening strategic partnerships around the world. Continuing to bring the best writing from the JPME classroom, JFQ completes our presentation of the best essays from the 2011 Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions. Seeing the requirement to adapt our military to deal with an uncertain future, Colonel David H. Carstens believes the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review is correct in that global climate change will be a significant driver behind where our forces will be needed in the future and recommends that we adjust all aspects of the military to deal with this issue. In a prescient article written far before the current National Defense Strategy was published focusing on the Pacific, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas J. MacIntyre, USMC, assesses the
future in the Pacific region and our alliance based on shifts in Japan’s national strategy.

We welcome back Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF (Ret.), in our Recall section as he provides us with another outstanding historical essay that we can use to reflect on jointness today through the lens of those turbulent years just after the signing of the National Security Act of 1947. Rounding out this edition as always is a joint doctrine update from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Education and Doctrine Division as well as four excellent book reviews.

I personally wish to acknowledge the true standard of excellence and dedication to the JFQ mission that Book Review Editor Lisa Yambrick provided during her time at NDU Press. As a true battle buddy to this new editor and possessing an eye for detail second to none, I am certain our loss is the Secretary of Defense's gain as she is now a part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office.

As the winds of change rise and fall over the course of the next few months, I look forward to hearing from you on those issues that confront the joint force as we go forward together. The articles you write have an impact, whether it is in your organization, your Service, the joint force, or beyond because you can reach and influence more than 50,000 readers of this journal in print and online each quarter. JFQ is an integral part of the ongoing conversation and learning in our joint professional military education classrooms as well, reaching the minds of the next generation of joint and Service leaders. Through your great ideas, JFQ helps the joint force keep an eye on the bubble.

—William T. Eliason, Editor

Sailor plots navigational position of USS Abraham Lincoln with sextant
The Real Key to Success in Afghanistan
Overlooked, Underrated, Forgotten, or Just Too Hard?

By MICHAEL D. FORTUNE

Nangarhar Agribusiness Development team members confirm cash-for-work project has been conducted in a corruption-free manner.
For the U.S. Government and its coalition partners to fully achieve their goals in Afghanistan, the vast majority of the Afghan people—regardless of their ethnicity, tribe, age, gender, social status, income, occupation, current political alliances, or current ideology—must somehow begin to see beyond their differences and personal interests and come together as a team to build a better future for themselves and their children.

At first glance, this may not appear even remotely possible, especially to many coalition forces personnel who have worked closely with the Afghans and seen first-hand how self-centered and complicated their personal agendas tend to be. However, consider that Mahatma Gandhi was able to persuade an entire nation of more than 300 million Hindus and Muslims to put aside their longstanding mistrust to participate in a peaceful but concerted “Non-Cooperation Movement” in the 1920s that eventually led to India’s independence from Great Britain.

Gandhi’s example suggests that the same kind of wholesale change in behavior might also be possible in Afghanistan. However, such a dramatic and far-reaching realignment of goals and actions, if it can be achieved at all, clearly must be driven by selfless, courageous, visionary, and highly ethical leadership—what is commonly known as transformational leadership—as it was in India under Gandhi’s influence.

Gandhi did what all transformational leaders strive to do. He inspired the people to come together to pursue a common dream, to think beyond themselves and work for a greater cause. Such leaders establish and leverage a shared vision to pull their followers to action. Transactional leaders, on the other hand, aim to accommodate the specific needs and wants of individuals or subgroups in return for their cooperation or support. While still able to motivate their followers to a point, transactional leaders tend to be less effective and less able to effect change than their transformational counterparts.

In his Pulitzer Prize–winning book Leadership, first published in 1978, James MacGregor Burns points out that “Transformational Leadership occurs when leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality. Their purposes, which might have started out as separate but related, as in the case of transactional leadership, become fused.”2 Bernard M. Bass, another pioneer in the study of transformational leadership, makes this comparison: “Whereas transformational leaders uplift the morale, motivation, and morals of their followers, transactional leaders cater to their followers’ immediate self-interests. The transformational leader emphasizes what you can do for your country; the transactional leader, on what your country can do for you.”3

Currently, Afghanistan’s senior leaders seem either unwilling or unable to lead their people in transformational ways and tend to rely on transactional techniques to achieve their goals. For example, Governor Gul Agha Sherzai of Nangarhar Province routinely pays off tribal leaders within his province as a way of temporarily resolving land disputes and other important issues. However, even for Governor Sherzai and those like him, adoption of a more transformational leadership style is not beyond possibility. It is widely accepted among experts in the leadership field that people can improve their ability to lead if they are motivated and empowered.

It is likely that improved leadership would be well received by the majority of Afghans

Furthermore, it is likely that improved leadership would be well received by the majority of Afghans. As the situation currently stands, the people are forced to choose between two unattractive options: the current government, which is corrupt and inept, or the Taliban, which is oppressive and sometimes sadistic and maniacal. An influx of transformational leadership intent on uniting the nation with a shared vision of hope, peace, prosperity, freedom, and responsive and accountable governance would offer a much more palatable third option that is likely to excite the people and call them to action. As French playwright Victor Hugo once said, “The thing that is more powerful than all the armies in the world is an idea whose time has come.”

The fact that transformational leadership is so vitally important yet so fundamentally lacking in Afghanistan suggests that the U.S. Government and its coalition partners should begin to focus more intensely on training, empowering, and inspiring Afghan government officials, military commanders, and other leaders to lead their people in more altruistic and transformational ways. In cultivating effective transformational leaders, the role of the coalition would shift from an impetus for evolutionary change to a catalyst for revolutionary change. Viewed another way, the coalition would finally begin to address the root cause of the problems in Afghanistan rather than just their symptoms.

Challenges to Leader Development

There are significant challenges associated with this approach. The first is that senior Afghan officials, including President Hamid Karzai, may not be open to any form of leadership training, coaching, mentoring, or advice from coalition forces. The second is that formal and informal leaders throughout Afghan society seem to lack the basic character traits of conviction, integrity, selflessness, and empathy upon which effective leadership skills—and transformational leadership skills in particular—must be built.

If senior Afghan officials are not open to working with coalition forces to improve their leadership capabilities, U.S. and coalition forces leaders must ask themselves if there is value in attempting to develop transformational Afghan leaders at lower levels of government and, if so, whether they should also include tribal, religious, and other informal leaders.

The traditional Western view of leadership is that it is most effective if driven from the top down. In practice, however, leadership does not always abide by the standard rules of organizational design. For example, while Gandhi was clearly the most influential leader in India from the 1920s until his assassination in 1948, at no time did he hold an official position within the Indian government.

Furthermore, leadership of an entire nation does not necessarily have to—and for that matter cannot—come from a single individual. Good transformational leaders are needed at all levels, from all disciplines, and from all across a country to set the example, hold their people accountable, and convey and reinforce the vision. One could even argue...
that the greater the concentration of good leaders at lower levels, the more pressure the people themselves are likely to place on senior leaders to improve their performance.

However, while transformational leadership need not be driven from the top, it is critical that formal and informal leaders throughout the country share and profess a common vision, as that is the only way to truly unify the masses. Such a vision must provide widespread appeal, be ethically sound, and unify the masses. Such a vision must provide a solid foundation of values, ethics, and principles, the coalition must, in addition to training these officials on the technical aspects of transformational leadership, try to instill a deep-rooted, life-changing, personal transformation in them. Like the ghosts of Christmas past, present, and future in Charles Dickens’s A Christmas Carol, the coalition must provide these officials with an experience that leads to adoption of a more altruistic, passionate, and caring mindset that extends beyond family, tribe, and ethnicity.

But while it is probably not possible to completely overhaul the character of these self-serving officials, commanders, and other leaders in the dramatic way the ghosts transformed Ebenezer Scrooge, it still may be feasible to influence the ways these leaders think and operate at a fundamental level. Stephen Covey, author of The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People and The 8th Habit: From Effectiveness to Greatness, says: “If you want to make minor, incremental changes and improvements, work on practices, behavior or attitude. But if you want to make significant, quantum improvement, work on paradigms . . . i.e., perceptions, assumptions, theories, frames of reference, or lenses through which you view the world.”

A field of study called Transformative Learning Theory (TLT), first introduced by Jack Mezirow in 1978, provides a framework for accomplishing the types of quantum improvements to which Covey refers. Mezirow says that transforming what is called a “habit of mind” (HOM)—a way of thinking about a particular subject or theme—is the most difficult kind of transformation but also the most epochal. According to TLT, HOMs are founded in underlying assumptions developed subconsciously over a lifetime—many of them culturally induced and formulated at a young age. The theory tells us that the key to transforming HOMs is to get learners to recognize the existence of, and understand the role of, these underlying assumptions; reflect upon, assess, and critique them; engage in rational discourse with others to gain new perspectives; and reformulate and reintegrate these assumptions as appropriate based on internal logic, emotion, or a combination. Ultimately, because assumptions are the building blocks of HOMs, significant revision of the former can result in permanent and substantive transformation of the latter.

According to Mezirow, the process of transformation of a HOM usually begins with what he calls a disorienting dilemma—a statement, situation, or event that does not neatly fit into a learner’s system of beliefs or schema. Certain carefully crafted questions can also manifest themselves in the form of a disorienting dilemma. Once learners experience such a dilemma, the associated internal cognitive dissonance or emotional discomfort may compel them to challenge their assumptions, eventually leading to transformation of one or more of their HOMs. Mezirow describes transformative learning as a 10-step process beginning with the introduction of a disorienting dilemma and ending with “reintegration.”

While transformative learning is certainly never guaranteed and cannot be forced upon those who are not open to it, the introduction of a disorienting dilemma is intended to help learners see themselves and the world around them more clearly and accurately, and thereby open them up to more productive and authentic ways of thinking and acting. Dr. Sharon Lamm, a transformative learning researcher, claims: “transformative learning can result in a better quality of life; more differentiated, inclusive, complex, reflective perspectives manifested in successful action;
as many of these leaders as possible, coalition forces might carefully design and conduct intensive multiday workshops to stimulate the thought processes necessary for transformative learning. Mezirow believes that activities such as metaphor analysis, life history exploration, learning contracts, group projects, role playing, case studies, simulations, and journal writing can sometimes achieve this goal.9

To maximize their impact, these activities might also pose some thought-provoking questions to the participants such as: Can a person be corrupt and still be a good Muslim? Do you think corrupt officials go to heaven? Do you view corruption as stealing? Would you rather live modestly and be remembered as a person who did everything he could to help his people or live extravagantly and be remembered as someone who stole from his people and kept them from breaking their cycle of poverty? Do you think it is right for one man to live in a beautiful mansion while his neighbor, who is just as talented and works just as hard, lives in a slum? What do you think will happen to Afghanistan if government officials continue to put themselves before their people? Why do you think some Afghans support the Taliban rather than the government?

Because different Afghan leaders are likely to be moved by different stimuli, use of a wide variety of techniques and questions may help coalition forces open up the transformative learning process to as many participants as possible.

**Improving Transformational Leadership Skills**

As coalition forces work to improve the character of government officials and other leaders through transformative learning, they must also teach Afghans the necessary skills to be better transformational leaders. The Afghans must first be taught the basics: the fundamental principles of good leadership and the attitudes and behaviors commonly found in good leaders such as selflessness, integrity, candor, competence, empathy, and loyalty. They might also be exposed to historical examples that highlight some of the more spectacular successes and failures associated with or attributed to both good and bad leadership.

Eventually, however, Afghan leaders should understand how to apply the four components of transformational leadership as identified by *Handbook of Leadership* author Bernard Bass. These components are idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individual consideration. Idealized influence is the practice by which leaders set high standards for followers primarily by serving as role models and leading by example. Inspirational motivation is the process of establishing and communicating a shared vision, enabling followers to think and act beyond their own self-interests. Intellectual stimulation is the process of encouraging followers to challenge their own assumptions and beliefs. Finally, individual consideration is the process of getting to know followers on an individual basis and then mentoring, coaching, and demonstrating care and empathy for them.10 In combination, these processes enable transformational leaders to achieve guided transformative learning in their followers and, consequently, more closely align these followers’ values and goals.

To introduce these concepts and begin to develop these skills, coalition forces might utilize classroom training. They might even combine transformational leadership training classes with the transformative learning workshops discussed earlier.

**Providing Leadership Training Opportunities**

To reinforce what was taught in the classroom, the coalition must next ensure Afghan leaders have opportunities to practice their newly acquired leadership skills and provide them candid and timely feedback on their performance.

For example, after an official completes a transformational leadership course, his coalition forces counterpart might encourage him to prepare an inspirational speech or a set of talking points for a radio broadcast that incorporates some or all of the components of transformational leadership. In doing so, the coalition forces leader might help the Afghan leader lay out a plan and timeline for accomplishing the task and meet with him every few days to monitor progress and provide feedback. If the Afghan underperforms, the coalition leader might call for more frequent, lengthy, and intensive mentoring sessions.

To achieve the best results, the United States and its coalition partners should consider conducting transformational leadership workshops, classes, and on-the-job leadership training in iterative and progressive phases. In other words, initial classes, workshops, and on-the-job training might introduce and reinforce simple concepts and tasks while follow-on activities might address more advanced and complex concepts and behaviors.

**Leading by Example**

To demonstrate the positive impact of transformational leadership and to further reinforce the Afghans’ newly acquired leadership skills, coalition forces must lead by example. They must show the Afghans what “right” looks like in everything they do. For instance, coalition forces leaders must have a clear vision of what they are trying to accomplish, be well prepared for every
meeting engagement, demonstrate that they are willing to work just as hard as or harder than the Afghans, meet deadlines and keep promises, and exhibit genuine care and empathy for the people. Furthermore, they must project a positive outlook that instills hope, confidence, and enthusiasm in the Afghans. The more closely coalition forces work with the Afghans, the more opportunities they will have to lead by example.

A Real-world Success Story

During the past several years, coalition forces have employed what are called National Guard Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) to help revitalize the agriculture sector within Afghanistan. These teams operate at the provincial level and below and work closely with government officials to improve agricultural sustainability and productivity while also enhancing agribusiness value chains.

Recently, members of the ADT assigned to Nangarhar Province in eastern Afghanistan recognized that, if they were to make a lasting impact, they would have to do more than just help the Afghans solve technical agriculture problems; they would also have to develop and improve the quality of the provincial- and district-level leadership associated with this sector. Based on this realization, they focused on training, empowering, and inspiring the provincial-level Director of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (DAIL) and his district-level Agriculture Extension Agents (AEAs) to become better leaders.

The members of the Nangarhar ADT were not familiar with TLT and had only a cursory knowledge of transformational leadership. Yet following their instincts, they applied several of the techniques and principles described above and achieved remarkable success. Specifically, they conducted basic leadership training classes for the DAIL and his AEAs, offered these officials hands-on training opportunities to practice and refine their leadership skills, provided them candid and real-time feedback on their performance, regularly coached and mentored them, and demonstrated effective leadership behaviors by leading by example.

With regard to hands-on leadership training opportunities, the ADT developed a structured and transparent process for managing small, agriculture-related cash-for-work projects and then began to allow the AEAs to lead and manage these projects. When the ADT discovered early on that some of the AEAs were embezzling funds intended for laborers, the ADT leadership called them out on their misdeeds in the presence of the DAIL. The ADT also provided the AEAs a detailed report card after each project to summarize their performance and let them know where they needed improvement.

The ADT’s efforts to address corruption and improve performance produced positive results. First, because the DAIL was embarrassed that some of his people were found to be skimming funds, he began to take a strong stance against corruption with his subordinates. On several occasions over the next few months, the ADT saw him lecture his AEAs on the detrimental impacts of corruption and the importance of transparency. Second, as word spread that the ADT was being relentless in identifying and confronting corrupt officials, the other AEAs abruptly fell in line and began following the ADT’s cash-for-work process to a tee. Third, as a result of the report cards, the AEAs improved their leadership performance with every project.

Through coaching and mentoring, the ADT also made the DAIL more aware of the importance and power of his position and taught him how to inspire and unite the farmers of his province with a shared vision. When the ADT helped the DAIL prepare a set of transformational sound bites for a radio broadcast, he got such positive feedback from his followers that he continued to use and build upon these sound bites in subsequent speeches where he visibly inspired farmers to want to come together as a team and take charge of their own development.

But while the ADT’s classroom training, on-the-job training, and mentoring proved effective, the team’s biggest impact may have come through leading by example: holding themselves and the Afghan officials accountable, working hard and side-by-side with the Afghans, constantly displaying an attitude of optimism and hope, and demonstrating genuine care for the people. Over time, this appeared to cause many of the officials with whom the team worked to question the morality of their own corrupt and self-serving behavior and to assume a more selfless and productive way of thinking. By the time the ADT had completed its 10-month deployment, corruption within the Nangarhar DAIL’s organization had been greatly reduced and the DAIL himself seemed to have adopted a radically new mindset of selfless service and genuine care for the people.

The team’s impact appeared to cause many of the officials with whom the team worked to question the morality of their own corrupt and self-serving behavior

However, while the ADT was successful in improving the quality of the leadership in the agriculture sector in Nangarhar, the team could have had an even greater impact had there been a national-level leader development plan to guide their actions, had leader development been identified as one of the ADT’s primary missions from the start, had the team been thoroughly trained on how to develop effective transformational leaders, and had they been provided national-level support in achieving that end.

Setting Up a Transformational Leader Production Line

To improve the quality of Afghan leadership on a national scale and to the greatest extent possible, coalition forces should develop a plan and establish a process to take in as many formal and informal leaders as they can find; try to instill in them a personal transformation to improve their characters; teach them the fundamentals of basic and transformational leadership; infuse in them a vision of hope, peace, prosperity, and freedom; and send them back to share that vision and effectively lead their people. Even if the coalition is only able to improve the collective performance from a grade of F to C, it would likely still sway the bulk of the population to support their government.

In establishing this transformational leader production line, the United States and its coalition partners should emphasize leadership development from every possible angle in order to achieve maximum impact. For instance, coalition forces should:

- Develop and issue a comprehensive campaign plan to improve the quality and cohesiveness of leadership in all sectors, at all levels, and across all geographic regions of Afghanistan.
Design a series of culturally appropriate transformative learning workshops and transformational leadership classes to enhance the character of government officials and other leaders while simultaneously improving their leadership knowledge and skills. Ensure these workshops and classes are developed by experts in their respective fields and conducted at national, regional, and provincial levels.

Ensure leaders who undergo these workshops and classes are provided with on-the-job training to solidify and reinforce their newly acquired knowledge and skills. Simultaneously and intensively coach, mentor, and provide candid feedback to these leaders.

Set a consistently outstanding example of transformational leadership, transparency, accountability and commitment to excellence for Afghan leaders to follow.

As effective transformational Afghan leaders emerge from these efforts, utilize them to train and mentor other Afghans. According to Barry L. Boyd of Texas A&M University, "Finding success stories and using the voice of the Afghans to tell those success stories (i.e., peer-to-peer communication) is one of the most effective means of diffusing an innovation—and transformational leadership is certainly an innovation."

Reward, support, and praise leaders who exhibit selfless service, competence, and other basic leadership qualities, and find innovative ways to make life difficult for those who do not. For example, the United States and its coalition partners might influence the Afghan media to endorse the election or reelection of good leaders while exposing the misdeeds of those who continue to demonstrate self-serving behavior. Coalition forces might also restrict or deny funds to districts where corruption and ineptitude are prevalent and redirect those funds to districts that are well led. Here again, the coalition should leverage the Afghan media to ensure the people know that the amount of development funding they are receiving is a function of the quality of their leadership.

Put much greater command emphasis throughout their own ranks on developing Afghan leaders; in other words, reengineer civilian and military directives, plans, policies, and programs to put leader development at the forefront. As part of this process, the coalition should redesign predeployment training programs so deploying personnel better understand the concept of transformational leadership and how to foster it among the Afghans. All U.S. and coalition forces workers in Afghanistan—civilian, military, or contractor—should be made aware that developing Afghan leaders is one of the coalition’s top priorities and should be trained on how to contribute to achieving that goal.

Redesign metrics to measure and focus on the quality, and changes in the quality, of Afghan leadership rather than more tangible variables like the number of Afghans employed, number of businesses started, or amount of money spent. U.S. and coalition forces should also reward their own leaders, both military and civilian, for success in advancing leadership among the Afghans.

Immediately eliminate U.S. and coalition practices that reward bad leadership. For instance, it is imperative that the coalition set up systems, processes, and management controls that hold Afghans accountable and allow tracking of development funds all the way to their intended recipients. If coalition forces continue to allow Afghan officials to skim funds, they add fuel to an already large fire.

**Transformational Leadership vs. Transformative Learning Theory**

It is important for all stakeholders—those designing and conducting classroom training and workshops, those participating in these activities, and coalition forces coaching, mentoring, and leading by example—to understand the relationship between transformational leadership and Transformative Learning Theory. Both models provide a framework for radically changing the ways in which people—followers in the case of transformational leadership and learners in the case of TLT—think and act, but transformational leadership is intended to transform group behavior while TLT focuses on the individual. However, the two activities are mutually supportive in the sense that TLT facilitates transformational leader development while transformational leaders leverage TLT to achieve intellectual stimulation and help effect a convergence of values and goals among their followers.

**Conclusion**

During the past 10 years, it has become painfully obvious that without some kind of direct intervention, Afghanistan’s poor leadership is not going to improve no matter how much time and money the coalition spends. And unfortunately, leadership is the one factor that absolutely must be fixed if the United States and its coalition partners are to achieve their goals. As former White House Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles once said, “Leadership is key to 99 percent of all successful efforts.” Without good leadership, there is no shared vision among the people, no accountability, and no good example for the public to follow. Without shared vision, there are no common goals and unity. Without accountability and standards, government workers do not perform. And without a good
example, the people are unmotivated to support the common good.

General Stanley McChrystal, USA (Ret.), former commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, pointed out in his now superseded counterinsurgency guidance that “The [Afghan] people are the prize.”13 Since populations throughout history have consistently followed and supported competent, visionary, empathic, and highly ethical leaders, one could argue that the ongoing struggle for power between the Taliban and the government will eventually be won by the side with the most and best transformational leaders.

Poor leadership is not the only significant problem in Afghanistan, and U.S. and coalition leaders should therefore continue to pursue traditional security, governance, and development lines of operation. However, good policies, processes, infrastructure, and equipment are no substitute for good leadership—and in the end, they are of little value without it. It is therefore imperative that the coalition begin to put more emphasis on empowering and inspiring Afghan government and military officials as well as religious and tribal leaders at all levels to better lead their people. Ultimately, it is transformational leadership—at least on a small scale. However, isolated pockets of good leadership scattered across the country are unlikely to bring lasting change or significantly impact the outcome of the war. For the United States and its coalition partners to permanently transform the Afghan culture—which is really what this is all about—they will have to generate a critical mass of effective transformational leaders that continues to sustain and build upon itself once coalition forces have left the region. To achieve this, the coalition must begin to tackle the problem more deliberately, more aggressively, and on a much grander scale.

Looking beyond Afghanistan, the United States must recognize that in any region where good leadership is lacking, there are likely to be problems that threaten U.S. interests. Poor leadership exacerbates poverty, invites corruption, promotes unrest, and creates a vacuum likely to be filled by insurgency. A more proactive and globally focused approach to leader development might help prevent conflicts, improve the quality of life for those living in failed or failing states around the world, and possibly even bring or return vitality and prosperity to those states.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates commented, “Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States’ allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.”14 Although Secretary Gates does not specifically mention leader development, history, experience in Afghanistan, and intuition all suggest that developing effective transformational leaders should be viewed as the centerpiece of this strategy. JFQ

Afghan leaders—not coalition forces—who must rally the people to take charge of their own development, security, and future and who must make the people understand that poverty, ignorance, greed, and radicalism are the true enemies.

As things currently stand in Afghanistan, the U.S. Government finds itself in much the same position it did in Vietnam in the early 1970s—fighting a protracted, unconventional, and domestically unpopular war, spending a lot of money on development without achieving the desired effects, and propping up a corrupt and inept government. Given enough time and resources, the United States and its coalition partners could physically rebuild Afghanistan from the ground up. But without a parallel effort to develop effective Afghan leaders, conditions would return to status quo once coalition forces left the country, and the Taliban would once again challenge the government for control.

The recent success of the Nangarhar ADT suggests that, despite the various challenges, it is possible for coalition forces to significantly improve the quality of Afghan leadership—at least on a small scale. However, isolated pockets of good leadership scattered across the country are unlikely to bring lasting change or significantly impact the outcome of the war. For the United States and its coalition partners to permanently transform the Afghan culture—which is really what this is all about—they will have to generate a critical mass of effective transformational leaders that continues to sustain and build upon itself once coalition forces have left the region. To achieve this, the coalition must begin to tackle the problem more deliberately, more aggressively, and on a much grander scale.

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Every generation in a military conflict finds it hard to envisage a different kind of threat. Soon we shall reach the 25th anniversary of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987, which eliminated cruise, Pershing II, and SS20 missiles in Europe. No one imagined then that, within 5 short years, the Soviet bloc would collapse—or that, within 15 years, the main opponents of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would be international terrorists and that Muslim regimes would give them shelter.

A new orthodoxy emerged after the shock of 9/11 and the wars that ensued. Until just 2 years ago, full-scale counterinsurgency seemed the template for the future: in places like Afghanistan, it would continue to apply for a very long time. Yet in 2010, there was a sharp about-turn by Western political leaders who doubted that their peoples would tolerate the casualties and costs for decades to come. Even before the Arab uprisings, the United States opted for a major troop drawdown, and the British pledged to end their Afghan combat role entirely no later than 2014.

We did not predict the Soviet collapse; we did not predict the impact of al Qaeda; and we did not predict the upheavals in the Arab world. It would thus be foolish to try to predict the outcomes of other dramatic events. What we should do instead is consider new concepts and prepare provisional plans for various contingencies. For example, at the time of writing, we simply cannot know whether postintervention Iraq will stabilize and settle down, or whether the bombing campaign after the U.S. withdrawal heralds an escalating conflict and renewed civil war. It is most unlikely that Western forces will re-enter Iraq unless it transforms itself into a direct and unmistakeable threat to the West’s security. Does this mean we should never intervene in a Muslim state for humanitarian reasons? Not necessarily—as events in Libya have shown.

In Parliament last year, I voted for British military action against Muammar Qadhafi, but only with extreme reluctance. This was because, although the threatened massacre of the citizens of Benghazi was thought to be intolerable, my government’s proposals seemed inadequate to prevent it. We were asked to approve a “no-fly zone,” which, in the normal sense of the term, would have involved denial of airspace to Qadhafi and the suppression or elimination of Libyan anti-aircraft assets. What actually occurred was very different: Western aircraft intervened operationally and tactically in close support of a ground campaign mounted by one side in a civil war. This greatly exceeded the limits of the no-fly zone concept (though not the terms of the relevant United Nations resolution) and for that reason it ultimately proved effective. However, there was certainly no appetite for Western intervention on the ground—and
if Qadhafi’s forces had proven too strong for the rebels despite the air attacks, a dreadful slaughter of his opponents would probably not have been prevented.

The future of Iraq remains uncertain, as did the outcome of the Libyan campaign for quite a long period. Though dictatorships have died in both countries, it is too soon to say if democracies have been born—either there or in any of the other states affected by the so-called Arab Spring. This term is meant to remind us of the Prague Spring when reformers attempted to create “Communism with a human face” in the late 1960s. It is an unhappy comparison: the Czechoslovak reformers were swept away and the people were suppressed for another two decades. Whether the same will happen in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, or Yemen we cannot possibly know. Yet it is beyond doubt that a fanatical brand of fundamentalist terrorism is at large in the world; that it has done us harm in the past; and that it means to do so again if it can. What, then, should our approach be when tackling this threat in this context? Let us first consider why we originally went to Afghanistan.

**Focusing on the Aim**

When al Qaeda mounted its attacks in September 2001, these did not begin with the hijacking of the four aircraft. Barely noticed in the West was the assassination, 48 hours earlier, of General Ahmed Shah Massoud—an outstanding Afghan leader with impeccable anti-Soviet and anti-Taliban credentials. The timing of his murder proved that the plotters expected to provoke an invasion of Afghanistan in retaliation for 9/11; they wanted to eliminate the former—counterinsurgency—is hugely expensive in terms of both blood and treasure. In Northern Ireland, the British were prepared to pay that price for 38 years, despite horrific attacks against soldiers and civilians on the mainland as well as in Ulster. By contrast, no such price would have been acceptable to maintain British Imperial control in Iraq between the wars, so a policy of containment was adopted instead.

Three further objectives, though desirable in themselves if achievable at minimal cost, are not adequate reasons for our presence in the country:

- the creation of a tolerant democratic society
- the prevention of drug production, which harms consumers in the West
- the advancement of the human rights of its citizens, especially women.

There is a striking difference in the measures necessary to achieve the first two aims compared with the other three. In general, the former can be attempted by a policy of containment, but the latter can be fulfilled only by a full-scale counterinsurgency campaign.

**Counterinsurgency versus Containment**

When irregular forces use unconventional means to undermine a government, the potential responses fall into one of two broad categories: micromanagement of the threatened society, as in Northern Ireland, or minimal intervention, as in Iraq in the 1920s. The former—counterinsurgency—is hugely expensive in terms of both blood and treasure. In Northern Ireland, the British were prepared to pay that price for 38 years, despite horrific attacks against soldiers and civilians on the mainland as well as in Ulster. By contrast, no such price would have been acceptable to maintain British Imperial control in Iraq between the wars, so a policy of containment was adopted instead.

Of course, that sort of aerial policing, involving the punitive burning of villages after their inhabitants were warned to leave, would be totally unacceptable and inappropriate in the 21st century. But the episode is relevant because it illustrates the principle of containment which ought to be applied in a far-flung theater where there is too little incentive to incur the costs and casualties of full-scale counterinsurgency. Modern Western countries are ill-equipped to cope with attritional warfare of that sort, particularly when there is no end in sight and each individual loss attracts daily news coverage at home.

If reshaping the threatened country in the image of a modern society, with all its rights, privileges, and standards of living, is the strategic aim, then counterinsurgency is the only option—the war must indeed be fought “down among the people,” in the words of the doctrine. Yet one must pause and think long and hard before opting for this model. To embark on such a struggle is to contravene a fundamental principle of effective combat—that, whenever possible, one must fight on the ground where one is stronger and one’s opponent is weaker. There was never any doubt that NATO would be able to overthrow the Taliban regime, just as later occurred with Saddam Hussein. The problems arose in the aftermath of these initial easy victories when, first in Iraq and more slowly in Afghanistan, insurgents replaced set-piece resistance with guerrilla techniques of sabotage, sniping, and roadside assassination.

NATO has opted for the micromanagement model in Afghanistan—at least, until the end of the surge. Thus, time after time, military patrols issue forth along predictable routes in order to assert ground-level control of the occupied territory. The Taliban are
effectively provided with an endless procession of uniformed personnel to be picked off and blown up at will. NATO, in short, is playing into the hands of its enemies by choosing a model that provides them with the one lever likely to compel the withdrawal of our forces. This explains why President Barack Obama and Prime Minister David Cameron have both indicated timetables to draw down forces—and in the British case quit—despite the outcome in Afghanistan remaining in the balance. But are they exploring all the options?

**Transition to What?**

When a version of this article was drafted for private circulation in the summer of 2010, my principal concern was that—in the United Kingdom at least—the military establishment, and the army in particular, were wedded to a model of open-ended counterinsurgency campaigning as the answer to al Qaeda. The incoming Chief of the Defence Staff, for example, had been quoted as predicting British involvement in Afghanistan for the next 40 years. There was much talk of the need to prepare for “the wars” of the present (counterinsurgencies) rather than for “a war” in the future (conventional conflict between modern states). Given the unpredictability of future crises, this seemed to be dangerously short-sighted and strategically illiterate. Already, there were signs that al Qaeda strategists were thinking far ahead. A single act of international terrorism had already succeeded in embroiling the United States and its allies in an Afghan morass that had soon become self-sustaining, without the need for further al Qaeda input. It was obvious that Osama bin Laden, or his successors and imitators, could therefore turn their attention to other vulnerable Muslim states.

And what then should we in the West do if such states also became bases, training grounds, or launch pads for attacks against us? Should we invade and occupy each country in turn? Should we apply the costly and prolonged counterinsurgency model to Sudan, or Somalia, or Yemen as well? Or should we recognize that our strategic interests would have to be met by the containment model—in a way not involving war down among the people, not requiring hands-on control of occupied territory, and not linking the fate of our campaigns too closely with the fortunes of unpopular or corrupt indigenous regimes?

My concern, in short, was that Western strategy in 2010 seemed determined to restrict itself to the straightjacket of fighting irregular forces by conventional means—that by trying to do too much, NATO would achieve too little. Yet within weeks, the scene had shifted almost 180 degrees, at least in the United Kingdom. An unrealistic commitment to a 40-year campaign was abruptly replaced by an unrealistic commitment to a 4-year transition. The trend seemed similar in the United States, though not spelled out so starkly.

It is not yet clear if American forces will remain in Afghanistan after the drawdown or if their military footprint will disappear as their bases are transferred to Afghan control. From a costly and indefinite commitment, we are in danger of avoiding any commitment at all. It is argued, on the European side of the Atlantic, that the deadlines for withdrawal

![soldier prepares 60mm mortar as Afghan interpreter directs Afghan soldiers to coordinate fire on Taliban forces](image-url)
are intended to put pressure on the Afghan government to reach a deal with “reconcilable elements” among the Taliban. But what pressure will this put on the Taliban—reconcilable elements or not—to reach a deal with the Afghan government? None whatsoever.

It has become fashionable to declare that “there can be no purely military solution in Afghanistan—there has to be a political solution” and that we must match our “military surge” with something called a “political surge.” Certainly, if the United States and United Kingdom begin withdrawing according to a pre-announced timetable, the Afghan government will be forced toward a compromise. The Taliban, by contrast, even if they pretend to acquiesce, will simply wait patiently until NATO has gone before redoubling the insurgency. There is, therefore, no basis for a deal under the present NATO strategy. It amounts to little more than a pious hope that a few years of dominance by the extra “surge” contingents will be enough to enable the Kabul government to strengthen its forces sufficiently to survive. If it failed, both of our strategic interests would remain unfulfilled: once again Afghanistan could be used as a base, training ground, and launch pad for attacks against the West, and we would remain poorly placed to assist Pakistan if the terrible prospect of nuclear-armed al Qaeda militants began to develop seriously.

In the case of Iraq, Western forces entered the country, overthrew its dictatorship, established a fragile democracy—with a degree of local assistance—and withdrew. Meanwhile, in an adjacent country, a fanatical regime with ambiguous links to the new Iraqi leadership was busily developing a nuclear capability. The West looks on, anxious and undecided about the prospect of an Iranian nuclear arsenal. In Pakistan, such weapons exist already, and its government remains susceptible to Talibanization. In Afghanistan, the danger lies in the return of the same Taliban regime that was ousted in 2001. If this occurs, it is hard to perceive any overall benefit to the West from more than 10 years’ costly involvement. Perhaps a reinstated Taliban would realize that sheltering and sponsoring al Qaeda had brought nothing but trouble and would resolve not to do so again, but there can be no guarantee of this. NATO, therefore, needs a strategy designed to maximize the likelihood of the Afghan government surviving, but prepared for the prospect of its predecessor returning.

If the whole Afghan endeavor is not to prove a gigantic waste of effort, there must be provision for the long-term use of sanctions against states that assist the al Qaeda cause.

