

Joint Force Development Vision: Adapting to New and Future Realities

By GEORGE J. FLYNN

It's clear we have work to finish in the current conflicts and it should be just as clear that we have work to do in preparing for an uncertain future. Our work must result in a joint force that is responsive, decisive, versatile, interdependent, and affordable.

—General Martin E. Dempsey to the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 26, 2011

On August 31, 2011, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) was disestablished—the first disestablishment of a combat command. As part of the USJFCOM disestablishment, the execution of key joint force development functions (joint training, education, doctrine, lessons learned, and concept development and experimentation) was realigned to the Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development (J7). This action was designed to improve the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of joint force development functions by bringing these core responsibilities directly under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After a decade of persistent conflict, we are presented with an opportunity to reflect upon what was done well and what can be improved, and incorporate that learning into our current and future development efforts. Our success in the future requires a joint force that is more adaptable and responsive than our adversaries, as well as one that is able to respond rapidly and decisively to the broad array of irregular and conventional challenges.

To guide this effort on behalf of the Chairman, the J7 director was tasked to lead the joint force development process.

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Joint Force Development Authorities

Each of the Services organizes, trains, and equips to bring its own unique capabilities to the fight. While these Service capabilities provide the foundation of our warfighting capability, it is the integration and interdependence of these capabilities that achieve jointness and exponentially multiply the value that each alone brings to the fight. Jointness is not automatic; it must be nurtured and continually updated through integrated joint force development activities to provide relevant capabilities that are responsive to the security environment. Joint force development comprises joint training,

doctrine, education, lessons learned, and concept development and experimentation.

As mandated in Title 10, U.S. Code, the Chairman is responsible for providing planning, advice, and policy formulation for key joint force development functions, such as doctrine, training, and education.¹ The functions of lessons learned, concept development, and experimentation are key to supporting joint force development activities. With the disestablishment of USJFCOM, the Chairman now directly oversees the execution of these key functions.



Soldier searches building under construction in Baghdad enabling withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq

(John S. Laughter/U.S. Army)

Directorate for Joint Force Development

Leveraging the Chairman’s statutory responsibilities, the J7 leads the effort to develop an adaptable and responsive joint force capable of confronting the wide range of future challenges—those that will arise tomorrow, and those that will arise in 2020.

In light of current fiscal constraints, balancing resources between current and future needs will be more challenging, but it is all the more important to get it right. The

future joint force must be able to operate across the full spectrum of operations in both a supported and a supporting role. We will anticipate the future security environment and adapt accordingly because we know our adversaries will seek to engage us where we are weakest, exploiting any capability gaps that might exist.

Each of the joint force development functions must deliver results both independently and together in order to produce a trained, adaptable, and responsive joint

force of today and the joint force of 2020. In concert with the Chairman’s guidance, the following objectives provide the primary means of directing and aligning joint force development.

Training. The J7 is responsible to the Chairman for the content of joint training policies, policy guidance to improve joint force readiness, management of joint exercise and engagement funds for the combatant commands and Services, and provision and support of a continuum of integrated individ-


Understanding the Why, How, and What of Joint Force Development

Why does the J7 mission exist? Jointness is at its core. Each of the Services organizes, trains, and equips to bring its own unique capabilities to the fight. It is the integration of these Service capabilities that is the foundation of our warfighting capability. Jointness is not automatic; it is maintained and advanced through continuous joint force development efforts.

How the J7 maintains and advances jointness is through the joint force development cycle. It is iterative, constant, and inclusive. It does not rest. Our joint warfighting capability is *improved* through the exploration of concepts validated by rigorous experimentation. It is *sustained* through relevant joint doctrine, education, training, and exercises. New capability is *discovered* through the collection and exploration of lessons learned—that is, best practices from the field that are rapidly integrated into collections of joint knowledge such as doctrine and learning programs. It is discovered through active scouting—capitalizing and exploiting innovative opportunities and developments occurring inside and outside of the military community. Finally, joint warfighting capability is *created* through the codification of best practices into joint doctrine; the dissemination of tactical, operational, and strategic lessons learned; and a comprehensive education program that produces strategic joint thinkers and leaders for today and tomorrow.

