


# Strategic Political Sabotage and How to Tackle It

By Elisabeth Braw and Richard Newton

In January 2023 activist Rasmus Paludan, who leads a tiny, far-right, anti-Islamic party in Denmark, set out to intentionally offend Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. While some might characterize what Paludan did as acceptable civil disobedience, and Paludan may have acted out of opportunism, seeing in the debate an opportunity to get considerable attention, its effect was that of an act of strategic political sabotage intended to disrupt Sweden's efforts to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. The difference between strategic political sabotage and civil disobedience is important because it guides how



The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914 was an act of political sabotage that ignited World War One. Source: Smithsonian Magazine (public domain)

liberal democracies may tackle the challenges of legal protest.

Paludan's first act was to burn a copy of the Qur'an in front of Turkey's embassy in Stockholm. A week later he burned another Qur'an in front of a mosque in Denmark. The governments of Sweden and Denmark firmly denounced the burnings but noted such acts are protected

**Ms. Elisabeth Braw** is a Visiting Fellow at the Atlantic Council and a columnist for *Foreign Policy* and *Politico Europe*. She is the author of *The Defender's Dilemma: Identifying and Deterring Gray-Zone Aggression*. **Richard Newton (PhD)** serves as Adjunct Faculty at the University of Alaska Fairbanks and is a Fellow at the Homeland Defense Institute, a security studies collaboration between the U.S. Air Force Academy and U.S. Northern Command.

under their countries' respective freedom-of-expression laws,<sup>1</sup> and in addition, neither nation possesses anti-blasphemy laws. Erdogan, facing a tough reelection campaign, reacted by increasing his public opposition to Sweden's bid for NATO membership. Paludan's small and legal intentional act of political theater severely harmed Sweden's otherwise straightforward accession to NATO. The same was true for subsequent Qur'an burnings by Salwan Momika, an Iraqi refugee living in Stockholm who previously served with the Iranian-sponsored Imam Ali Brigade.<sup>2</sup> It was only in July 2023, after NATO, the European Union, and the United States agreed to military and economic concessions unrelated to the desecration of Islam's holy text, that President Erdogan agreed to forward Sweden's NATO accession to the Turkish parliament for ratification.<sup>3</sup> In October, Erdogan did submit a bill to the Turkish parliament to ratify Sweden's accession, but by year's end it remained there, still a hostage to real and imagined provocations of Turkey.<sup>4</sup> Hungary, too, had failed to ratify Sweden's NATO accession, ostensibly because of anti-Hungarian posturing by Swedish opposition politicians and the educational sibling of Swedish National Radio.<sup>5</sup>

Together, these events meant that a crucial Swedish foreign-policy initiative had been sabotaged by what seemed to be an innocent combination of thin-skinned foreign leaders and domestic saboteurs (whether acting consciously or unwittingly) who had exercised their right to free speech.

Indeed, citizen participation in or fueling of such a concoction offers a promising recipe for an adversary, whether state or non-state, seeking to undermine liberal democracies through non-military means. The likelihood of malicious external meddling makes it imperative that liberal democracies be prepared and have appropriate processes and programs in place and ready to mitigate the effects of political sabotage.

The term sabotage is defined by the *Cambridge Dictionary* as a deliberate attempt to obstruct, disrupt, or destroy an opponent's equipment, facilities, policies, or actions. The term can be applied to any number of domains; for example, economic sabotage, where workers deliberately slow production, make mistakes during assembly, or damage equipment; military sabotage that destroys infrastructure critical to the war effort; and environmental sabotage, such as cutting mile-long driftnets that trap protected fish species or spiking trees to prevent deforestation. But there is also strategic *political* sabotage—sabotage by individuals or a minority group that deliberately acts to disrupt, undermine, or manipulate the political process for strategic political or ideological gains. While such activities often include unethical, if not illegal, behaviors, their perpetrators typically portray themselves as dissidents performing acts of civil disobedience to justify their actions as acceptable and legitimate, even if inconvenient and disagreeable, forms of political expression. The strategic political saboteur's objective is to obstruct or disrupt political decisions by generating enough opposition to force policymakers to reverse policy decisions. In a globalized world, with ubiquitous and near-instantaneous communications, the dilemma is that what may be legitimate and protected rights of protest in one culture might cause outsized damage to that country's relations with other nations. Countries hostile to liberal democracies, meanwhile, exploit their adversaries' democratic freedoms to fuel such sabotage and help undermine foreign policy decisions they consider detrimental to them.

