Afghan Border Police wait to receive certificates of completion for training in entry-control points, road blocks, vehicle maintenance, and infantry patrol

Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level

A Rejoinder to Volney F. Warner and "C"

By CHRISTOPHER D. KOLENDA

The editor of *Joint Force Quarterly* asked me to respond to the thought-provoking interview conducted by General Volney F. Warner with "C." I do so as a Soldier serving in Afghanistan. The sentiments here are entirely my own and should not be attributed in any way to the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Initial Observations

C argues that "we need to bring our Afghan enterprise to a close quickly and in a manner that gives some hope of future stability without further alienating the Afghans." In so doing, we must deny recruits to terrorist organizations and destroy those aligned with them. I could not agree more, in principle.

The assessment of the problem and the prescriptions for the way ahead, however, are where we differ.

C characterizes Afghanistan as a country in the sense of real estate but not as a nation. The confederations of tribes, notions of identity that center on the family, and desires for local autonomy make Afghanistan unworkable as a state in any modern sense. State- or nationbuilding, therefore, is a futile enterprise. Afghans do not want a government and resist any attempt to impose one upon them.

Counterinsurgency, therefore, is the wrong approach—particularly the "population-centric" type that C equates with

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"feed your enemy and kiss his kids and he'll be yours for life." The conflict is more civil war than insurgency. U.S. forces are seen as occupiers, similar to the Soviets. Afghans, he asserts, want us out; but they will take our money to build facilities in their villages.

C recommends a counterterror (CT) approach, combined with a focus by current U.S. forces on the ground to "secure the Afghan eastern border" against Taliban invasion from Pakistan and to provide population security by eliminating militants. A psychological operations campaign should explain why we are in Afghanistan, counter Wahhabist spin, and state our intent to "decimate" al Qaeda and its supporters.

The CT approach, coupled with reliance on tribal strongmen, is becoming in vogue among those frustrated with the state of our efforts in Afghanistan, and who look for a less costly solution to securing our interests. These sentiments are entirely appropriate and should be debated fully.

Questions

A number of problematic assumptions and tensions exist within this argument that deserve exploration. First of all, is Afghanistan truly ungovernable, or must it be governed in an Afghan way? Afghan history from the 1930s through the early 1970s suggests a reasonable degree of governance is entirely possible.

Second, does one's identity as a Sukdari clan, Kom tribe, or Nuristani, for instance, exclude identity as an Afghan? Or can one hold *several* identities at once? If not, where does the exclusion begin—between clan and tribe, between tribe and ethnicity, or between ethnicity and national identity? To argue that one's identity can be the first three and not the last is tenuous at best. Afghans I know have little problem holding multiple circles of identities—not unlike most Americans. According to the International Republican Institute survey released on June 16, 2009, 78 percent of respondents considered themselves "Afghan" first.[1] While individual surveys should be used with great caution, identity remains an interesting theme for additional analysis.

What evidence do we have that the insurgent forces invade from Pakistan rather than being resident within Afghanistan itself? If protecting the population means that we must target and destroy Taliban militants, and we have been doing just that for the past 8 years, why is violence rising? Will doing more of the same really lead to a successful outcome? Can we truly kill our way out of this?

Is government by warlords or tribal strongmen actually feasible in Afghanistan? Afghans *roundly reject* warlord empowerment. The Taliban, in fact, received tribal support against them in the 1990s after years of civil war. They do not want to see a return to those times. Community leaders remain alienated from the culture of "commanderism," repression, and criminality that threatens both their ways of life and hopes for the future. Thirty years of warfare and social atomization have crippled the large traditional structures so badly that rule by tribal strongmen is no longer possible. But certainly the governance that will work in Afghanistan must be one that enfranchises, builds on, and adapts traditional systems in appropriate ways.

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Is a CT approach feasible without basic law enforcement, governance, and security institutions, or is it just another example of playing "whack-a-mole" to no enduring effect? If we counter Wahhabist "spin," will that have any effect in Afghanistan? The Taliban are, in fact, Deobandi Hanafis—not Wahhabis—as someone with C's experience should know. And he should also know that Hanafis generally do not enroll in Wahhabi madrassas. Nonetheless, supporting moderate madrassas inside Afghanistan as alternatives is critically important.