What we produce is the trained, adaptable, and responsive joint force of today—and the joint force of 2020.

Joint Doctrine



*Graphic adapted from Simon Sinek, *Start with Why* (New York: Penguin, 2009).



Airmen lock down AIM-120 missile on F-15 Eagle during load crew competition at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada

(Daniel Hughes/U.S. Air Force)

ual, staff, and collective training and senior leader education.² Our programs of training and exercises will continually challenge and improve an experienced force, maintaining readiness for today and tomorrow. Training will ingrain in the force the lessons learned from the last decade of warfare. We will maintain interoperability with our coalition and interagency partners. Most importantly, training will continue to adapt to prepare the force for tomorrow's challenges.

Education. The J7 is responsible for developing the policies governing officer and enlisted joint professional military education (JPME) and for National Defense University, the Chairman's University.³ Our joint education system will promote the knowledge, skills, attributes, and behaviors of the joint force that define our profession of arms, keeping leadership as the foundation. It will produce leaders at every echelon who possess the ability to think strategically, critically, and jointly.

Doctrine. The J7 is responsible for the content of joint publications and for managing the joint doctrine development process.⁴ Doctrine must be accessible to all and relevant to the challenges faced by the joint force commander today and in the future. It will reflect

proven principles and best practices but will be responsive to changes from lessons learned and validated concepts. Joint doctrine will codify the values of the profession of arms.

Lessons Learned. The J7 develops joint lessons learned policy and guidance and provides active lessons and analytical support to the Chairman, Joint Staff, combatant commanders, and joint warfighter throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations and exercises. The J7 oversees teams that deploy worldwide to collect, analyze, aggregate, and disseminate joint lessons and best practices across the full spectrum of military operations.⁵

Our lessons learned process will achieve greater effectiveness in identifying lessons and making these collected best practices available to the entire force. Furthermore, we will ensure that we have actually learned those lessons by evaluating how they have been integrated into our joint warfighting capability through a rigorous exercise program.

Concept Development and Experimentation. The J7 leads the development, assessment, and transition of joint capabilities, filling gaps identified by the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, and combatant commanders. The purpose of the program is to

develop conceptual solutions to expected challenges faced by combatant commanders or Service chiefs and then evaluate those potential solutions through joint experimentation. Validated solutions lead to the development and fielding of joint warfighter capabilities.⁶ Concept development will focus on how the joint force can operate more effectively and guide change by developing new joint operating methods, again validated by experimentation, leading to substantive changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. Comprehensive concept development and experimentation enable us to consider future challenges and prepare for them before they are upon us. Nonmateriel solution development and transition will be a key part of future warfighting capabilities. Nonmateriel solutions allow us to get the most out of our ideas, people, and fielded capabilities in a fiscally constrained environment. The J7 will be the advocate for nonmateriel solutions in the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS).

We cannot afford to lose the jointness we have achieved. To fulfill this role, the J7 will remain organized for mission success and enabled by authorities consistent with its

responsibilities. Unity of effort, both internally and with our partners in the force development community, increases our impact and effectiveness significantly.

Chairman's Guidance

The Chairman's intent is a balanced management of today's and tomorrow's requirements, highlighting opportunities rather than obstacles. Simplification of the staff organization and processes to achieve innovation is critical to providing the responsiveness needed to push jointness deeper, sooner. As the Chairman's principal steward of jointness, the J7 director is charged with executing four immediate tasks:

- make concept development and experimentation relevant to building joint force 2020
- develop a comprehensive plan to promote the knowledge, skills, attributes, and behaviors that define our profession of arms
- make sure we learn the lessons of the last decade of war and correctly apply them to future conflicts
- lead a reexamination of joint professional military education.