**Total Withdrawal or Strategic Basing?**

The British currently plan to end combat operations completely, while maintaining development and reconstruction teams in Afghanistan. As the Taliban are intent on returning, this would be an extremely hazardous undertaking. The notion that Western work of this sort would be allowed to proceed unhindered is fanciful. The teams would quickly become top targets for insurgent attacks and would soon be forced from the scene. The likelihood that they could be sufficiently protected by
local Afghan forces is low. Keeping them in place without adequate security would be to repeat the error of intervening in ways which play to the enemy’s strengths and our own weaknesses.

By contrast, the United States has yet to signal its long-term intentions. Announcing an arbitrary date for withdrawal, as the British and others have done, would reduce the incentive for a negotiated deal. The insurgents would sense that they were on course for victory. The choice should not be limited to one between continued counterinsurgency and the total cessation of military activity. In order for there to be any chance of compromise, at least as much pressure must be applied to the Taliban as to the Afghan government—and it must be applied in a way that enables the West to minimize the risk to its own personnel.

There is no necessity for NATO to shift from ground-level and almost total coverage of the country to complete withdrawal in a single step. With the full authority of the United Nations, the Alliance has established a network of military bases within Afghanistan together with the means of supplying them. If we genuinely believe that NATO has brought the Afghan National Army and other security forces to the point where they can maintain their government in power unaided, then the next stage should be a phased withdrawal of Western troops from the country at large into the most viable and best protected of these bases. The time will have come for the exercise of power in specialized and selective ways, rather than by blanket coverage of the entire territory—with all the opportunities that gives the insurgents to inflict piecemeal casualties on NATO forces.

There should be no secret about NATO’s intentions. The Alliance should be quite explicit in setting out its position. This would reiterate that only the attacks upon the United States had brought NATO into Afghanistan and that we have no interest in remaining other than to ensure that such attacks can never again be mounted with the complicity of Afghanistan. Transitioning into strategic bases would put to the test the viability of the Afghan government. The longer it survived, the greater would be the reductions in the number of bases and the size of the deployments within them. Withdrawal into the selected bases would remove the constant irritant of a uniformed infidel presence in the towns and countryside, thus reducing Western casualties on the one hand and the motivation of Afghans to join the insurgency on the other. NATO would be demonstrating its lack of ambition to micromanage Afghan society, but the potential would remain to inflict carefully chosen military sanctions, by whatever means deemed appropriate, in response to any sign of a renewed al Qaeda presence in the country connived at by the Taliban.

It is impossible to know in advance whether or when the Taliban would succeed in replacing the Afghan government—rather than reaching a deal with it—after a scaling-back of NATO’s footprint in the manner described. It is also hard to assess whether such bases could continue to be maintained in the country if the Taliban did return to full control of the government. What can be said with assurance is that the prospects of the Taliban’s return would not be made greater—and might well be lessened—if Western forces relocated to strategic bases instead of abandoning the country completely as soon as the Afghan National Army seemed ready to take control.

Western policy should not be characterized by an all-or-nothing approach. The threat from international terrorism is an agile one and it needs to be counteracted by flexible means. It is neither possible nor desirable to invade and occupy every country from which a terrorist threat emerges. The number of states where it is practical to wage and win full-scale, long-term counterinsurgency campaigns is necessarily small. Yet means must be found to deter the remainder from hosting, supporting, or even tolerating al Qaeda and its imitators in their midst. The purpose of this article is to plant the seed that part of the answer is the use of strategic bases in appropriate areas to administer sanctions selectively and effectively. JFQ
In a world shaped by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Thirty Years’ War seems far from the public consciousness. Nevertheless, this war, which is difficult to understand, in fact offers a useful analogy to the politics of religion in the current international security environment. This article first addresses the consequences of the Thirty Years’ War on religion in the context of the international order emerging from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. It then explores how these aspects of religion and the politics of the Westphalian system of states are both relevant to Pakistan and a source of instability in the region.

Today in the Western world, sovereignty is accepted as a dominant principle regulating relations between states. It was not always so. The Peace of Westphalia established the conditions for an inverse relationship between sovereignty and religion: as the sovereignty of states became dominant, religion receded in importance in international politics. Consequently, the international environ-
ment was no longer subject to the passions that religious militancy had inspired. For the 364 years since the Peace of Westphalia, the primacy of state sovereignty has been a stabilizing influence in international order in the West. Among states in the Islamic world that gained independence in the 20th century, however, the idea of religion as an instrument of international politics is reminiscent of pre-Westphalian Europe. Pakistan best illustrates how a state that has attempted to construct a direct rather than inverse relationship between sovereignty and religion has created conditions that have destabilized the region, inviting comparisons to Europe in the early 17th century.

Two aspects of the Thirty Years’ War concerning religion are especially noteworthy. First, state sovereignty emerged as a dominant feature of international politics in the years after the Peace of Westphalia. The national interest of the state consequently developed as a concept that for the first time separated a state’s interests from the religion of the prince and his people. Second, religious moderates, who “rejected providentialist theology,” contributed to the development of the Westphalian system of states by prevailing over religious militants and their belief in the primacy of universal moral values. These aspects have contributed to the development of a system that is inherently more stable than the one that preceded it. In addition, they have an important relation to the evolution of Pakistan since its independence.

On one hand, Pakistan, an insecure state highly sensitive to its sovereignty, is closely wedded to the post-Westphalian order. On the other hand, the growing influence of Islamists there, whose religious worldview is not unlike the militants’ view during the Thirty Years’ War, suggests that Pakistan continues to evolve toward a pre-Westphalian society where religion has primacy over the state. This dilemma has created an inherently unstable dynamic similar to the religious tension that sparked the Thirty Years’ War. The expanding role of Islam in Pakistani society, while originally intended to buttress the state’s legitimacy, now poses a threat to the security not only of neighboring India and Afghanistan, but also to U.S. interests in the region and, ironically, to Pakistan itself.

The Thirty Years’ War

While the Thirty Years’ War was far more complex than simply a conflict over religion, Europeans in the 17th century believed religion played a significant role in initiating the conflict. In addition, the Peace of Westphalia that ended the war signaled major changes for the relationship between religious and temporal authority. The significance of religion in the Thirty Years’ War was not about differences of doctrine or faith: the alliance of Catholic Bourbon France with Lutheran Sweden and Calvinist princes against the alliance of Catholic Habsburgs and their Lutheran allies indicates as much. Nor did it involve a consciously secular challenge to religion. On a personal level, people in the 17th century remained devoutly religious; religion remained a powerful influence in society. Still, several fundamental changes affected how religion was seen as an instrument of political power and identity in the aftermath of the war. First, the war’s unprecedented violence discredited militant Christians and challenged their belief in the overarching importance of universal moral values in international affairs. Militants believed Christian unification could be achieved through force rather than persuasion. Moderates, on the other hand, were more pragmatic and saw Christian unification as a distant goal achievable only through persuasion. Though they were religious rather than secular in their outlook, their influence ultimately contributed to the rise of an essentially secular international order.

It took the Thirty Years’ War to resolve the longstanding tension between the two perspectives. Militants such as Emperor Ferdinand II’s confessor, the Jesuit Wilhelm Lamormaini, were aggressive advocates of religious dogma and were uncompromising and intolerant of heresy. As a force in European politics, militancy had been particularly destabilizing to relations among the German princes. The 1629 Edict of Restitution was perhaps the most damaging manifestation of militant influence during the Thirty Years’ War. The edict, inspired by Lamormaini, directly threatened to reverse changes to the political-religious landscape favoring Protestants since the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, and was opposed not only by Calvinists who were not recognized under its provisions, but also by Lutheran princes who questioned the Emperor’s authority to issue it. Most significantly, it extended the war by triggering the intervention of Sweden, ultimately leading to intervention by Sweden’s ally, France. When it ended, the German principalities were exhausted and had little appetite for the militants and their universal Catholic aspirations.

With the end of the war, religion as a force in international politics gave way to new political concepts not explicitly addressed in the Peace of Westphalia, the principles of state sovereignty and national interest. German academic Johannes Burkhardt had these thoughts in mind when he described the Thirty Years’ War as a “state-building war.” It was the result of a process whereby the Reformation initially destroyed “the universality of canon law that had underpinned the medieval international order [which peaked during the Thirty Years’ War and which] determined the size and character of individual states and settled how they were going to interact.”

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**the Peace of Westphalia signaled major changes for the relationship between religious and temporal authority**

**The Thirty Years’ War also established conditions for change in the relationship between the authority of the Catholic Church and the German princes. Though the Peace of Westphalia did not actually result in the outright independence of German principalities, it did give princes authority to supervise churches and church property, which effectively increased their authority over their subjects. This development was one reason that Pope Innocent X objected to the Peace of Westphalia, although in vain. The principle of state sovereignty developed from this new authority of the princes (and also because other provisions that might have restricted the princes’ authority were never enforced). Over time, therefore, the sovereignty of the state replaced religion as the most influential political idea shaping a new international order. Related to the principle of sovereignty was another secular idea: a state’s national interest—‘raison d’état’—was distinct from a ruler’s religious affiliation or authority. Although “national interest” is widely used in international political discourse today, it was not immediately accepted in the 16th and 17th centuries. Dutch academic Jakob Jansenius expressed the skepticism of many at the time:**

Do they believe that a secular, perishable state should outweigh religion and the Church? . . . Should not the Most Christian King believe
that in the guidance and administration of his realm there is nothing that obliges him to extend and protect that of Jesus Christ, his Lord? . . . Would he dare say to God: Let your power and glory and the religion which teaches men to adore You be lost and destroyed, provided my state is protected and free of risks?"

Although Niccolo Machiaveli wrote about the principle of national interest for the first time, the French Chief Minister, Cardinal Richelieu, introduced it into international politics of the 17th and 18th centuries: “Richelieu was the father of the modern state system,” Henry Kissinger writes. “Under his auspices, raison d’etat replaced the medieval concept of universal moral values as the operating principle of French policy.”

Richelieu, in allying Catholic France with Protestant Sweden, separated the interests of France from those of the institutional Catholic Church, and thereby established a new paradigm that challenged the traditional integration of religion with the state. In fact, raison d’etat did not merely separate religion from the state, it subordinated religion to the state, contributing to the secular post-Westphalian system that has come to dominate international politics. State sovereignty gave rulers the ability to formulate their interests separate from the interests of the Church and express them as secular policy. Distancing religion from the interests of the state in this way quelled passions that religion had inspired during the Thirty Years’ War, contributing to a more stable international order. However, this particular paradigm of relations between religion and the state is a Western tradition. In the 20th century, newly independent states in Asia and Africa challenged the dominant international paradigm that emerged from the Peace of Westphalia. The developing world did not subscribe to the Westphalian system; “their cultures were not secular. On August 11, 1947, he famously addressed the newly independent Pakistan about his vision for the nation saying, “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State.”

Although Pakistan was created as a home for the Muslims of British India, Jinnah’s view was consistent with attitudes in post-Westphalian Europe: religion was subordinate to the state. From its inception, Pakistan has been particularly sensitive to its sovereignty. To the west, the Durand Line has remained contested with Afghanistan, which had previously made claims on Pashtun lands east to the Indus River. To the east, Pakistan and India fought over competing claims to Kashmir. In the war on terror, the United States has added to Pakistan’s overriding insecurity and concern over its sovereignty, the most notable instances being unilateral U.S. Predator strikes in North Waziristan and the May 2011 SEAL raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound.

Despite the Westphalian system serving as the basis for its legitimacy, Pakistan has evolved from its secular origins to embrace a Westphalian concept of the primacy of Islam over the state. This transformation has become a source of instability to both the government of Pakistan and its neighbors, particularly India and Afghanistan, and threatens U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. Initially, Pakistan’s government attempted merely to buttress the legitimacy of the state without any sense that its actions would spur the growing influence of Islamists in Pakistani society. In 1956, for instance, Pakistan became the first state to use “Islamic” in its title: “the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” However, despite the intention of Pakistan’s founder merely to use Islam to lend legitimacy to the state, the introduction of religion into the political sphere has grown as a force in society beyond the government’s control. From early in the nation’s
history the writing has been on the wall. The founder of Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami party (Islamic Society), for example, spoke for many in the middle and lower classes when he advocated establishing "Islamic rule, [organizing] the various aspects of social life on Islamic bases, to adopt such means as will widen the sphere of Islamic influence in the world."14

Soon after independence, Pakistan's government began supporting militant groups both to serve as proxies in the ongoing conflict with India over Kashmir and as a means of bolstering the state's legitimacy. Under the presidency of General Zia ul-Haq, these efforts linking the government to Islam became comprehensive, transforming Pakistan's government and society: "Zia's decade in power . . . ushered in an era of religious obscurantism that affected every facet of domestic life and foreign policy."15 Zia, with American assistance, famously used Islam as a shield against Communist influence in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion. Pakistan's support for the Afghan Mujahideen further caused the country to turn to the Middle East for both financial support and to strengthen its position in the Muslim world. Zia also integrated Islamic principles into schooling, the judiciary, and the military: Zia ul-Haq's efforts at Islamization made Pakistan an important ideological and organizational center of the global Islamist movement. . . . Pakistan's sponsorship of the Taliban in Afghanistan, together with the presence in Pakistan of Islamist militants from all over the world, derived from Islamabad's desire to emerge as the center of a global Islamic resurgence.16

Many Pakistanis have opposed the idea of identifying Islam more closely with society, the government, and relations among states, highlighting another aspect of the Thirty Years' War relevant to Pakistan: longstanding tension between religious moderates and militants. The Pakistani writer Zaid Haider suggests Pakistani society is split between moderates descended from the South Asian and Sufi tradition of inclusion and tolerance, and militants inspired by Wahabi or Deoband traditions of uncompromising "pan-Islamic revivalism."17 While the Pakistani establishment is largely moderate, those moderates who have openly advocated more inclusive and accommodating positions, such as revising or repealing the blasphemy laws, have increasingly been victims of intimidation and violence.18 While militants were largely discredited following the Thirty Years' War, in Pakistan they have proven resilient in the face of moderate opposition and remain very influential. Much as militant influence was responsible for stirring popular passions and prolonging the Thirty Years' War, the influence Islamists exert in Pakistan contributes to domestic sectarian violence. Bombings and assassinations attributed to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, a terrorist group that seeks to establish an Islamic regime in Pakistan, for example, have seriously stretched the capacity of the Pakistani army to contain domestic violence.
Predictably, Pakistan’s pervasive use of Islam as an instrument of policy has provoked rather than contained conflict with its neighbors. Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) support of Lashkar-i-Taiba (LT), for example, has accounted for much of the recent violence in Kashmir as well as the LT attack on the Taj Mahal hotel in Mumbai. To the west, ISI support for the Pashtun Haqqani network, operating on both sides of the Durand Line, is currently the most serious insurgent threat to Afghanistan’s security. Most significantly, the fact that Pakistan is the only Islamic state to possess nuclear weapons is hugely symbolic to the rest of the Islamic world, in addition to serving as a deterrent to its nemesis India.

Pakistan, therefore, has experienced a different relationship between the state and religion than what took place in Europe after the Thirty Years’ War. Instead of separating religion from the state as a means of establishing the government’s authority, successive Pakistani governments have used Islam in an effort to strengthen their legitimacy. Political authority, in other words, has become closely identified with religion, precisely the opposite of the political development of Europe following the Peace of Westphalia. Consequently, rather than confronting militancy and distancing itself from religion, the Pakistani government’s close association with Islam has inflamed religious passions it subsequently has been unable to control. “Islamists,” a Pakistani diplomat noted, “not content with having a secondary role in national affairs . . . have acquired a momentum of their own.”99

The integration of politics and religion in Pakistan will not necessarily provoke violence on the scale of a Thirty Years’ War. Nevertheless, it does indicate a political-religious dynamic that is inherently violent and destabilizing, which Europeans came to understand through painful experience. Where Europe after the Thirty Years’ War came to view religion and religious authority as incompatible with the principles of sovereignty and national interest, Pakistan has viewed them as mutually supporting. Its policies linking religion to the state underscore the incompatibility of the Islamist worldview with the Westphalian order.

**Conclusion**

The rejection of religious militancy in Europe resulted from the economic and social impact of 30 years of violence. In contrast, Islamic militancy in Pakistan continues to pose a threat to the legitimacy of the government and security of the entire region. The situation in Pakistan has not degenerated to resemble Europe during the Thirty Years’ War. Still, it is telling that writers and pundits have occasionally opined that the Middle East and Southwest Asia are returning to the sort of religious and political environment that infected Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries.20 We cannot predict where the influence of religion in Pakistan’s society and government will lead. Nevertheless, the Thirty Years’ War and Peace of Westphalia provide a useful reference for a study of militant religion, the use of religion as an instrument of international politics, and the relationship between religion and sovereignty in Pakistan. For the time being, the conflicting aspects of religion in Pakistani society, both supporting and challenging the legitimacy of the government, do not suggest that the Westphalian system, which has provided a semblance of order in international affairs for more than 360 years, is falling apart. They do, however, point to the increasingly accepted view in the Islamic world of the resurgence of religion’s primacy over the state. This Islamist perspective opens the door for challenges to the previously sacrosanct principle of state sovereignty, even as Pakistan clings to this principle to bolster international acceptance of its contested borders. JFQ

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**NOTES**


2 This article is more narrowly focused on religion than ideology. I use religion as a destabilizing, potentially explosive component of ideology in international politics. Ideology has continued to be fairly common in international politics, militant religion less so. Pakistan is not entirely unique as a state drawing legitimacy from the Westphalian system emphasizing the primacy of sovereignty over religion while at the same time promoting a pre-Westphalian idea of religion as a unifying principle in the international order. The Arab-Israeli conflict and Iran are also examples. Pakistan is provocative because these two aspects of the pre-post-Westphalian order seem to function at cross-purposes and are a source of domestic and regional instability.

3 Peter W. Wilson, “The Causes of the Thirty Years War 1618–1648,” English Historical Review 123, no. 502 (June 2008), 560. Wilson points to evidence that Europeans themselves in the 17th century believed the war was religious in character, initiated with the Defenestration of Prague and ending with the Peace of Westphalia.


5 Wilson, “The Causes of the Thirty Years War,” 562.

6 Ibid., 564. Peter W. Wilson paraphrasing Johannes Burkhart.


8 Richard Bonney, The Thirty Years’ War (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 89. Enforcement of this provision, which established 1624 as the year for determining allocation of church property among the three recognized denominations, would have limited the authority of the princes.


10 Ibid., 58–59.


12 Quoted from the Pakistani daily Dawn, Independence Day Supplement, August 14, 1999.


14 Ibid., 22.


16 Haqqani, 317.

17 Haider, 40–41.

18 Most notably, Salman Taseer, governor of Punjab, was assassinated by one of his guards in January 2011 for advocating repeal of Zia’s blasphemy laws. Taseer, a secularist, was a leading member of the moderate Pakistan People’s Party.

19 Haqqani, 318.

20 Many have drawn parallels between the Thirty Years’ War and the Middle East. Among them are Andrew Sullivan, “The Thirty Years War Brewing in the Middle East,” The Sunday Times, December 17, 2006; Spengler, “General Petraeus’ Thirty Years War,” Asia Times Online, May 4, 2010; Michael T. Klare, “The New Thirty Years War,” Middle East Online, June 27, 2011.
Our presence in the Asia-Pacific permits us to engage in Southeast Asia through military exercises as well as the native communities. In Indonesia, we interact with the armed forces in command post/field exercises and occasionally in limited civil action projects that further support the legitimacy of the local and national authorities. However, as we execute these yearly commitments in this strategically imperative nation, which occupies some of the most important gateways of global trade, unrest and instability grow.

Indonesia is the largest archipelagic nation in the world, consisting of more than 15,000 islands that are home to 6 major religious groups, 300 ethnicities, and over 700 linguistic communities. Indonesia is also home to the largest Muslim population in the world, with a substantial majority following the Sunni tradition. Since 1945, Indonesia has experienced rapid and successful economic, political, and social development, which has led its economy to become the largest in Southeast Asia. This transformation led to the resignation of a ruthless dictatorship in 1998 and further established Indonesia as today’s successful and only liberal democracy in Southeast Asia as well as the only regional member of the G-20. As a result of these milestones, the country has been commended as a role model and possible conduit for peace and democracy for fellow Muslim nations and the region. Unfortunately, the successes of this young democracy have had a high price, as years of bloodshed and the near balkanization at the turn of the century have shown.

Indonesia’s postdictatorship transition was marred with economic turbulence in the aftermath of the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997, which fueled the 1998–2002 ethno-religious communal conflicts resulting in nationwide carnage. Since then, several government actions led to the recovery of the Indonesian economy, enforced the peace between warring factions, and strengthened the democracy.

However, Indonesia is experiencing a new rise of violence as its traditional terrorist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) continue to weaken and disappear. This terrorist activity is not receiving the same degree of international media coverage as the Jakarta and Bali bombings (2002–2009), although it presents a new and greater danger to national and regional stability. In fact, aspects of this new trend are more deeply rooted in the historical phenomena of this archipelagic nation. As the United States pays closer attention to the events of the Arab Spring, while winding down the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, this vital portion of world is slowly slipping into instability.

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By Andrés H. Cáreres-Solari

BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND CHAOS

Indonesia at a Crossroads

Major Andrés H. Cáreres-Solari, USMC, is Commanding Officer, Combat Logistics Company 36, Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, as well as a Foreign Area Officer for Southeast Asia and Latin America.
Can our regional engagements support the stability and security of Indonesia and further secure global trade in its national waters? Can we provide these forces with the tools to prevent another nationwide ethnoreligious conflict? Are we sharing lessons from our nation’s reconstruction experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq? Can we further enhance our bilateral engagements with civil-military training from which we can both prosper?

This article discusses this emerging threat in Indonesia, as well as its potential catastrophic effects in the Asia-Pacific and the world. To present my argument, I follow historical examples of Indonesia’s social behavior of the colonial period and recent past and compare them with more recent events. Furthermore, I propose several ways that our expeditionary forces and interdepartmental efforts could mitigate these rising challenges and support a continuum of democracy in this vital part of the globe.

A Modern and Liberal Democracy

Indonesia emerged as a flourishing and modern democracy shortly after the end of President Suharto’s dictatorship (1967–1998). Unlike the rest of Southeast Asia, and unlike the more recent turbulence in the Arab Spring nations, this was a swift transfer of power that led to peaceful and free elections in 1999. Furthermore, the young democracy has experienced three more such elections since then.

Freedom House ranks Indonesia as the only “free” nation in Southeast Asia in its 2010 Map of Freedom. Moreover, it stands next to three other “free” nations in the greater Far East (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). Also, per the East Asia Forum, Indonesia’s present democratic status is seen as a longlasting and evolving political development rather than a temporary phenomenon. During my in-country phase of Foreign Area Officer training, as I lived and backpacked in Indonesia, I witnessed several protests (sizable enough to halt traffic in Jakarta) demanding the resignation of important government officials. These were organized demonstrations of students as well as rival political parties and, on occasion, Islamic groups. However, unlike demonstrations by their Southeast Asian neighbors, these never led to violence, nor were they crushed by the government’s use of force.

As I traveled through Indonesia’s major cities and remote villages, I often listened to open political conversations for and against the local and national governments and their officials. I never witnessed such free debates in any other Southeast Asian nation. Public expressions of government dissent are taboo in the other countries, which keeps such dialogue behind closed doors due to fear of informants and retaliation. I was a guest lecturer at Universitas Pelita Harapan, a top Indonesian university, where students often debated openly in formal and informal circles. These debates often criticized official government decisions and national policy. Following my lecture, the students openly challenged government actions regarding a host of issues including energy policy and corruption among politicians, all without fear of reprisal.

Free political expression is widely respected throughout Indonesia, as it is in the Western world. Throughout my travels, I saw homes, stores, and private vehicles decorated with governing and opposition political party advertisements. These showed obvious signs of wear and tear, which indicated they were present both leading up to and following national elections. In the remote islands of eastern Indonesia, I witnessed an informal political debate between two fishermen and a local government official during their lunch break. Such conversations were lengthy and thorough, with the locals citing economic figures and making detailed references to domestic and international events. On several occasions, I also witnessed locals reinforcing and supporting the secularity of Indonesia. This became evident during debates about socially sensitive subjects such as nudity in the media, abortion, and religious activity. It was common to hear Indonesians say, “It may go against our personal morals, but Indonesia is a free country.”

An Evolving Threat

From 2002 until 2009, the Western and tourist concentrations in Bali and Jakarta became the targets of several bombings at the hands of JI. As a consequence, the government embarked on an aggressive campaign to defeat transnational terrorism on its soil. These efforts led to the arrest and deaths of several important terrorist leaders, causing their organizations a severe blow. However, even as the terrorists keep losing strength at the hands of government campaigns, attacks continue. These attacks are not being planned and conducted by traditional al Qaeda–linked terrorist organizations, but instead by perpetrators who are much harder to trace. Furthermore, the targets have changed from Western symbols to the domestic population, thereby becoming less attractive to the international media. Indonesia is currently experiencing a transformation of its domestic radical Islamic threat from centrally organized jihad (jihad tanzim) to individually pursued jihad (jihad fardiyah).

Jihad tanzim was easily neutralized, which accounts for the vast number of successes in the government’s campaign against Jemaah Islamiyah. This type of jihad focused on attacking the Western presence in Indonesia, as evidenced by the bombings of nightclubs, hotels, and embassies. However, in recent years terrorists in Indonesia have attacked diverse places of worship and the national police force. Not only have the victims changed, but so have the perpetrators.

In the recent past, the actors of jihad fardiyah have been individuals and small groups inspired by radical rhetoric professed in various religious and educational centers. These perpetrators are harder to track as they tend to form and operate independently. Many begin as groups of friends holding irregular meetings for developing terrorist plans and tactics and for limited training. These independent groups have been responsible for a number of attacks, including the book bombs sent to police officers and Muslim clerics in March 2011, the string of police assassinations in Java, and the April 2011 mosque bombing in Cirebon that killed 30 people. Furthermore, these new jihadist groups were the actors of the attempted Easter Serpong church bomb plot that same April, which was intended to cause mass casualties as Christian worshipers attended Easter Mass.

Per the International Crisis Group, some of these organizations are attempting to reignite old tensions from the 1998–2002 ethno-religious communal conflict that engulfed Indonesia shortly after the fall of
Suharto in 1998. It took years to decelerate this spiral of violence, and even today special measures and active government monitoring are necessary in these central Indonesian communities to maintain the frail peace. This is particularly the case in central Sulawesi and the Maluku islands, where these tensions are still very much a reality. In these two regions, communities are still segregated from each other, and illegal checkpoints where ethnicity and religion are scrutinized are still a reality. As I traveled this region in 2009 and 2010, I met several Muslims who affirmed that they had no hatred or tensions toward Christians. However, these statements were always followed by confessions that they had weapons hidden in their homes for “when they start trouble again.” These communal tensions and wounds are exactly what jihad tanzim under the banner of JI attempted to reignite. Nowadays, less organized and smaller terrorist cells or jihad fardiyah are attempting to pick up the fight where more organized jihad tanzim failed.

The Balinese Example
The Balinese society, where the Hindu population forms a vast majority over the Muslim communities, was directly impacted by the nightclub bombings of 2002 and 2005. More than 80 percent of the Balinese economy depends on tourism, but these busy resort areas turned into virtual ghost towns as a result of the attacks. Several nations placed restrictions or advised against traveling to Indonesia, spelling a curse on the Balinese economy.

The collapse of the Balinese tourist industry caused great losses of foreign investment. More importantly, locals who put their life savings into their tourist businesses went into ruin. Newly bankrupt entrepreneurs and tourism employees were forced to the countryside to work in the rice fields, making a fraction of their former salaries while laboring three times as hard. Several Balinese families I met described the times of 2002–2006 with “jurisdictional authority” is traditionally constrained to village lines. In the aftermath of the Bali bombings, the community deployed the pecalang in force to ensure the safety of the tourist industry as the local and national governments seemed unresponsive. As mentioned the pecalang used to service their villages without infringing on domestic governance; however, after the attacks, village chiefs and tourist industry operators forced a new unofficial agreement on the local authorities. These types of vigilante activities filled the vacuum left by the national government, further ensuring that local interests were protected with minor concern for national mandates. While the Balinese are now reaping great benefits, this type of gang activity has proven deadly throughout Indonesia’s history and recent past.

Centuries of Gang Warfare
Street justice and vigilante activity are not restricted to Bali. Similar social behavior has taken place for hundreds of years throughout Indonesia. During Portuguese colonial rule, as Lisbon focused on pacification campaigns in their richer African colonies, the employment of these gang-like groups kept a tight control over this far corner of the empire. During the colonial era, the Dutch and Portuguese documented incidents of attacks on rival villages and colonial forces, causing severe bloodshed. Following the independence of East Timor in 1975, the Indonesian government employed these gangs to facilitate both the submission of the new republic and the Indonesian invasion. Jakarta maintained that strategy during its rule of East Timor (1975–1999) with the employment of East Timorese armed loyalist gangs. This continued after the United Nations referendum of 1999 when the Indonesian army employed these factions with the purpose of reintegrating the territory. These groups were the authors of several acts of violence in East Timor to include the Liquiça massacre of 1999.

The ethno-religious communal conflict of 1998–2002 ravaged several provinces where the absence and often the refusal of police forces to intervene (in many instances due to fear) gave way to unimpeded activity of gangs and vigilantes. This was the case in Borneo (Kalimantan) in 2000 when the native Dayaks attempted to violently expel the transmigrated Madurese, killing thousands of them as national authorities looked on. Several Dayaks I met in northeast Borneo described how Christian preachers turned to native beliefs and regular churchgoers wielded swords against the Madurese, severing their heads in the belief that decapitations provided special powers.
The Helsinki Agreement of 2005 marked the end of the Acehnese conflict in northern Sumatra; however, it did not end local tensions. That was particularly the case with the Gayo and Alas ethnic minorities, which are more tightly linked to southern Sumatran ethnicities. These two ethnic groups of northern Sumatra have long been supporters of the Indonesian government while opposing Acehnese separatism. The recent decision to award autonomy to Aceh without considering the allegiances and support of these two groups sparked a movement to create new provinces under the same auspices of self-determination. In the meantime, alienation and discrimination at the hands of the new Acehnese government have fueled ethnic gang activity over minor revenue disputes and other financial grievances.

Indonesia's Challenges

The Indonesian military and law enforcement agencies are heavily challenged due to poor equipment, inadequate training, manpower shortages, and, most importantly, corruption. Recent history has proven that these national institutions can actually aggravate the situation when deployed. The 1998–2002 ethno-religious communal conflict in the Maluku archipelago witnessed KOSTRAD (the Indonesian Army’s Strategic Reserve Command) supporting the Muslims while BRIMOB (Mobile Brigade) supported the Christians. The Indonesian government deployed these units for peace enforcement; however, it was not long before they supported warring factions, further aggravating the conflict.

Corruption is widespread in Indonesia and is a mechanism for some government officials to obtain supplemental income. As I traveled in East Java, I quickly learned that I could not simply organize transportation for six backpackers by speaking directly to vehicle owners. They directed me to the police chief, who would receive payment, segregate a generous portion for himself, and afterward direct a driver to take us to our destination. On the southern coast of the island of Lombok, waterborne transportation in the coastal village of Gerupuk can only be arranged with a youth gang that enforces tight control. Villagers refuse to make any arrangements with Westerners because they fear violent reprisals from these youths. Any attempt to involve the police is usually met with refusal to intervene and the official reply of “It is their town and that is how they run it.”

Indonesia’s economic situation (even as it is weathering the current global economic crisis fairly well) shows an impartial concentration of wealth and development. While Bali and several geographical areas with natural resource concentrations experience a certain degree of economic development, there are vast regions where extreme poverty is the norm. Although Jakarta is making a tremendous effort to develop these less privileged communities, decades of deliberate negligence during Suharto’s reign caused localized stunted growth. This is particularly the case of Papua and the inland regions of Indonesian Borneo, whose ethnic groups were officially
are being converted into Islamists who, upon release, are further spreading a perverted version of their faith.

Maritime piracy and human trafficking can potentially provide the finances to support these cells and possibly larger movements such as those Indonesia witnessed during the ethno-religious communal conflicts of 1998–2002. Unlike the Horn of Africa, the straits of Makassar and Malacca are situated in the national waters of sovereign nations, and any plans to deploy a foreign naval task force there would face greater global opposition. The option to employ alternative waterways as a result of continuing pirate activity would skyrocket global trade costs, further crippling the economies of our Northeast Asian partners and the rest of the world.

Interdepartmental and bilateral training with Indonesian armed and police forces at the tactical level could foment unified postconflict communities. With the assistance of the U.S. Department of Justice, we could enhance our scope with training capabilities and further support Indonesian government legitimacy at the local level. As an expeditionary force, we could exploit lessons learned from our experiences in provincial reconstruction and locally embedded teams and apply them in these postconflict environments.

Furthermore, as an interdepartmental effort, the Justice Department could enhance our civilian-military interaction and training with democratic policing. This should be focused on supporting police work per democratic principles, along with existing national and local rules and regulations, while actively discouraging ethnic and religious lines. Furthermore, community policing training could strengthen government-communal relations by empowering the civilian population to police their neighborhoods while supporting national authority. This could be accomplished through a shorter version of police training designed for unarmed civilians with national police support. Both of these training concepts should be reinforced with human rights training, thus building and strengthening the relationship between community and local law enforcement. Corrections interaction and training could also further improve prison conditions and mitigate the exposure of inmates to radical Islamic rhetoric, thereby halting the rapid spread of violent ideas.

Our forces in the Asia-Pacific already engage Indonesia’s forces and communities through a myriad of exercises and localized projects. However, slightly more aggressive planning and new thinking could further solidify our bilateral engagement, consequently supporting these forces and communities and enhancing our bilateral relationship. Timely action in this region could guarantee a stable gateway of commerce and stabilize the most populous Muslim nation on earth. Our coordinated bilateral and interdepartmental efforts in Indonesia could prevent this archipelago from plunging into chaos and communal warfare once again, further threatening the stability of this critical part of the world.

Conclusion

Decades of centrally organized jihad tanzim terrorism failed to accomplish what independent jihad fardiyah terrorism seems able to achieve: the reignition of ethno-religious communal conflict throughout Indonesia. These independent groups’ ongoing attacks on local government facilities and diverse places of worship are further amplifying what seems to be Jakarta’s inability to quell an existing insurrection. To these groups’ advantage, Indonesia is rich in ungoverned spaces with remotely located disenfranchised and destitute populations who are more than willing to follow an alternative to the status quo. Historical patterns of gang warfare throughout the archipelago in an environment of persistent ethnic and religious tensions are fuel for a widespread conflict. Counterterrorism campaigns have filled national prisons with radical Islamists who have a captive audience for their rhetoric. Consequently, convicted petty thieves

NOTES

No one knows precisely how Hans Lippershey came upon the invention. One legend holds that some children wandered into his spectacle shop, began playing with the lenses on display, and suddenly started to laugh. Tiny objects far away appeared as though they were right in front of them. The miniscule had become gigantic. Though the truth of that tale is doubtful, the story of the telescope’s invention remains a mystery. We know only that four centuries ago, on October 2, 1608, Hans Lippershey received a patent for a device that is still recognizable as a modern refractory telescope.

