focused on World I, the interwar period, and World War II, editors Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray . . . posited a number of factors influencing military effectiveness. . . . But organizational culture was not an explicit element of the study and chapter authors, for the most part, did not address it." This is excessively modest; certainly, I read that collection as a disquisition on military culture. Nevertheless, Mansoor and Murray see the current volume as a corrective to that study.

Like *Military Effectiveness*, the current volume is a scholarly work, but the editors also have a professional practitioner in mind. They do not merely want to interpret military culture but to change it: "One of the purposes of this book is to help military leaders understand how organizational culture forms; the influence culture has on organizational functioning and the development of strategy, operations, and tactics; and how culture changes."

Mansoor and Murray are correct to address the question of military culture because it is vital to military performance and effectiveness. They are also equally justified in noting the complexity of the term. Because its connotations are multiple, it is a difficult term to apply with any analytic rigor. However, Mansoor and Murray propose a plausible definition of culture at the beginning of the work. They define *organizational culture* as "the assumptions, ideas, norms, and beliefs, expressed or reflected in symbols, rituals, myths, and practices, that shape how an organization functions and adapts to external stimuli and that give meaning to its members." Organizational culture refers, then, to the often unacknowledged stocks of shared understandings and to the habitual collective practices of military personnel. Culture unites the armed forces.

On the basis of this definition of culture, Mansoor and Murray identify a predicament in which all military organizations find themselves. Since they must order their personnel to kill or, potentially, be killed, armies, navies, and air forces have to be highly cohesive organizations; they must be unified like no civilian company. Yet, ironically, the military requirement for dense culture integration threatens to undermine them.

Precisely because they must be so bound to existing hierarchies, established traditions, and internal commitments, military forces often ignore or wilfully misinterpret their enemies and the threat they pose. Frequently, they reject innovations which in retrospect prove vital because they seem to jeopardize order, discipline, morale, cohesion, and entrenched organizational interests. Like Achilles, the armed forces are tragic organizations, fatally compromised by their very virtues.

Every chapter in this book describes this predicament through colorful historical explication. For instance, David Kilcullen discusses how, in Mogadishu, at 1620 on October 3, 1993, U.S. Task Force Ranger had completed its mission to capture Somali militia leaders when a Blackhawk helicopter crashed over the city. Instead of simply returning to base, the convoy detoured to the crash site to save the pilots and crew. In the following 26 minutes, it suffered 50 percent casualties as it engaged in furious firefights in the city streets. Kilcullen notes, "Rational military decisionmaking is not a sufficient explanation for behavior in what was later dubbed the 'lost convoy.'" Yet culture may. Bound by an ethos that no Soldier would ever be left behind, U.S. Rangers and special operations forces felt obliged to try to rescue comrades rather than complete their mission. The very cohesiveness of these elite forces led to mission failure in those streets of Mogadishu.

The Culture of Military Organizations is replete with insights like this. It explores the predicament of the armed forces from a diversity of fascinating angles. Particular high points include analyses of German (Jorit Wintjes), North Virginian (Mark Grimsley), Indian (Daniel Marston), U.S. Marine (Allan R. Millett), and U.S. Army culture (Peter Mansoor). Most of the chapters in this book use a narrative historical method rather than a critical, analytical framework, and the collection may, therefore, have benefited from drawing more explicitly on sociological and anthropological literature. In particular, although the infamous 1991 U.S. Navy Tailhook scandal is discussed insightfully by John Kuehn, questions of gender, race, and

ethnicity might have been addressed more systematically.

Mansoor and Murray want this collection to be useful to military professionals. It will undoubtedly be of the greatest utility to the brightest and most inquiring officers. However, readers should be under no illusion. This is a scholarly work of the highest academic credentials that military scholars will find both deeply interesting and useful. **JFQ**

Dr. Anthony King is a Professor and the Chair of War Studies at the University of Warwick, United Kingdom.

