

authoritatively and comprehensively the fundamental principles and best practices of operating in IED-rich environments before they are forgotten.

As our force levels in Afghanistan fall and our operational tempo decreases, now is a good time to consider what we have learned about IEDs and invest the intellectual energy into ensuring our doctrine is relevant to future conflicts. While the IED is not the only threat we face, its effectiveness suggests it is not going away any time soon. JFQ

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>JCCS-1 (Joint CREW Composite Squadron-1) was a Navy-run electronic warfare unit in Iraq that managed CREW systems and developed CREW-related tactics, techniques, and procedures. Task Force ODIN (observe, detect, identify, and neutralize) was an Army aviation battalion in Iraq that flew the MQ-1B Warrior-Alpha unmanned aerial vehicle to provide reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) against insurgents using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The range of materiel solutions that the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) fielded is extraordinary—aerostats, explosives detectors, electronic countermeasures, patrol dogs, ground-penetrating radar, robots, personnel protective equipment, optics, mine rollers—and reflects the variability and unpredictability of the IED threat.

<sup>2</sup>Ian Jones, *Malice Aforethought: A History of Booby Traps from World War One to Vietnam* (London: Greenhill Books, 2004), 33.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, 226.

<sup>4</sup>General Staff (Intelligence) General Headquarters (GHQ), *German Ruses* (1<sup>st</sup> Printing Co., R.E., GHQ, April 8, 1917), available at <<http://museumvictoria.com.au/collections/items/1955526/document-german-ruses-13th-australian-field-ambulance-world-war-i-1914-1918>>.

<sup>5</sup>Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, November 8, 2010, as amended through March 15, 2015), s.v. “improvised explosive device.”

<sup>6</sup>Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 192.

<sup>7</sup>Stanley A. McChrystal, *My Share of the Task: A Memoir* (New York: Penguin Group, 2013), 252.

<sup>8</sup>Jones, 45.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 227.

<sup>10</sup>MCIP 3-17.02, *MAGTF* [Marine

## Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision (to be signed within 6 months)

JP 1-04, *Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation*

JP 1-06, *Financial Management Support in Joint Operations*

JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence*

JP 3-13.3, *Operations Security*

JP 3-14, *Space Operations*

JP 3-34, *Engineer Operations*

JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*

JP 4-01.2, *Sealift Support to Joint Operations*

JP 4-01.5, *Joint Terminal Operations*

JP 4-01.6, *Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore*

JP 4-03, *Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water*

## JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months)

JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*

JP 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*

JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*

JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*

JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*

Air-Ground Task Force] *Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, November 14, 2012), 4–5.

<sup>11</sup>Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-43, *Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam, 1969, Special Issue, Mines and Boobytraps*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, July 20, 1989), 3.

<sup>12</sup>Jones, 229.

<sup>13</sup>MCIP 3-17.02, figure 1-1.

<sup>14</sup>Jones, 47.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, 167.

<sup>16</sup>FMFRP 12-43, 66.

<sup>17</sup>James Pelkofski, “Before the Storm: al Qaeda’s Coming Maritime Campaign,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 131, no. 12 (December 2005), 20–24.

<sup>18</sup>Paul Huard, “Viet Cong Commandos Sank an American Aircraft Carrier,” *Medium.com*, available at <<https://medium.com/war-is-boring/viet-cong-commandos-sank-an-american-aircraft-carrier-7f243ede06b3>>.

<sup>19</sup>Brigadier General Barbara Fast, C2, CJTF7, for Defense Intelligence Agency, through Commander JCMEC, memorandum, *Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell*, October 23, 2003.

<sup>20</sup>JP 1-02, s.v. “weapons technical intelligence.”

<sup>21</sup>Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), *Weapons Technical Intelligence Handbook*, Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: DIA and JIEDDO, March 2014), 4.

<sup>22</sup>*Combat information* is “unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user’s tactical intelligence requirements.” JP 1-02, s.v. “combat information.”

<sup>23</sup>U.S. Department of Justice, “Former Iraqi Terrorists Living in Kentucky Sentenced for Terrorist Activities,” available at <[www.fbi.gov/louisville/press-releases/2013/former-iraqi-terrorists-living-in-kentucky-sentenced-for-terrorist-activities](http://www.fbi.gov/louisville/press-releases/2013/former-iraqi-terrorists-living-in-kentucky-sentenced-for-terrorist-activities)>. In another recent incident, a London taxi driver’s fingerprints linked him to an IED that killed a U.S. Soldier in Iraq. Laura Perez Maestro and Don Melvin, “British Man Found Guilty in U.S. Soldier’s Death in Iraq,” *CNN.com*, available at <[www.cnn.com/2015/05/21/world/briton-guilty-u-s-soldier-death/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/21/world/briton-guilty-u-s-soldier-death/index.html)>.

<sup>24</sup>Laqueur, 139.