Not long after Lippershey’s patent, the device found its way to Pisa, Italy, where it was offered to the Duchy for sale. Catching wind of this new invention, Galileo Galilei quickly obtained one of the instruments, dissected its construction, and redesigned it to his liking. Galilei intended it, of course, for star gazing, but his loftier intentions were not shared by the Pisans. This new tool had immediate and obvious military applications. Any commander who could see enemy ships at great distances or opposing armies across battlefields would instantly gain a distinct advantage. That commander would, in effect, be looking forward in time. And with that:

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literal foresight, he could predict aspects of the enemy’s actions.

The telescope offered its owner a previously unimaginable advantage in battle. It brought the invisible to light. It altered the perception of time. It presented a genuine glimpse into the future, beyond what the naked eye could see. We don’t know whether Lippershey, Galilei, or some other crafty inventor made the first telescope sale to a military, but when he did, that exchange represented one of the earliest mergers of enlightenment science with the business of war. From that moment on, modern science has been searching for ways to extend that glimpse into the future, and militaries have been eager to pay for it.

In the 17th century, merely gaining an early glimpse of the enemy’s actions was enough to advantage one side over the other. By the 20th century, strategists sought much more. They needed greater predictive power for anticipating enemy moves. Technology alone could not, and still cannot, fill that gap.

Strategists have always needed to develop a sense of the enemy, but the craving for more concrete, reliable predictions has also made militaries easily seduced by science. Lately, that longing has led them to focus on the wrong objective: predicting the unpredictable.

Number Worship

Predictions in military and foreign affairs fall broadly into two types. They focus either on large-scale societal transformations or the actions of individuals. The recent uprisings
across the Arab Middle East, just as with the Soviet Union’s collapse, demonstrated yet again how unlikely it is to foresee such macro-level changes. At best, we can assess when societies are at risk, but predicting revolutions remains the stuff that dreams are made of. Yet it is a dream that will not die. The Central Intelligence Agency continues to invest in a Political Instability Task Force, which might identify the correlates of instability but cannot provide the kind of early warnings that politicians crave. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency tried to launch a political futures market back in 2003, but had to scrap it when the public disapproved. It seemed somehow unsavory to be betting on upheavals. Though private futures markets have been thriving, they, too, failed to presage the latest spate of Arab revolts.

In response to many failings, behavioral scientists have been shattering crystal balls. The Berkeley scholar Philip Tetlock has been widely cited for revealing that the more renowned the expert, the more likely his predictions will be false. The Harvard psychologist Daniel Gilbert tells us that we cannot even predict what will bring us joy since our expectations are almost always off. Nassim Taleb argues that the massive impact of black swans—improbable but surprisingly frequent anomalies—makes any effort at prediction fruitless. Most notable of all, the economist Dan Ariely has exposed the flawed models for predicting our behavior in everything from the products we buy to the inputs. If the inputs are off, the output must be off—and sometimes dramatically so, as Taleb gleefully irreverent market trader argues the massive impact of black swans—improbable but surprisingly frequent anomalies—makes any effort at prediction fruitless.

Large-scale predictions will continue because they must. Governments and militaries cannot function without them. And leaders will continue to be frustrated by their performance. In contrast, predicting individual actions—gaining a sense of the enemy—is a skill that can be developed and improved.

For better or worse, this sense of the enemy can only be partly aided by science. Simulation games, such as Gemstone, can be useful in shifting leaders’ thoughts toward cultural perceptions of military actions, but as with all algorithm-based models, they are limited by their rigid information inputs. Despite this ineluctable fact, quantifying human behavior remains in vogue. Frequently funded by the Defense Department, political scientist Bruce Bueno de Mesquita insists that foreign affairs can be predicted with 90 percent accuracy using his own secret formula. Of course, most of his 90 percent accuracy likely comes from predictions that present trends will continue—which typically they do.

The crux of Bueno de Mesquita’s model rests largely on the inputs to his algorithm. He says that in order to predict what people are likely to do, we must first approximate what they believe about a situation and what outcomes they desire. He insists that most of the information we need to assess their motives is already available through open sources. Classified data are rarely necessary. On at least this score, he is probably correct. Though skillful intelligence can garner some true gems of enemy intentions, most of the time neither the quantity nor the secrecy of information is what matters most in predicting individual behavior. What is important is the relevant information and the capacity to analyze it.

The crucial problem with Bueno de Mesquita’s approach is its reliance on consistently accurate, quantifiable assessments of individuals. A model will be as weak as its inputs. If the inputs are off, the output must be off—and sometimes dramatically so, as Bueno de Mesquita is quick to note on his own Website: “Garbage in, garbage out.” Yet this awareness does not dissuade him from some remarkable assertions. Take for example the assessments of Adolf Hitler before he came to power. Bueno de Mesquita spends one section of his book The Predictioneer’s Game explaining how, if politicians in 1930s Germany had had access to his mathematical model, the Socialists and Communists would have seen the necessity of cooperating with each other and with the Catholic Center Party as the only means of preventing Hitler’s accession to Chancellor. He assumes that Hitler’s opponents could easily have recognized Hitler’s intentions. He further assumes that the Catholic Center Party could have been persuaded to align against the Nazis, an assumption that looks much more plausible in a post–World War II world. In 1932, the various party leaders were surely not envisioning the future as it actually unfolded. Their actions at the time seemed the best choice in a bad situation. No mathematical model of the future would likely have convinced them otherwise. Assessments are only as good as the assessors, and quantifying bad assessments will yield useless if not disastrous results.

None of this means that all efforts at prediction are pure folly. Bueno de Mesquita’s larger aim is worthy: to devise more rigorous methods of foreseeing behavior. An alternative approach to his quantitative metrics is to develop our sense for how the enemy behaves. Though less scientific, it could be far more profitable, and it is clearly very much in need.

Sense and Sensible Solutions

More than two millennia ago, Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu advised generals to know their enemy. The question has always been how. Writing in 1996 in the New York Review of Books, philosopher Isaiah Berlin argued that political genius—the ability to synthesize “the fleeting, broken, infinitely various wisps and fragments that make up life at any level”—is simply a sense—“you either have it or you do not. But what if Berlin was wrong? What if that sense could actually be learned and improved?”

That sense of the enemy could have been of use in 2010, when, hoping to induce the Afghan insurgents into peace talks, U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials paid an undisclosed and hefty sum to Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour for his participation, at one point flying the Taliban’s second-in-command to meet with President Hamid Karzai in Kabul. Unfortunately, the Taliban commander was a fake, a shopkeeper from Quetta, Pakistan. The episode showed how poorly the United States knows its enemy in this ongoing war. On one level, U.S. and NATO officials could not even identify the number-two man in their opponent’s organization. On the more strategic level, they could not recognize that throughout three separate meetings, the impostor never once requested that foreign troops withdraw from Afghan soil—a staple of Taliban demands.
What U.S. and NATO negotiators needed was strategic empathy: a sharpened sensitivity to their enemy’s underlying drivers and constraints. For much of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, it seems that the Afghans have possessed a greater degree of strategic empathy for the Americans than the other way round. It is this crucial weakness that needs to change, and it will not come through complex algorithms or high-tech tricks.

Strategic empathy is the ability to think like your enemy. It is the skill of stepping out of our minds and into the heads of others. It is what allows us to pinpoint what truly drives and constrains the other side. The best strategic empaths can achieve a good, though certainly never foolproof, ability to predict the actions of others—individuals or small groups. Unlike stereotypes—which reduce others to broad, simplistic categories in order to assess their nature and predict their actions—strategic empathy identifies what is unique both in individuals and their context. One of its keys lies in determining which information is most crucial to observe.

Knowing how another thinks depends initially on gathering and analyzing information. Most leaders use the great mass approach. They gather up as much data as they can. The problem, of course, is that it is too easy to drown in an ocean of noise. In a recent Armed Forces Journal article, Colonels Kevin Benson and Steven Rotkoff noted the idea that “there are specific knowable causes that are linked to corresponding effects dominates military thinking and manifests in our drive to gather as much information as possible before acting.” Determining which data matter and connecting the dots then grows even harder. In contrast to the great mass approach, others believe that a “thin slice” of information is more effective at reducing noise and revealing someone’s true nature. The obvious danger is that we often choose the wrong slice, as author Malcolm Gladwell graphically showed in Blink. The conclusion here is inescapable: the quantity of information is irrelevant; it is the relevance of any quantity that matters. The key is not to collect a great mass or a thin slice, but the right chunk. The challenge that has long bedeviled analysts and statesmen alike is to find heuristics—shortcuts—to help them locate the right chunk in any given context. Psychologists point to a wide range of cognitive biases that lead us astray from finding and correctly interpreting the right chunks. The knack for avoiding these cognition traps is the “sense” to which Sun Tzu and Isaiah Berlin allude.

Fostering a sense of the enemy typically involves gathering information specifically on intentions and capabilities. By examining these two elements of power, the experts believe they can comprehend or even anticipate the adversary’s behavior. This categorization is, however, far too narrow. A more inclusive categorization focuses on drivers and constraints.

This first step in strategic empathy has nothing mysterious about it. Instead, it involves a cold assessment of strategic constraints. We look first not at what the other side might want to do but what it is able to do based on context. Capabilities are not constraints. Capabilities are what enable us to achieve our wants, but constraints are what render those capabilities useless. International relations experts too often think about capabilities in mainly military terms. They count missiles and tanks, factor in firepower, and dissect strategic doctrine for clues to enemy intentions. If China builds an aircraft carrier today, it must be planning to challenge America on the high seas. But military capabilities, like intentions, are often constrained by nonmilitary factors, such as financial, political, organizational, environmental, or cultural impediments to action. Even something as inefable as the Zeitgeist can be a powerful constraint, as Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi recently discovered. Strategic empaths seek out the less obvious, underlying constraints on their enemy’s behavior as well as their own.

Once the underlying constraints are understood and it is clear that the enemy actually has room to maneuver, strategic empaths turn to exploring the enemy’s key drivers. Again, we must distinguish between intentions and drivers. If intentions are the things we want to do, drivers are what shape those wants. We can be driven by an ideological worldview, such as communist, capitalist, or racialist dogma. We can be driven by psychological make-ups, with all the myriad complexes and schemas they entail. Or we could be driven by religious and cultural imperatives: conquer the infidels; convert the heathens; or Russify, Francofy, or democratize the other.

Political scientists have produced a vast literature on enemy intentions. Each scholar offers an ever more nuanced explication of how states signal their intentions and how other states perceive them. Yet intentions are only fully anticipated when the underlying drivers are clearly understood. In an ideal...
case, strategic empaths would not bother to assess intentions without first divining drivers. In reality, of course, most statesmen cannot first determine constraints and then turn to drivers. Typically that analysis occurs in tandem, or in whichever order circumstances allow.

From wargames with red teams to scenarios and software programs, militaries employ a variety of methods for thinking like the enemy. Though these approaches can be helpful, they often lack a truly imaginative spark. They are either grounded in social science theories, which themselves may be of limited reliability, or they draw on the perspectives of those steeped in the American military culture. One less-frequented avenue is to recruit the experts in understanding what drives characters to act. Successful novelists, among others in the arts and humanities, devote themselves to putting themselves into others’ heads. They concentrate on boring down to a character’s essence, stripping away pretext to uncover deep-seated motivations. And they typically achieve this without relying on the latest trend in psychological, sociological, or other social science theories. Instead, they do it the old-fashioned way—through incisive observation and thoughtful analysis of what makes different people tick.

Rather than diverting labor hours, energy, and brain power—not to mention money—to speculating on the unknowable, analysts should instead be concentrating on developing their sense of the enemy as individuals. In recent years, the U.S. military has been turning to outside sources for their insights into enemy intentions. It has increasingly employed the skills of social scientists, particularly anthropologists, to help it traverse complex cultural terrain. It is time now to enlist the aid of more experts in the arts when seeking foresight into others’ actions. To take one example, successful novelists are highly astute at developing strategic empathy for another’s character. They devote themselves to identifying someone’s less obvious drivers and constraints. Likewise, the best actors must learn to get inside another’s head, penetrating to the core of a character’s deepest wants and fears. We do not need an army of Hollywood guilds. What we need is to learn the skills that good fiction writers, actors, and others in the arts and humanities have developed when thinking about what makes a human being tick.

Militaries, by nature, crave metrics and checklists. If it smells too artsy, they think it has no use. This attitude can only act to their detriment, especially for the U.S. military, which finds itself increasingly at odds not only with cultures that are possessed of dramatically divergent perspectives from their own, but also with individuals. The average American Soldier cannot be expected to land in Fallujah or the Korangal Valley and suddenly possess a deep appreciation for what the locals truly want. It is instead the responsibility of strategic planners to seek out all reasonable means of knowing the people—and the persons—with whom that Soldier engages.
In addition to exploring how the arts and humanities develop a sense for others’ key drivers, we could also profit from more in-depth studies of historical figures who have successfully managed to do so. Isaiah Berlin’s dismissal notwithstanding, there may be much to glean from past strategic empaths, not least being some clues for how they achieved their skill. I suspect we might find at least two traits. First, rather than synthesizing vast amounts of information, the best strategic empaths learned how to filter out the ocean of noise and identify the right chunks of data. Second, instead of straining to see patterns in enemy behavior, they focused on the pattern breaks. This means that they, unlike their peers, already had a general sense of the patterns and could quickly spot the breaks. Anyone who ever received a call from a credit card company alerting him to unusual activity on his account knows that MasterCard and Visa employ sophisticated algorithms to identify purchasing patterns and sudden deviations. This is a realm in which computers provide enormous added value. But in the realms where human behavior is less amenable to quantification, we must supplement number crunching with an old-fashioned people sense. It is here that historical records might contain an untapped trove.

The ability to get out of our own minds and into the heads of others is one of the oldest challenges we face. It is tough enough to do it with people we know well. Attempting it with those from foreign cultures is immeasurably harder. It should be obvious that even small-scale, individual actions can never be perfectly anticipated since so much of human behavior rests upon contingencies and chance. That said, we can still enhance our strategic empathy by retraining ourselves to approach prediction differently. We will never find the Maltese Falcon of grand societal predictions. But we can improve our predictions of individual and small group behavior. Even a modest refinement in our ability to think like others could have substantial payoffs both in winning wars and, more crucially, in sustaining the peace. JFQ

5 One recent study of military planning calls for the creation of more flexible, adaptable weapons systems in order to account for our inevitable failure to predict. See Richard Danzig, Driving in the Dark: Ten Propositions About Prediction and National Security (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, October 2011).
6 For more on Gemstone, see Michael Peck, “Firmer Ground: How the U.S. Army is teaching tough-to-simulate COIN and irregular warfare,” Training and Simulation Journal, October 1, 2011.

1 For more on the telescope, see Geoff Andersen, The Telescope: Its History, Technology, and Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) and Mario Biagioli, Galileo’s Instruments of
THE Evolution of Saudi Security and Enforcement Policies on Communication

By NAEF BIN AHMED AL-SAUD

His Royal Highness Brigadier General Naef Bin Ahmed Al-Saud of the Royal Saudi Army holds a doctorate from Cambridge University. His professional focus includes military special operations and international diplomacy.
Communication, including social media, is vital to Saudi policy concerns—pursuant to both national and internal security. The evolution of Saudi security policy on communication and social media is being derived to a significant extent from recent external precedents, particularly government actions in the United States and Great Britain, as well as India, Israel, and other countries. The consensus among such countries appears to be that antiterrorism and other anticrime objectives, including public safety, civil order, and governmental alleviation of economic hardship, take precedence over political notions such as democracy.

Despite broadly analogous restrictions under American, British, Indian, and Israeli laws and government actions, some in the West seem to romanticize social media as a tool for protest in Saudi Arabia. It is therefore ironic that by mid-2011, social media in America, Europe, and Israel expedited the organization of large illegal protests by citizens against their own governments, as a function of economic deprivation that could not be adequately resolved by political activities associated with democracy. In recent years, Saudi government policies have focused on economic development intended in part to address the concerns of its citizens, which has so far tangentially preempted widespread social media–organized unrest that other countries have begun to experience.

This article argues that Saudi Arabia and many other nations have found that communication access, particularly including social media and the Internet generally, may both facilitate and co-opt antigovernment protests and criminal acts including terrorism. Moreover, and analogous to usage by other governments such as those of the United States and Israel, communication infrastructure may be deployed by the Saudi government to track and arrest criminals, including potential terrorists. In fact, relevant Saudi laws may be deemed analogous to U.S. national and internal security policies upheld by Supreme Court decisions. Saudi laws may also be broadly analogous to restrictive Indian Internet laws in the world’s largest democracy. Next, the article argues that the Kingdom’s experience with Internet technologies is that they provide effective communication methods toward rehabilitation of terrorists and other criminals. The analysis concludes by observing that America and other countries may wish to learn from the Saudi experience in antiterrorism and other criminal rehabilitation through social media. However, social media–organized protests by Israelis due to economic hardship may possibly lead to greater Israeli compassion for Palestinian economic hardship under occupation.

**Lessons from Israel and Great Britain**

By mid-2011, the Israeli government faced public protests, which were brought about by widespread economic deprivation. Some estimate over a quarter million Israelis participated in protests at some point—similarly organized by cell phone and social media, particularly Facebook. An editorial in London’s Financial Times stated, “a perception that too many people cannot make ends meet, or even live in outright poverty, motivates Israelis as did Tunisians and Egyptians in January and February . . . .” It is evident that public spending on education and healthcare is low partly because the [Israeli] government’s military budget is so high. Nothing better illustrates how a peace deal with the Palestinians would benefit Israeli society as a whole.” Among the poorest are Israel’s Arab citizens and orthodox Jews. Another commentator in the Financial Times points out that Israeli discontent is also caused to a significant extent by a widespread resentment that the country may be under the influence of powerful, small interest groups including Israeli settlers in the occupied territories: the “settlers . . . enjoy cheap, subsidized housing and benefit from public services that are far superior to those available to Israelis living inside the Green Line.”

Such mounting evidence of resentment driven by social media—by Israelis inside Israel against Israeli settlers in the occupied territories—may have a powerful, positive impact on Middle East peace. In any case, such protests have not been limited to Israel and the Arab world. In early August 2011, more reverberations from riots in Tunisia and Egypt appeared across London and other locations in the United Kingdom, turning several areas into “quasi-war zones.” These events were organized by social media including Twitter and Facebook, as well as BlackBerry Messenger. The police called the unrest the worst in memory, and the streets of London were flooded with 16,000 police officers.

At the height of the 2011 London riots, which seem to be known as Britain’s “intifada
of the underclass,” one of Prime Minister David Cameron’s former advisors pointed out that the rioting youth “have nothing to lose and nothing to gain.” British rioters believed that their lives were going nowhere because they were “further than ever from the sort of wealth that makes them adults. A career, a home of your own—the things that can be ruined by riots—are out of sight.” One woman who carried a television out of a store justified her action by stating, “I’m taking my taxes back.”

According to an editorial in the Financial Times in early August 2011, the government “lost control of England’s streets. [The unrest] has exploded into an orgy of arson, looting and feral violence which has spread through the capital and to other English cities... The government must now do what is necessary to regain control of the nation’s streets.” Cameron tackled the threat of social media, stating during an emergency parliamentary session: “Everyone watching these horrific actions will be struck by how they were organized via social media,” noting the government’s need to “stop people communicating via these Web sites and services when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and criminality... Free flow of information can be used for good. But it can also be used for ill. And when people are using social media for violence, we need to stop them.” According to Cameron, the British government would not be deterred by “phoney human rights concerns.”

Beyond such declarations, one mainstream British publication observed that the London rioters were able to “terrorize” their own countrymen, and that the government considered deploying the British army into the streets.

Thus, Saudi Arabia’s security policy on communication including the Internet and social media may need to evolve in this direction as well, with contingency plans for Saudi military deployment to protect the people and in support of the Kingdom’s other security and law enforcement institutions. At the same time, it is crucial to note that in early 2011, before the protests broke out in Israel and Great Britain, the Kingdom announced $35 billion in government spending for unemployment benefits, housing subsidies, and other social programs. With these developments in mind, Saudi policies continue to address economic security—and by logical extension, social media as a function of national and internal security—which would appear to be roughly analogous to conclusions reached by Israel and Great Britain.

Ultimately, Western leaders do not want to see “social media” sources organize large protests erupting in Riyadh or downtown Beijing. The serious risk is that Western oil traders and other Western financiers could get nervous due to miscalculations of risk—causing oil prices to skyrocket—and Western economies could finally collapse.

According to a report, curiously entitled “America Fears the Great Brawl of China,” there are an “estimated 18,000 riots, strikes and protests that break out in China” each year. Consider the global economic destruction if such unrest were to become much more organized through social media or other Internet facilities. According to one Western media dispatch on China, “Since the nationwide student-led protests of 1989, the educated urban elite has mostly been politically quiescent. But the party fears them far more than it does unruly farmers or migrants. Beijing’s center was flooded with police earlier this year when calls for an Arab-style ‘jasmine revolution’ circulated on the internet.”

A postscript on developments in Libya makes clear that economic deprivation is at the root of instability and may not necessarily alter circumstances by simply changing regimes. According to Anthony Cordesman, “We need to recognize that Libya—like all of the other states that have become increasingly unstable since early 2011—is not going to suddenly emerge with stable politics, effective governance, security and human rights for its people, or an economy that offers jobs, development, and a fair share of the nation’s income.” The risk is that when established governments fall, violence and instability may grow over the long term, rather than Western notions of democracy or peace.

Social Media Impacts on Saudi Security Laws

In 2009, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested a social worker for using Twitter by spreading information to protesters about American police movements at the Group of 20 summit of global leaders in the United States. It turned out that while protesters were using social media to try to help other protesters escape arrest, the police were also monitoring the social media site to keep informed about protesters. The protester who was arrested claimed that the FBI wanted to crush “dissent.”

Protesters and pundits in other countries may also make false claims about crushing dissent when, as in the United States, Great Britain, and other countries, the government imperative is to protect civilians from protesters who may turn violent. This extends to the Saudi government’s objective to monitor and defeat the use of social media in any potential terror-related or illegal means, which broadly parallels U.S. security policies upheld by Supreme Court decisions.

A 2010 Supreme Court decision, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, made clear that almost all types of support for groups labeled as terrorists are banned, apparently even if the support may turn out to be advice favoring nonviolence. In 2008, the U.S. Government started an investigation leading to that court case when activists began planning to hold large demonstrations against war. Analogous to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Kingdom restricts those who might try to provide any type of support for terrorists, including communication, whether by social media or other means. Also analogous to FBI investigations, the Saudi government has been known to monitor groups in the Kingdom, or communications about the Kingdom focused on various types of innocent-sounding “rights,” particularly when such rights may turn out to involve any type of communication or support whatsoever with respect to terrorism.

Consider the following. In mid-June 2011, the Washington Post published a report on FBI raids of homes belonging to labor organizers and peace activists. The American activists appear to have publicly
criticized—including via social media—American foreign policy toward South America and the Middle East. They claimed that the U.S. Government was using antiterrorism policies as a pretext to target them for their political opinions. The FBI was looking toward the possibility that these citizens may have provided “material support”—which the citizens denied—for Palestinians and Colombians on U.S. Government terror suspect lists. Most of the Americans raided were non-Muslim and, according to one of their lawyers, were “public non-violent activists with long, distinguished careers in public service, including teachers, union organizers and antiwar and community leaders.” Thus, Saudi Arabia’s national security and internal security approaches do not appear to be more restrictive than the U.S. Government’s deployment of FBI raids on American activists and organizers who have used social media to spread political opinions criticizing U.S. foreign policy and possibly implicating “material support” for terror suspects.

Even apart from terrorism, public safety is a paramount concern for government entities that may need to take action by monitoring communication, whether through social media or analogously by cell phone. For example, in mid-August 2011, San Francisco transportation officials turned off cell phone underground service for several hours in order to maintain public safety by stopping a planned protest discovered on the Web site of a protest organizer.

Some in the United States compared the San Francisco transportation agency strategy of temporarily cutting off cell phone use to former President Hosni Mubarak’s strategy of cutting off Internet and cell phone services in order to quell protests by the Egyptian people. Other research indicates that Mubarak may have made a mistake in doing so. When Egyptian cell phone and Internet services were disrupted on January 28, 2011, unrest apparent increased instead of decreased. The cutoff caused more civilians to become aware and interested, while more people became involved in communicating face-to-face with greater street presence, and communication became more decentralized and harder to control than simply large gatherings in Tahrir Square. (In contrast to the situation in Egypt involving communication cutoff, the Libyan uprising may have been relentless largely due to North Atlantic Treaty Organization support for the rebels including strategic bombing, access to drones and other intelligence, and other assistance.)

San Francisco’s local government determined that it had a legal right to turn off cell phone service on its property under a 1969 ruling by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio. In this case, the Supreme Court decided that a government may stop speech that could incite activity considered unlawful (beyond merely advocating violence). In 2011, mass violence apparently did not occur within San Francisco’s transportation system, but the local government believed that violence might possibly occur imminently if it did not cut off communication. Thus, even in America, as in Saudi Arabia, it is legal for a government institution to cut off communication in the interests of public safety and security if there is a chance that it could prevent protests that might possibly lead to violence— if considered to be imminent—whether or not violence later occurs.

Analogous to the Supreme Court ruling in Brandenburg, other nations including Saudi Arabia and India place restrictions on speech that may possibly be communicated to incite unlawful activity—whether by social media or other means. In mid-2011, for example, India issued Internet rules to strengthen security and place limits on information, including content that might be considered “insulting” or “blasphemous” or “harmful” to any country.

Indian cyber cafés, Web sites, and search engines may be liable to the government for any offending Internet content, including social media. According to the Indian government, its rules weigh security and freedom, deriving inspiration from laws in other democratic countries. According to the deputy minister responsible for information technology and communication, Sachin Pilot, “We must draw a distinction between freedom of expression and freedom of expression with intent to harm or defame someone.”

Analogous to both Indian law and the Supreme Court’s holding in Brandenburg, under Saudi law, mainstream media (including the print media) and Internet sites (including blogs) are restricted from “damaging the country’s public affairs,” or delivering insults to senior clerics, or “inciting divisions between citizens,” among other violations. Also analogous to Indian law and the Supreme Court’s holding in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, Saudi proposed laws pending in the Shura Council would punish anyone who may be supporting terrorism by any means, such as “harming the interests of the state” or “endangering national unity.”

In Saudi Arabia, activism online has thus far not created significant challenges to the Royal family or the rest of the government. For example, a “day of rage” organized via social media, including Facebook, fizzled out. In any case, King Abdullah has ensured that newspapers, and by implication social media, have considerable freedom to question religious clerics, discuss the rights of women, report on police abuse, and so forth. Thus, for example, religious clerics may be criticized or questioned in public media or forums, but not personally attacked.

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**Saudi Arabia would be willing to advise Western institutions on structuring effective social media programs to rehabilitate a broad spectrum of violent criminals**

When foreigners aim to influence events under a particular nation’s control, whether by social media or otherwise, that nation may take it upon itself to expel or repel such foreigners. By further extrapolation, a nation may request assistance from another in such security matters—as Bahrain had to ask for Saudi assistance in 2011—due to concerns about the disruptive influence of foreigners that would appear to have been greater national security threats than those faced by Israel from self-proclaimed Westerners aiming to visit Palestinian lands under occupation and use social media to spread international awareness.

**Saudi Social Media Strategies**

While the Western approach toward violence caused by social media substantially concentrates on punishment, a separate example of the Saudi government’s social media approach to counterterrorism is the Sakina program, which has achieved considerable success in persuading radically inclined...
youth toward moderation. The program is run by a nongovernmental organization supported by the Interior Ministry, Education Ministry, and Islamic Affairs Ministry. Sakina’s religious experts deploy social media to hold online discussions in chat rooms with people who initially seem to support extremist views. The experts aim to ask online extremist sympathizers why they seem to believe in religious violence, and then the experts point out how those views contradict the peaceful teachings of Islam.

Such dialogues via social media have had a multiplier effect against violence due to their perpetual availability online where others can read and share them. Violence in the Kingdom has been drastically reduced since authorities started becoming involved in such social media. Saudi advice has been sought by numerous other Arab countries wishing to structure similar antiviolence social media programs.42

One analyst in the West observed that the Sakina program has “international appeal” as it draws audiences and interaction throughout the Middle East as well as the West and particularly the United States.43 It thus stands to reason that if asked, Saudi Arabia would be willing to advise Western institutions on structuring effective social media programs to rehabilitate a broad spectrum of violent criminals typically indigenous to and rampant in the West—not merely limited to terrorists.

Coincidentally, by late June/early July 2011, several mainstream Western media (not just social media) reports appeared concerning Google’s self-proclaimed “idea” to try using social media against extremists. Curiously, Saudi Arabia’s preexisting Sakina program was not emphasized. But at least one of the leaders of the new Google project was formerly with the U.S. Department of State. Is it possible that State Department personnel who now work with social media against extremism may not be aware of highly successful preexisting Saudi social media programs against extremism? It would appear that top individuals in the Kingdom may need to be more high profile in deploying mainstream media to proclaim the success of particular Saudi policies, especially pertaining to broad social media access and effective nonviolence programs.

As one mainstream European media source pointed out about the new Google social media antiterrorism program, “to solve the problems of violent extremism, clever technology and algorithms are only a sideshow.”44 The Saudi approach to antiviolence programs does not rely on social media programs alone, but further deploys highly qualified experts, along with available rehabilitation programs and incentives for success.

Tangentially, given the importance of Palestinian welfare to Saudi national security, the Kingdom’s policies may develop in the direction of supporting social media to provide similar success in encouraging Israelis, Palestinians, and other Arabs to get to know each other at least initially over the Internet while discussing sports, photography, and other common interests—including peace prospects.45 These days, physical interactions between Palestinians and Israelis tend to be constricted to army checkpoints.46 At least one Facebook site appears to encourage peaceful coexistence, as Israeli President Shimon Peres and the President of the Palestinian Authority both posted welcome messages.47 Behold the future of Middle East peace.

Conclusion

It is worth noting that social media are increasingly being used by Arabs and Israelis to promote communication toward peaceful coexistence. Such efforts deserve support as an evolving part of Saudi security policy on social media, particularly if some of the many Israelis now protesting their government’s economic deprivation also use social media to help Palestinians under occupation travel to Tel Aviv to protest economic deprivation without access to meaningful careers, decent housing, world-class health care, or education. Ultimately, further development toward well-targeted Saudi-supported social media policies could catalyze profound achievements toward Middle East peace. JFQ

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Global Dispersion, Global Sustainment

A Mandate for a Global Logistics Organization?

By C. V. Christianson

Lieutenant General C.V. Christianson, USA (Ret.), is the Director of the Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics at the National Defense University.
For the past several years, my position regarding whether or not the United States “needs” a global logistics command has been represented many ways—sometimes in ways that were unfamiliar to me. I thought it important to take this opportunity to offer my thoughts on this subject, and hopefully to open meaningful dialogue in an area with the potential to fundamentally change how we enable the Nation to project and sustain its forces.

Most defense analysts agree that the future operating environment will be unstable, uncertain, and complex. These attributes call for U.S. military capabilities that are adaptive—able to quickly and precisely respond to emerging conditions in a constantly changing operating environment. Although there seems to be strong consensus about the future attributes, I am not certain that there is agreement on what the implications of that future environment are for U.S. logistics capabilities (resources, processes, policies, and organizations).

One characteristic of this future environment will have a major impact on how we provide logistics support to our forces: global dispersion. There should be no doubt that potential adversaries will attempt to thrive in the least governed areas of the globe, and if we, as a nation, are to deal with them, we will find ourselves operating in remote, harsh, and globally distributed locations. This global dispersion is a profound problem for logicians that, when coupled with the environmental attributes described above, should drive us toward sustainment concepts that are based on the imperative to respond rapidly and precisely to changing requirements. If “rapid and precise” were to become the overarching metrics of success for an uncertain, globally dispersed environment, we should be asking ourselves if we have the best logistics structure to meet that outcome. The purpose of this article is to offer an idea of how to partially answer that question, and in doing so, to clarify my personal views regarding a “global logistics organization.”

Before addressing the issue of organizational design, it is important to provide my underlying assumptions. I am assuming that the preeminence of the Services with respect to their Title X responsibilities will remain in place. In other words, the Services will continue to be held responsible to raise, train, equip, and maintain our forces, and those forces will be made available to the joint force commander (JFC) for employment. Secondly, I assume that the JFC’s authorities as defined by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 will remain unchanged. And last, I assume that a 21st-century organization does not have to “own” all of the assets needed to effectively and efficiently deliver a harmonized outcome. Given these constraints, let us take a look at the heart of our ability to sustain operations: the defense supply chain.

The Defense Supply Chain

The ability of commercial providers to effectively respond to their customers’ needs has been supported primarily by the modernization of their supply chains. This incredible commercial success has been the result of four key principles: the effective integration of supply chain processes; the ability of distributors to provide highly reliable, time-definite delivery to the customer; the transparency provided into and across supply chains for all the players; and optimizing supply chain performance against common outcomes. Taken together, these four principles have revolutionized the commercial market space and serve as a foundation for my ideas in the military sphere. In developing an organizational option for better performance, I have tried to discern what could be learned from the commercial world’s success and how those lessons might be applied to the defense supply chain to significantly improve the ability to support the needs of the customer—the members of the joint force. If we can coalesce around these few key principles of commercial success, we could use them to help design an organizational option that would deliver significant value.

In the commercial space, supply chain processes have been integrated for the most part through a single organizational element responsible for harmonizing a company’s supply chain operations. These control elements ensure that the needs of the customer are directly linked to the source of supply, and that the two are tied together with an efficient and effective distribution system. Furthermore, they ensure that commercial supply chain planning is done in a collaborative and transparent manner. The defense supply chain, however, has no equivalent organization responsible for its overall performance.

Since the defense supply chain is not blessed with a single “organization” or element responsible for ensuring that supply and distribution operations are in harmony, it is a logical and relatively easy step to declare that we should have such an organization. But in many respects, the defense supply chain looks very different from the commercial model, and that fact is often used as a rationale against making changes. The primary players in the defense supply chain do not look like what we see in the commercial space. The defense supply chain does have a global distributor—the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)—which has been designated the distribution process owner. But we also have a distribution command in the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and we have two Services that execute distribution activities at the operational level through executive agent authorities. The supply chain has, for the most part, a global supplier in DLA, but significant supplier activities are also taking place in each of the Services for critical components. Additionally, we have lots of “sourcing” activities being conducted that cannot be seen by DLA, even though those activities could be for supply items that DLA is responsible for managing. Also, we must not forget that industry is an important player—maybe the most critical element of all—to defense supply chain success; for it is within industry that we ultimately find the “source” of our logistics support. Given this background, what options do we have?

The Status Quo-Plus

One option is to continue with our current organizational design and find ways to deliver following the principles of supply chain success described earlier:

- Integrating supply chain processes that are “owned” by the Services, USTRANSCOM, DLA, industry, and members of the joint force would be possible. Although possible,
this kind of integration would be very difficult given that these organizational elements do not always share a common view of the outcome that the supply chain is to deliver, do not share common financial processes to unite their efforts, and do not have information systems that enable the sharing of supply chain data.

- Providing expected delivery times would also be possible within the current organizational construct, and we could do so at a level of reliability that exceeds 90 percent. But it will not be easy given that the current design insulates supply chain members from each other, and we rarely, if ever, measure order fulfillment from the customer's end of the supply chain. In fact, we really do not measure reliability today; we measure our performance on the average only for those items we deliver.

- Providing transparency under the current structure could be accomplished, but sharing information among the many different players will require some significant data management policy changes and openness. Delivering transparency will be a challenge regardless of organizational design, if for no other reason than the assumptions stated at the beginning of this article. However, bridging the systems gap will be the key to achieving the principle of transparency.

