

application of joint force capabilities and strengthen the alignment of the instruments of national power. The factors work in conjunction with existing methodologies to assist the joint force in achieving U.S. policy aims.”¹⁸ Throughout all the strategic-level documents, the same conclusion can be found—all capabilities need to be integrated in order to achieve the optimal desired effects.

Until the definition, utilization, and cultural understanding of “fires” is updated to include *all* offensive capabilities, regardless of the weapon system they originate from, the integration and synchronization problem will remain. The JTC is designed to provide the optimal solutions, but stovepiping capabilities prevents the process from being fully realized. Instead of trying to achieve consensus on a specific term like *kinetic*, the joint doctrine development community and the joint force should focus on the primary warfighting function that is responsible for delivering the effects necessary to achieve the commander’s objectives. Without doing so, the same complications of synchronization and integrations will be manifested repeatedly and will continue to be brought up during joint exercise after action reports as well as feedback received during joint fires-related publications revisions. The capabilities are extant and efforts are ongoing to use the JTC the way it was designed. The missing piece now is the formalization of the idea that all capabilities need to be considered. To do this, all offensive capabilities should be considered under the fires function and thereby equally considered during the targeting process. Similar to a concept developing into the next major military acquisition program, the solution cannot already be assumed. Incorporating the integration and synchronization of all offensive capabilities allows joint planners, through the JTC, the ability to recommend an optimal solution to achieve the desired effects, enhancing how fires are understood at the fundamental level. It will refocus the joint warfighting community and open the eyes of those who have been constrained

Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision (to be signed within 6 months)

- JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel*
- JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*
- JP 3-(number not yet assigned), *Information*
- JP 3-05, *Special Operations*
- JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*
- JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations*
- JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*
- JP 4-09, *Distribution Operations*
- JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*
- JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*

JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months)

- JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*
- JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*
- JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments*
- JP 3-28, *Defense Support to Civil Authorities*
- JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*
- JP 3-72, *Nuclear Operations*
- JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*
- JP 4-04, *Contingency Basing*
- JP 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning*

by compartmented ideologies. Then joint force commanders will truly know what it means to “fire for effect.” JFQ

Notes

- ¹ Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, July 12, 2017).
- ² JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October 29, 2018).
- ³ JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 31, 2013).
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ Ibid., II-17.
- ⁶ *Defense Acquisition Guidebook* (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition University, 2017), available at <www.dau.mil/tools/dag/>.

⁷ JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December 12, 2014).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ JP 3-09.3, *Close Air Support* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, November 25, 2014).

¹² As described in JP 3-09.

¹³ JP 3-42, *Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September 9, 2016).

¹⁴ JP 3-09.

¹⁵ JP 3-42.

¹⁶ *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, March 16, 2018), available at <www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257>.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.