It is helpful to acknowledge the similarities between strategic political sabotage and civil disobedience, while explaining why one is not the other, especially when politically motivated dissent—such as Paludan's and Momika's—seeks to blur the lines between the two. One of the most important differences is that political sabotage is generally externally



Danish anti-Islam politician Rasmus Paludan burning a quran at a rally in Nørrebro under heavy police protection. Photo by FunkMonk, September 2, 2019 (Wikimedia Commons).

focused, seeking to influence another nation's leadership from afar. Political saboteurs such as Paludan use their legal rights of free expression, often intentionally offensive to the "target audience," hoping to bring adversary perspectives to the fore of public and governmental consciousness. Civil disobedience, on the other hand, is internally focused, and perpetrators intentionally and publicly break domestic laws they deem immoral. Those engaging in civil disobedience do not impinge on other citizens' rights but merely conduct their acts of disobedience to attract attention to their causes. Most important, they accept the judicial consequences of their actions.<sup>6</sup> While Paludan and Momika styled themselves as civil disobedients, their acts were directed against Islamic regimes but conducted in Sweden and Denmark, where Islamic governments in the Middle East and South Asia were unable to prosecute them. Were they true civil disobedients, they would have publicly burned the Qur'ans in

Istanbul, Tehran, or Baghdad and accepted the judicial consequences their actions.

Admittedly, there is overlap between political sabotage and civil disobedience, if for no other reason than well-meaning citizens confuse the two. This confusion can create an exploitable opportunity for hostile adversaries and their strategic sabotage, which, in the case of Sweden's bid to join NATO, Russia is known to have planned and supported. In December, Finnish National Broadcasting (YLE) reported that Finland's intelligence service knew of Russian plans to undermine Sweden's NATO accession by fueling disinformation campaigns disguised as legitimate protest.<sup>7</sup>

## HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

Political sabotage is not new. Long before social media made it possible for anyone with a smartphone and an internet connection to offer their opinions and recommendations to a global audience,

journalists, photographers, actors, and authors were powerful influencers. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo in June 1914 may well be one of the most ill-conceived and consequently disastrous episodes of strategic political sabotage of the 20th century.<sup>8</sup> During his trial, Princip characterized what he did as civil disobedience to make the case for an independent Serbia, when in fact it was an illegal and unethical action intended to disrupt Austrian-Hungarian political processes for both political and ideological gains.<sup>9</sup> Ironically, it resulted in a war that claimed the lives of some eight million soldiers and thirteen million civilians and brought about the fall of four great empires: Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. The First World War also claimed the lives of over 1.2 million Serbs, the highest per capita number of casualties of any nation involved.<sup>10</sup>

The Qur'an desecrations and burnings by Paludan and Momika are clearly not as serious as an assassination. Paludan, though, managed to enrage Erdogan, and Momika's desecrations resulted in Sweden being condemned by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Swedish embassy in Baghdad being attacked by a mob, and violent protests unfolding in Muslim-majority Swedish neighborhoods. This prompted Erdogan to declare that Sweden's NATO accession hinged on "security in the streets of Sweden."<sup>11</sup> In July 2023, far-right activists in Denmark followed Swedish protesters' example and burned Qur'ans in two separate incidents, resulting in Denmark also being condemned by the OIC.