- The last principle—optimizing against a common outcome—is the ultimate goal of a 21st-century supply chain, whether it be defense or commercial. In the current design, we will be challenged to work through differing organizational cultures, disconnected internal financial and business processes, and differing views on the outcomes we want to achieve.

Although it is possible to accomplish these principles without changing our organizations, I do not think we can effectively cross the barriers that stand in our way. Is there a better way to design our organizations to more effectively and efficiently achieve the outcomes these principles demand? I believe there is. My first priority in finding a better way is to look at the defense distribution process because distribution is the common thread that binds a supply chain together. In the commercial space, as previously mentioned, it has been the distributor's ability to provide highly reliable, time-definite delivery that has fundamentally changed the way the world does business. In the distributed operating environment of defense, I believe that our work should start and end with the distribution process.

**Distribution**

USTRANSCOM, as the distribution process owner, has most of the tools today to be as effective as any commercial distributor—most, but not all. What could be done organizationally to give USTRANSCOM an enhanced capability to provide time-definite delivery? What might this new organization look like if it were to reflect cutting-edge distribution capabilities in support of the joint force?

First, each of its distribution components (mode operators) should have the same set of capabilities for the mode they represent. Using Air Mobility Command as a template, that would require the Services to assign to their USTRANSCOM components the units and equipment related to delivering distribution support through the operational level. Specifically, it would require giving this organization’s Service components the distribution assets necessary to assure responsiveness to operational needs. As an example, the Army would move all of its surface transportation/distribution assets above the brigade combat team level to its USTRANSCOM component to form a global surface (road, rail, and inland waterways) distribution organization. Each of USTRANSCOM’s functional distribution components would then be able to integrate the distribution process from end to end, working with each other to design distribution networks that reflect the best use of multimodal operations in support of joint force requirements, sharing information across the distribution network to ensure visibility and control, and linking with the elements of the joint force to ensure rapid and flexible throughput to the customer/tactical level.

To fully achieve world-class success, DLA’s Defense Distribution Command (DDC) could become a functional component of USTRANSCOM or the U.S. Army’s Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, with its mission remaining to operate the distribution centers based in the continental United States. However, this new DDC would also be responsible for maintaining a capability to deploy forward to establish and operate distribution center activities at the operational level in support of the joint force, and to extend the defense distribution network in support of operational requirements.

Last, to ensure that we are able to project and sustain the joint force in support of national interests, the responsibility for the global distribution en route infrastructure should be given to USTRANSCOM. The current policy of making the regional combatants responsible for en route infrastructure and then fighting through Service component funding mechanisms to support global distribution needs does not reflect best business practices. In its role as the distribution process owner, and with its responsibility to support the projection of the joint force, USTRANSCOM is in the best position to discern where the Defense Department should invest its next dollar in infrastructure to support that mission.

These organizational changes would give USTRANSCOM the capabilities to truly become world-class as the global distributor for the joint force and the Nation. We should expect that our distribution network would be better integrated, more visible, more responsive, and, over time, more economical as USTRANSCOM drives down the costs to meet joint force needs.

**Supply**

The actions above, if taken, would clearly impact DLA, but that impact could be positive if the actions are taken in conjunction with the recommendations for the supply process discussed below. Removing the distribution mission from DLA’s portfolio will enable its role as a global supplier to the joint force, and as part of this new organizational design, I envision DLA as having the same portfolio for supply that USTRANSCOM has for distribution. But we cannot just take the DDC out of DLA; we must do more to achieve world-class levels of supplier performance. Some critical imperatives toward this end are listed below:

- First and foremost, the global supplier must have visibility over the supply requirements of the joint force, regardless of how
or where those requirements are fulfilled. For example, all local purchases should be visible to the global supplier so we can deliver the most accurate forecasts and reduce any duplication in the sourcing process. This does not imply that DLA would "control" local purchases, but rather that the agency must be able to see those purchases. Additionally, the global supplier must be an integral part of the joint planning process to ensure that forecasted support is harmonized with operational requirements.

- The global supplier must have visibility over customer receipt so the supply chain can truly measure order fulfillment. Ultimately, we want to hold DLA accountable for fulfillment at the customer level, which means that DLA, as the supplier, will tell the customer when the requirement will arrive. The implication here is that we should expect complete harmony between the supplier (DLA) and the distributor (USTRANSCOM).

- The global supplier must be an integral part of all maintenance and repair planning activities at the national level; this includes depot operations and systems development operations.

Command, Control, Coordination, and Collaboration

It is not possible to achieve the principles of supply chain success without changing our structures. By making the changes articulated above, we would have a much better chance of success. If we were to "create" a global organization to coordinate distribution and supply as outlined previously, what might it look like? Today’s USTRANSCOM is not that organization—it could be, but not as it is currently structured. USTRANSCOM is fundamentally a transportation headquarters—that is its heritage, that is its DNA. What we need is a global supply chain organization that reflects a merger of supply and distribution.

USTRANSCOM is the proper headquarters around which to build a new global support organization that would be held responsible to respond to the needs of the joint force—in other words, an organizational element with joint components that blend both the distribution and supply processes in support of joint force requirements. In order for this new organization to achieve the supply chain principles described, it has to change. The new organization has to look and feel like a global supply chain organization; it must be focused on customer outcomes and optimizing the performance of its functional components.

Structurally, this organization would consist of its headquarters and five functional component commands. Its functional commands would include the following: three modal components (air, land, and sea) with the assets to reach into the operational area; a distribution operations component with the capability to provide flexible and adaptive distribution center support down to the operational level; and a global supply component focused on meeting the joint customers’ supply requirements.

At the headquarters level, this organization would be structured around its global supply and distribution mission. Existing world-class, global commercial structures could be used as a baseline for the design, with the headquarters focusing on supply chain planning, flexible response, global risk analysis, and customer outcomes.

The global nature of U.S. interests and our national imperative to project and sustain forces anywhere on the planet mandate that we review organizational structures that were designed for a different place and time. I support the need for a global organization that can move the joint force to where it needs to be, as well as integrate and optimize the defense supply chain in ways that will enable adaptive support and respond to the needs of the joint force with speed and precision. That organization does not exist today. It should be created soon. JFQ
Facing major budget cuts, the Department of Defense is entering the first phase of what will be a bruising budget battle. With U.S. participation in the war in Iraq essentially over, and the war in Afghanistan winding down, a central issue will be what capabilities the United States requires in its future force structure.

As Frank Hoffman noted in April 2009, the force structure discussion has developed four schools of thought:

1. Counterinsurgents, who emphasize the high likelihood and rising salience of irregular adversaries
2. Traditionalists, who place their focus on states that present conventional threats
3. Utility Infielders, who balance risk by striving to create forces agile enough to cover the full spectrum of conflict
4. Division of Labor proponents, who balance risk differently by specializing forces to cover different missions to enhance readiness.

The structure and, to a certain degree, size of U.S. forces will depend heavily on which of these schools of thought guides the Pentagon’s decisionmaking. Each school has its own proponents. The decisions will impact hundreds of billions in investment over the next decade and will shape the thinking of a generation of defense leaders.

However, it is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate these schools of thought. Rather, the discussion is limited to why the current U.S. approach to counterinsurgency is failing, why the United States will nevertheless have to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the future, and what COIN approach has worked in the past. Finally, the article closes with suggestions for how future force structure can incorporate a COIN capability at a reasonable cost.

Counterinsurgency Not a Strategy, But a Necessary Capability

By T. X. Hammes

Dr. T.X. Hammes, a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer, is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University.
that [U.S. Army retired General Stanley] McChrystal championed and [U.S. Army retired General David] Petraeus virtually invented may be fatally flawed, at least as it’s practiced in Afghanistan.” Hirsh is only one of the voices questioning whether the “COIN strategy” now in use by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan can succeed.

Despite the sharp criticism, ISAF has a number of vocal supporters of its COIN strategy—not the least being General Petraeus and U.S. Marine Corps General John Allen. These supporters state that, prior to 2009, ISAF was not using a COIN strategy and therefore was losing. They contend that General McChrystal’s adoption of COIN strategy fundamentally altered ISAF’s approach and is the route to success. These proponents point to the recent progress in raising and training Afghan National Security Forces; the increasing presence of U.S. advisors with those Afghan forces as the Afghans take the lead; the expansion of security to larger segments of the population; the improvements in U.S. intelligence efforts that allow extensive targeting of Taliban leaders; and some improvements in the capacity of the Afghan government. They state these efforts reflect a genuine COIN strategy. More precisely, it is population-centric counterinsurgency.

Unfortunately, this conflation of COIN techniques and strategy by participants in the discussion is not helpful.

Why Counterinsurgency Is Not a Strategy

Any discussion of future force structure must recognize that counterinsurgency is not a strategy, but merely one possible way in the ends-ways-means concept of strategy. Thus, the discussion of a COIN strategy is misleading. The very phrase COIN strategy confuses a method or way of fighting with an operational technique. Counterinsurgency is not a strategy but rather a range of possible ways in the ends, ways, and means formulation of strategy. Furthermore, population-centric counterinsurgency, as documented in Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency, is only one possible approach to counterinsurgency. Unfortunately, the United States seems to have taken one doctrinal approach to a specific problem—insurgency—and elevated it to the level of strategy. A disturbingly large portion of the discourse within the U.S.

Government simply accepts FM 3–24’s recommended best practices and accepts that, if applied as a package, they create a strategy. Yet by nature, best practices in counterinsurgency are essentially tactical—or, at the most, operational-level efforts.

In fact, there is no general COIN strategy, just as there is no antisubmarine or antiaircraft strategy. One does not develop a strategy against an operational technique. Rather, each specific conflict requires the development of a strategy that includes assumptions, coherent ends-ways-means, priorities, sequencing of events, and a theory of victory. And any strategy must be designed to be flexible enough to respond to the innumerable changes that are an inherent part of any conflict. A strategy devised for Iraq simply will not work under the very different political, social, and economic conditions of Afghanistan.

Rather than unquestioningly accepting that COIN strategy is the correct solution to a conflict, planners must start by first understanding the specific conflict. Since it will be impossible to know everything necessary to develop a strategy, they must next think through and clearly state their assumptions about that specific conflict. With this level of understanding, they will be ready to start the difficult process of developing coherent ends, ways, and means; prioritizing and sequencing their actions; and developing a theory of victory. Only then will they have a strategy that is appropriate for the actual conflict.

With this clarification, it is possible to move on to a discussion of why the United States requires a COIN capability and how it can achieve that capability at a relatively low cost.

A COIN Capability Is Needed

While one might think the discussion of the validity of counterinsurgency as a concept will lose its importance as the United States withdraws from Afghanistan, the question has enduring relevance. One of the critical issues facing the Pentagon is building the appropriate force structure in the resource-constrained, post-Afghanistan period. The United States must balance the risk of not being prepared in some mission areas against the ongoing cost of maintaining readiness across the spectrum of conflict. If the COIN skeptics prevail, then the United States may choose to severely reduce or eliminate the capabilities necessary for fighting an insurgency. In short, the Pentagon could choose the
same route it chose in the late 1970s, which left the country unprepared for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

However, the discussion of COIN strategy is problematic because it clouds the real issue. Rather than arguing about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a nonexistent strategy, we need to be discussing more fundamental questions. Does the United States need to maintain COIN capabilities in its national security tool kit? If so, what should such capabilities focus on? Answers to these questions are an essential part of answering the larger question concerning future U.S. force structure.

Much like after the Vietnam War, the presence of a potential peer competitor strongly reinforces the argument that counterinsurgency is not an appropriate mission for resource-constrained armed forces. Many defense analysts see China as the primary threat and wish to focus U.S. defense efforts on a naval and air campaign in the Far East. Advocates for this position believe the decade of COIN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has starved the Navy and Air Force. They feel that investment post-Afghanistan must focus on ensuring we maintain our edge against the rising threats in these arenas—and that, with pending budget cuts, the United States must focus its decreasing assets against China. In short: hard times mean hard choices.

Drivers of Insurgency

As much as the American military would like to turn away from its bitter experiences with insurgency, the fact remains that insurgents, in a variety of forms, will threaten U.S. national interests and thus our forces must be prepared to respond. However, in thinking about what forms this response will take, U.S. planners must understand that over the last 60 years the primary drivers of insurgency have changed. The initial major driver—anticolonialism—has obviously passed. Colonial powers have been driven out. Their withdrawal led directly to the second major driver of insurgencies—conflicts over who will rule the state the colonists established and left behind. A clear example of this motivation is the long war over who would rule Angola: the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola or the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

A third driver has now emerged—the desire to change the colonial borders that were drawn without any consideration of local ethnic, cultural, and religious networks. We are seeing an increase in conflicts in regions where colonial borders artificially divided much older cultures. The Pashtuns and Balouch of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran are prime examples. They join the Kurds of the Middle East in struggling against the colonial boundaries. We are also seeing the emergence of transborder separatist movements in several nations in Africa. The different drivers have dramatically changed the character of the insurgencies, their organization, and their approach to gaining power. It has not changed the fact that they will use force to achieve their goals.

Inevitably, whether the conflict is over the control of existing borders or the need to change borders, some of these conflicts will impact the strategic interests of the United States. Whether through destabilizing important allies or impinging on world energy supplies, these conflicts will be important to the United States. Some parties to the conflicts will also provide either sanctuaries or safe havens for terrorists who are focused on striking the United States or its allies. In short, U.S. interest in insurgency and, of necessity, counterinsurgency will continue.

Range of Approaches

However, that does not mean we should look to the Iraq or Afghan campaigns when
considering the appropriate force structure. While FM 3-24 focuses on population-centric counterinsurgency, recent history has shown there are actually a wide variety of approaches that can be used. Some are not appropriate for a liberal democracy, but it is important that those thinking about counterinsurgency recognize that many methods exist.

Three methods not appropriate for a liberal democracy are deportation, ruthless suppression, and in-migration. In 1944, the Soviets deported the Chechens and Ingush from their native territory and spread them throughout the Soviet Union as “special settlers.” Although the Chechens and Ingush had not been disloyal, Stalin used this deportation as a preemptive measure. In Maoist terms, he drained the sea. It worked. Even after the Chechens were allowed to return in 1959, they did not revolt. It was not until 1994 following the collapse of the Soviet Union that they declared independence.

This time the Russians attempted ruthless suppression of the entire population in an effort to destroy the insurgency—it failed. This approach also failed in Afghanistan despite the Soviets’ willingness to kill more than 1 million Afghans. However, massive suppression and terror can work. For example, in 1982, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad used this approach to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood. Backed by ruthless security agencies, this approach suppressed dissent for almost 30 years.

The Chinese developed a third approach in dealing with the Uyghur people. China provided sufficient economic incentives to encourage huge numbers of Han Chinese to move to Xinjiang Province. As a result, the Uyghur have become a minority in their home territory. Essentially, the Chinese changed the salinity of the sea.

While these methods are not palatable for democracies, others are. For insurgencies dependent on charismatic leaders, decapitation has worked. By capturing Abimael Guzman, the Peruvians crippled the Sendero Luminoso insurgency.

In addition, counterinsurgency that focuses on the enemy or population has been used repeatedly by democracies. Britain used this approach in Malaya, Kenya, Oman, Northern Ireland, and Aden. The United States has used it in the Philippines (1899–1902, 1946–1954, 2001–present), Vietnam, El Salvador, Colombia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. While these campaigns are obviously of interest, the most important question is what approaches have worked best for the United States as an expeditionary power.

**What Has Worked?**

When discussing the future of counterinsurgency for the United States, it is essential to differentiate between those approaches that worked for domestic counterinsurgency and those that work for expeditionary counterinsurgency. FM 3-24 drew most of its best practices from the domestic COIN efforts of the British in Malaya and Northern Ireland and the French in Algeria. In all three cases, the counterinsurgent was also the government. Thus, they could make the government legitimate by removing any person or organization that was hurting its legitimacy. This was also the approach the United States used in the Philippines between 1900 and 1902.

However, in expeditionary counterinsurgency, it is much more difficult for the outside power to force the host country to make the necessary political changes. As the United States experienced in Vietnam and Afghanistan and the Soviets in Afghanistan, an outside power could not force the government to be legitimate. Even removing illegitimate leaders and replacing them with those picked by the expeditionary power failed.

That said, the United States has been successful at expeditionary counterinsurgency. U.S. efforts to assist the Philippines in the 1950s and again from 2001 to the present, Thailand in the 1960s and 1970s, El Salvador in the 1980s, and Colombia against its insurgents in the 1990s and 2000s have all been successful. In each case, the United States used an indirect approach. The indirect approach meant that U.S. personnel provided advice and support to host nation forces as those nations fought. While this support at times even included tactical leadership, the focus was always on assisting the host nation and not on U.S. forces engaging the enemy. In addition, these efforts were kept relatively small. This had two major benefits. First, it kept the U.S. presence from distorting the local political and economic reality too badly. Second, it prevented impatient Americans from attempting to do the job themselves because they simply lacked the resources.

**Implications for Force Structure**

Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan have demonstrated that using a direct approach to population-centric counterinsurgency is manpower intensive and actually reduces the political leverage the United States has with the host country government. In contrast, the Philippines, Thailand, El Salvador, and Colombia demonstrated that an indirect support can both drive a population-centric approach and provide greater leverage over the host government. If the host government refuses to make the necessary political reforms to generate popular support, the United States can disengage without a major loss of face. Host nation politicians understand this fact and thus have to deal with the real possibility of losing U.S. support. In contrast, when the United States has made a major commitment of its own troops and prestige, host nation politicians have repeatedly refused to modify their behavior, seeming to believe the United States could not or would not back out of such a major commitment. In fact, until the U.S. population grew tired of the commitment, it did not. Actually, the United States stayed well past the point when it was clear the host nation government was simply not going to make the changes necessary for population-centric counterinsurgency to work.

Thus, although the United States must maintain a capability to intervene in insurgencies that threaten its vital interests, that does not mean maintaining a major portion of its force structure for that mission. Rather, it means studying the successful expeditionary COIN campaigns of the United States and other liberal democracies and developing a doctrine that uses those approaches. The quick analysis in this paper indicates that an indirect approach, with the United States although the United States must maintain a capability to intervene in insurgencies that threaten its vital interests, that does not mean maintaining a major portion of its force structure for that mission.
limiting itself to training and advising local personnel in conducting a population-centric COIN effort, has the greatest potential. Further study is obviously required, but the cases noted indicate future COIN efforts will rely heavily on Special Forces (not special operations), trainers, and advisors. While this creates a significant demand for more senior personnel, it does not require a major portion of U.S. force structure. It does require updating doctrine, education, training, and personnel systems.

**Doctrine, Education, Training, and Personnel Tracks**

As a number of commentators have noted, it is time to update FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency.* The authors did an exceptional job of pushing this doctrinal publication into print to support the effort in Iraq. However, there is now time to go back and complete the work. The manual must be expanded to include the range of COIN approaches that have worked. The design chapter must also be expanded to guide commanders in developing a true understanding of the situation so they can select an appropriate approach. While the United States has had the most success with indirect and small efforts when conducting expeditionary counterinsurgency, that approach should not be the default position. Instead, the design process must provide an initial understanding of the problem so the commander can select the appropriate response. He must make the choice with the full understanding that his forces’ interaction with the problem will change it and, therefore, the commander and his political bosses must be prepared to change the approach.

In turn, the Services’ educational institutions must ensure their courses deepen the student’s understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency. While the United States might not wish to be engaged in these conflicts in the future, there is a high probability that insurgency will affect areas of vital interest to the Nation. Counterinsurgency must remain a part of the joint community’s repertoire. Course graduates must incorporate what they learned in the training cycles of the organizations they join.

Operationally, the U.S. Government needs to focus on providing effective advisors for those at-risk nations that are of strategic interest. The idea will be to prevent conflicts from maturing into full-scale insurgescences. Clearly, this effort will have to be an all-of-government effort and will require a small training and education element both to prepare personnel for advisory billets and to maintain and update doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

With proper understanding, it becomes clear we do not need large conventional forces dedicated to COIN training. That said, some conventional forces will likely be necessary for a COIN campaign. Sufficient training can be integrated into the training cycle of designated units.

Perhaps the most important changes will be to the personnel system. Changes in doctrine, education, training, and even operations will not have major impacts unless the various government personnel systems recognize counterinsurgency and peace-time advisory billets as career enhancing. To provide the best possible advisors, personnel should first serve in a similar billet in U.S. forces before advising a counterpart in a host nation. Further, they must be appropriately rewarded for assuming these challenging jobs. Advising and the accompanying increased understanding of another culture must be recognized as a critical element in the path to flag or Senior Executive Service rank.

Our understanding of counterinsurgency has been clouded by discussion of “COIN strategy.” We need to move past this discussion and develop the tools to analyze an insurgency, determine an appropriate strategy for that specific case, and then employ the proper elements of the U.S. Government. This does not require a large dedicated force structure, but it does require an understanding that insurgency remains a significant threat and the United States needs to be able to respond appropriately. **JFQ**
We are a school. We here are teachers, and students, and researchers. Many of us are in uniform with obligations to our defense and security establishments, but in the end we are a school with everything that entails—libraries, homework, computers, research, publications, and end-of-term grades... We have this common understanding of the central importance of continuous learning, and that is what we should take as the central motivating force in our institutional relationship.

—Toast in honor of Vietnamese National Defense Academy Commandant General Vo Tien Trung offered by NDU President Vice Admiral Ann E. Rondeau, October 2011, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC.
For as long as nations have had organized militaries, bilateral relations have been marked by exchanges of personnel and knowledge on how each is organized, trained, and equipped. The United States has benefited and helped other nations through such exchanges. One of the most remarkable instances of this kind of exchange is the development of a military-to-military relationship between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). As this bilateral defense relationship evolved, and both sides sought a means of infusing strategic content into the interaction, the relationship between the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, DC, and the National Defense Academy (NDA) in Hanoi took shape. The most recent evidence of success in this

NDU has played an important role in the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Vietnam

increasingly sturdy defense relationship is the visit of Vietnam’s NDA Commandant Lieutenant General Vo Tien Trung to Washington in early October 2011. The general conducted meetings at NDU and conferred with congressional staffers on bilateral defense relations, underscoring significant geopolitical considerations driving Hanoi’s recent commitment to improve the defense and security dimension of the bilateral relationship.

The relationship between NDU and NDA has been built on careful discussions that meet the needs of both nations. NDU, led by President Vice Admiral Ann E. Rondeau, has played an important role in the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Vietnam, especially as both countries sought to elevate the level of interaction. The Vietnamese defense establishment and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) see the relationship as a means of strengthening cooperation between the two militaries. Moreover, both schools are committed to increasing the number of academic exchanges, joint research, communication between subject matter experts, and visits by institutional leaders, faculty, and staffs to the other’s professional military education home. As a part of a larger relationship, this academic engagement has a great deal of promise, but this effort was not achieved overnight. To appreciate the full context of this effort, we need to go back almost a decade.

Setting the Context

During the early 2000s, as the opportunity for improved state relations appeared, senior Vietnamese officials in the Ministries of National Defense (MND) and Foreign Affairs (MFA) consistently made several key points about U.S.-Vietnamese ties, offering a recipe for improving bilateral ties and for positioning the United States in regional affairs in a manner that would echo the increasing strategic relevance of the United States for Southeast Asia. At the core of the relationship between Vietnam and the United States, the issue of mutual trust remained a sticking point that complicated moving forward in any area. That reality required deliberate, focused

galvanizes broad popular support in Vietnam, generates activism within specific constituencies that find legislative support, and promises to be a domestic issue with significant foreign policy consequences. Another concern to those seeking a basis for enhancing relations with the United States was the Vietnamese perception that the U.S. Congress keeps churning out punitive legislation that speaks to Vietnam’s human rights record and that the Obama administration has not been actively speaking against these initiatives.

Nevertheless, Vietnam was resolved to invest energy and resources to improve critical bilateral relations, a point evidenced in the key themes made explicit in the Political Report to the 11th National Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party in January 2011. Within this context, an active role for each nation’s top military universities offered a path for forward movement.

First Efforts

The notion of a relationship between NDU and NDA was first broached during a visit to Washington by an NDA delegation in 2003, and was raised again during Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman’s 2005 visit to Hanoi. The Vietnamese delegation was briefed on the International Fellowship opportunity that could place a Vietnamese candidate in the National War College. The delegation was also offered the chance to engage in a regular exchange of publications produced by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). NDA participants embraced the ideas laid out at the NDU meeting, but did not take any steps to act on the potential for a formal relationship.

the notion of a relationship between NDU and NDA was first broached during a visit to Washington by an NDA delegation in 2003

During 2008 and 2009, the possibility of a formal relationship between NDU and NDA was raised by the U.S. side at senior levels during several critical meetings. The matter of a relationship between the universities was briefed to senior-level Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy and Department of State representatives for the October 2008 Political Military Talks, a first dialogue between DOD and State on the U.S. side, and the MND and MFA on the Vietnamese side. The June 2009 Political Military Dialogue between the United States and Vietnam, hosted by the State Department, focused on the regional and global security environment, bilateral security issues, humanitarian programs, and defense cooperation. Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Greg Delawie led the U.S. delegation consisting of representatives from State, DOD, Department of Commerce, the Joint Staff, and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). INSS presented the case for an entry-level program of engagement between the U.S. and Vietnamese defense universities, and reiterated the longstanding invitation to send a Vietnamese officer to the National War College as part of the International Fellowship program.

In September 2008, NDU developed an informal quarterly discussion between INSS scholars and senior fellows from NDU and officials from the SRV Defense Attaché’s Office and SRV Embassy Political Section. The SRV Ambassador Le Cong Phung lent his support to this initiative, which made it increasingly easy for the defense ministry to embrace some of the initiatives involving strategic and policy dialogue, roundtable discussions at NDU, and programs in Hanoi for visiting INSS study groups. Moreover, the SRV embassy was primed to include INSS on the dance card for future official delegations that passed through Washington. At a minimum, this meant annual U.S. engagement with the two committees of the National Assembly—Foreign Affairs and National Defense, as well as the General Staff’s deputy director. A more direct and active engagement between NDU and NDA would occur in the next year.

In early November 2009, on the margins of the 13th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Heads of Defense Universities, Colleges, Institutions Meeting (HDUCIM) in Bangkok, Vice Admiral Rondeau met with then commandant of the NDA, General Nguyen Nhu Hoat. They agreed that the first step should be reporting the substance and positive tone of this first meeting to their respective headquarters, followed by working-level efforts to outline the possibilities for enhancing bilateral relations between the two institutions. Importantly, the two leaders agreed to consider planning a meeting between their respective staff and specialists responsible for teaching, research, curricula development, international outreach, publication production, and regional studies institutions for the purposes of an “information exchange.”

General Hoat agreed with the idea of a more robust bilateral relationship and stressed an interest in cooperating on “strategic studies.” He agreed to invite the United States to send a student to the next iteration of Vietnam’s NDA international students’ course and stated his
readiness to send an officer student to NDU. He agreed that the next logical step would be to define an opportunity for selected faculty and staff to meet and share basic information about respective organizational structure, curriculum, teaching practices, and rules and regulations for students and faculty. General Hoat thought that NDU and NDA should look at a range of interactions including scholar-to-scholar exchanges and student fellowships at the point where the respective defense establishments were prepared to accept such activity in the context of bilateral defense engagement.

Making the Case at the Ministerial Level

In December 2009, General Phung Quang Thanh, SRV minister of defense, became the second defense minister to visit NDU.1 General Thanh endorsed the approach that emerged from the discussions between Vice Admiral Rondeau and General Hoat in Bangkok, voicing confidence in his NDA director. General Thanh invited Vice Admiral Rondeau to visit Vietnam, an invitation that was reiterated during his meeting with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on the margins of the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in May/June 2010.2 His commitment to the notion of NDU relations with NDA was the motivation for pressing forward with the initiative.

In August 2010, an interagency delegation led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Robert Scher traveled to Hanoi to participate in the inaugural U.S.-Vietnam Defense Policy Dialogue. Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh, deputy defense minister, led the Vietnam delegation. The meeting derived from the Secretary of Defense’s commitment to General Thanh to establish a mechanism between OSD and MND to exchange policy-level perspectives on bilateral, regional, and global issues of mutual concern. The importance of establishing institutional connections between the two national level defense universities was part of this bilateral military dialogue and would be reflected in a formal memorandum of understanding that would be presented to Vietnam the following month and amplified in subsequent discussions at NDU.

Role of Defense Universities

On September 19, 2011, the DASD for South and Southeast Asia (OSD Policy) and Vietnam’s Deputy Defense Minister Vinh signed a memorandum of understanding for “advancing bilateral defense cooperation.” The document identifies five areas in which both sides will work to expand cooperation: maritime security cooperation, search and rescue cooperation, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian and disaster relief, and cooperation between defense universities and research institutes.

The document speaks to the principles of cooperation, essentially enshrining the Vietnamese preoccupation with friendship, trust, mutual respect, and nonalignment (“independence, self-reliance and sovereignty”), and reiterating the U.S. concern that the relationship is mutually beneficial and resonates positively with regional defense and security equities. It provides a “framework” for cooperation aimed at expanding practical bilateral engagement in the defense and security realm and calls for the promotion of a “common vision” for defense cooperation and the establishment of a “mechanism” to identify and implement new areas for defense cooperation. This could be as simple as the existing interagency paraphernalia for policy coordination or the emergence of an ad hoc alliance of DOD, State, and USPACOM planners and policy advisors who would do the brunt of the coordination.

The proposed agreement was approved at the prime ministerial level. The defense minister’s “informal” triangle of policy advisors—the Military Strategy Institute (MSI), Institute for Defense International Relations (IDIR), and External Relations Department—was involved in reviewing the proposed U.S. text, hammering out Vietnamese counterproposals, and managing the discussions that led to the emergence of the memorandum (the MSI was renamed the Institute for Defense Studies in 2011). In the text of the document regarding defense university relations, the United States sought to encompass institutions and entities beyond just the NDU–NDA relationship. Seeking to operationalize what was intended by such a relationship, the language referenced bilateral interaction between U.S. and Vietnamese “research institutions,” which was meant to signal abiding interest in sustaining the link originally formalized between INSS and MSI. From the perspective of NDU, such engagement should place a primacy on exchanging delegations, students, and publications of mutual interest; promoting interaction and engagement among faculty, staff, and students; developing dialogue between U.S. and Vietnamese subject matter specialists; and promoting the exchange of ideas and resources.

Importantly, momentum for the idea of a defense cooperation framework agreement between senior defense officials resulted from the discussions between Secretary Gates and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung during his mid-2008 visit to the Pentagon, when both leaders agreed to establish a mechanism between OSD and MND to exchange policy-level perspectives on issues of mutual concern. The inaugural session of that dialogue took place in August 2010 and established the basis for discussion of ways to improve bilateral defense cooperation in several areas. The United States came away from the session with the sense that the discussion was open and candid, and identified a newfound willingness on the part of the Vietnamese to advance bilateral cooperation in the form of joint exercises.

In the first months of 2011, OSD drafted a U.S.-Vietnam Strategic Defense Framework document that was circulated on April 1, 2011. This document derived, ultimately, from the initiatives first suggested during Vietnamese Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh’s visit to Washington on December 14–15, 2009, following a stop in Hawaii where he met with the USPACOM commander. During the Washington portion of his trip, Defense Minister Thanh met with the Secretary of Defense, and struck an agreement in principle regarding the terms for expanding bilateral cooperation in the form of joint exercises.
and rescue, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  

Getting Down to Business

On September 28, 2010, Vice Admiral Rondeau welcomed Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh as a distinguished guest to NDU. Lieutenant General Vinh came to Washington for a 4-day visit with the goal of discussing Vietnam’s support for the upcoming ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, which was held in Hanoi the following month and occurred during the last few months of Vietnam’s tenure as the ASEAN chair. This was the first meeting of this group of regional defense leaders plus dialogue partners, including the United States. While attending this event in Hanoi, Secretary Gates conducted counterpart talks with the leadership of the Vietnamese defense establishment.

Lieutenant General Vinh’s secondary purpose in coming to Washington was to discuss with NDU the possibility of a formal relationship between INSS and two defense ministry institutes, the IDIR and MSI. The deputy minister agreed to consider meetings between staffs and specialists responsible for teaching, research, curricula development, international outreach, publication production, and regional studies institutions for the purposes of “information exchange.” While the general endorsed the idea of a more robust bilateral relationship with NDU and stressed an interest in cooperating on conferences in the area of “strategic studies,” he was not quite ready to commit to joint research. He agreed that both sides should look for opportunities to host delegations of staffs and specialists, and agreed to invite the United States to send a student to the next iteration of Vietnam’s NDA international students’ course. Lieutenant General Vinh stated his readiness to send an officer student to the National War College in 2011 and identified the IDIR director as the likely candidate. Additionally, the general seemed animated at the thought of a Vietnamese cadet attending West Point.

High-level Support

During Secretary Gates’s October 2010 meeting with Defense Minister Thanh on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the two endorsed the results of the September 28 meeting, which launched official relations among INSS, IDIR, and MSI. Defense Minister Thanh noted that he had invited the NDU president to visit Vietnam during his December 2009 appearance at Fort Lesley J. McNair, and asked Secretary Gates to convey the reiterated invitation. The Secretary replied that he would ask Vice Admiral Rondeau to make plans to visit Vietnam as early as possible.

During the 14th ARF HDUCIM, hosted by Vietnam’s NDU in November 2010, General Hoat’s replacement, General Vo Tien Trung, formally invited the NDU president to visit Vietnam and NDA in 2011. General Trung and Vice Admiral Rondeau discussed promoting relations between the institutions through exchanges of delegations, students, and publications. The two leaders also discussed how NDU could contribute to enhancing the strategic academic dialogue on these issues in Southeast Asia.

General Trung discussed the Vietnamese proposal to create an ASEAN Institute for International Security Study, which would allow ARF members to cooperate more closely by working together to study nontraditional challenges and enhance information-sharing among regional academic institutions. Vice Admiral Rondeau offered to work bilaterally with the Vietnamese on this proposal to see if NDU could help accelerate the process in establishing such an institute, noting that India and South Korea were interested in developing similar regional institutes and that there might be a way to gain some momentum by working with interested parties within this organization.

A Friendly Visitation

Vice Admiral Rondeau and a delegation from NDU visited Vietnam in April 2011. This was a well-organized visit marked by a constructive itinerary that demonstrated Vietnamese seriousness about the relationship. Press coverage of the admiral’s meeting with the minister of defense underscored the mutual interest in efforts aimed at adding strategic depth to the bilateral defense relationship; it also underscored the increasing recognition that strategic thinkers and professional military educators were in a good position to take the steps necessary to bring defense intellectuals, strategists, and students of defense and security affairs together to achieve the goals discussed during the October 2010 meeting between Secretary of Defense Gates and Defense Minister Thanh.

During her visit, the NDU president stressed that the defense universities each need to identify a single subject matter specialist who can draw on relations throughout

**Vice Admiral Rondeau placed appropriate primacy on allowing American professional military education specialists to meet their counterparts and establishing a formal channel of communication**
People’s Army officer who would be a member of the National War College class of 2012. Vice Admiral Rondeau identified a support group that will be responsible for working with the senior colonel during his residence in Washington to ensure that he has the chance to make the most of this opportunity. The NDU delegation stressed the importance of reciprocity, arguing that the United States looks forward to working with the NDA to send a U.S. military officer or civilian academic from NDU to participate in seminars for foreign participants offered at the academy.

