powerful and advanced artificial intelligence than what is possible now—and argues that military strategy will change as machines become more flexible and autonomous. In particular, issues of friction and uncertainty will continue to be part of human conflict, but machines acquire increasingly higher decision roles without human cognition.

Payne concludes the book by putting artificial intelligence into broad historical context with the advent of the written word, which altered the psychological basis of strategy. Because artificial intelligence is not just information-processing technology but also decisionmaking technology, advances in artificial intelligence will mark a significant departure for strategy as decisions are made without human motivations. Payne recommends that one way to protect against artificial intelligence making decisions devoid of human goals is to inject it with biological intelligences wherein a human–artificial intelligence hybrid would offer human motivations and heuristics.

Although *Strategy, Evolution, and War* is highly speculative, this book provides valuable insights about the trajectory of military strategy shaped by artificial intelligence. Payne is upfront about the book's limitations, including the notional aspects of his argument, the broad themes, and the oversimplification of the complex evolutionary processes. Indeed, readers wanting more empirical research and detailed scientific discussion will be disappointed. Payne's theories raise important questions about the future of artificial intelligence and strategy in broad terms, but they sometimes neglect ethical issues. Nonetheless, even if aspects of Payne's argument are hypothetical, his book offers valuable ideas about how artificial intelligence could change military strategy in the future. **JFQ**

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
LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media

By Peter W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018
416 pp. $28.00
ISBN: 978-1328695741

Reviewed by Brett Swaney

There is a battlefield you cannot see, a digital ocean of social media, news feeds, botnets, sock puppets, neural nets, and trolls. In *LikeWar*, defense analysts Peter W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking examine the role of social media in reshaping the character of war and politics. The result is a thematic and insightful overview of the weaponization of social media and the power of narrative in conflict.

The authors frame the discussion by tracing the development of communications and information technologies through the telegraph, radio, television, the Internet, Web 2.0, and social media. At each phase, new communications technology subverts some powers and people while crowning new ones in their place. Each new evolution of information and communications technology has revolutionized tactics, strategy, and

the discourse around war. This makes the utopian vision of the Internet and social media often espoused by Silicon Valley tycoons feel naïve in hindsight—a reckoning that is already well under way.

Social media was founded on the optimistic premise that the closer knit and communal world would be a better one. Yet that same openness and connection of social media platforms has also made these spaces the perfect place for continual and global conflict. The so-called Islamic State advanced on Mosul riding a wave of social media that broke the Iraqi defenders before they even arrived. A World of Warcraft gamer used geolocation and crowdsourced social media to reveal the truth behind the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, and Harry Potter character Albus Dumbledore used his army to foster community to combat violent extremists. These fascinating vignettes reinforce the reality that social media has empowered new actors and individuals in conflict with tremendous reach. Conflict is global, and we are all connected to the virtual battlefield, seamlessly able to participate in the narrative battlespace.

In modern wars, Singer and Brooking remind us, the online fight is for attention and influence; the ability to shape the narrative in and around conflict is just as important as the physical conflict. Rupert Smith in *The Utility of Force* (Knopf, 2007) and Lawrence Freedman in *The Future of War* (PublicAffairs, 2017) have noted the importance of narrative, and governments around the world have been busy adapting. The Israel Defense Forces have pioneered the development of specialized units and tactics dedicated to social media and the recruitment to man those units. Russia too has rapidly embraced the new battlespace with an army of social media "trolls," a panoply of state media, and relentless botnets. China is also singled out for its disturbing model of social media–enabled, state-managed systems of mass control. Unfortunately, there is a noticeable lack of discussion regarding U.S. military efforts to grapple with social media in conflict, especially in the counterinsurgency space where there has been significant effort.

Where Singer and Brooking break new ground is in their observation that even as national militaries reorient themselves to fight global information conflicts, the domestic politics of nations have not remained in splendid isolation. Singer and Brooking suggest that the two spheres of war and politics have become more tightly linked. Just as states and conflict actors use the Internet to manipulate, so too do political candidates and activists. Online there is little difference between the tactics required to "win" either a violent conflict or a peaceful campaign. Singer and Brooking are not afraid to challenge the level of preparedness or even the seriousness with which the national security establishment, Congress, and social media companies take these issues. However, there is curiously little discussion regarding the implications of national governments attempting to combat "dangerous speech" in free societies, or the regulatory efforts concerning personal data already underway in many Western nations.

Nonetheless, social media is a seismic shift for military strategy. As Singer and Brooking point out, Carl von Clausewitz would have understood the nature of social media in conflict today. It fits entirely within his articulation of war as politics by other means. At the time, this continuum of conflict was revolutionary and flew in the face of those who believed that war and politics were separate worlds governed by distinct rules. Despite these solid philosophical underpinnings, Singer and Brooking fail to convince that social media has fundamentally changed the nature of war itself.

Smartly researched, engaging, and technically astute, *LikeWar* is a worthwhile primer on the new information battlespace for national security professionals. The authors argue convincingly that war and politics have never been more intertwined. With colorful and engaging prose, the authors implore us to treat this new virtual battleground with the gravity it deserves. **JFQ**

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
New from the Office of Joint History

The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations

By Christopher J. Lamb
2018 • xxiv + 284 pp.

President Gerald R. Ford's 1975 decision to use force after the Cambodians seized the USS *Mayaguez* merchant ship is one of the best documented but least understood crises in U.S. history. U.S. behavior is still explained as a rescue mission, a defense of freedom of the seas, an exercise in realpolitik, a political gambit to enhance Ford's domestic political fortunes, and a national spasm of violence from frustration over losing Vietnam. Widespread confusion about what happened and why it did contributes to equally confused explanations for U.S. behavior.

Now, with new sources and penetrating analysis, Christopher J. Lamb's *The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations* demonstrates how three decades of scholarship mischaracterized U.S. motives and why the common allegation of civilian micromanagement during the crisis is wrong. He then extracts lessons for current issues such as mission command philosophy, civil-military relations, and national security reform. In closing he makes the argument that the incredible sacrifices made by U.S. Servicemen during the crisis might have been avoided but were not in vain.