In September 2023, Hungary—beside Turkey the only country yet to ratify Sweden's NATO accession—seemed to follow Turkey's path and suspended ratification of Sweden's NATO membership on the basis of what it considered hostile manifestations in Swedish civil society. Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó scolded his Swedish

counterpart, Tobias Billström, in a letter that was also published on Twitter by the Hungarian government.<sup>12</sup> Swedish politicians, complained Szijjártó, had engaged in "biased, unfair, and unjust accusations" toward Hungary, adding that now that parliamentarians "have read in the news that as part of your school curriculum provided by UR (the educational sibling of Swedish Public Radio) belonging to a state-run foundation, serious accusations and fake informations [sic] are being spread in the schools of Sweden, suggesting that democracy has been on a backslide in Hungary in the recent years." Szijjártó, though, failed to mention that opposition politicians within the Swedish Parliament had indeed been smearing Sweden's Prime Minister, Ulf Kristersson, but that this was part of a domestic dispute where the opposition compared Kristersson with Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The educational sibling of Swedish national radio had, for its part, included negative references to the state of Hungary's democracy in its school content. Even though the Swedish government clearly was not in a position to ban such expressions, Szijjártó admonished Billström, saying the negative characterizations don't "help your continuously raised demand [for NATO accession] to be fulfilled."

When domestic provocations are intended to harm foreign policy and impugn another nation's laws, culture, or ideology, they become acts of political sabotage, even when covered by citizens' rights to free expression. When they are conducted, wittingly or not, to further an adversary's objectives, they enter the realm of gray-zone aggression. Let's consider Paludan's January 2023 Qur'an burning. The protest permit was paid for by Swedish far-right journalist, Chang Frick, who in the past has contributed to the Russian media network *RT*.<sup>13</sup> There was nothing illegal under Swedish law about Frick paying for the permit and Frick himself says he did so to support Kurds living in Sweden.<sup>14</sup> Still, given Russia's tradition of manipulating legal protests so

as to destabilize other countries' governments, the Russian connection to Paludan's protests raised questions as to the extent of Russian involvement.<sup>15</sup>

Another case of strategic political sabotage intended for disproportionate effect was National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden's leak of highly classified documents to major newspapers. Snowden argued that what he did was an act of conscience because his personal concerns over domestic surveillance programs were ignored by the agency's leadership. Yet Snowden breaking the law was not civil disobedience, because he damaged the United States' credibility and standing among its allies and partners, harmed private individuals whose private information was leaked, and escaped the judicial consequences of his actions by seeking asylum in Russia.<sup>16</sup> Regardless of whether one considers Snowden a heroic whistleblower or a traitor, the consequences of his actions harmed the United States and aided Russia, where he was subsequently granted citizenship.<sup>17</sup>

## STRATEGIC SABOTAGE AS GRAY-ZONE AGGRESSION

In liberal democracies, strategic sabotage is bound to happen. The freedoms citizens enjoy are undeniably a strategic vulnerability, but at the same time they are also a strength. The rights of expression, dissent, and peaceful protest ensure governments remain, as President Abraham Lincoln said at Gettysburg, of the people, by the people, and for the people. The exercise of those freedoms, though, means citizens can and will do things that harm the political order, both at home and abroad. At the extreme ends of the political spectrum, there will always be those who are quite happy to harm society in the name of their causes and protesters who willingly accept the consequences of their actions. Such positions make it rather easy for hostile regimes to exploit well-meaning, but loyal, dissidents and legitimate opposition groups through gray-zone aggression,

usually malign, non-kinetic activities that seek to undermine the rules-based order without crossing a threshold that leads to open conflict. What is hard to detect, harder to attribute, and extremely difficult to respond to is outsider manipulation of legal protest. Hostile powers that support, influence, or control domestic dissent intentionally hide their involvement. Authoritarian adversaries have proven extremely adept at exploiting legal loopholes in Western democracies for their own benefit. If democratic societies are to deter acts of strategic political sabotage sponsored by hostile powers, their political leaders and security professionals must anticipate and prepare for legitimate acts that are likely to create opportunities for significant political damage. When developing strategies for deterring political sabotage, potential target countries must also consider the targets of their deterrence by communicating to the strategic saboteurs, the sponsoring hostile powers, or both, the consequences of their malicious actions. The two actors may be linked, but they will often have differing motivations, and thus the tools employed to deter must also be tailored to each targeted "audience."