During its visit to Vietnam, the NDU delegation met with the new head of the Economics and Research Department, and received a briefing on the Vietnamese military’s mission and leadership organization. Vice Admiral Rondeau seized the chance to reaffirm friendship with senior leaders who had visited Vietnam. A courtesy call on the minister and a chance to meet with Vice Defense Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh helped anchor the visit to important moments in the relationship up to that point. The NDU delegation received a full briefing at NDA on the People’s Army military education system and a tour of the facility. Finally, the admiral addressed the NDA. In her remarks, she placed appropriate primacy on allowing American professional military education specialists to meet their counterparts and on the importance of establishing a formal channel of communication.

As a final part of the visit, the NDU president and her staff met with the IDIR for a session that was yet another opportunity to discuss plans for a regular exchange of publications between INSS, IDIR, and MSI, and to encourage reciprocity in the relationship, establish the basis for continuous communication, discuss the terms of reference for supporting working-level study group visits between the United States and Vietnam, and encourage the MND to send Vietnamese military officers to U.S. military academies. After this trip, NDU leadership focused on the working-level initiatives intended to operationalize some of the goals and took steps to sustain the existing programs of engagement, including the INSS–SRV Embassy Informal Dialogue, INSS–Defense Academy of Vietnam relationship, emergence of an INSS dialogue with IDIR, and efforts to move the relationship toward joint research/joint publication/hosting of seminars and workshops/continuous interaction between traveling study groups.

**NDA Commandant Visits NDU**

NDA Commandant Lieutenant General Vo Tien Trung visited Washington in early October 2011, conducted meetings at NDU, and conferred with U.S. congressional staffers on bilateral defense relations.

Lieutenant General Trung, a “Hero of the People’s Armed Forces” and former deputy commander of Military Region 5, is a member of the National Assembly representing Phu Yen Province. He was born into a family with a revolutionary tradition. His father was Vo Mien, the chairman of the committee of Duy My village, Duy Xuyen District, responsible for direct action during the August revolution in 1945.
At NDU, the focus of Lieutenant General Trung’s visit was on developing a comprehensive work plan for the next year that would operationalize the commitments contained in the memorandum of understanding for advancing bilateral defense cooperation. The work plan was to feature bilateral cooperation on peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief as the focal point for the two academic institutions. Beyond serving the overall strategic interests of the relationship by shouldering the responsibilities for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief as articulated in the memorandum, NDU sought to continue to focus on the nuts and bolts of building a credible relationship between schools by encouraging discussions about curriculum issues, working toward joint research projects, sharing publications, exchanging delegations, discussing the art and science of professional military education, and organizing opportunities for the exchange of viewpoints between strategic thinkers.

Lieutenant General Trung’s speech to an assembly of NDU faculty, students, and invited guests derived from the December 2009 white paper, “Vietnam’s National Defense,” which has provided the basic narrative for the senior Vietnamese defense leadership since early 2010. He spoke about the great and sprawling historical record of the formation of a Vietnamese nation, the prolonged conflict deriving from the historic intentions of “northern countries” that has compelled generations of Vietnamese to fight invaders, the struggle against colonialism and the contests waged to liberate the South and unify the nation, and the fight to protect the southwestern and northern borders from 1977 to 1989.

The general spoke about Vietnam’s “national defense strength” and the intangible dimension of the national character that places a primacy on “all People Defense,” an approach that integrates reliance on organization and machinery as much as on national soul, character, and the vigorous historic spirit that drives the Vietnamese to protect their nation. He also described the calculus of Vietnamese military organization and its sustained focus on local defense, militia units (at the commune and precinct level), and self-defense organizations. Importantly, Lieutenant General Trung described Vietnam’s continuing commitment to enhancing national defense capabilities in a fashion that recognized the contribution of both intangibles and modernizing forces to the goal of creating a capable, professional military force:

**Based on the foresaid viewpoints, enhancement of Vietnam’s national defense potentials must be realized comprehensively, not only political strength, economic strength, but also science and technology potentials and military potentials. . . . We hold the view that in any national salvation, human factor is decisive, weapons and equipment play an important role; those two elements are interdependent. . . . In order to build the political and spiritual strength, firstly we fortify the whole national solidarity, building a wholesome political system with a government of the people, for the people and by the people.**

The general spoke to the ancient conflict with China, mentioned the relevance of current disputes over land borders and maritime and territorial claims, and described Vietnam’s national goal of achieving a defense capable of coping with intrusions and disputes that go to the core of Vietnam’s sense of sovereignty.

Accordingly, his effort to define the basis for expanded defense and security cooperation with the United States and other countries can at least in part be explained as a Vietnamese attempt to hedge bets in a contest with an assertive and aggressively inclined China focused on maintaining a stable environment on its periphery and encouraging economic relationships that will contribute to modernization. The Vietnamese, in that argument, see the acceptance of the formality of defense relationships as one way of coping with China’s strategic intentions of increasing its influence in East Asia. Beijing’s efforts to prevent “containment” of China have, from the perspective of that explanation, compelled Vietnam to enter into a closer and more completely normal relationship with the United States, especially in the realm of defense and security.

It seems that at this point, much more of Vietnam’s interest in enhanced defense cooperation with countries including the United States is explained by focused attention of the People’s Army to modernize the military and rationalize its defense relationships in order to bring the force into the 21st century. Lieutenant General Trung summarized these ideas in his reference to the army’s concerted efforts to “construct and develop into a professional, elite and gradually modern force.”

After Lieutenant General Trung’s visit to the United States, the work between NDU and NDA was focused on achieving the basis for agreement to a comprehensive work plan for 2012 that would operationalize the commitments contained in the memorandum of understanding. Beyond serving the overall strategic interests of the relationship—by shouldering the responsibilities for developing capabilities in the areas of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief as articulated in the memorandum—NDU seeks to continue to focus on the nuts and bolts of building a credible relationship between the defense schools.

NDU Vice President for Research and Applied Learning Hans Binnendijk visited Hanoi in early December 2011, and signed an agreement with the IDIR focused on the involvement of INNS in a joint research project on maritime security issues and a possible peacekeeping operations simulation. The NDU delegation received a second document setting the parameters for a broadened NDU–NDA relationship that will bear the signature of both Lieutenant General Trung and Vice Admiral Rondeau as well as provide the structure for expanded engagement between the two defense institutions.

**Conclusion**

The role of National Defense University in shaping strategic-level exchanges must be featured as an important contribution to the emergence of a “strategic partnership” with Vietnam to continue focus on the nuts and bolts of building a credible relationship between the defense schools.

NDU has now hosted two Vietnamese defense ministers and hopes to be a permanent part of the itinerary of future senior military officials. Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh visited the NDU campus in December 2009 for a fruitful talk with the NDU.
Case Study 4

U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

By Jonathan B. Tucker

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international agreement signed in Paris in 1993, was the culmination of a 70-year global effort to ban chemical arms. The United States was one of the 130 original signatories to the CWC, but it would not become a full party to the convention until the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty by a two-thirds majority vote. Achieving a supermajority of 67 votes is one of the most challenging tasks facing any administration. Moreover, for various reasons described in this case study, the CWC proved to be far more controversial than originally anticipated. In April 1997, however, the Senate finally ratified the treaty by a two-thirds majority vote. Achieving a supermajority of 67 votes is one of the most challenging tasks facing any administration. Moreover, for various reasons described in this case study, the CWC proved to be far more controversial than originally anticipated. In April 1997, however, the Senate finally ratified the treaty. This study examines the long ratification process in fascinating detail, addressing such questions as who the key players were, what positions they staked out in advance, and how the shifting political landscape shaped the outcome.

It is important to remember that no aspect of this relationship—or any other policy achievement for that matter—would have emerged as a potentially important connection and a clear dividend for U.S. policy in Southeast Asia had those involved in the earliest efforts to broach military relations with Hanoi accepted conventional wisdoms, or unquestioningly embraced the priorities that guided and structured U.S. defense thinking about Indochina. None of this would have emerged as a possibility had working-level Vietnamese and U.S. counterparts failed to understand the need to step outside the box and explore new ways of thinking about old problems. It is now up to INSS and the NDU community to determine the level of investment necessary to make a difference.

NOTES

1 By September 2009, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) sought to develop the basis for an exchange of publications between the Center for Strategic Research and Vietnamese Military Publishing House. That remains a work in progress, but combined with several other opportunities, it suggested that in the face of increasing Vietnamese confidence in this kind of cooperation, joint research between U.S. and Vietnamese government analysts and national defense scholars is not entirely out of the question.

2 Pham Van Tra was the first in 2003.

3 Thanh was reelected to the Politburo at the 11th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VNCP) in January 2011, and received the highest vote total in the National Assembly in the 2011 election (97.4 percent), assuring his second term as defense minister.

4 In specific terms, the Vietnamese defense minister agreed to every one of the U.S. Department of Defense’s five proposals to expand military-to-military relations: commencement of a policy dialogue in 2011, a search-and-rescue exercise, joint patrols, more active participation in the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, and enhanced humanitarian assistance/disaster relief cooperation. The two sides continued to discuss these terms of reference for expanded defense relations at the Bilateral Defense Dialogue in August 2010, and reaffirmed the agreed upon areas of enhanced cooperation during Secretary Gates’ visit to Hanoi in October 2010.

5 Additionally, INSS engineered a relationship with the Foreign Ministry’s National Defense Academy of Vietnam (DAV), which was seeking to become a degree-granting academy supporting Ph.D.-level students from the Foreign Ministry. The DAV has welcomed INSS study groups in Hanoi and participated in several meaningful roundtables at National Defense University (NDU) since 2008. The DAV has also responded positively to the idea of enlisting INSS senior fellows as “outside readers” of completed dissertations should they elect to require outsiders as part of the process of providing guidance to students writing theses, or reviewing the final text before granting the degree. That was a potentially important starting point for spotting new strategic intellectuals and gifted policy talent on the Vietnamese side.

6 General Trung was elected to the Central Committee at the 11th VNCP Congress in January 2011.

Sailing the Cyber Sea

By JAMES G. STAVRIDIS and ELTON C. PARKER III

Secretary Panetta listens to brief on functions of combat direction center aboard USS Enterprise
A career in the maritime profession brings a fair share of stormy and uncertain seas. To successfully navigate these seas requires constant studying, understanding, and operating by an internationally agreed-to set of standards and norms affectionately known as the Rules of the Road. There are “rules” like these that apply to all the “global commons”—what we in the Department of Defense have classified as domains, namely land, sea, air, and space—and accordingly, we are somewhat accustomed to existing and navigating within boundaries and respecting borders.

There is another domain that tests such classification and definition. It is similar to the seas in its sheer magnitude, seeming ubiquity, and lethal potential, but it is also unique in that it is not comprised of water and waves; rather, it consists of zeros and ones, optic fibers and photons, routers and browsers, satellites and servers. This is, of course, cyberspace, the new global commons, a medium referred to herein as the Cyber Sea. Upon it, we set sail each day in the company of a vast array of different vessels, vehicles, and crafts.

**Unlimited Potential**

The Cyber Sea is the ultimate expression of freedom, as it cannot be constrained by national or international lines drawn on any map or chart. In the military realm, when we speak about the cyber domain, it is easy and tempting to frame the discussion only in terms of cyber warfare or cyber attack. Although those are important dimensions of the subject, the topic is much broader, so the discussion on the matter must be much broader as well. We live in an increasingly interconnected world, a competitive marketplace where the primary commodity traded is ideas, a 24/7 news cycle with near-instant reporting and widespread dissemination of stories. It is a teeming, tumultuous, and exhausting marketplace, and all of us must continue to compete for our market “share.” In this world, information is power—and that power is magnified exponentially when shared.

We must embrace traditional forms of sharing (press interviews, newspapers, print magazines, and so forth) and then combine them with newer forms like blogging, tweeting, and posting on Facebook. As an example, between the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) blog postings and tweets, we have been able to form almost 13,000 connections, and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) blog entries have been viewed more than 185,000 times over the last 2 years. But those numbers pale in comparison to the potential of connections that exist in this still vast and untamed realm. For instance, Facebook tops Google for weekly traffic in the United States; Lady Gaga and Justin Bieber have more Twitter followers than the entire populations of Zimbabwe, Cuba, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, or Sweden; there are over 200 million public blogs.

Furthermore, it took radio approximately 38 years to reach an audience of 50 million, television 13 years, the Internet 4 years, and the iPod 3 years, while Facebook added 200 million users in less than 1 year. And finally, if Facebook were a country, based on population it would be the third largest in the world behind only China and India.

With each of these potential connections, we forge one link in the chain of understanding—eventually galvanizing a foundation of trust vital to exchanging ideas, communicating, collaborating, and cooperating with one another. Still, although the utility of social networking is obvious, the initial difficulty of obtaining access to Facebook and other social networking sites on a government network can be discouraging and frustrating. We need to do better. We need to be more openly connected. The use of social media is a great idea that is growing in popularity and can be a great tool for all kinds of activities. Audience size can be very large and messages disseminated quickly. We need to friend on Facebook, to blog, and to tweet. We need rich site summary (RSS) feeds and podcasts, and we need to be LinkedIn. Those and many others are all important tools in making key and valuable strategic connections to increase the positive correlation among words, deeds, and consequences.

Another example of the potential advantages and benefits that the connectivity and expanse of the cyber realm provide can be found in perhaps one of the least likely places—Afghanistan. Within a decade or two, paper money will no longer exist, and electronic banking and other transactions
will take its place. This will further connect us in ways that we have not yet begun to assimilate into our societies and our cultural norms—particularly in the United States. As the saying goes, follow the money. As it continues to rebuild, Afghanistan may skip brick and mortar banking, shifting from paper money and going directly to cell phone transactions and electronic deposits. The vast majority of the Afghan National Security Forces are currently being paid electronically and, after biometric vetting, can access their money through cell phones. This reduces the opportunity for corruption, taking out layers of distributed paper money and the associated temptation to skim large amounts at each layer. Such a process allows the Afghans to use the electronic medium around their entire country.

Storm Clouds on the Horizon

Of course, while the new mechanisms and technologies provide means of connecting and empowering the next generation, they also enable voices and provide conduits for the spreading of nefarious ideologies, for proselytizing, and for engaging in illicit activities in this largely unregulated virtual domain. As we keep a weather eye on the horizon of the Cyber Sea, we need to look at the underlying technologies and their transformational effect on our culture, our institutions, and our social fabric. We must also ascertain how all those things connect and interact to detract from or enhance our collective security. Each tidal wave brings potential challenges to that security that we ignore at our peril—cyber events can run the gamut from low-level observation to denial-of-service attacks to destruction of infrastructure; from espionage and intrusion to actual kinetic effects; and from crime to war.

On any given day, we may fall prey to hackers, identity thieves, and “hacktivists.” Our systems are bombarded by botnets and viruses. Trojan horses, worms, spyware, and spam all exist. We know these threats are real. According to the professionals at U.S. Cyber Command who are tasked with leading the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) effort in the cyber domain, on an average day, DOD networks are probed approximately 250,000 times an hour; there are foreign intelligence organizations attempting to hack into U.S. computers; and terrorists are active on more than 4,000 Web sites. In 2010, a DOD contractor’s cyber defenses were breached and more than 24,000 files and pieces of data were stolen.

These seas are stormy indeed and they are just as unforgiving on individual humans cast adrift as they are on business enterprises and even nation-states. Here in Europe, this issue has particular resonance. In April 2007, the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each had a series of denial-of-service attacks predominantly focused on Estonia and its financial systems. The
following year, the Republic of Georgia experienced not only a cyber attack, but a nearly simultaneous physical attack as well. The attacks themselves were challenging, though not insurmountable. What was more difficult was attributing the attacks and determining their origin. While bombs and missiles tend to leave “fingerprints” and come with a return address, photons on fibers are tough to track. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn has stated, “A keystroke travels twice around the world in 300 milliseconds, but the forensics necessary to identify the attacker may take months.” Thus, despite not being able to precisely determine the origin of the cyber attack for attribution, this situation still showed the disastrous effects that can be achieved when combining the two forms of offensive warfare, solidifying the reality of cyberspace as a legitimate warfighting milieu.

This attribution and prosecution effort is further hampered by the fact that there is really no agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a cyber attack, nor is there a physical result of the attack in most instances—no crater, sunken ship, or blown-up safe. While the target is usually data, the effects can range from exploitation to degradation to destruction, and because data may not seem as tangible as some other more traditional types of targets, the effects may not appear as dramatic. The long-term effects, however, may actually be more devastating and costly, both in economic and human capital. Thus, to the victim, an attack is an attack, regardless of whether the weapon is a bomb or a botnet. Avatars and icons help to perpetuate a sterile and inorganic environment that tends to create a false sense of security and detachment, but injury, destruction, and death can be caused with comparable ease in this age of “dot combat.”

A particular example of this is the increasingly rapid and far-reaching terrorist use of cyberspace. Over the last 10 years, for instance, the number of Web sites devoted to what we in the West consider Jihadist terrorist sites has increased a thousand-fold, exploiting the freedom of the Web as a forum to spread poisonous propaganda, raise funds, and recruit converts. Jihadists also use the Internet as a virtual classroom to teach how to make bombs and plan attacks, ultimately even coordinating and carrying out attacks online. In a sense, for terrorists, the Internet has become a low-cost worldwide command and control network with unlimited nodes and zero main-tenance requirements or overhead expenses. They are adept at adopting off-the-shelf tools to more fully exploit the lack of boundaries, policies, and regulations, as well as the anonymity found within this domain. Make no mistake—our enemies are as smart as they are well-funded, and thus innovation is definitely a two-way street.

finding the balance between empowering the disenfranchised without enabling the iniquitous can and will be arduous and daunting

Balancing Open Access and Security

All this leads to an important question: how do we—individually and collectively—balance free and open access to such a virtual realm with the protections and regulations necessary to ensure our continued access to an environment that is safe and secure and contributes to the prosperity of humanity as a whole? The same technologies used by ordinary people to connect, inform, and educate are also being used by those who wish to harm, traffic, and degrade. There is a tension between that desire for openness and the very legitimate concern to protect our networks and our citizens. Whether mitigating the threat of industrial espionage, ensuring system redundancies in our Internet-dependent infrastructure, or improving cyber-forensic techniques to conduct investigations and precisely attribute the source of a cyber attack, those with a stake in cyber security are in pursuit of the same goals: maximum protection of proprietary information while enabling seamless connectivity, functionality, and redundancy.

Finding the right balance, the right setting on the rheostat, is key. If we want to compete in the current marketplace of ideas, if we want to fully take advantage of advances such as telemedicine, biometrics, terrain mapping, virtual collaboration, and the incredible array of user developed and user friendly applications, we need to get this correct. We need to secure our cyber networks to our advantage, not our detriment. Within the U.S. Armed Forces today, we wrestle with this dichotomy—even at the highest levels. To echo the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright, “we cannot allow the chain of command to break the chain of information.” To ensure the continued flow of information, traditional stovepipes (which some may refer to as cylinders of excellence) that impede the cross-flow of ideas must be broken down. We need to develop meaningful policies, design and build innovative technologies, and otherwise inform the debate in order to bridge the “needs-technology-policy” gaps.

We have seen the positive potential of this medium in action—whether it is in the jungles of Colombia, the streets of Tehran, or Tahrir square in downtown Cairo—and most recently in Libya and Syria. In each case, activists and tech-savvy sympathizers joined forces, leveraging the connectivity and potential of the cyber domain with the result being, as Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen wonderfully labelled it, a situation where “the revolution will be podcast,” with “political ‘flash mobs’ . . . reporting, tweeting and writing a bill of human rights for the Internet Age.” As those who enjoy freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly, and political self-determination can attest, finding the balance between empowering the disenfranchised without enabling the iniquitous can and will be arduous and daunting, and the sheer number of users—one billion and growing—only exacerbates the challenge.

If we are going to successfully exist in this domain, we need to do so together, combining the military and civilian, foreign and domestic, and public and private sectors. Each nation has its own sovereignty, law enforcement, approach to privacy, systems and mores, and networks and technologies; however, in cyberspace, perhaps more than any other domain in which we are used to operating, the collective whole truly is greater than the sum of all of us working individually.

As with most endeavors, words matter—taxonomy is important. Thus, the first step is to agree on a set of definitions, formulate terms of reference, and establish a common lexicon. For the most part, this already exists in and throughout the military-technology world, but it has not truly translated or resonated to others outside this collective. Much as we continue to struggle to establish the physical boundaries of cyberspace, we need to determine what does and does not constitute a cyber attack. Criminal activity? Espionage? Cyber war? Hostile intent? We then need to determine and agree on what action is necessary and justified in each situation, based on
perhaps still-as-unwritten laws that govern action in this untamed sea during times of both war and peace. These are admittedly very militaristic terms; however, action in this domain will most often not be led by military personnel, so we must ensure our interagency community experts, as well as industry professionals, are involved with this discussion from the outset. And here at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), they have been. As a result, in our vernacular, we have begun to establish what we call "rules of engagement," rules that all 28 member nations understand and to which they agree.

NATO Cyber Actions

In mid-November 2010, the leaders of the 28 member states of NATO gathered in Lisbon for a summit. One of the primary products of this successful meeting was the new NATO Strategic Concept, and one of the key focus areas of this seminal document as the Alliance looks to the future was the cyber domain. The Lisbon Summit tasked the development of a revised NATO cyber defense policy by midsummer, as well as an accompanying action and implementation plan. In June 2011, the political decisionmaking body of NATO—the North Atlantic Council—adopted the new NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, coupled with an Action Plan, fulfilling the tasking from Lisbon. Working with our Allies and taking lessons learned from events such as the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia, NATO’s new policy focuses on improving a coordinated multinational approach and enhancing our collective and individual cyber defense capabilities to prevent threats and improve our responses.

In 2003, NATO founded the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in the Estonian capital of Tallinn. It was accredited as a NATO Centre of Excellence in 2008. It is a multinational organization dealing with education, consultation, lessons learned, and research and development in the field of cyber security. The center’s mission is to enhance the capability, cooperation, and information-sharing among NATO nations and partners in cyber defense. Additionally, the center recently established an important and formal relationship with Symantec Corporation to promote cooperation on the research of online threats and countermeasures. The collaboration between the two organizations helps this center of excellence further explore new ideas to best understand, operate, and navigate within the still ungoverned and undergoverned spaces of this domain.

We have also established the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (CIRC), which fulfills the summit mandate that NATO will enhance its ability and capacity to identify, assess, prevent, defend, and recover from a cyber attack. This center will be fully operational in 2012, and this is an important step in expanding a function to support cyber warning and damage assessments as part of a single integrated crisis management structure. Additionally, since it appears increasingly clear that cyber will play a role in any future crisis, we need to integrate cyber warning into our planning, and possibly develop ways to assess damage from a cyber attack as well as be able to determine how cyber attacks align with the employment of other instruments of power (diplomatic, military, economic, and others) in a crisis. Thus, we have established a Cyber Defence Cell as part of our new Crisis and Operations Management Centre, which will include the ability to enhance national and international cyber knowledge support into the shared system of warning, assessment, and crisis response.

If NATO itself is attacked, the CIRC will lead the technical defense and recovery responses, in conjunction with the Cyber Management Board, which has sole responsibility for coordinating cyber defense...
throughout the Alliance via a series of memo-
manda of understanding between each nation’s
cyber defense organization and the board. If
an individual Ally is attacked, however, things
get a little more complicated, particularly
when it comes to collective defense. Under-
standing all this within the context of the
original Washington Treaty, signed during
a very different time in this world in 1949, is
paramount. Article 5 of the NATO treaty truly
is the heart of the agreement—the bedrock
that states an attack on one shall be consid-
ered an attack on all. Article 6 of the treaty
goes on to define what constitutes an armed
attack, focusing on geography, attacks on ter-
ritory, ships at sea, attacks on aircraft, troop
formations, and the like. In 1949, however,
few, if any, could have conceived of this new
cyber world. As a result, within NATO in
particular, we need to determine what defines
an attack. Does it change from one member
of the Alliance to another? Again, each nation
has its own sovereignty, its own laws, its own
law enforcement, and its own approach to
privacy and security.

How Allies will respond to a cyber event
of significant magnitude or the set of mea-
sures Allies will endorse in response to a cyber
attack are decisions individual nations must
make. However, NATO’s new cyber policy
makes clear that any decision on collective
response (invoking Article 5) will be a politi-
cal one made by the senior policymakers of
the Alliance and member nations, and not by
military or technical response teams. Of note,
the only time NATO has invoked Article 5
was on September 12, 2001, following the 9/11
terrorist attacks on the United States.

**Collaboration in the Larger Context**

This new and undeniable aspect of
warfare is likely to manifest itself more as the
methodology of warfare continues to evolve.
We need to understand this new cyber dimen-
sion of warfare and how to contend with it,
and we need to come to grips with the notion
that military involvement in this domain is
but a small piece of the puzzle. In the United
States, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) is clearly and correctly the lead in
this endeavor. DOD is merely one member
in coordinating activities as well as creating
the right incentives to participate. One way is
highlighting the participation of such compa-
nies, producing a catalogue of trusted firms
able of offering security services and com-
ponents. A primary condition for inclusion
in such a list would be a commitment and con-
tribution to the evolving information-sharing
environment. And there are other ways.

NATO’s cyber defense experts rely
heavily on the partnerships formed across
all of our Allies, both in the military and
civilian realms. Increasingly, we are finding
we need to develop and leverage the strong
bonds with the private sector as industry will
be absolutely essential as we move forward.
This is also where the bulk of unrestricted
innovative thinking resides. We recently
convened a conference at NATO headquarters
attended by corporations, academics, military
members, and a wide variety of government
officials from many nations to explore these
public-private sector linkages, and how best
to integrate them into a larger comprehensive
approach in the cyber domain. Many wonder-
ful conversations produced some outstanding
initiatives that we will pursue energetically in
the coming weeks and months. Such confer-
ences will be regular occurrences as we start
to lay the foundation for long-term collabora-
tion and cooperation.

DOD has already begun to explore how
industry can help in this regard through
a public-private partnership called the
Enduring Security Framework. Under this
arrangement, the chief executive and chief
technology officers of major information
technology (IT) companies now meet recur-
rently with senior officials in both DOD and
DHS, as well as with the Director of National
Intelligence. Within NATO, we have started
the conversations to examine creating a
similar framework wherein key European
agencies, businesses, and governments are
selected to participate in sharing information
on cyber security. This information collabo-
ration would include everything from threat
assessments to policy debates to research
and development initiatives. That final category
would provide a potentially large return on
investment as we seek to match the defense
industry’s current excessive IT acquisition
cycle (which ranges between 7 and 8 years)
to the technological development cycle (which
averages 1 to 2 years—just 24 months to
develop the iPhone, for example). As Deputy
Secretary Lynn put it, “In less time than

**although it is an incredibly complicated thing to do,
internationalizing cyber security is absolutely possible**
it would take us to prepare and defend a budget, and then get Congressional approval for it, [Apple] gets an iPhone. It’s not an acceptable trade.”

**New Thinking**

In the context of security, unleashing the power of the Cyber Sea has changed everything—except our way of thinking. We simply cannot solve new problems using old thought processes. We need to continuously evolve. And we need to continue testing our theories and doctrine with joint, interagency, and international exercises and simulations. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is creating a “mock Internet,” a simulation training range where we can test security measures, responses to attacks, and how best to integrate the different capabilities and capacities each player brings to the table.

In 2010, DHS conducted Homeland Security Exercise Cyber Storm 3, a cyber incident response framework exercise. It included Federal and state entities, the private sector, and international organizations, all brought together to evaluate strengths and weaknesses of current policies, tactics, procedures, and capabilities. We need to continue conducting such hard-hitting evaluations and tests. Through them, we are learning we cannot afford to limit our own access to valuable information to protect ourselves from potentially harmful activity. Rather, we must be technically agile and politically courageous enough to get ahead of those who seek to do harm in cyber space. It is maneuver warfare on a cyber scale, and we must be swift.

In addition, in September 2011, U.S. European Command held an exercise called Combined Endeavor, a communication and computer network exercise where international military, industry, and academic professionals from 28 nations and organizations gathered to collaborate and improve partnerships with the end goal of strengthening collective cyber defense capabilities. The theme for this year’s exercise was “Coalition Information Dominance,” and the sessions focused on improving international cyber defense postures, operationalizing cyber information sharing, and institutionalizing coalition cyber training. Similarly, in December, NATO conducted its major annual cyber exercise, Cyber Coalition 2011. More than 100 specialists took part in the cyber defense exercise in NATO headquarters in Brussels and Mons, including national cyber defense facilities in their respective countries, all coming together to test technical and operational Alliance cyber defense capabilities. In both exercises, scenarios were designed that required action, coordination, and collaboration from technical experts, policymakers, and management bodies. Both were highly successful events and we learned a great deal. We learned that we face a shared challenge, and thus through open communication and collaboration, we will build trust between and among our nations. Most importantly, we underscored the fact that although it is an incredibly complicated thing to do, internationalizing cyber security is absolutely possible. It is also absolutely necessary.

This article began with an analogous reference to the Cyber Sea. As we engage the cyber world, it is interesting to contemplate the comparisons with the maritime domain, particularly within the context of the challenges mankind faced in bringing some order to the untamed oceans. It has taken humanity two or three thousand years to sort out how we operate on the sea; we have gradually created international maritime law, buoy systems, a global navigation grid, and charts to guide our way. In sum, we have built a system. And in the 1980s, the international community came together in the largest negotiating project in the history of mankind and created the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The treaty took a decade to negotiate. At more than 200 pages, it is an extremely complex canon; but with few exceptions, 195 different sovereign signatories guide their actions at sea by it.

Now, contemplate a similar undertaking regarding the Cyber Sea. We have been sailing upon that realm in earnest for about 20 years now, and really generating some waves for about the last 10. Yet for the most part, we still do not have reliable buoys, we still do not have an enforceable navigation grid, and we still set sail without up-to-date charts. We cannot even really say we have the basic norms of behavior save a few very specific punitive laws for the most egregious acts. More importantly, we do not have a millennium to figure it out. We are running out of time. Our Secretary of Defense recently commented “there is a strong likelihood that the next Pearl Harbor that we confront could very well be a cyber attack.” With each passing millisecond, this expanding medium grows in vulnerability faster than it grows in utility, and our institutional regulations and policies fall farther behind.

We need to catch up and eventually get out in front of this bow wave. We need to agree to specific terms of reference like “attack” and “incident” and what constitutes each. We need to agree to policy prescriptions that dictate proportionality of response, pursuit of attackers across national boundaries, be they geographic or virtual network lines, and others. The 2011 White House and Pentagon strategies on cyber go a long way toward each of these aims, as does the new NATO cyber policy—but we must push these efforts further.

And we need to do this collaboratively; within and across governments and their agencies, within and between public and private enterprises, throughout academic institutions, and within our shared homes. Cyber security requires complex and coordinated responses that move at the speed of thought. Diversity of capabilities, capacities, and responses to any cyber challenge should be seen as a strength, not a weakness—but only if the actions and tools can be used synergistically. This can only happen when all the interested parties adopt a common vision for security built on the foundation of trust and confidence, and achieved through coordination, cooperation, and partnering. No one of us is as strong as all of us working together. JFQ
The United States is at a strategic inflection point, as described in the new defense strategic guidance *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.* American forces left Iraq last year and are drawing down in Afghanistan. Political transformation is shaking the Arab world. Security threats continue to emerge from those seeking to deny access to the commons and from provocative nations such as Iran and North Korea. At home, we must address the Federal budget deficits and grow the Nation’s economy.

This inflection point presents U.S. leaders with both challenges and opportunities. It presents challenges because each of these changes impacts the Nation’s ability to pursue its longstanding objectives of economic growth, strengthened alliances and partnerships, defense against direct attack, and promotion of freedom abroad. It presents opportunities because this dynamic period is one in which America may be able to "lock-in" new strategic approaches that improve its ability to pursue objectives over the long term.
Upon taking office as Chief of Naval Operations, I identified what I believe are the key tenets that our forces should apply in developing these new approaches. They are warfighting first, operate forward, and be ready. Warfighting first is our fundamental responsibility. The most likely and consequential threats to our security and prosperity today come from regional aggressors who will only be deterred by current, present warfighting capability. Be ready acknowledges that our ability to shape the security environment depends on whether we can respond quickly and proficiently to counter aggression or attacks before they escalate. Operate forward is the focus of this article and describes how our ready warfighting capability must be employed to pursue our nation’s security objectives.

Operating Forward Today

Operating forward allows naval forces to provide offshore options to deter aggression, influence events abroad, and win conflicts in an era of uncertainty. Our history and current operations both show that operating forward is essential to our national security objectives. As a nation separated from significant threats by two oceans, those objectives are more outwardly focused than they are for other nations, and U.S. military power is most often used to protect and aid allies and partners, as opposed to defending America from direct attack. For example, forward Navy and Marine forces responded to the Great East Japan Earthquake to deliver hundreds of tons of relief supplies and logistics that reconnected affected areas with the rest of Japan. Forward Sailors and Marines on ships in the Mediterranean made the first strikes to defend civilians during the Libyan civil war, and naval forces at sea continue to deliver dozens of sorties each day to support troops in Afghanistan as we reduce our footprint on the ground there.

Maintaining forces forward requires bases and host nation “places” overseas where our ships, aircraft, and Sailors can rest, refuel, repair, and resupply. Some of these places are on the territory of longstanding allies such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Italy, Greece, and the United Kingdom. Others are facilities made available by partners including Singapore, Djibouti, and Bahrain or leased areas such as Guantanamo Bay. These places join our own bases on Guam and in Hawaii and in the continental United States as locations from which our forces operate and can be supported.

Where we establish bases and places is critically important. While our overseas Cold War infrastructure emerged from the need to contain the Soviet Union, our posture today must be driven by enduring objectives and the threats and opportunities of the current strategic environment. These place a premium on warfighting capabilities at the strategic maritime crossroads where our security interests and air, maritime, and cyber transportation systems intersect. These locations—such as the straits of Hormuz and Malacca, Panama Canal, and around the Horn of Africa—are where trade flows are concentrated and where the threat of instability is most likely and consequential. They likewise present violent extremists an opportunity to inflict disproportionate damage upon regional security and the global economy.

Today’s fiscal environment will constrain our ability to buy a larger fleet that can rotationally deploy overseas from bases in the United States; therefore, remaining forward at these strategic crossroads requires innovative approaches to operating and manning our fleet. We will depend on strong relationships with our allies and partners to host support facilities for our deployed forces to exchange crewmembers and tap into logistics networks.

In turn, these allies and partners will depend on American forces to assure access to the air, sea, and cyber commons in their regions and help protect their own interests from aggression. This connection between operating forward and assured access was made plainly evident to the United States in the first conflict after our nation’s founding—when we were the victims of aggression from overseas.

History’s Lesson for a Maritime Nation

Today, the U.S. Navy is the world’s preeminent maritime force, but that was not always the case. In the lead-up to the War of 1812, Britain’s Royal Navy held that distinction. Our own fleet was not ready for conflict and became bottled up in port early in the war, unable to break the British blockade off the Atlantic Coast. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy and British army wreaked havoc along the mid-Atlantic seaboard, even burning parts of Washington, DC, in 1814. Our nation’s young economy suffered as insurance rates soared and imports from Europe and the Caribbean grew scarce.

Soon, however, the fledgling American fleet developed a warfighting focus and engaged the British, winning victories on Lake Erie and in the Atlantic, capturing the interest of the French, and forcing Britain to the negotiating table. However, outside of a determined effort from privateers, the U.S. Navy could not project power away from home, could not control the sea, and could not deter aggression against its interests. These core capabilities of the current maritime strategy were just as important then as they are today. The experience of 1812 focused the Navy over the next century on preventing another aggressor from restricting our trade or isolating us from the sea.