Surrogate Warfare: The Transformation of War in the Twenty-First Century
By Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli
Georgetown University Press, 2019
244 pp. $104.95
ISBN: 978-1626166776

Reviewed by Harry Wingo

What do you get when two Middle Eastern subject matter experts decide to update the age-old concept of proxy warfare and explore the potential of machines to serve as surrogates that substitute or supplement a nation's formal military

forces? The answer is an ambitious and useful examination of how war is changing in light of emerging technologies, such as autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) and cyber weapons able to leverage artificial intelligence (AI). Members of the joint force willing to brave the occasional academese passages on Clausewitzian theory will find gems of insight throughout *Surrogate Warfare.*

This well-researched volume benefits from the considerable experience of two defense scholars at Kings College London. Andreas Krieg has a background supporting professional military education for officers of the British and overseas armed forces, and Jean-Marc Rickli mines his experience as the head of global risk and resilience at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) in Switzerland. Together, they have created a framework for considering ways that nations may ease the burden of warfare by constructing "security assemblages" of irregular forces, both human and machine, that afford strategic leaders the ability to coerce adversaries overseas while avoiding political upheaval at home.

The book surveys the use of surrogates throughout history, taking the reader from the adventures of Sir Francis Drake—English privateer of the Elizabethan era—and his exploits liberating gold and silver from Spanish colonies in South America, to the modern use of Stuxnet to slow the Iranian nuclear program. The authors attempt to broaden the scope of surrogates in warfare by examining an evolving array of entities, from privateers to modern mercenaries and contractors. Technological surrogates, however, remain a central focus. It is a thought experiment likely to provoke healthy debate among scholars and practitioners alike.

The authors also propose an update to Carl von Clausewitz's "trinity" of society, state, and soldier, a concept they rebrand as the "neo-trinitarian" aspects of modern warfare that are now "privatized," "securitized," and "mediatized." This is deeply academic but should intrigue more than just military theorists. It is worthwhile framing for those in the joint force who must increasingly

consider the "burden" of war and the implications of externalizing it to machines such as UAVs and advanced autonomous weapon systems, or for those who must now contend with the dynamics of novel cyber weapons and social media "super influencers," all powered by increasingly independent artificial intelligence.

Krieg and Rickli also explore the well-known promises and challenges of integrating AI into joint force operations and grand strategy. What is new, however, is the attempt to ground this discussion in a comprehensive historical framework of military theory while tackling broader ethical dilemmas. What does it mean when the state becomes, as Kreig and Rickli observe, simply a remote manager of violence? These are considerations that will become only more pronounced as the United States and its allies seek to recover from the impact of the novel coronavirus.

The implications of growing more reliant on technological surrogates are discussed so convincingly and thoroughly in *Surrogate Warfare* that the book falls short only in its scope. While the authors acknowledge their Western perspectives of military theory, the latter part of the book goes to Krieg's and Rickli's deep experiences in the Middle East, as they discuss Iran's extensive and creative use of surrogate warfare—something likely

to continue despite the killing of General Qasem Soleimani on January 3, 2020, by a U.S. military drone, the quintessential technological surrogate. It is a useful deep dive, but the book would have benefited from a wider aperture and the examination of a peer competitor primed to use a range of surrogates both technological and otherwise. This is especially salient as U.S. strategic focus turns to East Asia and Great Power competition in the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic.

While *Surrogate Warfare* offers a wealth of history, theory, and novel thought about the nature of surrogates and their evolving technological dimensions in war, it is the near- and long-term engagement with near-peer competitors in the wake of the coronavirus that serves as a catalyst to recommend this book to the joint force. As theories abound about the origins of the microscopic force that has changed the world in a few months, it is clear that the diminished ways and means of the United States, its allies, and its partners will make the lessons of *Surrogate Warfare* necessary, even required reading for all strategic leaders. **JFQ**

Harry Wingo is a Professor in the College of Information and Cyberspace at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.

Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision (to be signed within 6 months)

JP 1-0, *Personnel Support*

JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*

JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*

JP 3-03, *Joint Interdiction*

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JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months)

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JP 3-05, *Special Operations*

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