Joint Force Development Way Ahead

The future is fraught with complex challenges ranging from dynamic adversaries to resource constraints. To achieve the Chairman's intent and execute the functions of joint force development, we must adopt a business model founded on innovation and collaboration. We must recognize that what works today will not withstand the force of change.

The J7 is on course, having published a 90-day plan that initiates an examination of business processes, requirements, resources, and outputs for each of the J7 functional areas. The plan articulates individual and collective objectives with the ultimate goal of unifying the different functions into one iterative, deliberate, and continuous joint force development cycle.

Experience gained over the last decade of active joint combat must be captured and included in future exercises and training. The force must be prepared to operate in dynamic and complex threat environments that include a robust cyber threat. Increased use of special operations forces and the principles of mission command must also be emphasized in future training events and exercises. The high level of

coalition and interagency support in rehearsal exercises and operations must be maintained and incorporated into exercises, training, and JPME. Increased collaboration with key coalition and interagency partners is ongoing to ensure that the training environment adequately replicates the interoperability challenges and complexity faced in operational deployments. Critical decisions are necessary to prioritize limited resources for these important events.

Joint doctrine, education, and lessons learned continue to evolve in a dynamic manner to ensure relevant knowledge, skills, attributes, and behaviors within the joint force. A plan that promotes our profession of arms will form the foundation of joint and Service education programs. Development of electronic collection systems is ongoing to streamline lessons learned to ease collection, storage, analysis, and dissemination. Compiling the lessons learned process under a single Web-based system will ease use and enable rapid, accurate data retrieval for incorporation into planning processes. A joint doctrine application is under development to enable rapid access and searching of joint



Navy shooter mirrors trainer to launch F/A-18F aboard USS Enterprise

(Jared M. King/U.S. Navy)



Marine M777 howitzer kicks rocks and dust during fire mission

publications. JPME programs and institutions are under constant review to improve effectiveness, measured against creation of the required capabilities in individuals and units toward joint force 2020.

As the defense budget becomes smaller, nonmateriel solutions are critical to fill warfighter capability gaps. A revision to the formal Defense Department process that defines acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense programs—JCIDS—will drive nonmaterial solution importance and increase the J7 director's role as the nonmateriel advocate. These include requiring a J7 director's nonmateriel endorsement to all documents staffed to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and injecting the J7 director's involvement at acquisition milestones A, B, and C.

Conclusion

The J7 cannot miss this opportunity to make a difference. Across all functions, joint force development will implement practices and processes that are adaptable and responsive; eliminate stovepipes that impede change and relevance; and work together to achieve more synergy in efforts and results within the J7 itself and the Services, coalition partners, interagency partners, and other organizations that play a role in force development. It will advocate adaptability and responsiveness as the core capabilities that will enable the joint force to confront the complexity of future challenges. The J7 endstate is a joint force development process that does not rest; is integrated, leaner, and focused on results; and

produces operationally relevant solutions to meet the needs of the joint warfighter—today and in 2020. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹“Chairman: Functions,” Title 10 U.S. Code, § 153.

²As described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3500.01 Series, “Joint Training Policy and Guidance”; CJCS Memorandum (CJCSM) 3500.03 Series, “Joint Training Manual”; Department of Defense Directive 1322.18, “Military Training”; CJCSI 3511.01 Series, “Joint Exercise Transportation Program”; CJCSI 7401.01 Series, “Combatant Commander Initiatives Fund”; CJCSI 3500.XX, “Chairman’s Exercise Program.”

³As described in CJCSI 1800.01D, “Officer PME Policy”; CJCSI 1805.01A, “Enlisted PME Policy”; CJCSI 1801.01C, “National Defense University Policy.”

⁴As described in CJCSI 5120.02B, “Joint Doctrine Development System”; CJCSM 5120.01, “Joint Doctrine Development Process”; CJCSI 5705.01D, “Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology”; CJCSI 2700.01, “Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability.”