Our navy operated farther forward as our nation’s economy grew and, by necessity, became more integrated with Eurasia. In the midst of the world’s first wave of globalization, the Great White Fleet sailed from 1907 to 1909, demonstrating America’s emerging power and capability to project it globally. This episodic forward operation became more sustained during World War I as our fleet convoyed supplies and forces to Europe and combated German submarines across the Atlantic Ocean. In World War II, the Navy went forward around the world, protecting sea lanes and projecting power to Europe and Africa and taking the fight across the Pacific to Asia. We stayed forward through the Cold War to contain Soviet expansion and provide tangible support to allies and partners with whom we were highly interdependent diplomatically, economically, and militarily. One lesson of history for our joint force is the importance of operating forward to our international relationships, deterrence, and rapid response.

From Interdependent to Interconnected

Since World War II, our economic interdependence with Eurasia and the Southern Hemisphere expanded through the restoration and explosive growth of global,
interconnected systems of trade, finance, law, and information. In the two decades since the Cold War ended, however, economic interdependence evolved into economic interconnectedness. Twenty years ago, we depended on global markets to obtain goods or financial products more cheaply than those we could create in our own country. Today, almost every physical or virtual product is the result of operations in several different countries. In the words of Maersk’s Stephen Carmel, we have interconnected production chains as opposed to just interdependent economies. A Boeing 787 is only about 30 percent made in the United States, while the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago noted recently that an “American-made” Jeep Patriot is only about 66 percent made in America and a “Japanese-made” Toyota Sequoia is about 80 percent made in America. This is not a new phenomenon for major pieces of capital equipment such as these with many subsystems and parts. What is new is that even small items such as loaves of bread are composed of ingredients from up to 14 different countries. A “Made in USA” label only guarantees a minimum of 8 percent U.S. content and usually only a maximum of 26 percent. Since 90 percent of goods by volume and 65 percent by value travel by sea, the international production chains that create goods great and small depend on a large degree upon strategic maritime crossroads.2

Our security interests are similarly global. The September 11 terrorist attacks shattered the notion that distance alone affords us security. The proliferation of submarines and submersibles, unmanned air vehicles, and electronic warfare systems further highlights how a growing range of potential adversaries can hold our interests at risk both at home and abroad. With interdependent production chains, almost every aspect of American life depends on global systems of commerce and finance. Moreover, our allies and partners, with whom we share extensive economic and diplomatic relationships, depend on U.S. military forces to help preserve regional stability and to assist in the development of their own security capabilities.

With so many concerns prompting a global focus, it is not surprising that many nations see the value of operating forward. The navies of nations such as France, Russia, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom have long been globally deployed. In the last 20 years, they were joined by navies from India, China, Japan, and South Korea. Many more nations have established regional navies to protect their territory, resources, and people from maritime threats ranging from poaching and trafficking to terrorism and piracy. Some regional neighbors team up to address shared maritime concerns, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore to counter piracy in the Strait of Malacca, or Nigeria, Ghana, and other central African countries to combat trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea.

Our global forward posture and the facilities that support it depend on a network of partnerships overseas. These are described in our maritime strategy A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: "Expanded cooperative relationships with other nations will contribute to the security and stability of the maritime domain for the benefit of all. Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, trust and cooperation cannot be surged. They must be built over time so that the strategic interests of the participants are continuously considered while mutual understanding and respect are promoted.” Operating forward alongside allies and emerging partners builds trust and gives us greater understanding of the security environment and the behavioral patterns of competitors and adversaries. Gaining this familiarity and trust takes time. Within our current fiscal constraints, a deliberate, sustained approach to partnerships requires judicious resource management as well as new, innovative approaches to building partner capacity and security cooperation.

Implementing a New Strategy

Innovation and cost-effective approaches to forward operations are hallmarks of the new defense strategic guidance. This emphasis arises from the strategy’s challenges and opportunities, which place a premium on presence in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific while sustaining our alliances in Europe and improving partner capabilities elsewhere. The strategy also states that the “United States will continue to lead global efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons.” Maintaining our forward deployed capacity and capability to assure access requires that naval forces increase their cooperative use of partner locations overseas and employ new models for operating and manning the fleet.

The vision for the Joint Force of 2020 outlined in the new defense strategic guidance reflects the emphasis on operating forward, warfighting capability, and readiness of my Sailing Directions and our fiscal year 2013 budget submission. The missions outlined in the strategy include deterring and defeating aggression, projecting power despite threats to access, and actively countering terrorists. These and the other missions of the strategy require forward forces with credible warfighting capability. These forces will help deter
attack and control escalation, if attacks do occur, by promptly countering the aggression.

The Navy is working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress to increase its forward warfighting capabilities by establishing Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) destroyers in Rota, Spain, and forward stationing littoral combat ships (LCS) in Singapore and additional patrol craft in Bahrain. When part of the FDNF, ships, aircraft, crews, and their families all reside in the host nation, such as Japan, South Korea, Spain, or Italy. In contrast, forward stationing keeps the ships or aircraft overseas while crews rotationally deploy overseas from their home stations in the United States.

Our fleet’s evolution over the next decade will improve the ability to remain forward and implements the defense strategic guidance’s emphasis on innovative, low-cost approaches to partner-building activities. Our fleet will be about the same size it is today (285 ships) in 2017, and will grow to about 300 ships by 2019. The mix of ships in the future fleet, however, will provide many more ships well suited to partnership and cooperation activities. The LCS, joint high speed vessel (JHSV), Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), and the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) will allow us to provide combatant commanders more forces for operations such as counterterrorism, countering illegal trafficking, counterproliferation, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR). In turn, they will free up higher-end destroyers (DDGs) and nuclear submarines (SSNs) for deterrence and power projection missions in other theaters.

These new platforms also will employ new manning and operational models that will keep them forward more of the time. The LCS will join our mine countermeasures and patrol coastal (PC) ships in employing rotational crews that live in the continental United States and deploy overseas to meet their forward stationed ships. This model provides more than twice the forward deployed time per ship as traditional manning models. As support ships, JHSV, MLP, AFSB, and our existing Combat Logistics Fleet ships employ civilian mariner crews and embarked military detachments. These ships deliver two to three times as much forward deployed presence as traditionally manned warships. We are studying the possibility of expanding the concept of rotational crewing to additional ships, such as DDGs and SSNs, but the complexity of those platforms limits their abilities to be manned by rotating crews without significant investments in shore training infrastructure—such as we do with our existing ballistic missile and guided missile submarines.

Day-to-day presence in strategically important regions is the most effective method to build trust among allies and partners and to be in position to assure access and influence events as part of the joint force. Operating forward can be viewed as an element of Phase 0, shaping the environment and setting the conditions for subsequent action in a contingency. It follows that forces already present in a particular region are capable of sending a more nuanced message than forces perceived to be rushing to the scene of a crisis.

The new defense strategic guidance emphasizes the need to assure access to the global commons and to retain the ability to project power despite threats to access. The new Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) highlights the importance of forward operations to access for the joint force, stating, “Geography, particularly distance, arguably determines the access challenge more than any other factor, as military power has tended to degrade over distance.” By operating forward, we mitigate the tyranny of distance and improve our ability to assure access. Partnerships also figure prominently in assuring joint access per the JOAC: “The employment of forces in engagement activities often years prior to a crisis may be critical to success by encouraging willing and capable partners.”

Operating Forward at the Maritime Crossroads

On any given day, more than 50,000 Sailors are under way on 145 ships and submarines, 100 of them deployed overseas. They are joined by more than 125 land-based patrol aircraft and helicopters, 1,000 information dominance personnel, and over 4,000 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command Sailors on the ground and in the littorals, building the ability of partners to protect their people, resources, and territory. We focus this deployed presence on the strategic maritime crossroads, where conflict is both most likely and most consequential.

Threats directed by Iran toward our regional partners and international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz require warfighting capability forward in the Arabian Gulf, through which 20 percent of the world’s
oil passes each day. The joint force there relies on rotationally deployed Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups as well as forward stationed PCs, mine countermeasures, and aircraft at facilities in Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In the near term, we plan to forward station three additional PCs in Bahrain and over the next decade will send LCS to replace our minesweepers there. To the southeast in Jebel Ali, we have another place where we are able to conduct repairs and rest our forces, from the smallest ships up to our largest aircraft carriers. Our forward posture in the Arabian Gulf enhances cooperation with nations in the region. For example, USS Whidbey Island and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit conducted Iron Magic 12, a bilateral amphibious exercise, with UAE forces last November and December. Also, in the ultimate “offshore option,” our aircraft carriers will continue to provide 30 percent of the close air support missions support operations in Afghanistan from the Arabian Sea—a percentage that will likely grow as we continue to shrink our footprint on the ground there.

The Asia-Pacific has been a focus of the Navy for more than seven decades. About 40 percent of the world’s trade passes through a strategic maritime crossroad at the 1.7-mile wide Strait of Malacca, and the region is home to five of our seven treaty alliances. Today, trends in trade and energy flows are increasing interest in the South China Sea and in the region. Our forward posture in the Arabian Gulf enhances cooperation with nations in the region. For example, USS Whidbey Island and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit conducted Iron Magic 12, a bilateral amphibious exercise, with UAE forces last November and December. Also, in the ultimate “offshore option,” our aircraft carriers will continue to provide 30 percent of the close air support missions support operations in Afghanistan from the Arabian Sea—a percentage that will likely grow as we continue to shrink our footprint on the ground there.

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The Asia-Pacific will continue to be a top priority as President Barack Obama stated in announcing the new defense strategic guidance: “We will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. Our relationships with Asian allies and key partners are critical to the future stability and growth of the region.” The Navy’s presence in the Asia-Pacific will increase over the next decade as new platforms such as JHSV, LCS, and MLP enter the fleet. This evolution will be accompanied by greater cooperation, interoperability, and information-sharing as we strengthen our network of security partnerships through forward naval operations.8

On any given day, about 50 ships are deployed in the Asia-Pacific region, supported
of the nearly 170 exercises and training events that we conduct in the region, such as Talisman Sabre, which last year brought together 18 U.S. and Australian ships and more than 22,500 sailors and marines for a series of events from maritime security to amphibious assault. Last December, exercise Kilat Eagle brought together forces from Malaysia with USS Makin Island and Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit to improve proficiency in conducting HA/DR, peacekeeping operations, and countering weapons proliferation. In February of this year, the multinational combined joint exercise Cobra Gold 2012 brought together some 20 nations in Thailand to improve interoperability across a range of operations, the largest such event in the Asia-Pacific region.

We plan to forward station LCS in Singapore over the next several years, increasing our presence by rotating crews and avoiding about 3 weeks of transit time to the region. The first operations of an LCS from Singapore will occur in early 2013 and will be followed later with forward-stationed ships. The offer of Singapore to host LCS is an excellent example of a partnership that has deepened from occasional logistics support to a full-time operational relationship. To the south in Darwin, Australia, we are developing options to provide amphibious lift to support the rotational deployment of Marines there as the President announced last November. We are continuing to work with the Marine Corps and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) to refine the operating concept for these forces and make the best use of this new location. USPACOM is also working with other countries in the region such as the Philippines to use their port and air facilities to support ongoing counterterrorism and maritime domain awareness operations. Each of these places involves a small footprint ashore. The return on investment in enabling our forward operations, however, will be large.

Our naval forces in Europe operate adjacent to strategic maritime crossroads at the Suez Canal in the east and Strait of Gibraltar to the west. Through these chokepoints flow the majority of Europe’s oil and much of its exports and imports. Although many are noting a shift in our focus to the Asia-Pacific in the coming years, our operations in Europe will remain steady in the near term and increase over the long term with the entry of LCS and JHSV into the fleet. Over the next 4 years, we plan to move four DDGs with ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability to an existing facility at Rota, Spain, under the FDNF model. We will base these ships forward to avoid the 15-day transit to the Mediterranean and maintain them in a higher state of readiness than ships deploying from the United States. As a result, one forward-deployed DDG can provide the presence of five rotationally deployed from U.S. homeports. When not conducting BMD missions, these ships will be available to perform other missions and exercises with North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allies and regional partners. For example, operating forward from Rota will allow more frequent training with the Spanish navy, with whom we share the Aegis weapon system and a history of combined operations. The Navy’s forward presence at Rota is complemented by longstanding use of facilities at Naples, Gaeta, and Sgonella, Italy, and at Souda Bay, Greece. Recent operations off the coast of Libya highlight the value of being able to sustain our ships and aircraft from these locations.

Our engagement with European allies is not only to address European security. As some of our most capable partners, the navies of Europe are essential to our combined capability at the world’s most challenging crossroads. We plan on British and French help clearing mines from the Strait of Hormuz if Iran chooses to deny free passage through that chokepoint. Several European navies contribute to coalition counterpiracy operations around the Horn of Africa and in the Arabian Sea. Moreover, European partners deliver much of the training capability that we bring to Africa Partnership Station operations in East and West Africa.

Occupying a unique location on the African continent, the port of Djibouti and airfield at Camp Lemonier provide places for our forces to refuel and resupply while conducting operations in the Red Sea and around the Horn of Africa. Approximately 20,000 merchant ships pass through the Gulf of Aden each year, en route to or from the Suez Canal. The Navy is engaged with over 20 international partners to combat piracy and safeguard the free flow of commerce at this strategic maritime corridor. As events in Somalia and more recently in Yemen illustrate, the ability to provide a range of offshore options in this volatile region is essential to both U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Central Command. In the Gulf of Guinea, we use a combination of amphibious ships, high speed vessels, frigates, and support ships as mobile sea bases for Africa Partnership Station deployments that conduct maritime security and interagency engagement activities with partners in West and Central Africa.

In our own hemisphere, the port and airfield at Guantanamo Bay provide a vital link to Latin America and the maritime crossroad around the Panama Canal. Today, we maintain about five ships in the region to counter illegal trafficking as part of Joint
Interagency Task Force–South. The widening of the canal over the next several years and expected increase in merchant traffic to U.S. ports will increase the importance of naval operations in the region.

History has shown that navies usually do not win wars on their own—but they can certainly lose them. This is important to keep in mind as we develop the Joint Force of 2020. America’s global interests demonstrate that we need a global Navy. We will have to balance the need to be efficient in operating forward with the need to be ready and effective with the warfighting capability that we deliver. Through the judicious use of bases and places at the strategic maritime crossroads and strong relationships with our partners and allies, we will remain able to deter and defeat aggression and respond to crises—the hallmarks of a global Navy. JFQ

NOTES


6. Ibid., 8.


Building Resiliency into the National Military Strategy

By DAVID H. CARSTENS

Rising demand for resources, rapid urbanization of littoral regions, the effects of climate change, the emergence of new strains of disease, and profound cultural and demographic tensions in several regions are just some of the trends whose complex interplay may spark or exacerbate future conflicts.

—The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review

Colonel David H. Carstens, USA, is currently serving as a Senior Service College Fellow and Associate at the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, DC.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) prediction of future trends in an emerging complex environment is arguably more accurate than many leaders might like to believe. Whether or not we have reached the “tipping point,” or that period in history when we will be subjected to irreversible detrimental environmental consequences, is a subject of intense scientific debate. The fact is that natural disasters in 2010 killed 295,000 people and cost world economies an estimated $130 billion. This 2010 data is but one point on a trend line that depicts a sharp increase in disaster reporting between 1960 and 2009. The climate is changing and a confluence of worsening environmental conditions is creating the perfect storm of regional security crises and humanitarian disasters. The U.S. military will be called upon to assist in such situations based on binding cooperation agreements or because it has the demonstrated capacity to act quickly and effectively.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions pull resources from the available force structure that might otherwise be used for defending the Nation and preparing for tomorrow’s combat contingencies. In 2010, U.S. Southern Command (USOUTHCOM) responded to natural disasters in Guatemala, Chile, and most notably Haiti, where a 7.0 magnitude earthquake shook the country, causing a reported 316,000 deaths and countless injuries and homes destroyed. To these crises, USOUTHCOM collectively deployed more than 20,220 military personnel, 24 ships, and dozens of aircraft, and helped deliver millions of pounds of food and water.

The numbers of natural disasters will increase as the globe experiences the worsening effects of climate change. This will create a further drain on available combat forces and decrease the ability of combatant commanders (COCOMs) to effectively plan for and execute combat contingencies.

Consequences of Climate Change

In a landmark report issued in 2007, a panel of 11 retired senior military leaders concluded that climate change “poses a serious threat to America’s national security.” The report addressed the concern that the United States may be drawn more frequently into volatile and rapidly eroding regional situations to help provide stability before environmental conditions worsen or before the situations can be exploited by extremists. One way to avoid this pitfall is for the United States to make its allies and partners resilient—more adaptable to the impacts of climate change and more capable of dealing with disaster prevention and response. Failing to help allies and partners build adaptive programs and preparedness will only delay the inevitable U.S. involvement to avert larger and more frequent humanitarian crises.

One need only look as far as recent events in Tunisia and Egypt to appreciate how resource scarcity can trigger internal unrest or even revolt against the government. While the public outcry against former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak grabbed the headlines in late January 2011, it was a dramatic rise in food prices that brought masses of protesters into Cairo’s streets.

Climate change will create increasingly dry conditions across much of the globe in the next 30 years, putting the world’s food-producing countries under immense stress. According to Richard Seager, a noted climate change expert, “The term ‘global warming’ does not do justice to the climatic changes the world will experience in coming decades.”

As the Earth’s temperatures increase, so too do concerns about water shortages. In no other area of the world are the stakes higher over water than in the Hindu Kush–Himalayan region. Scientists in India monitoring the water situation reported an alarming 38 percent shrinkage in the Himalayan glaciers over the last 40 years. Some experts argue that this is a phase in the natural life of the region. Nevertheless, there is ample cause for concern over this freshwater source that sustains 1.3 billion people and impacts food and energy production for 3 billion. The Himalayas are the lifeline for almost half of humanity.

Adding to the concern is the knowledge that this region is bordered by three countries possessing nuclear weapons and which have historical adversarial relationships: China, Pakistan, and India.

Ocean levels are rising at an alarming 3 millimeters per year based on satellite data observed since 1993. At this rate, factoring in an increase brought on by warming ocean temperatures and melting ice caps, sea levels could rise by 1 meter or more by the end of this century. What will this do to countries across the globe in the long term (20 years and beyond)? Consider Vietnam: in a projection released by the Vietnamese government, more than one-third of the Mekong Delta, where 17 million people live and nearly half of the country’s rice is grown, could be submerged if sea levels rise by 3 feet. The impacts on neighboring countries like India and Bangladesh are equally grim.

Typhoons and hurricanes and their associated storm surges present the greatest near-term (next 10 years) danger to countries with populations living in low-lying coastal regions. Climatologists predict a dramatic increase in these events that could ultimately drive hundreds of thousands of residents from their homes. Central India has witnessed a 50 percent increase in the number of extreme weather events over the last 50 years.

In summary, the consequences of climate change include destruction of coastal settlements and a loss of life and livelihood on a scale that could eclipse anything seen to date. In the near term, countries across the globe will face a larger number of storms of increasing intensity. In the long term, drought and rising ocean levels will create more catastrophic impacts. As one example, in Vietnam alone, a staggering 11 percent of the population might be forced to displace from coastal residences in the coming decades.

Food and water shortages due to drought, and forced migration due to sea-level rise, will bring social and economic upheaval to countries that are vulnerable to climate change on a scale that is incalculable. The resulting political unrest will exceed governments’ internal capacities to cope with the crises in all but the most advanced countries.

Even Japan, which has the world’s third largest economy and arguably the most resilient infrastructure in regard to earthquakes, was hard pressed to deal with the aftermath of the natural disasters that hit the country in March 2011. Although the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami were devastating, the impacts pale when compared to the estimated combined effects of climate change on whole societies over the next several decades.

Toward a Strategy of Resiliency

In developing a strategy that emphasizes resiliency, the military must undergo a cultural transformation. General George Casey, former Chief of Staff of the Army, spoke in 2010 about an Army “out of balance.” Arguably, all of the Services are out of balance with only enough time and resources to continue planning based on the assumptions of the current wars. A mention of climate change in the 2010 QDR was a groundbreaking beginning to this dialogue. The 2011 National Military...
Strategy (NMS) identifies “the uncertain impact of global climate change” as a challenge to both governance and natural disaster response in developing nations. Given the weight of current scientific data, the NMS grossly understates the grave impact that climate change will have on regional stability and national security. A much more aggressive approach is required to fully integrate a climate change response framework into the NMS that better addresses national security challenges.

COCOMs must begin to address the near-term effects of climate change as a growing regional threat and design a coherent approach to adaptation and preparedness into their theater campaign plans. For this issue to be taken seriously by Capitol Hill lawmakers, COCOMs need to more fervently identify climate change as a force protection issue. A failure to confront these risks now will cost lives and require additional force deployments to respond to crises in the future.

The military must redefine what is being taught to its next generation of leaders. Most of the junior officers who entered service after the 9/11 attacks are focused on the lessons learned of the current war. The spark igniting tomorrow’s conflicts may be less about terrorism and peer competition and more about resource scarcity and relocation of whole societies due to sea-level rise. The military needs to embrace this eventuality and begin to build climate change adaptation and disaster preparedness as core competencies. Existing joint and Service-specific military planning courses must be updated to include these new core competencies into the curricula.

The military must also appropriately resource educational institutions and organizations that have the mandate to train a new generation of subject matter experts on dealing with the challenges caused by climate change. These centers of excellence need to be capable of partnering across a broad range of expertise that possesses cutting edge insights into the issues of climate change. The new breed of military “resiliency warriors” educated at these centers should be identified and managed under a separate functional area within their respective Services’ human resource systems. Integration of these subject matter experts into the strategic and operational levels of command is fundamental to the success of creating viable theater campaigns and plans that address climate change adaptation and preparedness.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has the will and demonstrated capacity to lead in the area of sustainability. In 2008, the Nature Conservancy recognized this in its recommendations to the new U.S. Presidential administration: “Just as DOD has served as an engine of progress in developing and taking full advantage of information technology, it can serve as an engine of technical and policy advance related to reducing greenhouse gases, reducing reliance on fossil fuels, greatly improving energy efficiency and conservation, and attaining energy security.”

Developing adaptive capabilities and disaster preparedness in allied and partner nations, however, falls more into the area of security sector assistance, and in that arena, DOD is clearly a supporting organization. The Department of State is responsible to lead integrated U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts as directed by National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 44. Yet even in this supporting role, DOD must shoulder more than its share of leadership burden in building the capacity of the Nation’s allies and partners to adapt to, prepare for, and respond to climate change. While the State Department understands the foreign policy objectives as well as the cultural/political context of particular countries, it is DOD that has the logistical resources and expertise in planning and execution to drive the mission. DOD also has the experience of bringing different organizations together and forming a cohesive team.

This imperative is not about spending more money. Instead, the portion of the U.S. budget earmarked for foreign military financing (FMF) and DOD’s Global Train and Equip Program (Section 1206) needs to be spent more prudently as a means of confronting tomorrow’s climate change impacts. Two key objectives of FMF are to maintain regional stability and to improve response to humanitarian crises. Working within these objectives, given the overwhelming data that suggests adverse environmental conditions will trigger tomorrow’s crises, a larger portion of FMF and Section 1206 funding must be jointly focused on building climate change adaptation and disaster preparedness programs in allied and partner nations.

In the case of Vietnam, for example, a country that is already experiencing the detrimental effects of climate change, a portion of FMF dollars might be best spent giving the Vietnamese a means to access large data repositories of previously classified imagery and the training to interpret this imagery in order to assess the long-term impacts of erosion on coastal communities. This type of soft engagement may prove more beneficial to the Vietnamese in the long term and be less contentious than conventional military training and equipping to neighbors such as China.

Partnerships

DOD should continue doing what it does best: engaging other militaries. The focus should be expanded to include assessing allied and partner nations’ military capabilities to deal with climate change adaptation and disaster response and prevention, and then systematically building their capacities to adapt and respond to these challenges. Most foreign militaries are not restricted by legislation such as Posse Comitatus, so they can play a larger role in support of civilian authorities. DOD must look through the lens of allied and partner nations’ military mandates, and not their own, when exploring new ways to support climate change adaptation and disaster response and prevention initiatives abroad. Brigadier General Bob Barnes, USA (Ret.), a senior policy advisor for the Nature Conservancy, expressed similar views during his testimony before the Defense Science Board on January 13, 2011. More importantly, General Barnes stressed the need to help partner nation militaries “move beyond disaster response to prevention.”

Admiral Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized that DOD cannot address the complex issues of climate change unilaterally. “We cannot, nor should we do this alone,” he remarked in 2010. The admiral went on to say that partnerships within the interagency, with industry, and with allies and partners will be “essential as we push the bounds of what is possible and affordable.” In this light, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
U.S. Forestry Service, and U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration are examples of potential government partners that DOD must begin to engage more broadly with regard to climate change.

The most beneficial partnerships for DOD may be with academic and scientific institutions. These nongovernmental organizations represent the vanguard of work on climate change. The International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI), part of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is one such example of a potential partner for DOD. IRI works with local communities across the globe to develop and evaluate climate risk management strategies. This institute possesses both top-driven analytical assessment tools and bottom-up-driven feedback from local communities on climate change requirements, all of which are necessary to shape adaptation programs.24 IRI has what DOD lacks: an understanding of tomorrow’s environment and a strategy to deal with it.

There is already a funding vehicle to take advantage of the academic capacity of institutions such as IRI. The Minerva Initiative, launched in 2008 by then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, is a DOD-sponsored, university-based initiative designed to harness social science research and apply it to areas of strategic importance to the United States.25 When unveiling the program, Secretary Gates clearly articulated his desire to find untapped elements of national power in the halls of academia.26 The problem is that Minerva has limited funding that is further at risk due to current budget constraints. What funding does exist is spent on a very broad range of issues. The single Minerva Initiative award, granted in 2008 under the project title of “Climate Change, State Stability and Political Risk,” was given to an institution that conducts research almost exclusively on Africa. Finally, while the Minerva Initiative may ultimately create a consortium of social scientists conducting research on issues relevant to U.S. national security, these individuals and institutions are not directly responsive to the emerging requirements of the COCOMs—the decisionmakers who need the information most.

Similar invaluable partnerships exist in the private sector. The Rockefeller Foundation is a prominent philanthropic organization fully engaged in climate change adaptation projects. In 2007, the organization pledged $70 million to help cities around the world confront the dangers of increased flooding, severe drought, and the spread of infectious diseases.27 The foundation is involved both in climate change research and in the funding and management of actual climate change adaptation projects focused on a combination of top-driven assessments and local-level requirements.

What all of these organizations lack is the unity of purpose that comes with direction. There is no established authority for bringing these sectors together. What is needed is a responsive network of academicians, scientists, engineers, and philanthropists that can provide a way forward on climate change adaptation to the Chief of Mission and COCOM in a specific country.

To help drive climate change adaptation and disaster preparedness planning using this broad range of available resources, COCOMs should turn to organizations such as the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. The power of this relatively small organization rests in its broad authorities. It is a DOD organization with a global mandate that reports to the regional COCOMs.28 While its mission is primarily to educate, train, conduct research, and assist in international disaster preparedness, this role could be expanded to include climate change adaptation planning. The center could help DOD bridge the cultural divide of working with organizations comprised of academics, scientists, and engineers. Civilians with a wide range of public-private partnership experience make up the ranks of the center and speak the same language as those engaged in climate change research. Furthermore, the center can bring the whole of State/USAID to the table to ensure that adaptation program recommendations match foreign policy objectives.

Both Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen openly acknowledged that engagement across the globe would be greatly enhanced by an all-out reform of security sector assistance. An imperative to drive a unified resiliency strategy is the “dual-key” approach, one of several security sector assistance reform options mentioned in the 2010 QDR. Under such a proposal, projects addressing resiliency would be jointly approved by the Chief of Mission and COCOM in the field, followed by approval by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. This is the only way to truly avoid redundancy, maximize the impact of limited resources, and ensure that climate change adaptation and preparedness measures are addressing the assessed security shortfalls of both State and DOD.

As part of this reform, planning timelines must also be compressed. Agility is key when responding to unpredictable climate conditions. The Cold War–era planning system that currently drives security sector assistance project approval is far too slow. DOD can learn from organizations like the Rockefeller Foundation’s Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network, which is successfully implementing an aggressive 2-year approach to move beyond climate change adaptation problem identification to implementation of effective urban resilience-building projects. How? “The natural tendency is to invest in the thing . . . but there never is just one thing,” said Maria Blair, former managing director for the Rockefeller Foundation. “The key is to embrace uncertainty and navigate within it.”29

The impacts of climate change will increasingly put internal stresses on countries that are least prepared to deal with them and external stresses on countries like the United States that will assuredly assist. The environment is being transformed and military leaders must be prepared for the inevitable changes and their consequences. There is cultural resistance to meeting this challenge while the Nation is engaged in war. Raindrops kill fewer people than bullets, and the war in Afghanistan remains a first-order emphasis. Yet if DOD does not define a better strategy aimed at shifting resources toward building U.S. allies’ and partners’ capacities to adapt to, prepare for, and respond to climate change, it will continue to be caught up in responding to disasters and regional security crises after they occur. Enabling the Nation’s allies and partners to deal with the impacts of climate change will ultimately allow our out-of-balance military to reset and prepare for
tomorrow’s threats. In doing so, the United States will strengthen the security environment, be more prepared for an uncertain future, and assure its allies and partners with a strengthened image abroad. JFQ

NOTES


6 Ibid.


14 Ibid.


General George W. Casey, Jr., USA, speech presented at the Eisenhower Luncheon as part of the Association of the United States Army’s Annual Meeting and Exposition, Washington, DC, October 26, 2010.

Brigadier General Bob Barnes, USA (Ret.), interview by author, January 21, 2011, Arlington, VA, PowerPoint slides received from source.


The Posse Comitatus Act is a U.S. Federal law (18 U.S.C. § 1385) passed on June 18, 1878, after the end of Reconstruction, with the intention of substantially limiting the powers of the Federal Government to use the military for law enforcement. The act prohibits most members of the Federal uniformed Services from exercising nominally state law enforcement, police, or peace officer powers that maintain “law and order” on nonfederal property (states and their counties and municipal divisions) within the United States.


Stephen Zebiak, interview by author, December 19, 2010, Palisades, NY.


Maria E. Blair, interview by author, December 14, 2010.
EMERGING FROM BEHIND THE U.S. SHIELD

Japan’s Strategy of Dynamic Deterrence and Defense Forces

By DOUGLAS JOHN MACINTYRE

I do not believe that it is a good idea for Japan to depend on the United States for her security over the next 50 or 100 years.

—Former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, June 10, 2010
As the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan passed its 50-year milestone in 2010, tectonic shifts within the societal, economic, geopolitical, and military landscape of East Asia were already posing serious challenges to many of the treaty’s basic tenets. Within the depths of a global financial crisis, domestic stagnation, internal political change, and the shadow of China’s rise, Japan’s leaders have continued the decades-long transformation of their country’s instruments of national power. The most far-reaching of these changes occurred in December 2010, when Japan announced a new national security strategy that established a defense force capable of dynamic deterrence: the use of multifunctional, flexible, and responsive military capabilities to respond to complex contingencies and “secure deterrence by the existence of defense capability” in order to contribute to stability within the Asia-Pacific region. Despite the environmental and national political crisis triggered by the cataclysmic earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster, Japan’s commitment to this strategy is underscored by the fact that the annual budgets for 2011 and 2012 continued defense funding, including acquisitions programs and capability development, at a rate greater than 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).1

Adopting a strategy of dynamic deterrence, Japan’s current generation of leaders has stepped beyond previous strategies—held captive by the legacy of World War II—in order to set the conditions for a near-term resurgence in Asia. Building on decades of incremental reforms, they have focused on national core values of autonomy and prestige to redefine Japan’s security strategy in terms of its own national interests within current and future security environments and to develop a more balanced and symmetrical military capability. Japan’s new strategic trajectory presents the United States with an opportunity to renew influence in Asia relative to China; increase cooperation and joint interoperability among diplomatic, economic, and security partners; and foster cooperative engagement through strengthened regional institutions.

Core Values, Vital Interests, and Realism

Japan’s primary core values are autonomy, reflected in rejection of dependence, and prestige, with shame dependent upon the observations of others.2 Ensuring economic prosperity and maintaining its leadership role within the balance of power in Asia are enduring, nonnegotiable vital interests. The ideal balance of these values was expressed within Japan’s foreign policy and grand strategy during the period following the Meiji Restoration and rise of the nation as a great power during the early 20th century. Unique to Japan and in direct conflict with its core values, its national interests have been defined since World War II primarily by its relationship with the United States, characterized by reduced sovereignty, minimal military capability, and constraints imposed by its U.S.-developed constitution. Rather than pursuing its own national interests aligned with its core values, Japan has followed a path more in concert with its common security interests with the United States, including preserving stability, maintaining freedom of action and navigation within the global commons, maintaining leadership roles in regional and global multilateral institutions, keeping the Korean Peninsula peaceful, maintaining peace within the Taiwan Strait, defending against terrorism, avoiding regional proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and ensuring the independence of Southeast Asia.3

Realism defines international relations in terms of a nation’s use of its means—the diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement capability—to increase its power and position relative to other nations as it reacts to changes within the regional and international geopolitical environments.4 Based on its unique security relationship with the United States since World War II, Japan’s foreign policy can best be described by the persistence of its realism, expressed over the past several decades in terms of economic strength and diplomatic power through multilateralism.5

For example, under the postwar U.S. security umbrella between 1945 and 1952, Japan developed the Yoshida Doctrine, a mercantile-based realism that shaped its economic and foreign policy during the Cold War.6 In addition, Prime Minister Eisaku Satō’s December 1967 articulation of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, also known as the “Three No’s,” announced that Japan would not possess, make, or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons into its territory.7 As the Yoshida Doctrine and Three No’s policy established themselves as Japan’s foreign policy and grand strategy, autonomy and prestige were supplanted by economic strength and prosperity.8 Despite a prewar history of expressing national power in terms of military strength and external involvement, Japanese realism under the Yoshida Doctrine differed in that the country would now realize power in terms of economic strength and the Faustian bargain of its conditional sovereignty.9 This goes far toward explaining why a country that valued autonomy and prestige would allow its foreign policy to be dominated by another country for such a critical period of its history.

Japan’s political leaders in the latter stages of the Cold War differed greatly regarding the timeframe to change the nature of the country’s relationship with the United States to restore full sovereignty and reassert itself on the regional and global stage. They steadfastly maintained that the U.S.-Japan security alliance was essential until the nation could become more independent and self-reliant.10 As Japan’s leaders examined their position in Asia, relationship with the United States, and international standing relative to the application of national power, they perceived increased vulnerability within a rapidly changing and highly volatile region, overdependence on the United States for security, and increasingly qualified international and regional respect.11 From the early 1990s through Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s (2000–2006) tenure until today, geopolitical changes and increased uncertainty in Asia have shifted Japan’s strategic policymakers; they have moved from the economic realism of the Yoshida Doctrine and U.S. security umbrella toward a new security strategy based on the interests of an independent nation facing regional threats, challenges, and
competition within the Asia-Pacific region and the international system.

