


Cooperation are not conducive, nor comprehensive enough, to tackle the contemporary realities necessitating changes to the international system. This is a challenge for statesmen going forward: revise the world order arrangement or face a fragmented dysfunctional world.

Over the years much has been written regarding the theme of this book. Kissinger's breadth, depth, and astute understanding of the subject matter are beyond reproach and vividly displayed throughout the book. No other author has ever accomplished such a comprehensive feat in such a judicious and finely distinct way. The historical context that only he can provide is evident with a nuanced flavor that is as readable as it is enlightening. It is readily apparent he brings to bear his entire professional experience in writing this fine addition to his seminal body of work.

The book is a must-read by political science, international diplomacy/relations, public administration, and strategic studies students and scholars, as well as government officials, foreign policy designers, and military leaders. It is also relevant to historians and those with a general interest in the history of states and international diplomacy. JFQ

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Russia and the Relationship Between Law and Power

By James P. Terry
Carolina Academic Press, 2014
188 pp. \$27
ISBN: 978-1611635959

Reviewed by Alice A. Booher

Winston Churchill stated, “Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” James Terry patiently peels away each of those layers to hypothesize an unrelenting consistency and prevailing logic to Russian behavior as it seeks power, for myriad reasons, over those who dwell within and without its self-defined boundaries. The release of this compact yet intricate work by Dr. Terry, addressing the long and convoluted history of Russia and its recurrent international “habits,” could not be timelier in multiple contexts.

The timeframe is inclusive of the post-Yalta Soviet Union through 2008, with cogent collateral references to subsequent behaviors. There is a thorough analysis of the Russian vocalized rationalizations versus actions (legal and otherwise) vis-à-vis Afghanistan (which remains in a class by itself), as well as Hungary,

Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Chechnya, and Georgia. Terry's salient analyses are primarily twofold: first, directed to the Russian forward propulsion of military, economic, political, and cultural decisions through creative interpretation of one or more provisions of already existing legal documents ranging from Geneva Conventions to the United Nations Charter to the Warsaw Pact; and second, in those instances where the reasons proffered for Russian actions were defined in the context of reinvented so-called inherent national interests as the result of its citizens in that territory.

For instance, in discussing the 2008 Russian dealings with the government of Georgia, Terry identifies the prophetically strong message, now heard in its greatest cacophony in Ukraine, that those areas with significant Russian populations “would be viewed as squarely within Moscow's sphere of influence, and be protected.” He further observes that the current events in locations such as Ukraine and perhaps elsewhere were and are probably inevitable given the ongoing and expanding Russian “leasing” and/or other control of ports including Sevastopol, part of the ever-expanding spectrum of exigencies that offer inexorable opportunities to further exercise and perfect a decidedly idiosyncratic reading of the international rights to self-defense.

Although all segments of the book are valuable in delineating the Russian machinations and explanations often after the fact with their purported supporting legalities, Terry has done an equally articulate job in his longest and shortest chapters discussing the situations in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Lithuania in 1990, respectively.


In the former instance, having obvious problems with but not altering its basic premises from the earlier Hungarian intervention episode, Russian justifications for its behavior in Czechoslovakia would eventually run a legal gamut, none with permanent potent efficacy. Terry's detailed explanation of how that evolved both factually and legally illuminates not only the specifics but also the nature of the Russian thought process.

As for the discussion relating to Lithuania, Terry notes that as one of the 14 Soviet Republics and autonomous regions to make the claim of independence from Moscow under “perestroika” in March 1990, the Baltic states most clearly met the criteria for self-determination established by international law affirmed by many including the then–Soviet Union, but that did not deter repeated threats and actions to the contrary. The decades-long struggle of Lithuania, although unique, illustrates a conundrum in international law, the weighing of protections for states versus peoples, and not exclusively in the realm of human rights.

In finite examples, Dr. Terry has demonstrated that Russia may now call itself a democracy, but unlike a rose which by any other name may smell as sweet, an oligarchy by any other name does not expand a leadership to more than merely a few. The individual country “crises” described herein are not all inclusive, of course, but as Terry sums up, provide a realistic guide for assessing the overall Russian approach to international legal commitments.

It is easy to concur with the foreword by eminent scholar John Norton Moore that “this is not a quick survey of Soviet/Russian uses of force, but rather an extraordinarily deep presentation and analysis of each. This important book also has crucial insights into the future of United States/Russian foreign relations. It is a must-read for those focused on international relations.” JFQ

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The Most Dangerous Man in America: The Making of Douglas MacArthur

By Mark Perry
Basic Books, 2014
380 pp. \$29.99
ISBN 978-0465013289

Reviewed by Francis P. Sempa

Douglas MacArthur and Franklin Roosevelt first met in 1916 when both were involved in planning prewar mobilization for the Woodrow Wilson administration. Two years later, MacArthur was commanding the Rainbow Division in France where he earned seven Silver Stars for courage and bravery in leading his troops in battle against the Germans, while Roosevelt was serving as President Wilson’s assistant Secretary of the Navy. When Roosevelt became President in 1933, MacArthur was the Army’s chief of staff (having been appointed by President Herbert Hoover). Roosevelt, mainly for political reasons, extended MacArthur’s term as Army chief of staff, but the two repeatedly clashed over budget matters. During World War II, Roosevelt as commander in chief

selected MacArthur to lead the U.S. war effort in the Southwest Pacific.

The story of this fascinating relationship between two of the giants of the 20th century is the subject of Mark Perry’s book. The title comes from a remark Roosevelt reportedly made to one of his aides early in his Presidency. When the aide suggested that Louisiana’s Senator Huey Long was the most dangerous man in America, Roosevelt said no, Douglas MacArthur was. Perry credits Roosevelt with “taming” MacArthur’s worst instincts and characteristics and skillfully using this most talented commander to help win the war in the Pacific.

Perry’s book covers familiar ground: MacArthur’s early defeats in the Philippines, his daring escape to Australia and famous pledge to return to liberate the Philippines, his frequent clashes with Washington and the Navy over war strategy and the allocation of resources, and his innovative strategy during the Southwest Pacific campaign where he brilliantly used land, sea, and air forces jointly to bypass Japanese strongholds during the New Guinea campaign.

Perry describes in great detail the formulation and implementation of MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific strategy. From the defense of Australia and Port Moresby to the New Guinea offensive, and on to the recapture of the Philippines, Perry shows MacArthur at his best—waging a war of maneuver where possible that integrated all aspects of military power to achieve relatively economical (in terms of human costs) victories. It involved, writes Perry, “a series of combined arms operations involving dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of soldiers, whose movements would be coordinated over thousands of miles of ocean” (p. 230). In Operation *Cartwheel*, which focused on eliminating the Japanese stronghold of Rabaul, MacArthur, in Perry’s judgment, “coordinated the most successful air, land, and sea campaign in the history of warfare” (p. 354).

MacArthur’s success was due in part to his selection of and his reliance on first-rate subordinate commanders, such as the Airman George Kenney, Admiral