Detering a hostile power from sponsoring acts of strategic sabotage falls into the realm of statecraft: the use of tools such as diplomacy, sanctions, and public opinion to change would-be aggressors' cost-benefit calculus. The more challenging aspect of deterring strategic sabotage is the internal, or domestic, problem of dissuading citizens from conducting extreme political acts in the first place and encouraging them to consider the second or third-order effects of those acts.

Political scientists Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter explored how activists used extreme acts, including violence, to sabotage popular political efforts that would have led to peace and stability in war-torn regions. They found that there is little that is random, irrational, or indiscriminate about what saboteurs intend. In fact, the saboteurs

know they are “playing a role,” conducting acts of political theater to influence the masses and in turn shape strategic decision-making in their favor.<sup>18</sup>

Democratic governments have a duty to protect the rights of dissidents, activists, and sometimes even nut-cases. Burning a Qur’an is a blasphemous and punishable act in Muslim-majority countries, but that is not the case in most secular societies. As was seen in Sweden and Denmark, even though the burnings caused offense, they were not illegal, and both Paludan and Momika took advantage of their relative protection from prosecution. Swedish and Danish authorities had little official recourse other than to tolerate the offensive acts in the interest of sustaining their free and liberal societies.

Deterrence theory since the end of the Second World War has primarily focused on avoiding nuclear confrontation and major conventional war between the superpowers. Western deterrence policies and the resulting implementing strategies have been decidedly military in nature, based upon physical aspects of military strength—tanks, ships, aircraft, divisions, and corps—reinforced by arsenals of nuclear weapons. In 1966, at the height of the Cold War, Thomas Schelling wrote one of the foundational works for the study of modern coercion and deterrence theories, *Arms and Influence*.<sup>19</sup> That volume, which has guided many other theorists’ and strategists’ work, recognized that deterring an individual was a cognitive exercise and that the motivations necessary for individual deterrence were different than those necessary for deterring a nation-state that one assumes acts rationally based upon quantitative cost-benefit analyses. Individuals have the freedom to make their underlying issues personal, and thus the range of deterring actions and policies needs to emphasize the human domain where decisions are often driven by intangibles such as passion, anger, culture, isolation, powerlessness, perception, bias, and feelings.

Karl Mueller, from RAND, expanded on Schelling’s work by describing deterrence as the range of preventative measures taken through a combination of denial and punitive strategies. Denial strategies, observed Mueller, are the sum of tangible and intangible actions taken to convince an opponent its objectives are unattainable. He found that denial strategies were overwhelmingly more effective than punitive strategies. Threats of after-the-fact punishment tended to be effective only when one opponent believed the other possessed and was willing to use the full range of capabilities at its disposal—capability and credibility (will).

Adapting deterrence theory to address domestic political sabotage means stepping outside Western politicians’ traditional comfort zone: the rational comparisons between each nation’s capabilities. When addressing political sabotage, governments should implement and employ whole-of-society approaches that address the human aspects of conflict.

## DETECTING STRATEGIC SABOTAGE

Preventing acts of strategic political sabotage must be the preferred goal of deterrence and can be achieved through a combination of *preemption*, *education*, *co-option*, and *prosecution* strategies.

During the 2010’s efforts to sustain and improve the peace in Northern Ireland, an independent review of the security situation revealed that the biggest threat to maintaining the peace agreement was not from sectarian paramilitary groups who had agreed to a ceasefire, but instead from individual dissidents, both nationalist and unionist, who disagreed with the political process and wanted to sabotage the effort.<sup>20</sup> Preempting these individual dissidents’ efforts to sabotage the peace required collaboration by the Northern Ireland Executive, the police, domestic intelligence services, tax agencies, and the different factions. The governments

declared their intent to ensure the peace, used the appropriate tools available to the different groups, and then communicated the collective intent and the results through the courts and the media. For the most part, preemption succeeded in keeping a lid on attempts at political sabotage.

Most Western societies already have a range of legal and ethical tools within their community policing and domestic antiterrorism laws, as well as acceptable forms of open-source information gathering. Law enforcement, domestic intelligence agencies, and citizens' groups enable governments to influence potential saboteurs and anticipate possible adverse activities. In societies with traditions of civil liberty and the rule of law, it can be difficult for law enforcement agencies to be preemptive. In a contest for influence, it is, instead, an engaged citizenry that often creates awareness of the motivations and

contexts that push activists to take adverse actions, and who then help governments avoid or mitigate acts of strategic political sabotage.