A Complicated and Uncertain Asia

Three security issues are central to understanding the impetus behind Japan’s reassessment of its strategic environment and shift toward a new strategy:

China’s Rise and Regional Ambitions. Japan finds itself between two superpowers: the United States, an ally refocusing on the Asia-Pacific region following its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and China, an economic competitor defining national interests in the South China Sea, expanding its regional and global presence, and seeking to prevent Japan from countering its regional ambitions as it attempts to weaken the U.S.-Japan alliance. With both Japan and China reliant upon maritime trade, increasingly interdependent due to capital investments, and reigniting territorial disputes due to keen resource competition, the vulnerabilities inherent within the Yoshida-era Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) structure and capabilities represented high strategic risk for Japan.

Regional Territorial Disputes. Despite the cooperation and transparency engendered through dialogue and exchange within organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN + 3, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and East Asia Summit, regional territorial disputes remain at the center of potential conflict within the region. Japan currently has disputes regarding claims...
of sovereignty with China over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai to the Chinese), with Russia over the Northern Territories (Southern Kuriles to the Russians), and with South Korea over Takeshima (Dokdo to the Koreans). Also, sharp resource competition has led China to extend its exclusive economic zone via claims of an extended continental shelf into the Okinawa Trench within the East China Sea, posing both an economic and sovereignty challenge to Japan.

**WMD and the Ballistic Missile Threat.** In 1998, North Korea launched its first missile over Japan. Since that time, the development, testing, and employment of ballistic missiles throughout the region by both North Korea and China, and the increasing regional proliferation of these weapons, have generated significant Japanese political commitment toward the joint development of ballistic missile defenses (BMD) with the United States and a reexamination of collective self-defense under the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Without necessary changes to the treaty, Japan’s future BMD capabilities could not provide defense to U.S. forces in the region or engage missiles fired at the United States from third parties.

Faced with the emergence of these security issues and the recognized limitations of its previous strategy, Japan’s leaders engaged in serious efforts to reexamine their foreign policy and began to stake out a more independent security strategy. Unlike the United States, which regularly updates its national security strategy and defense plans, Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) represent a comprehensive, forward-looking, strategic-level document outlining every aspect of its security strategy until the national leadership determines that there has been enough of a change within the strategic environment to warrant an update. Since the initial NDPG in 1976, it has been updated three other times: 1995, 2004, and most recently in 2010. The evolution and increasing frequency of NDPG revision clearly signal that Japan is taking stock of its security environment and developing the necessary strategic concepts and military capabilities to achieve its national objectives.


Each NDPG prescribes JSDF capabilities, acquisition goals, and annual budgetary outlays within a corresponding 5-year Mid-Term Defense Program and annual budgets. Within NDPG 1976, the Basic Defense Force (BDF) concept was established to address Japan’s static deterrence posture, and budget outlays resourced the JSDF at levels sufficient to meet a minimum defense capability. NDPG 1976 was based on five key assumptions: global and regional security environments would remain stable, JSDF could perform essential defense functions, Japan had adequate intelligence and surveillance capabilities, JSDF could be rapidly reinforced by the United States, and the development of an independent military capability would upset the regional balance of power. While the NDPG 1995 reviewed Japan’s security posture for the first time in 18 years and codified the national security process, it offered no substantive changes and retained the legacy BDF concept.

Reacting to the evolving strategic environment, specific reforms commenced by Prime Minister Koizumi to adapt Japan’s foreign policy and domestic institutions began to lay the groundwork for an increasingly globalized security relationship with the United States apart from constitutional and Yoshida policy constraints. These efforts included:

- The Yoshida Doctrine prohibition against deploying Japanese forces was challenged by deploying forces in support of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations.
- Japan’s constitutional ban on collective self-defense was challenged by deploying elements of the JSDF to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of its U.S. ally.
- Japan began acquiring power-projection capability, such as in-flight refueling tankers, amphibious shipping, and air transports, and updated its strike capability by obtaining precision-guided munitions (PGMs).
- Japan began procurement of advanced military technology such as BMD, partnered with the United States on emergent technologies, and began to invest in its military industries.

In 2004, an updated NDPG was published that redefined Japan’s basic security principles. To demonstrate that Japan was a “responsible stakeholder in the international community” without fundamentally altering its relationship with the United States, NDPG 2004 defined two objectives for national security: the defense of Japan and prevention of regional threats “by improving [the] international security environment.” It detailed three approaches concerning the application of Japan’s instruments of national power: through its own efforts, in cooperation with its U.S. ally, and as part of the international community. Reforms initiated by Koizumi were codified in NDPG 2004, and there was a concerted effort to critique the validity of the BDF concept given changes in the strategic environment. JSDF roles were redefined to “provide effective response to new threats and diverse situations; prepare to deal with full-scale invasion; and take proactive efforts to improve the international security environment.”

The articulation of Japan’s security strategy in terms of the strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region and its own national interests within NDPG 2004 provided continuity despite the repeated changes in political leadership in the period between Koizumi’s successor, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe (2006–2007), and current Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda (who assumed office September 2, 2011) and set the stage for the development of NDPG 2010, which established defense forces capable of dynamic deterrence.

**NDPG 2010 and Dynamic Deterrence Strategy**

In the summer of 2010, then Prime Minister Naoto Kan received a report from Japan’s Security Council that represented a clear departure from NDPG 2004 and the BDF concept to “secure deterrence by the existence of defense capability.” Within this report, the council stressed that, due to decreased warning times before contingencies and the increased imperative to respond to threats that have not been effectively deterred, Japan’s security strategy would have to shift toward enhanced JSDF operational capabilities based on responsiveness and the use of “dynamic deterrence.”
Dynamic deterrence is defined by Charles T. Allen, Gary L. Guertner, and Robert P. Haffa, Jr., as conventional military deterrence that combines efforts to dissuade, capabilities to neutralize or capture, credible threats to retaliate, and the ability to defend” coupled with “an explicit embrace of the use of force” to effectively communicate a deterrent threat or compel an enemy to change its behavior. The three-pronged approach of NDPG 2004 is retained, and Japan will continue to uphold a strategic defensive policy and the Three No’s. However, analysis of the strategic environment contained within NDPG 2010 recognizes that Japan’s current and future security environments will be characterized by increasing disputes in “gray zones,” representing confrontations over sovereignty and economic interests. Further analysis details North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat; China’s military modernization, insufficient transparency, and destabilizing actions; and a regional shift in power based on the rise of emerging nations, such as China and India, relative to U.S. influence.

Replacing the outdated BDF concept, Japan’s Dynamic Defense Force (DDF) should increase the deterrent credibility of Japan through timely and active operations. As stated within NDPG 2010, DDF capabilities require that the role and force structure of the JSDF change to develop an operationally deployable force that can provide effective deterrence and response, specifically to protect Japan’s sea and airspace and respond to attacks on offshore island territories; conduct efforts to promote stability within the Asia-Pacific region; and support improvements to the global security environment.

The associated Mid-Term Defense Program (2011–2015) for procurement and acquisitions indicates resource allocation priority is given to the development of an effective response capability through DDF. Initial changes to the JSDF structure include a reduction in heavy forces and increased mobility and repositioning of units to island territories in southwestern Japan for the Ground Self-Defense Force; expansion of the submarine fleet and regional deployment of destroyer units for the Maritime Self-Defense Force; shifting of a fighter squadron to Naha and the establishment of a new Yokota base for the Air Self-Defense Force; and reduction of active-duty personnel to shift toward a younger force.

NDPG 2010’s acquisitions programs specifically target areas that promote growth of DDF capabilities within the JSDF. These include capabilities to ensure security of sea and air space around Japan, respond to attacks against island areas, counter cyber attacks, defend against attacks by special forces, provide BMD capability, respond to complex contingencies throughout the region, and provide consequence management and humanitarian assistance to large-scale and special disasters. Focus areas for future development include joint operations, international peace cooperation activities, intelligence, science and technology, research and development, and medical capability.

Total expenditures for the 5-year plan will be approximately 23.49 trillion yen (¥), equivalent to $279 billion, as reflected within...
the Mid-Term Defense Program and corresponding annual budget plans, representing a total reduction of ¥750 billion from 2005–2009 levels. Given the turbulent domestic political situation faced by Prime Minister Noda and his Democratic Party of Japan, internal tensions regarding the country’s budget deficit, and the current nuclear crisis, funding levels articulated to support the new security strategy initially appear consistent with Japan’s dedication of approximately 1 percent of GDP toward defense. However, closer examination of the budget reveals another story.

The Ministry of Defense’s budget monitoring and streamlining initiatives including active investigation of fraud, bulk procurement of equipment, acquisitions reform, labor cost reform, and the adoption of performance-based logistics have realized significant savings, estimated at over ¥20 billion annually. After combining these savings with the special budget allocations of over ¥475 billion per year for modernization and selected DDF acquisitions programs supporting NDPG 2010 implementation, neither of which were included as part of the totals cited above, the actual Japanese defense budget shows a 3 percent real growth rate and exceeds 1 percent of current GDP. In 2012, Japan’s annual defense budget and ¥1.4 billion supplemental represent a 0.6 percent growth over 2011 and continue to align annual budget requests with NDPG 2010 goals. While policymakers and military leaders may wrestle with the details regarding NDPG 2010 implementation, what would the execution of dynamic deterrence look like in operational terms?

**Dynamic Deterrence: Country X in the Gray Zones**

Based on the theorists’ definition of dynamic deterrence and the NDPG 2010, the following illustration is offered using Japan’s response with prepositioned DDF to a territorial dispute with Country X in the gray zones. While Japan would use its diplomatic strength, its relationship with the United States, and multilateralism within regional forums to attempt to dissuade Country X, its DDF—in the form of a highly capable and responsive ground, sea, and air force positioned well within operational reach of the territory—would pose a credible threat of retaliation, including neutralization, capture, or defeat of an enemy, and would compel Country X to reevaluate its actions or face defeat. Japan could frequently demonstrate its ability to defend its territories through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral joint exercises. An explicit embrace of the use of force to defend its national interests should be interpreted by Country X as meaning that Japan would use the full potential of its military capability in response to an attack. As detailed within NDPG 2010 and the Ministry of Defense’s fiscal years 2011 and 2012 budget requests, Japan’s ability to respond effectively to any territorial incursion would be predicated on the permanent repositioning of some elements of the JSDF to become DDF, on enhanced capabilities as a result of procurement and acquisitions programs, and on development of rapid force projection expertise through increased training within its services and with U.S. Pacific Command, specifically elements of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

As the JSDF evolves into a highly capable and responsive force within the next 5 years, Japan’s dynamic deterrence strategy will help it avoid becoming an isolated, irrelevant “Galapagos” within Asia. Given the reemergence of Japan’s gleaming sword within its strategy, what would be the impact on its
neighbors in Asia and the region as a whole? Does Japan’s new policy represent an opportunity for the United States?

Implications for Key Nations and the Region

NDPG 2010 indicates a resurgent Japan seeking to achieve autonomy and prestige through national strength. In the future, Japan will act independently of the United States and no longer rely solely upon an American shield. Given this trajectory, impacts will be greatest for China, Russia, the Koreas, Australia, and within the Asia-Pacific region.

Russia. Within northeast Asia, Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev seek to leverage the increasing economic interdependence among Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan to further reintegrate the Russian Far East region into the national economy. For example, comparing 2009 and 2010 trade numbers, the total trade volume between Russia and Japan jumped by 45 percent to over $20 billion. With considerable additional trade dealing regarding energy, natural resources, and manufacturing at stake, Russia seeks to maintain regional stability as it rebuilds its industrial and economic base.

China. Military modernization, clashes over resource claims in disputed territorial waters, and economic posturing regarding exotic minerals are just a few of the recent actions that demonstrate China’s increasing threat perception regarding Japan, a trend that has grown greatly since 1980. China’s insecurity can best be ascribed to the tension between its regional ambitions, the counterweight represented by the U.S.-Japan alliance, and an increasingly capable and active JSDF, particularly in light of the near-term changes proposed within NDPG 2010. As stated within its dynamic deterrence strategy, Japan’s reorientation toward defending its southern islands, including stationing forces within its islands near the Miyako Strait and extending its Air Defense Identification Zone toward Taiwan, is aimed directly at China’s growing economic and military assertiveness in the South China, East China, and Yellow Seas.

China should not be surprised by Japan’s dynamic deterrence strategy. Strategic deterrence has a long history within Chinese military thinking and is defined in terms of weishe zhanlue as both deterrence and compliance through “the display of military power, or the threat of use of military power, in order to compel an opponent to submit.” That countries such as the United States and Japan would react negatively toward China’s application of weishe zhanlue throughout Asia by adjusting their own military strategies only adds additional weight to the chorus of Asian countries calling for greater Chinese transparency regarding its goals in the region.

Currently, there is a low threat perception within Russia regarding Japan; however, Russian leaders have expressed concerns regarding the impact of planned U.S.-Japan BMD employment in the region and have directly countered continued Japanese claims regarding disputed territories.

Tied directly to Japan’s perception of its autonomy and prestige, its determination to maintain sovereign claims on the Northern Territories (Southern Kuriles) and the assertive language of NDPG 2010 have the potential to jeopardize improved economic ties. Japan’s insistence on the return of these small islands, which were occupied by Soviet Russia following World War II, seems far out of proportion to their current or potential economic or military value. Without a diplomatic solution, political rhetoric from both sides, planned expansion to the Russian defenses in the Southern Kuriles, and upgrades to the Russian Pacific fleet may create the conditions for instability and continued stalemate between the two nations.

The Koreas. The year 2010 marked the 100th anniversary of the Japanese annexation of the Korean Peninsula that ended with Japan’s defeat in 1945 and was followed by the division that challenges the world today. Despite lasting remnants of animosity based on the Japanese occupation and the continued territorial dispute over Takeshima (Dokdo), political leaders in both Japan and South Korea have taken steps to bring the two nations closer. Approaching the annexation’s anniversary, former Japanese Prime Minister Kan offered a renewed apology, while South Korean President Lee Myung-bak expressed his hope that the nations could work together for a new future. Recognizing South Korea as its third largest trading partner, Japan sees its relationship with Korea as both economically and militarily vital.

Faced with a belligerent and nuclear-capable North Korea, South Korea’s ability to enhance multilateral security arrangements by leveraging its alliance with the United States remains its key strategy. Security arrangements between Tokyo-Washington and Seoul-Washington serve as an important unifying force to address North Korea, avoid unintended escalation with China, and defend freedom of navigation and territorial sovereignty. High-level discussions with Japan have led to agreements regarding intelligence and logistics support, while the South Korean political leadership has expressed a desire to reinvigorate trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Korea. For example, a renewed Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group process, first initiated by the United States in 1999, would enable the trio to better coordinate policy regarding North Korea, denying it the ability to use wedge tactics to negotiate on a bilateral basis to extort economic and food aid.

Australia. Responding to a rising China, perceived U.S. distraction, and increased economic and diplomatic ties between the two nations, Australia and Japan signed a joint declaration on security cooperation and entered into the Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) in 2007. The bilateral relationship between Australia and Japan followed decades of skillful internal political shaping and external diplomacy including Japanese support of Australia’s participation in ASEAN and other regional forums and Australian support of Japan’s efforts to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Common strategic goals include countering the often unilateral approach of the United States in the region, especially toward China; supporting U.S. and regional efforts to improve security and capacity development; and engaging China in multilateral forums, such as the ARF, to convince it to become a more transparent and responsible regional partner. An example of the success of the TSD is Australia’s participation in annual Proliferation Security Initiative maritime interception exercises with its U.S. and
Japanese naval partners aimed at the illegal trade of weapons and WMD technology.\textsuperscript{53}

Concern over China’s naval expansion, antiaccess tactics, and missile capability has reached Canberra. Australian politicians plan on spending $279 billion over the next 20 years to further develop the Australian Defense Forces (ADF), specifically within air and naval forces.\textsuperscript{54} Published in 2009, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 reorients Australia’s security policy to develop ADF capabilities to act independently when its strategic interests are challenged, provide leadership within military coalitions, and make tailored contributions to these coalitions where Australian strategic interests match those of its partners.\textsuperscript{55} Shared interests regarding freedom of action and navigation, sovereignty and resource protection, and increased ADF and JSDF capability should enable Australia and Japan to increase joint operations throughout the Asia-Pacific region, including providing security, aid, and capacity development within the fragile South Pacific Island states.\textsuperscript{56}

Asia-Pacific Region. Despite the lingering memory of Japan’s World War II legacy, China’s increased threat perception, and regional tensions regarding natural resources, Japan’s new assertiveness will be a positive factor within the Asia-Pacific region. Contrary to often emotional reactions by pundits, a dynamic deterrence strategy within the context of disputed “gray areas” will resonate with many countries throughout the region, as smaller, less capable nations face the same challenges and may negotiate diplomatic or even military support from Japan to back their own territorial sovereignty or resource claims.\textsuperscript{57} A more capable JSDF will be able to provide a more balanced military role within existing security arrangements, such as those with the United States, South Korea, and Australia, and provide additional assets in support of freedom of action, navigation enforcement, and counterproliferation efforts. In addition to the economic investment and development aid the country provides across the region, Japan may also be able to offer greater response to the region’s many natural disasters and assist in increasing local governments’ capacity-building efforts. Finally, Japan’s reemergence as a more independent and assertive regional actor will serve as an additional counterbalance to China’s ambitions and place greater importance on regional forums for coordination, dialogue, and action.

Prospects for the United States

Japan’s new strategic direction opens a window of opportunity for the United States to strengthen its bilateral alliance system to foster multilateral cooperative engagement within regional institutions, while also increasing military cooperation, joint operability, and load-sharing with a key partner for security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Developed as part of the Cold War containment strategy and to address the heterogeneity of the Asian peoples, the United States has employed a “hub and spokes” approach, where it is the hub extending power and influence into Asia through its bilateral alliances—its spokes—with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia.\textsuperscript{58}

Due to geopolitical changes in the region, the United States is examining the evolution of formal and informal, bilateral, and multilateral relationships in Asia for opportunities to leverage these linkages in pursuit of its national interests.\textsuperscript{59}

As stated within NDPG 2010, Japan places a continued emphasis on multilateral options concurrent to the implementation of its dynamic deterrence strategy. This presents Washington with an opportunity to leverage its alliance relationship in a meaningful manner to enhance its position relative to China and for increased regional security cooperation. With the U.S.-Japan alliance as the core security function, bilateral and multilateral agreements between ASEAN member states and Japan should be encouraged to enable the United States to expand its influence in a politically acceptable manner while engaging China regarding transparency and territorial issues.\textsuperscript{60}

Assured access to the global commons and defending against threats to the security of allies are core functions within the U.S. security strategy.\textsuperscript{61} Increased JSDF operational capability, with an intent to provide a more meaningful contribution through increased load-sharing with its ally, presents USPACOM with an opportunity to expand its joint interoperability with the JSDF throughout the region in mission areas such as ensuring freedom of action and navigation, maritime domain awareness, BMD defense, counter-WMD proliferation, contingency response, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and theater security cooperation.\textsuperscript{62}

The evolution of Japan’s national security strategy, influenced by its alliance with the United States and a rapidly changing security environment, signals Tokyo’s determination to navigate its own strategic course but also represents a positive factor for the region while enhancing U.S. influence. As today’s generation leaders take Japan in a new, independent direction, returning to its national core values and its role as a world power, Japan’s sword is indeed beginning to gleam once again. JFQ

NOTES


\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., 152.


\textsuperscript{5} Samuels, 188–189.


\textsuperscript{8} Samuels, 186–189.

\textsuperscript{9} Toshi Yoshihara (Professor, Naval War College, Newport, RI) in discussion with the author, March 3, 2011.

\textsuperscript{10} Sunohara, 48–49.

\textsuperscript{11} Pyle, 263–277.


13 Smith, 233.

14 Sunohara, 55.

15 Samuels, 2.


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20 Toshiki Kaifu, “Japan’s Vision,” Foreign Policy 80 (Fall 1990), 25.

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30 Ibid., 3–6.


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ADMIRALS RUN AMOK

THE DANGER OF INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY

By PHILLIP S. MEILINGER
Unification was the term used to describe the formation of a Department of Defense composed of three branches for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Unification had been discussed for decades, but initially it had few friends either in uniform or in Congress. That changed with World War II when global war against powerful enemies demanded far more than the “coordination” employed grudgingly by the Army and Navy since the 18th century. When Harry Truman became President, he pushed hard for unification and the separate Air Force it entailed. A repeated justification for unification was efficiency: ending duplication would result in budget savings. Congress agreed with this rationale, but this strained the Services. Because of fiscal austerity and demobilization following the war, all in uniform believed combat capability was at a dangerously low level. Although such beliefs no doubt resulted in a self-serving parochialism in some quarters, the average Soldier, Sailor, or Airman sincerely believed his special expertise was vital to American security but was in danger of being eroded away, a situation not unlike the present.

Precise roles and missions assigned to the Services were of enormous import; they were the Services’ lifeblood. No Service wanted its budget cut, but if tasks were taken away, cuts were inevitable. The issue causing the most debate was fundamental to the ethos and structure of the new Air Force.

Assigning Functions

In March 1948, Defense Secretary James Forrestal gathered his chiefs to Key West to hammer out decisions and compromises regarding roles and missions. A result of these meetings was a statement defining “primary” versus “collateral” functions. A primary function was one in which a particular Service had a clear-cut responsibility, whereas in a collateral function a Service supported whoever had a responsibility as primary. Forrestal admitted that such definitions were fluid and that a clear distinction was not always possible—the function of close air support, for example, was something all the Services might claim as primary depending on the situation. Yet the Secretary’s intent was to preclude one Service using a collateral function “as the basis for establishing additional force requirements.” When building a budget request, a Service would see to its primary functions first; if these were adequately covered and there were funds remaining, those dollars could be spent on collateral functions. If there was disagreement as to whether or not the primary functions were adequately covered, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or Secretary of Defense would decide.

Some of the functions assigned were vaguely worded and invited trouble. The Navy, for example, was given the primary function of conducting air operations “as necessary for the accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign.” The Air Force was given the primary function of strategic air warfare, defined as:

Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s war-making capacity to a point where he no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stock piles, power systems, transportation systems, communications facilities, concentrations of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems.

This definition described the bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan, but what of naval aviation? Were the thousands of missions flown by carrier aircraft against land objectives in the Pacific an example of hitting targets “necessary for the accomplishment of a naval campaign,” or were they strikes against “uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces”? Nonetheless, Forrestal noted in his diary that the chiefs had reached an understanding recognizing “the right of the Navy to proceed with the development of weapons the Navy considers essential to its function, but with the proviso that the Navy will not develop a separate strategic air force, this function being reserved to the Air Force.”

The Key West decision regarding strategic bombing was immediately challenged. The Navy had its eye on the mission, and Vice Admiral Daniel Gallery wrote a memorandum stating that “the Navy was the branch of the National Defense destined to deliver the Atom Bomb.” To Gallery, this function was crucial because the next war would be dominated by atomic weapons, and if the Navy did not participate in strategic bombing, it would be obsolete. He continued, “the time is right now for the Navy to start an aggressive campaign aimed at proving that the Navy can deliver the atomic bomb more effectively than the Air Force can.”

Using Gallery’s logic, Admiral Louis Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), wrote Forrestal on April 22, 1948, to “clarify” the decision reached in Florida. He argued that the Navy should be allowed to strike any targets, anywhere, without reference to the Air Force, and he wanted this interpretation accepted as official policy. General Hoyt Vandenberg, the Air Force chief of staff, protested that this would undermine the entire basis of Key West. If the Navy was allowed a free hand in strategic air warfare, then what was the point of assigning primary and collateral functions and attempting to eliminate redundancy? General Dwight Eisenhower (Army chief of staff) and Admiral William Leahy (chief of staff to the President) agreed, and Denfeld’s move was rejected. The issue did not go away, however. Forrestal noted glumly but presciently in his official report that the most divisive issue remained: “What is to be the use, and who is to be user of air power?”

Disagreement over roles and missions erupted into one of the nastiest inter-Service fights in American history. The issue, as Forrestal feared, concerned airpower. Although the Navy had strategic bombing only as a collateral function, it laid plans for building a “supercarrier” designed to carry multi-engine bombers. These aircraft were to be used, among other things, to deliver atomic weapons.

Forrestal had agreed that the Navy could build one such ship, but not an entire class, and then only with JCS concurrence. Denfeld ignored Forrestal’s qualifications and
“Baker” atomic test at Bikini Atoll, July 25, 1946
announced the carrier had been authorized. The Air Force protested this statement, so Forrestal referred the matter to the JCS. Denfeld and General Omar Bradley, who had just taken over as Army chief of staff, approved the ship, but Vandenberg disagreed stating: “I have not felt, nor do I now feel, that I can give my approval to the 65,000 ton carrier project.”11 Congress, unaware of Forrestal’s earlier comments or the Air Force dissent, assumed all was well and approved funds for the ship.

The matter was not closed. Although the keel of USS United States was laid on April 18, 1949, Forrestal had resigned the previous month. His successor was Louis Johnson, who upon taking office declared that the dissension over the new carrier was causing him concern. He directed the JCS to review the issue once again.12

Denfeld responded that the carrier’s enhanced size and flush-top construction (there would be no “island” on the edge) allowed increased capability. Indeed, the United States would be able to operate heavier, multi-engine aircraft that could employ “more complex armaments”—atomic weapons—but it could also carry a larger number of smaller aircraft. The ship was an evolutionary step allowing greater air operations in support of the fleet.13

Vandenberg argued that it was simply unnecessary and a waste of money—the total cost of the carrier with its aircraft and defensive screen was $1.265 billion—8 percent of the entire annual defense budget. He also argued the ship was highly vulnerable and the Navy was putting all of its eggs in one fragile basket. He referred to the agreements of the previous year: the Air Force was responsible for strategic bombing. The Navy was to tend to sea control, antisubmarine warfare, and mine-laying.14

These arguments were expected. The surprise came from Bradley, who now changed his mind: “The Navy’s mission as agreed to by the Joint Chiefs was to conduct naval campaigns designed primarily to protect lines of communication leading to important sources of raw materials and to areas of projected military operations.” The supercarrier was being built for strategic air operations, and that was not the Navy’s primary function. The United States was too expensive.15 Eisenhower, now chief of staff to the President, agreed with Bradley. Although he too had originally favored construction of the ship, he now felt otherwise.16

Johnson then conferred with Congress, spoke with President Truman who concurred with his plans, and on April 23 announced the cancellation of the United States. The Navy and its supporters were outraged, and Secretary James Sullivan, out of town when the announcement was made, resigned in protest. Soon after, rumors began circulating that the new Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber, the Consolidated-Vultee (Convair) B–36, was not living up to expectations, but there were also unanswered questions regarding its contract. Newspaper columnist Hanson Baldwin, a Naval Academy graduate, wrote a piece hinting of fraudulent airplane contracts and “financial high jinks.”17 Because of such rumors the House Armed Services Committee, chaired by Carl Vinson, called for hearings on the matter.

Vandenberg argued the total cost of the carrier with its aircraft and defensive screen was 8 percent of the entire annual defense budget

Spurious Stories

The hearings began on August 9, 1949, and the first speaker was Congressman James Van Zandt, a commander in the naval Reserve. Van Zandt reiterated the rumors of fraud and misdoings that had been circulating. Referring to an anonymous document, he stated that reports had reached him of 55 allegations of wrongdoing, some linking Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington and Defense Secretary Johnson with Floyd Odlum, president of Convair—favors given in return for contracts. Van Zandt claimed four aircraft contracts had been cancelled in order to funnel more money toward Convair to buy more B–36s. Finally, he claimed plans were afoot for Symington to take over this expanded corporation. He wanted a full investigation.18

The hearings that followed were a fiasco. In response to Van Zandt’s allegations, House committee staffers conducted an independent investigation and found nothing amiss. The Air Force then sent a number of witnesses to the stand to defend the B–36 and its programs. Finally, in response to Van Zandt’s allegations, a special committee of the House of Representatives was formed.

General Curtis LeMay, the SAC commander, followed and testified that on January 3, 1949, he had briefed the Air Force Senior Officers Board and asked for two additional groups and more aircraft for each group—72 more planes. That indicated his support for the bomber. He too was pressed on the charges of fraud and collusion in the production contract but retorted characteristically, “I expect that if I am called upon to fight I will order my crews out in those airplanes, and I expect to be in the first one myself.” When pushed on the Navy’s new fighter and similar developments in Britain or the Soviet Union, LeMay responded, “It’s my business to know these things. I know of no night fighter that could be brought against us at the present time that would be at all effective.” In conclusion he stated categorically, “I have been an advocate of the B–36 ever since I heard about it.”19

Much was made by the Navy of this suggestion, seeming to indicate the operational commander in charge of the aircraft did not want it; therefore, fraud must have been involved in its continued development. Not so, said Kenney. Convair put new engines and props on the aircraft and difficulties with the landing gear and flaps were corrected. The range was increased. By June 1947, Kenney decided that “the trouble that I had not liked had been cured. The airplane had astonished me.” When asked if pressure had been put on him to support the plane, he scoffed: “Nobody could sell me a bomber except the bomber.” Congressman Van Zandt continued to push him on whether or not there were aircraft out there—like the Navy’s “Banshee” jet fighter—that could intercept the bomber, but Kenney remained firm. He would take as many B–36s as Congress would give him.19

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The Admirals Strike Back

It was a clear victory for the Air Force, but the matter was not over. The new Navy Secretary Francis Matthews called for an internal investigation to discover if Worth had received help from the Navy staff in composing his fiction. As it turned out, he had received a great deal of help. This damning investigation prompted Matthews and Denfeld to agree that further hearings would not be in the Navy’s best interest. But they would not get off so easily.

Captain John Crommelin was disturbed over unification and what he saw as unequal treatment of the Navy, so he leaked a classified document to the press revealing widespread discontent within his Service. He stated it was “necessary to the interests of national security” that he make the report public so there could be an airing of the issues. Denfeld was reluctant to open barely closed wounds, but his staff was adamant that the Navy press on. They wanted new hearings to be used as a platform to debate defense priorities.

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Vinson rescheduled the hearings for October 5, 1949. The Navy’s arguments fell into three categories: the concept of an atomic strike by SAC was a poor strategy; the B–36—even if legally procured—was a substandard weapon that could not carry out the atomic strike; and the Navy was being treated as an unequal partner in the Defense Department.

Navy witnesses stated that Airmen were attempting to beguile the American people with promises of a “cheap victory.” Atomic bombing would not work because the B–36 was an inferior aircraft and would not be able to penetrate Soviet defenses. Moreover, such an atomic blitz was immoral—even though the Navy was eager to participate in it. In an attempt to turn the tables on the Air Force, one admiral argued that it was the Airmen who were putting all their eggs in one basket—the B–36—and other important missions of tactical air support and airlift were being slighted. Seamen claimed their budget was cut too drastically and they were threatened with impotency. The cancellation of the United States was proof the Army and Air Force were ganging up on them. Denfeld, the final Navy witness, was particularly vocal about all of this.

The CNO began by noting apprehension within the Navy due to the trend “to arrest and diminish” its capabilities. Reductions to the fleet were the result of arbitrary decisions imposed without consultation and without understanding. He argued that the air offensive “is not solely a function of the United States Air Force” and that the Navy should have a voice in deciding whether the B–36 should be procured at all. Denfeld stated categorically that “projection of our armed strength overseas and hence keeping the war from our homeland is a Navy task.” The supercarrier’s cancellation was “neither in accord with the spirit nor the concept of unification.” He concluded by proclaiming, contradictorily, that he “supported the principle that each Service within budgetary limitations be permitted to design and develop its own weapons.”

General Bradley was aghast at this “Revolt of the Admirals” and later wrote, “Never in our military history had there been anything comparable—not even the Billy Mitchell rebellion of the 1920s—a complete breakdown in discipline occurred. Neither Matthews nor Denfeld could control his subordinates.” Bradley lambasted Denfeld for letting “his admirals run amok. It was utterly disgraceful.” He was especially irritated with the CNO for deliberately misrepresenting American war plans and atomic bomb tests in order to attack the Air Force.

Vandenberge responded by beginning his testimony with a description of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, charged by law with developing war plans. They were assisted by a Joint Staff, consisting of equal numbers of officers from the three Services. At that time, the Joint Staff was headed by an admiral. The JCS were advised by civilian agencies led by distinguished scientists. All these groups had a hand in devising the current U.S. war plan—and this was the national war plan, not the Air Force plan. That plan called for an atomic air offensive to be carried out by Strategic Air Command. In its warfighting role, SAC worked for the JCS, not the Air Force, and its targets were selected by the Joint Staff. It was not the intent of the atomic air campaign to end the war; only surface forces could do that. Instead, the purpose of the air offensive was to serve as an equalizer to the millions of Soviet
Louis Johnson is sworn in as Secretary of Defense as James Forrestal looks on, March 28, 1949

XB-36
troops that greatly outnumbered U.S. forces. He asked if there was a better alternative: “Is it proposed that we build and maintain a standing Army capable of meeting the masses of an enemy army on the ground in equal man-to-man, body-to-body, gun-to-gun combat?”

Let the Air Force Do Its Job

The B–36 was not a perfect aircraft, but it was the best heavy bomber in the world. It had already flown 5,000 miles, dropped a 10,000-pound bomb (the weight of an atomic bomb at the time), and returned to base, with most of the trip at an altitude of 40,000 feet. Regarding the claim the bomber would need escort, as had the B–17s, B–24s, and B–29s in World War II, the chief replied that SAC had its own fleet of fighter escorts to accompany the bombers partially on their way, but the distances involved were so great that escort to and from the target was infeasible; carrier-based aircraft would be even less useful.

As for the charge of overemphasis on bombardment, Vandenberg noted there were 48 combat groups in the Air Force, but only 4 were equipped with the B–36. If the Service was allowed to expand to 70 groups—its goal for the past 5 years—there would still be only 4 B–36 groups. When all aircraft available at the start of a war were counted, the B–36 comprised only 3 percent of the total.

Referring to the United States, Vandenberg argued the ship was not needed for the Navy’s primary functions. Funds were too scarce to buy weapons not in support of the approved war plan. That was what unification was all about—eliminating redundancy and wasteful overlap. The Air Force had been given strategic air warfare as a primary function by the Secretary of Defense, and that decision was ratified by the President. SAC existed to carry out that function. Let them do their job. It was a clinching argument. One observer noted wryly that “What strength there was in the Admirals’ case was there by mistake.” The Air Force had won its brief in Congress and in the court of public opinion.

As a result of the hearings, relations between the Air Force and Navy were strained for years. SAC got its B–36s, even though it soon was obvious the aircraft was only a stopgap. All-jet bombers like the B–47 and B–52 were already in development, and upon their entry into the inventory the B–36s would gradually be retired. Maintenance problems never went away entirely, although the bomber’s in-commission rate was not much different from other new aircraft of that era. The “Peacemakers” served for over a decade, although they never saw combat, and the last B–36 was retired in 1959.

Resisting Unification

The Navy lost a few senior officers. Denfeld was fired immediately after his appearance before the House. Secretary Matthews knew something was amiss when Denfeld refused to show him his testimony in advance, although the admiral had promised he would. Later, Denfeld said he was sorry for breaking his promise, but he was determined to make his case despite its violation of norms. He said his subordinates thought he was too soft; he had to show them he was “hard-boiled.” Matthews later claimed he had already decided he could not live with Denfeld. His testimony to Congress was the last straw: “I could not administer the office with a CNO I could not trust. There are not two policies in the Navy: there is only one policy.”