⁵In accordance with: CJCSI 3150.25, “The Joint Lessons Learned Program,” October 10, 2008 (under revision); CJCSM 3150.25, “The Joint Lessons Learned Program,” February 15, 2011.

⁶In accordance with CJCSI 3010.02C, “Draft—Joint Operations Concept Development Process”; CJCSI 3100.01B, “The Joint Strategic Planning System.”

JPs Under Revision

- JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*
- JP 1-06, *Financial Management Support in Joint Operations*
- JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*
- JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*
- JP 2-03, *Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*
- JP 3-00.1, *Strategic Communication*
- JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*
- JP 3-04, *Joint Shipboard Helicopter Operations*
- JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*
- JP 3-07.4, *Counterdrug Operations*
- JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments*
- JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*
- JP 3-13, *Information Operations*
- JP 3-13.1, *Electronic Warfare*
- JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations (PSYOPS)*
- JP 3-13.3, *Operations Security*
- JP 3-13.4, *Military Deception*
- JP 3-15.1, *Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations (C-IED)*
- JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*
- JP 3-18, *Forcible Entry Operations*
- JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*
- JP 3-28, *Civil Support*
- JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*
- JP 3-32, *Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations*
- JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*
- JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*
- JP 3-40, *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*
- JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management*
- JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*
- JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*
- JP 3-59, *Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations*
- JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*
- JP 3-63, *Detainee Operations*
- JP 3-72, *Nuclear Operations*
- JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*
- JP 4-01, *The Defense Transportation System*
- JP 4-01.2, *Sealift Support to Joint Operations*
- JP 4-01.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Transportation Terminal Operations*
- JP 4-01.6, *Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS)*
- JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*
- JP 4-08, *Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations*
- JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*
- JP 6-01, *Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO)*

JPs Revised (last 6 months)

- JP 1-0, *Personnel Support to Joint Operations*
- JP 1-04, *Legal Support to Military Operations*
- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*
- JP 3-03, *Joint Interdiction*
- JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*
- JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*
- JP 3-15, *Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations*
- JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*
- JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs*
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*

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
for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs



The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

By David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders

The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically, despite each country's power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. A clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains—nuclear, space, and cyber—can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. David Gompert and Phillip Saunders assess the prospect of U.S.-Chinese competition in these domains and recommend that the United States propose a comprehensive approach based on mutual restraint whereby it and China can mitigate their growing strategic vulnerabilities. This mutual restraint regime may not take the form of binding treaties, but patterns of understanding and restraint may be enough to maintain stability.



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PRISM

A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations

PRISM begins its third year with a solid line-up of provocative articles. David Ucko opens "Features" with a look at counterinsurgency *after* Afghanistan, noting that the concept has undergone a rapid rise and now decline. Next, Thomas Pickering examines the prospect of negotiations in Afghanistan, asking three hard questions: *when, with whom, and about what* should we negotiate? The remaining feature authors take rigorous approaches as well: Renanah Miles on the flawed mandate for stabilization and reconstruction; Brian Burton on perils of the indirect approach; Paul Miller on fixing failed states; Amitai Etzioni on a problematical "Marshall Plan for the Middle East"; Birame Diop on Sub-Saharan military activities; and Kenneth McKenzie and Elizabeth Packard on military-to-military partnerships in light of the Arab Spring. In the Special Feature, Frank Rusagara looks at nontraditional roles for the Armed Forces and the crisis in Rwanda. "From the Field" author John Bessler examines the difficult operations in a remote district of Afghanistan as a "tragedy of policy and action in three acts." Bradford Baylor et al. in "Lessons Learned" present a case study of the challenges faced by the United States in Iraq from 2007 to 2010. Finally, Pauline Baker reviews Stewart Patrick's *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security* (Oxford University Press, 2011).

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