We don't know if Swedish diplomats informed the government of Turkey before Paludan's planned Qur'an burning or if their counterparts in Budapest were even aware that Orban would take exception to Swedish opposition politicians' unflattering use of his name in what was an internal Swedish debate. We also don't know if, given that Erdogan was facing a contested reelection campaign, it would have made any difference explaining to Turkey's leadership that burning a Qur'an, while condemned by Swedish politicians, is a protected right under Swedish law and could not be legally stopped. In both volatile and less volatile situations, there is always value in informing an external government that may be targeted by activists.



Media Literacy for You(th)" Project's Youth Exchange Was Held in Kaunas, Lithuania, on 01 – 11 February 2023. Photo by International Labor Association, February 11, 2023.

Strategic political sabotage has the power to shock sensibilities, disrupt leaders and societal routines, and influence populations to support policies contrary to the overall good. The power of education, though, is that when artfully, ethically, and consistently delivered, it can stiffen the population against the effects of malicious influence by raising awareness of political extremism, illustrating the dangers posed by information bias, and building resilience among the population to recognize and resist malign influence, disinformation, and deceptive practices.<sup>21</sup>

Moscow's robust international propaganda efforts after its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and again in 2022 served as a wake-up call for Western nations that had previously downplayed Russian disinformation campaigns. Moscow

weaponized two key pillars of liberal democracy, free speech and free media, to shape the Crimea narrative in its favor.<sup>22</sup>

Lithuania, which shares a common border with Russia, had previously suffered from Russian disinformation. The Lithuanian leadership mobilized governmental, educational, social, and private sector organizations and institutions to blunt the impact of Russian propaganda. This Baltic nation used its existing laws to insulate the public from Russian state media and began a public education campaign to raise awareness and created an information literacy program among its most vulnerable citizens—minorities, the elderly, and youth. They also used the judicial system to punish those who intentionally spread false damaging information.<sup>23</sup> By encouraging grassroots efforts to counter



Loyalist banner and graffiti on a building in the Shankill area of Belfast, 1970. Photo by Fribbler (Wikimedia Commons).



Russian disinformation, debunk false claims, and spread truthful counter-narratives, Lithuania proved the power of an educated population and sent a powerful message demonstrating its ability to resist external efforts to sabotage domestic policies and programs, while also preparing its population for future malign influence from Moscow.

Internally, government authorities can choose to deny strategic saboteurs' quest for legitimacy and credibility by controlling or ignoring the intended message, or instead they might meet the activists halfway. By co-opting the saboteurs' messaging and working toward compromise solutions, governments have the power to create acceptable outcomes all parties can agree to. Political scientist Markus Holdo, from the University of Lund in Sweden, has examined anti-establishment discourse and political co-option as means of influencing social change. He concludes that co-opting activist groups and individual dissidents by cooperating and collaborating with them offers an effective means of controlling opposition minorities and encouraging them to work within the authority's agenda in the hope that both sides might remain politically relevant.<sup>24</sup>

One of the most successful cases of political co-option is the 1998 Good Friday Agreement that ended Northern Ireland's 30-year sectarian conflict. Prior to that agreement, every other attempt at compromise and negotiation had been sabotaged by radicals from both parties who failed to trust the other sides' intentions or their own leaders' abilities to implement the terms of the various negotiated agreements.<sup>25</sup> By the late 1990s, citizens in both the nationalist and the unionist camps were exhausted by the violence and by the cost of policing Northern Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement between the governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom, as well as the four major political parties, co-opted the sectarian paramilitary groups, got the political leaders to agree to ceasefires and laying down their weapons, and brought the militants into the political

process. While the ensuing twenty-five years have not been without challenges, the peace has held in Northern Ireland.