In his letter to President Truman detailing his reasons for firing his top officer, Matthews wrote: “Very soon after I assumed office, it became clear to me that there was definite resistance on the part of some naval officers to accepting unification of the Armed Services, notwithstanding the fact that it was established by law.” As for the specific incident resulting in Denfeld’s relief, the Secretary stated, “A military establishment is not a political democracy. Integrity of command is indispensable at all times. There can be no twilight zone in the measure of loyalty to superiors and respect for authority existing between various official ranks. Inability to conform to such requirements for military stability would disqualify any of us for positions subordinate to the Commander in Chief.” It was a devastating indictment.

The roles and missions subject was toxic, and it had erupted into a startling display of insubordination. Sailors believed the Air Force message: strategic bombing with atomic weapons was the future of war, and their institutional survival depended on a share of the atomic pie. The Key West and Newport agreements precluded such a move, and the Navy was desperate to find a way out of that box canyon. Regrettably, they chose a path that did them disservice. Although the resultant hearings totally exonerated the Air Force, some Navy zealots demanded further hearings. These revealed malaise within the fleet because Sailors did not enjoy the status and primacy they felt was their right. They had grown used to a President who had been a Navy assistant secretary (Franklin Roosevelt), a Defense Secretary with a Navy background (Forrestal), and a chief of staff to the President who was an admiral (Leahy). This did not strike Sailors as biased in their favor, yet they objected to a new President (Truman), a new Defense Secretary (Johnson), and a new chief of staff (Eisenhower) who had Army backgrounds. The admirals saw no inconsistency in their stance.

In one sense, the long-term result of the revolt was minimal. The Navy eventually got its big-deck carriers and nuclear weapons went to sea. The biggest loser was national security. The smears by uniformed officers against their civilian superiors and colleagues were a serious blot on the American military tradition. Worse, the Revolt of the Admirals caused a lingering ill will and distrust within the Services—the baleful maladies that unification of the armed forces was designed to correct. Worse still, less than a year later, the United States would be at war in Korea.

Inter-Service rivalry is as old as the Services themselves. Competition is a good thing and the American way, but at times this rivalry can overstep its bounds and become dangerous as one Service either distorts the truth or actively works to undermine the efforts of a sister Service. Such baleful actions are generally most common during periods of fiscal austerity. The Services then begin to face severe cutbacks and fear their ability to carry out their wartime missions will be comprised. At such times, jointness is too easily forgotten and the Services become parochial rather than competitive.

The current economic situation in the United States is often stated to be the worst since the Great Depression. Budget cuts are inevitable, and it is likely the Defense Department will endure its share. It is the duty of Service leaders, both military and civilian, to ensure the resultant budget struggles are
handled with professionalism, honesty, and honor. The disgraceful events of 1949 must not be repeated. JFQ

NOTES


3 The terms missions, roles, and functions are often used interchangeably but have separate meanings: a mission is a task assigned to a unified or combatant command; a role is a broad and enduring purpose for which a Service was established; and a function is a specific responsibility assigned to a Service that permits it to fulfill one of its roles. See Warren A. Trest, Air Force Roles and Missions: A History (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998), ix.


5 Ibid., 165–166.

6 Walter Mills and E.S. Duffield, eds., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951), 392.

7 This memorandum was leaked to the press on April 10, 1948. See Paul Y. Hammond, Super Carriers and B–36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy, and Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 14.

8 “Chronology of Changes in Key West Agreement, April 1948-January 1958,” Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Study, February 2, 1958, National Archives, RG 218, file CCS 337, box 96.

9 Rearden, 402.

10 Mills and Duffield, 393, 467; “Press Release for Secretary Forrestal,” March 26, 1948, in “Public Statements by the Secretaries of Defense” microfilm, University Publications of America, reel 1.

11 Memorandum, Vandenberg to Forrestal, May 26, 1949, Vandenberg papers, LOC, box 52.


13 Memorandum, Denfeld to Johnson, April 22, 1949, Vandenberg papers, LOC, box 52. The United States would be 158 feet longer and 77 feet wider than the largest existing carrier at the time, the Midway.

14 “Supercarrier Study,” March 28, 1949, Vandenberg papers, LOC, box 97; memorandum, Vandenberg to Johnson, April 23, 1949, Vandenberg papers, LOC, box 52.

15 Memorandum, Bradley to Johnson, April 22, 1949, Vandenberg papers, LOC, box 52.

16 Hammond, 28. The position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not established until August 1949.


19 Ibid.; Kenney’s testimony runs from pages 115–139.

20 Ibid.; LeMay’s testimony runs from pages 139–163.

21 Ibid.; Vandenberg’s testimony runs from pages 165–205.


24 “Notes on meeting with representative of Navy League in SECNAV’s office,” January 11, 1950, 3–4, copy received from U.S. Naval Institute. Matthews met with the Navy League representatives to discuss the relief of Admiral Denfeld, and in the course of the discussion, he referred to the “cowardly anonymous attack” made by Cedric Worth with the connivance of several Navy members. Of note, Vinson had been chairman of the old House Committee on Naval Affairs and was close to many senior naval officers.


28 “Notes on Meeting with Navy League and SEACNAV,” 4–6.


30 Ibid., 350–361.

31 Omar Bradley and Clair Blair, A General’s Life: An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 488, 507–510. Several times during his testimony, Denfeld referred to a top secret report that examined the capability of the Air Force to carry out the war plan—when asked for details, he coyly responded he was not allowed to comment further due to classification issues.


34 For the Navy’s side of this episode, see Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950 (Washington, DC: Naval History Center, 1994).

35 “Notes on Meeting with Navy League and SEACNAV,” 8–10.

36 Letter, Matthews to Truman, October 2, 1949, copy provided by U.S. Naval Institute.

By Derek S. Reveron

Georgetown University Press, 2010
205 pp. $29.95

Reviewed by
RICHARD S. TRACEY

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) elevated building partner capacity to one of six Department of Defense (DOD) core mission areas. More recently, the January 2012 DOD strategic guidance explicitly recognized building partner capacity as an enduring and integral part of our defense strategy. Defense planners did not always recognize the importance of building partner security capacity. The prevailing assumption that a military prepared for high-end combat could easily accommodate less demanding missions relegated partner building to the status of a lesser-included mission. Thus, this longstanding U.S. military mission did not always receive the sustained intellectual attention and resources that it merited.

Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military explains how building partner capacity has become a core U.S. military mission and an integral part of our defense strategy. It reviews the broadly accepted assumptions regarding the nature of the post–Cold War international security environment, traces the U.S. military’s deepening involvement in a range of security cooperation activities, and considers how the military conducts partner-building activities. This work should be particularly useful in joint professional military education classrooms, as it provides a wide-ranging overview of the topic and offers many important points to consider and debate.

Derek S. Reveron is a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College and is therefore well suited to tackle this important topic. He specializes in strategy development, nonstate security challenges, intelligence, and U.S. defense policy and has written and lectured on a wide variety of national security issues. Reveron’s knowledge of the issues, as well as his command of the relevant sources, is evident throughout this work.

The book consists of an introduction and eight well-documented chapters. The first two chapters set up Reveron’s analysis with a recapitulation of conventional wisdom regarding the international security environment and the theoretical links between fragile states and security threats that are now embedded in our national security and defense policies. The third chapter provides an overview of resistance within the military and the Department of State to the expanding role of the military in security cooperation activities. Resistance flowed, according to Reveron, from those within the military who believed that a focus on security cooperation would diminish traditional warfighting capabilities and from those in the Department of State who feared a militarization of foreign policy.

This, however, is an old story, as resistance is now largely marginalized, and the fundamental premise that failed states pose broad security threats to the United States is now the official gospel. Theories have become axioms.

In the fourth chapter, disconcertingly titled “Demilitarizing Combatant Commands,” Reveron correctly emphasizes the importance of our geographic combatant commands in a range of nonkinetic engagement and security cooperation activities. In this regard, he does a nice job of explaining the evolving role of geographic commands in the post–Cold War international security environment with observations along the lines of those found in Dana Priest’s The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military (W.W. Norton, 2003). However, Reveron often overstates the changes. Consider U.S. Africa Command, which he frequently cites as the primary example of the changing face of the U.S. military. The command suddenly found itself leading an air campaign in Libya to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. U.S. Africa Command, like other geographic combatant commands, essentially pursues two lines of effort: building security partner capacity and preparing for a wide range of potential crises. So while DOD has correctly elevated building partner capacity to its rightful place alongside five other core missions, partner building has not replaced other geographic combatant command missions. This important point, although not absent in Reveron’s analysis, is often obscured by his enthusiasm for the so-called new face of the American military.

Chapter five provides a handy primer on security cooperation programs and funding sources. It highlights the long bureaucratic road that key Department of State Title 22 programs such as international military education and training, foreign military financing, and the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative follow from concept to execution; strategic- and operational-level interagency cooperation; and expedient funding mechanisms provided to DOD by the Congress. Maritime security issues such as poaching, piracy, and drug trafficking, and the emerging role of the U.S. Navy in developing partner capacity in the maritime realm, are the focus of chapter six.

For a work of this scope and detail, the final two chapters are somewhat disappointing. In some respects, this work is an argument without a conclusion, as it does not offer concrete doctrinal force structure or training proposals. Moreover, the study never comes to grips with an essential question: How do our geographic combatant commanders and senior policymakers really know that our partner-building programs and activities are truly achieving our national and theater objectives? In an era of constrained resources and growing skepticism regarding foreign entanglements, how DOD links programs and activities to outcomes will become increasingly important. JFQ

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By Andrew M. Roe

University Press of Kansas, 2010
328 pp. $34.95

Reviewed by
TODD M. MANYX
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers, Osama bin Laden, along with senior members of his al Qaeda terror group, decamped his safe haven in Afghanistan for a location believed to be in Waziristan, a remote, mountainous area of northwestern Pakistan. It is home to fiercely independent tribes that have refused to submit to outside governance for centuries and that today are part of Pakistan’s semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It is particularly well known by the British military as the home of the Fakir of Ipi, an early 20th-century Islamic extremist who was the subject of intensive British manhunts of up to 40,000 troops scouring the countryside between 1936 and 1947. The Fakir was never caught, and he lived out his days in the region, dying a natural death in 1960.

In his inaugural book, Andrew M. Roe has taken on a region of the world that is obscure to most people not concerned with the ongoing efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, despite the remoteness, Roe has combined his significant practical experience as a British infantry officer and former Afghan army kandak (battalion) mentor with an academic’s sense of history derived from his postgraduate and doctoral studies of the area to pen a book of substance that should appeal to historians, military professionals, and policy planners.

In establishing the purpose for his book, Roe is guided by Shakespeare’s assertion that “what’s past is prologue.” In particular, Roe is convinced that we need to examine the British experience in the late 19th and early 20th centuries for policies that were developed through trial and error and that have been the guiding principles for administration of the FATA for nearly a century. In the end, the raison d’être for this book is that Roe strongly believes that history and culture matter and that the “many . . . hard-earned lessons from Waziristan can be adopted as part of a contemporary solution” (p. 14).

Recognizing that “there is a lack of contemporary literature” (p. 6) on Waziristan, Roe has organized his book into three areas: a regional background, an overview of the British military and civilian government experience, and an analysis of modern parallels between the colonial period and present-day issues along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The first two chapters provide the historical context defining the grindstone upon which the British would simultaneously sharpen their troops’ proficiency in counterinsurgency warfare and wear down their own political resolve to dominate the tribes. Principal factors influencing the tribal mentality include the unmatched harshness of the terrain, the intense isolation of the people, and the unwavering dictates of the Pashtunwali code of honor.

Roe is particularly adept at explaining the importance of differentiating between the isolated and independent tribes, categorized as nang (honor) tribes, in which individual independence was of paramount importance and that were characterized by “proud and uncooperative self-government” (p. 41), and the qalang (rent/tax) tribes identified by strong centralized leadership. As he notes, “The psychological difference between the . . . tribes . . . was stark” (p. 39). In describing the region’s major tribes, Roe’s descriptions of the Waziris (for whom the region is named) and the Mahsuds hold as true today as they did 150 years ago, when one official described the tribes as “the largest known potential reservoir of guerrilla fighters in the world” (p. 59).

The subsequent six chapters provide an exceedingly detailed account of the specific policy and military efforts undertaken between 1849 and 1947. Reminiscent of Peter Hopkirk’s seminal work, _The Great Game_, Roe draws from an extensive number of primary government sources, unit histories, memoirs, and news accounts of the day to recount Great Britain’s efforts to secure the northwest border of the empire’s “crown jewel,” India. Without reexamining Roe’s detailed analysis, this section of the book will be most appreciated by historians and those interested in the finer details of British northwest frontier policy formation. It is an excellent recounting of the politics and practicalities associated with evolving and implementing the close border policy, the forward policy and _maliki_ (tribal leader) system, and the modified forward policy.

The crux of these different systems lies in how they addressed the issue of “rule” with the tribes. As the British quickly learned, the tribes produced excellent guerrilla fighters who would never quit. The resulting changes eventually led to a policy of cooption and containment in which the government utilized heavy subsidization to influence _maliks_ to accept those benchmarks deemed to be “good enough” (p. 196) in attaining Great Britain’s goals, and to realize the importance of cultural experts and experienced political officers who could negotiate with the tribal leaders.

The final chapters summarize the lessons learned during this period as well as analyzing parallels that exist between the colonial era and the present day. On the whole, these chapters represent an unnatural flow from the rest of the book; however, they are the most relevant from a policy and planning perspective. Within the author’s analysis, there are no perfect solutions, yet he notes, “[d]espite a varied record of success, the British approach to tribal control was adopted by the Pakistan state at independence” (p. 193)—an approach that remained little changed until President Pervez Musharraf, pressured by the United States, began to modify how the Pakistani government approached the now restive tribal areas.

In the final analysis, Roe is clear in noting that current issues—such as the role of a reality-based policy informed by clear cultural understanding, the challenges of the disputed border as represented by the Durand Line, and the need for a civil-military relationship that is both flexible and responsive to changes on the ground and that “employs all the elements of national power” (p. 256)—are necessary in establishing a policy that effectively works to resolve the issues of distrust, politics, and pride that guide tribal interests.

As the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States work to counter Islamic extremists, particularly along the ill-defined border derived from the Durand Line, the region of Waziristan will remain as central to resolving the issue as it was a century ago. Success will not be achieved through attainment of Western-dictated standards. Instead, it will be accomplished by realizing that the tribes must be consulted and their preexisting structures used.

History is replete with lessons to be learned if only we take the time to study them. In this case, the consequences of failing to draw on the lessons of our predecessors cannot be known. We have put “payment received” on Osama bin Laden’s personal debt to society. However, if the past is perceived as prologue, we can almost be guaranteed that unless we draw from the British government’s 19th-century playbook, senior insurgent leaders will likely—much like the Fakir of Ipi—die of old age in the safety of Waziristan’s remote hills and protective tribes. _JFQ_
Victorious Insurgencies: Four Rebellions That Shaped Our World
By Anthony James Joes
The University Press of Kentucky, 2010
319 pp. $40.00

Reviewed by
ERIC SHIBUYA

If failure is the best teacher, then the study of insurgent victories is obviously of benefit in enhancing counterinsurgent strategies. While each insurgency has different dimensions, they all share varying points of commonality. These are the gems to be mined. In this book, Anthony James Joes analyzes the Maoist revolution in China, Ho Chi Minh’s victory in French Indochina, Fidel Castro in Cuba, and the Afghan victory over the Soviets. The Cuban case gets short shrift (somewhat ironic given that the book’s cover depicts Cuban revolutionaries); it is less than half the length of the other chapters, and Joes notes in his conclusion that he offers it as a “control case” against which to compare the other insurgencies. Given the subtitle of the book, though, the lesser emphasis on Cuba is understandable. It is the insurgency whose “global” impact can be most debated.

Each case is described in significant detail, and Joes generally achieves a good balance between the level of specific detail and the larger lessons for theoretical analysis. However, the cases do at times get down to levels of specificity that historians will value but that may obfuscate the larger theoretical lessons. In describing the Maoist victory in China, Joes discusses both the Japanese and the Nationalists as the counterinsurgents, but the narrative at times blends the events. While the actual chronology overlaps at times, this section is a little unclear. The lyricism of the writing sometimes distracts from the insights. Joes repeatedly refers to the Soviet army as the “Army that defeated Hitler,” when the actual facts detailed in the case show it was nothing of the sort. Traditions and history matter, but training, equipment, and experience matter more.

On the theoretical side, Joes highlights major factors contributing to insurgent victory. These are the quality of the military leadership, the absence of a peaceful road to change, the inability to prevent external assistance, insufficient forces, and an inability of the counterinsurgents to give full attention to the conflict. The fact that many of these errors are unavoidable in the cases presented is perhaps the hardest lesson. Many counterinsurgents cannot find a peaceful road to change once the conflict has moved too far along for a compromise to be reached.

In terms of leadership, Joes rightfully highlights the mistakes made by the government/counterinsurgent forces in either their perception of the threat or the viability of their response. Insurgencies succeed because counterinsurgents fail. This theme recurs throughout the book, but the reasons for such misperception can be very different across the cases. While the case studies highlight specific manifestations of counterinsurgent weakness/incompetence, the real lesson is understanding the role of these weaknesses and then trying to find how they may manifest themselves in different situations. Counterinsurgency (COIN) forces may underestimate the enemy (as the Nationalist forces did against Mao, or the Soviets in Afghanistan), or they may be unable to commit extra needed forces (France in Indochina). This ends up being the same phenomenon—the lack of sufficient personnel to handle needed COIN operations—but for very different reasons. Joes also notes the role that timing plays in insurgent success. The Japanese invasion meant Nationalist forces understandably had to reprioritize their efforts against the Japanese rather than crushing the communist movement. Timing obviously matters, but how to take advantage of this insight in each particular case is the perennial question.

In the conclusion, Joes offers examples of counterinsurgent victory, but only in passing. Beyond the “usual suspects” (the British in Malaysia), he also points to examples such as El Salvador, which is a fascinating case of counterinsurgent success. This is obviously not the topic of this book, so perhaps that will be the focus of a companion volume. There are some minor editorial issues (The Rape of Nanking is listed twice, under Chang and “Chong,” and Callwell’s Small Wars is missing from the bibliography), but overall the book is well edited. A last point that Joes cannot be blamed for, is that, given recent revelations of Stephen Ambrose’s work on Eisenhower, conclusions drawn from that work may be questioned.

Joes writes with clarity, but those who have read Jeffrey Record’s Beating Goliath and Joes’s own Resisting Rebellion will find little new insight. Any new student of counterinsurgency, however, will find useful information here, as will historians looking for concise analysis on these specific cases. JFQ

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The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy, and War
Edited by Stephen J. Cimbala
Potomac Books, 2010
332 pp. $48.00
ISBN: 978-1-59797-507-0

Reviewed by
THOMAS M. SKYPEK

Several years after leaving the White House, George W. Bush remains a polarizing figure for many Americans. While hyper-partisan popular critiques of the Bush administration line bookshelves throughout the country, the scholarly literature remains much more limited in comparison, particularly in the area of national security policy. Evaluating the national security policy of any Presidential administration is challenging due to the complexity of the subject matter; however, in the case of the Bush administration, the challenge is compounded by the relatively limited time that has elapsed since the end of the administration. Passions remain high, and many of the historical documents required to conduct comprehensive analyses will remain classified for the foreseeable future, though a number of key documents have already been declassified.
The George W. Bush Defense Program is an edited collection of articles examining U.S. defense strategy and policy during the Presidency of George W. Bush. The collection, edited by Pennsylvania State University professor Stephen J. Cimbala, consists of both theoretical and prescriptive essays organized thematically. Ten contributors explore a range of defense and military issues handled by the Bush national security team including defense transformation, the management style of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his impact on civil-military relations, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S.-Russian relations and nuclear arms control, and foreign military sales.

The book sets out to provide a dispassionate survey of defense strategy and policy during the administration. While it may achieve its intended goal for the lay reader, it offers few fresh insights for scholars, analysts, and policymakers who closely followed or studied the administration. First, the collection lacks important content—a comprehensive analysis of major acquisition decisions and defense spending during the Bush years, for example. Second, several articles fail to cite available declassified and primary sources to enhance their arguments. This is especially true with content detailing the Iraq War and preconflict decisionmaking.

Organizationally, the book would have benefited from a more deliberate grouping of the essays into major categories such as defense strategy and policy, budget and acquisition, and leadership. Conspicuously absent are articles on defense spending during the Bush Presidency, congressional relations with the Pentagon, the U.S.-Chinese military balance, North Korea’s nuclearization, and Iran’s burgeoning nuclear weapons program.

Colin Gray provides a thoughtful, scene-setting essay on the exigencies of defense planning and the prominence of uncertainty in thinking about military threats and future defense requirements. Analysts and policymakers would be wise to heed Gray’s cautionary note that interstate conflict is not a thing of the past. While counterinsurgency warfare dominates thinking in defense circles, the requirements needed for state-based threats should not be neglected. As Gray reminds the reader, the one certainty of international politics is uncertainty.

In a pair of essays, Dale R. Herspring and John Allen Williams examine Rumsfeld’s management style and his impact on civil-military relations during his time as Secretary of Defense from 2001 to 2006. The reader is reminded that Rumsfeld’s top priority as he returned to the helm at the Pentagon in 2001 (Rumsfeld first served as Secretary of Defense for President Gerald Ford from 1975 to 1977) was the transformation of the U.S. military from a bulky, Cold War-era force into a smaller, more modular and technologically capable organization.

But it was Rumsfeld’s preoccupation with transformation, the authors argue, that led to his unwavering position that a force of 130,000 to 150,000 military personnel would be sufficient to defeat the Iraqi army and stabilize the country following major combat operations—despite much larger estimates from senior military officers including former Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, who testified before Congress in February 2003 that “several hundred thousand soldiers” would be required. Shinseki’s estimate was publicly dismissed by Rumsfeld and former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Rumsfeld’s failure to listen to General Shinseki’s advice was an ominous portent for Operation Iraqi Freedom following the end of major combat operations. Perhaps even more damaging to the war effort than prewar planning failures were two decisions made on Rumsfeld’s watch that together laid the foundation for the insurgency: implementing an excessive de-Ba’athification policy following major combat operations and disbanning the Iraqi army.

While Rumsfeld’s leadership failures are well documented, the book does not address his laudable efforts to reform the requirements generation process through the implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS), which places a greater focus on capabilities than on specific systems or force elements. The aim of JCIDS was to identify warfighter needs from a joint warfighting perspective rather than a Service-specific perspective. Additionally, Rumsfeld sought to improve the overall management of Department of Defense (DOD) resources by employing portfolio management processes to group capabilities into functional portfolios.

It is difficult to offer a robust analysis of the Bush-era defense program without a dedicated analysis of weapons acquisition and defense spending. Anyone who has worked in the Pentagon or closely studied DOD bureaucracy will undoubtedly be aware of the critical role weapons acquisition and programming decisions play in affecting the behavior of civil servants and political appointees alike. At least one chapter should have been dedicated to defense spending in the Bush administration, examining trends, interactions with the appropriations committees, and use of supplemental funding. A related absence is an analysis of key strategic guidance issued during the Bush administration, including the National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Guidance for the Development of the Force, Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and Quadrennial Defense Review reports. This guidance links national strategy to defense policy, outlining operational objectives and funding priorities. Failing to analyze this guidance and related budget issues was a major shortfall in this book.

While the collection provides a largely even-handed analysis of the Bush administration, Dale Herspring and Lawrence Korb make unfortunate excursions into popular commentary by making unsubstantiated claims about Rumsfeld and Bush as well as the Iraq War, reciting the popular media narrative of deception on the part of the administration while failing to provide the type of documentation required by scholarly canon. Claims such as Herspring’s charge that “it was Rumsfeld’s subordinates who were directly involved in manipulating intelligence data” (p. 99) and Korb’s contention that the “Bush administration misled the American people and world” (p. 65) require substantiation. While these claims were widely reported in the popular media, primary source documentation has yet to validate them. These essays provided no use of new declassified sources. In discussing prewar planning and Operation Iraqi Freedom, neither essay included any citations from Douglas J. Feith’s well-documented account of the conflict, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, which contains declassified memoranda and briefings.

This collection reminds the reader of the remarkable continuity between the defense policies of Bush and his successor, Barack Obama, particularly with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan. The reader is also reminded that the majority of issues confronted by the Bush and Obama national security teams persist with little hope for resolution in sight.
Multinational Command Relationships: Part II of III

By GEORGE E. KATSOS

Previously in Joint Force Quarterly,1 we provided an overview of command relationships as they occur in U.S. joint doctrine. Now let us take a broad look at multinational command relationships that take place under normal conditions within multinational doctrine.

Multinational Operations

Multinational operations are conducted by forces of two or more nations usually under the formal agreement (for example, a treaty) of an alliance, an ad hoc lead nation coalition, or an intergovernmental organization.2 Each operation is unique and affected by national motives, situations, and perspectives that may cause tension between national interests and military plans. Nations that assign military personnel or national forces to multinational operations are usually called troop contributing nations (TCNs). When deployed, the forces of these nations have both multinational and national chains of command. Within multinational chains of command, TCNs can delegate command authority to organizational commanders, which may include caveats that trigger different levels of authority to multinational force commanders. Commanders at all levels must be aware that national caveats may exist and may impact force limitations, command and control relationships, and delegation of authority without obtaining further national approval.

Within a multinational operation, a command structure is developed by arrangement with TCNs that determines who is in charge. Arrangements such as alliances and coalitions operate under three types of command structures: integrated, lead nation, and parallel. Normally found in an alliance, the integrated command structure is made up of a multinational command and staff. Multinational operations formed outside of an alliance are known as coalitions or coalitions of the willing and led by a lead nation or parallel command structure.3 Within a lead nation command structure, a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement exists, resulting in TCNs retaining more control of their own national forces with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity.4

In regard to multinational special operations, special operations forces (SOF) provide multinational task forces (MNTFs) with a wide range of capabilities and responses. SOF responsibility will normally be assigned to a multinational SOF component commander or task force within the MNTF command structure, which is made up of SOF from one or multiple nations depending on the situation and the interoperability factors of the nations involved.5

NATO Operations

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military alliance of 28 members based on a 1949 treaty to provide mutual defense in response to an external attack on another member. Within a NATO operation, the integrated command structure is adopted, which provides maximum unity of effort. NATO commands are successful because commanders understand the boundaries of command relationships. Within NATO doctrine, no coalition commander has full command over assigned forces in a mission.4 TCNs, through their own national command authorities (NCA), always retain full command of their own forces. TCN forces follow NATO doctrine if they have not already adopted Alliance terminology as their own. Since TCNs assign forces, they delegate their authority through NATO operational command (NATO OPCOM)6 or NATO operational control (NATO OPCON).8 The difference is that NATO OPCOM is the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks, deploy units, reassign forces, and retain or delegate OPCON and/or tactical control (TACON), while NATO OPCON is the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned to accomplish specific missions or tasks including the retention and assignment of TACON. Neither authority includes assigning administrative or logistic control. NATO OPCOM does give the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) the added authority to establish task forces and assign forces, which NATO OPCON does not.7

Within the NATO command relationships, national caveats are agreed on by and not dictated to TCNs, which are included in a TCN force preparation message (FORCEPREP) to SACEUR. Caveats in the FORCEPREP outline command and control relationships that may include the delegation of authority to and from SACEUR to subordinate commanders without obtaining further national approval. Additional authorities such as NATO tactical command (TACOM),10 which is narrower in application than NATO OPCOM, are delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces to accomplish the mission assigned. NATO TACOM does include the authority to delegate or retain NATO TACON.11 NATO TACOM and NATO administrative control (ADCON)12 are equivalent to U.S. TACON13 and U.S. ADCON,14 respectively.

U.S. Forces in Multinational Operations

U.S. participation in multinational operations is normally established by treaty led by an alliance such as NATO or led by a coalition of the willing with a lead nation structure. The President, as Commander in Chief, serves as the U.S. NCA who always retains command authority over U.S. forces in multinational operations. In past operations, U.S. commanders have led NATO missions with an integrated command and staff, and U.S. forces under any NATO commander agree to follow NATO doctrine.
U.S. OPCON is used within the U.S. chain of command, but normally NATO OPCON is given to the NATO force commander within a NATO operation. U.S. OPCON is similar to both NATO OPCOM and NATO OPCON, but U.S. forces will normally fall under NATO OPCON being more limited and an acceptable choice to the U.S. NCA. In NATO-led operations such as the Kosovo Force and International Security Assistance Force, U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command respectively retained U.S. OPCON of U.S. forces while the U.S. NCA delegated NATO OPCON to SACEUR. Within the limits of both NATO and U.S. OPCON, a foreign commander cannot change the mission or deploy U.S. forces outside the operational area agreed to by the President; separate units or divide their supplies; administer discipline; promote anyone; or change the internal organization of U.S. forces. Commanders must use caution and not interchange U.S. terminology with that of NATO or any other nation or organization.

Since World War II, the United States has participated and led in many lead nation command structure operations. In 1996, the United States became a member of the Multinational Interoperability Council, which is a forum for addressing coalition and multinational interoperability issues such as command relationships. Composed of seven countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and the United States), these nations are potential NATO TCNs that would collaborate with U.S. forces and could be a lead nation in a mission outside the realm of a treaty authorized operation. In 1991, Operation Desert Storm was part of the Gulf War waged by a coalition of 34 nations led by the United States against Iraq. In 2003, the United States also led a multinational coalition in the invasion and postinvasion of Iraq. Three additional nations contributed troops to the U.S.-led invasion force (Australia, Poland, and United Kingdom), and an additional 37 countries provided troops to support U.S.-led military operations after the invasion was complete.

Another example of a lead nation command structure was during the Korean War when South Korea put its forces under OPCON of the U.S. lead nation force. These examples differ from the parallel command structure during the Vietnam War in which no single allied lead nation force commander existed (the South Vietnamese would not place its forces under U.S. control due to the perception that the country would be seen as a puppet of the United States). Additionally, a lead nation and a parallel command structure may exist simultaneously within a coalition. This occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces. Both the United States and Saudi Arabia acted as lead nations in parallel over their respective TCNs and not over each during the Gulf War.

Other Authorities and Relationships

Within multinational operations, dual-hatted positions between two commands are common. In Afghanistan, a dual-hatted U.S. commander has OPCON of U.S. forces in both U.S. Forces—Afghanistan (USFOR–A) and NATO-led ISAF. The commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), is the dual-hatted commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) that also has OPCON of assigned U.S. forces. USNORTHCOM and Canada Command are both national commands reporting to their respective governments, while NORAD as a North American defense collaborative effort is a binational command reporting to both governments. Further, combatant commanders may establish subordinate unified (subunified) commands such as U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), which is similar to a combatant command but on a smaller scale. This particular command conducts operations on a continuing basis and exercises OPCON over assigned forces normally in a joint operational area. Established under a 1978 treaty, the Republic of Korea (ROK)–U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) commander in the USFK joint operational area is dual-hatted as the USFK commander. The CFC commander has CFC or “combined OPCON” of both U.S. and ROK forces. Used in the Korean theater, combined OPCON is a more restrictive term than U.S. OPCON strictly referring to the employment of warfighting missions. Another term used is “command less OPCON,” which is similar to ADCON.

There are a few more authorities worth noting. One authority over U.S. forces is within the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Group. Created by treaty, MFO is not part of the U.S. Government. As participants, U.S. forces are under the responsibility of the Department of Defense, which appointed the Department of the Army as the executive agent for matters pertaining to U.S. military participation in support of MFO. The MFO force commander has OPCON over the U.S. contribution, known as Task Force Sinai. The combatant commander (USCENTCOM commander) does not have combatant command (command authority) over forces at MFO but does provide force protection oversight. The Army has ADCON, while the U.S. Department of State coordinates with the director general of MFO and U.S. Army. Another example worth noting is within a specific country. The senior representative of the U.S. Government is the Ambassador as Chief of Mission in-country; however, the Ambassador’s authority does not include the direction of U.S. military forces operating in the field when such forces are under the command authority of the geographic combatant commander. Additional authorities include coordinating authority and direct liaison authorized regarding coordinating actions.

Regardless of what arises during a multinational operation, U.S. military commanders must have an awareness and understanding of command relationship intricacies in multinational operations and be prepared to deal with military and political interests of nations, national caveats, and impact on multinational force contributions.

NOTES

3 Ibid., II-9.
4 Ibid., II-6.
5 Ibid., III-26.
6 Full command is the military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The term command as used internationally implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him since, in assigning forces to the Alliance, nations will delegate only operational command or operational control. See AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (Brussels: NATO Headquarters, 2010),
2.F.7. **Full command** is the NATO equivalent to U.S. combatant command (command authority).

NATO OPCON is the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, deploy units, reassign forces, and retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. It does not include responsibility for administration. See AAP-6, 2.O.3.

NATO TACON is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. See AAP-6, 2.T.2.

NATO ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. See AAP-6, 2.A.3.

TACON is the authority over forces limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2012), GL-12.

ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support. See JP 1, GL-5.

OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. See JP 1, GL-11.


Ibid., 18.


U.S. combatant command (command authority) is the nontransferable command authority, which cannot be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. See JP 1, GL-5.

Ibid., I-12.
The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities
Edited by Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force has undergone a rapid transformation since the 1990s into a formidable, modern air force that could present major challenges to Taiwanese and U.S. forces in a potential conflict. To examine the present state and future prospects of China’s air force, a distinguished group of scholars and experts on Chinese airpower and military affairs gathered in Taipei, Taiwan, in October 2010. This volume is a compilation of the edited papers presented at the conference, rooted in Chinese sources and reflecting comments and additions stimulated by the dialogue and discussions among the participants. Contributing authors include Kenneth W. Allen, Roger Cliff, David Frelinger, His-hua Cheng, Richard P. Hallion, Jessica Hart, Kevin Lanzit, Forrest E. Morgan, Kevin Pollpeter, Shen Pin-Luen, Phillip C. Saunders, David Shlapak, Mark A. Stokes, Murray Scot Tanner, Joshua K. Wiseman, Xiaoming Zhang, and You Ji.

The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability
By David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders

The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically, despite each country’s power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. A clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains—nuclear, space, and cyber—can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. David Gompert and Phillip Saunders assess the prospect of U.S.-Chinese competition in these domains and recommend that the United States propose a comprehensive approach based on mutual restraint whereby it and China can mitigate their growing strategic vulnerabilities. This mutual restraint regime may not take the form of binding treaties, but patterns of understanding and restraint may be enough to maintain stability.

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PRISM
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PRISM 3, no. 2 (March 2012), offers the following Feature articles: Stuart Bowen calls for a new organization charged with overall planning, execution, and accountability of stabilization and reconstruction operations; Laura Cleary examines the historical, cultural, and strategic difficulties in exporting models of civil-military relations; Caroline Earle assesses the current state of interagency integration in stability operations; John Mackinlay reveals why the year 2015 may see the start of a very different security era for Great Britain; Julian Lindley-French finds that Libya has only barely begun its long, uncertain political transition; Antonio Giustozzi shows how the Taliban mixes coercion and cooptation of governmental services at the village level; Gregory Johnson, Vijaya Ramachandran, and Julie Walz examine how the military can improve execution of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program; Dencio Acop finds that the experience of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in state-building has diminished its military values; and Kevin Newmeyer examines who should lead U.S. cybersecurity efforts. In From the Field, Dennis Cahill reports how a combined joint task force integrated civilians into stability operations. In Lessons Learned, Joe Quartararo, Michael Rovenolt, and Randy White look at the command and control of Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. Closing out this issue is an interview with Ambassador Donald Steinberg, Deputy Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development.

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