When skillfully done, co-opting an opposition group can avoid future harmful acts that might damage a nation's policies or standing. The decisive aspect is whether the political act aids a hostile power and can be linked to that power. Awareness of domestic extremists' agendas and any links to unfriendly regimes offer acceptable criteria for determining if politically-motivated acts of protest are an appropriate vulnerability to be tolerated or if the acts are credible threats to national security and regional stability. Democracies thus have two tasks: they must constantly, legally, and appropriately monitor groups and individuals likely to engage in acts of political sabotage, and they must, also within the rules of law, address any evidence that domestic activists are acting with or for the interests of hostile powers.

Prosecuting a strategic saboteur after the fact falls outside the definition of deterrence by denial. Instead, it is a punishment strategy that hopefully will deter future acts of political sabotage. Paradoxically, punishing political sabotage, especially when given global visibility through modern communication tools, can enable political saboteurs to amplify their messages, extend their causes' lifespans, and exert significant control over their intended messaging. Governments must carefully balance between prosecuting illegal acts and enabling the public "microphone" political saboteurs crave. Much like efforts to suppress civil disobedience, efforts to thwart political sabotage must be subject to rules of evidence and due process. Most important, however, is that legitimate acts of political expression cannot, and should not, be prevented in liberal democracies. If, however, the government does find it necessary to prevent acts of political sabotage, it must be demonstrated that the acts violated the country's national security laws and be clearly attributed to a hostile power.

## CONCLUSION

Strategic political sabotage is so powerful because it occupies the nexus of freedom of expression and gray-zone aggression. Without an illegal act or a hostile power nexus, activists whose protests harm their country's policies or international standing enjoy freedom-of-expression protections. If, however, such acts are undertaken with the support of a hostile power, they then constitute gray-zone aggression—efforts by a hostile power to cause harm through non-kinetic means that stay below the threshold of conflict. To deter potential gray-zone aggression it is imperative that a nation identify and preemptively disrupt hostile sponsors by denying the saboteurs political, financial, and social support, as well as pursuing after-the-fact investigation and attribution that places blame and imposes consequences for any meddling, where appropriate.

To effectively avoid the harm of political sabotage, governments must monitor links between activists and foreign powers. Once alerted to impending political sabotage the government can then execute its deterrent strategies and programs that combine techniques of preemption, education, cooption, and prosecution to mitigate potential

harmful effects while also protecting the guarantees of democratic freedom. This can include changing the location of the permitted demonstration, educating the public about external meddling and possible interference in domestic protests, and collaborating with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to correct disinformation by hostile activists and to preempt malign state and non-state actors bent on sabotaging legitimate political processes.

Governmental and societal understanding and acceptance of the rights of appropriate political protest remain central to preserving democracy. Governments and citizens must ensure awareness of political protesters' likelihood to break laws and any possible connections to hostile powers. Activists who reflect opposition elements of society must carefully evaluate the consequences of their actions and the potential national harm their acts of sabotage might cause. Together, governments and societies require proactive thought and engagement on the topic of strategic political sabotage if they are to effectively protect themselves from actors and actions intended to undermine the stability, standing, and well-being of their societies. **PRISM**

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> In 2019, 18 of 20 nations in the Middle East and North Africa had laws criminalizing blasphemy and enforced those laws to varying degrees, including the death penalty. Virginia Villa, "Four-in-ten countries and territories worldwide had blasphemy laws in 2019" (25 Jan 2022), <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/01/25/four-in-ten-countries-and-territories-worldwide-had-blasphemy-laws-in-2019-2/>. A significant number of European nations still have such laws on the books, <https://end-blasphemy-laws.org/countries/europe/>.

<sup>2</sup> Momika's is an interesting case. He not only burns Qur'ans for publicity, but also rants against Islam and livestreams the events on TikTok, earning about \$270 per video. Burak Bir, "Salwan Momika: Quran burnings for freedom or money?" (7 Sep 2023), <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/salwan-momika-quran-burnings-for-freedom-or-money/2981044#>.

<sup>3</sup> Sweden agreed to support Turkey's accession process to the European Union and will also support visa liberalization within the EU's Schengen Zone. The United States will sell Turkey new F-16 fighter jets and help modernize the F-16s Turkey already owns. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/11/why-turkey-changed-its-stance-on-swedens-nato-membership-2>.

<sup>4</sup> Patrick Wintour and Lili Bayer, “Turkey’s president submits bill to ratify Sweden’s NATO membership,” *The Guardian* (23 Oct 2023), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/23/turkey-submits-bill-to-ratify-sweden-nato-membership>.

<sup>5</sup> Jack Detsch, “Hungary is Not Out to Scuttle Sweden and NATO,” *Foreign Policy* (18 Sep 2023), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/18/hungary-sweden-turkey-orban-nato/>; Justin Spike, “Hungary in the spotlight after Turkey approves Sweden’s bid to join NATO,” *PBS News Hour* (24 Oct 2023), <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/hungary-in-the-spotlight-after-turkey-approves-swedens-bid-to-join-nato>.

<sup>6</sup> Lewis H. Van Dusen, Jr., “Civil Disobedience: Destroyer of Democracy,” *American Bar Association Journal*, vol. 55 (Feb 1969), p. 123.

<sup>7</sup> “Russia planned Islamophobic campaigns in Finland, Sweden to delay NATO membership” (4 Dec 2023), <https://yle.fi/a/74-20063396>.

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I>.

<sup>9</sup> Srećko Horvat, “First world war: was Gavrilo Princip a terrorist or a freedom fighter?” *The Guardian* (15 Apr 2014), <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/15/first-world-war-gavrilo-princip-terrorist-freedom-fighter-revisionism>.

<sup>10</sup> Biljana Radivojevic and Goran Penev, “Demographic Losses of Serbia in the First World War and Their Long-Term Consequences,” *Economic Annals*, vol. LIX, no. 203 (Oct-Dec 2014), p. 39.

<sup>11</sup> [https://www.oic-oci.org/topic/?t\\_id=39325&t\\_ref=26550&lan=en](https://www.oic-oci.org/topic/?t_id=39325&t_ref=26550&lan=en) (31 Jul 2023).

<sup>12</sup> *Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to H.E. Mr Tobias Billström, Minister for Foreign Affairs* (14 Sep 2023), <https://twitter.com/zoltanspox/status/17022990458787421?s=20>.

<sup>13</sup> Jennifer Rankin, “Burning of Qur’an in Stockholm funded by journalist with Kremlin ties,” *The Guardian* (27 Jan 2023), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/27/burning-of-quran-in-stockholm-funded-by-journalist-with-kremlin-ties-sweden-nato-russia>.

<sup>14</sup> Erdogan has demanded that Sweden extradite a number of militant Kurds who have been given political asylum in Sweden.

<sup>15</sup> Jolanta Darczewska and Piotr Zochowski, *Active Measures: Russia’s Key Export* (Warsaw, Poland: Centre for Eastern Studies, Jun 2017), pp. 29–30.

<sup>16</sup> David Pozen, “Edward Snowden, National Security Whistleblowing, and Civil Disobedience,” *Lawfare*, (26 Mar 2019), <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/edward-snowden-national-security-whistleblowing-and-civil-disobedience>.

<sup>17</sup> Charles Maynes, “Putin grants Russian citizenship to Edward Snowden,” *NPR* (26 Sep 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/09/26/1125109303/putin-edward-snowden-russian-citizenship>.

<sup>18</sup> Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence,” *International Organization*, vol. 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 264–65.

<sup>19</sup> Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

<sup>20</sup> Hristin Archick, *Northern Ireland Peace Process: Background and Challenges* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 8 Mar 2019), p. 19.

<sup>21</sup> “Cognitive Biases,” <https://thedeclarationlab.com/biases/>; “Breaking Harmony Square,” <https://harmonysquare.game/en>.

<sup>22</sup> Vytautas Kersankas, *Deterring disinformation? Lessons from Lithuania’s countermeasures since 2014* (Helsinki, Finland: The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, Apr 2021), p. 7.

<sup>23</sup> Kersankas, pp. 10–12.

<sup>24</sup> Markus Holdo, “Cooptation and non-cooptation: elite strategies in response to social protest,” *Social Movement Studies*, vol. 18, no. 4 (2019).

<sup>25</sup> Archick, p. 3.