Many Afghanistans

Like C, I have grown to love the Afghan people, having spent the better part of the past 2½ years in-country working closely with elders and villagers. That I see things differently than C is not surprising. There are *many* Afghanistans—the rich tapestry of the society and culture conveys different meanings to different observers depending on their perspectives, biases, and agendas. Too often, observers see the Afghanistan they *want* to see and ignore the others that do not conform. This complexity is part of what makes Afghanistan so fascinatingly difficult and so potentially perilous. Afghanistan is one place where the so-called wisdom of crowds can help strate-gists and policymakers come to conclusions and recommendations that are about right, and avoid those that are desperately wrong. This is likely part of the reason General Stanley McChrystal brought so many diverse voices to his initial assessment.

Coming to a reasonable degree of understanding of the complexity is critical. To paraphrase Carl von Clausewitz, the most important determination that a strategist must make is to understand the *nature* of the war—not mistaking it for or attempting to turn it into something alien to its nature.

The emerging "CT plus tribal warlords equals victory" (or good enough) thesis needs to be carefully examined. Analysis of social, economic, and political dimensions of the conflict illustrates that such an argument is dangerously misguided.

Brief Thoughts on the War

Afghanistan is beset by five destabilizing and mutually reinforcing factors: (1) localized violence, struggles for power, and social unrest fomented by indigenous militants who are exploited by (2) larger insurgent groups whose senior leadership resides in Pakistan, such as the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and the Haqqani network that are enabled by (3) al Qaeda and affiliated with transnational terrorist networks, all supported and sustained by (4) narcotrafficking, criminality, smuggling, and international financiers. These four symptomatic factors coexist within an ongoing (5) socioeconomic upheaval and political disaffection that form the root causes of attraction to insurgency.

Until recently, our approach in Afghanistan focused primarily on directly targeting enemy leadership and building capacity from the top down, with increasingly mixed results. We have not invested as deliberately in addressing the root causes of a growing insurgency. Too often, we have left the arena of the people wide open to extremist influence. We have cleared without holding and building. Kinetic strikes, although disruptive, are ably spun by insurgent information networks, driving negative feedback that often creates more militants while expanding sanctuary. Despite 8 years of individually effective tactical actions, levels of violence have increased and the insurgencies have strengthened. We are not winning the decisive battles for the sentiments and perceptions of local communities.

Root Causes

The socioeconomic dislocation and political disaffection over the past 30 years of violence have created conditions ripe for insurgent activity. Pashtun society has fragmented; the fabric of village and tribal life is unraveling. Inter- and intra-tribal conflicts abound and are exacerbated by the insurgents. Economic deprivation creates vast unemployment outside the subsistence farm. Roughly 80 percent of the population is illiterate in rural areas. Many seek social and economic opportunities and outlets for addressing political grievances by joining insurgent groups; others are forced to choose. Poverty and disenfranchisement are guaranteed in the status quo.

While specifics varied greatly from tribe to tribe and clan to clan, in traditional stratified Pashtun society powerful families

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formed tribal elites that governed local affairs, much as C suggests. The maliks, mullahs, and malims (tribal elders, religious leaders, and teachers, respectively) controlled the politics, religion, and education of village and tribal life. The poor remained subsistence farmers with little social or economic opportunity.

After 30 years of conflict, an economy has developed in which money is exchanged for fighting. Violence has created the most viable path to social and economic mobility and political influence. Those who prove skilled and demonstrate leadership qualities can advance in the ranks, increase their local power, and grow wealthy. Many insurgent leaders are from traditionally poor families who would otherwise have remained outside the local governing structures.

At the risk of historical anachronism, it is fair to say that an element of class warfare forms an important subtext to the insurgencies. The rise of this violent, well-funded warrior middle class has attracted the poor while undermining traditional tribal aristocracy. As one elder stated, "The big rocks become little rocks, and the little rocks become big rocks."

A peaceful middle class cannot develop within the violent social, economic, and political dysfunction. Poor and uneducated boys grow up to be young men with little vision for building their communities. Those who show promise attend extremist madrassas and become radicalized, or they escape to larger cities for school or work and rarely return.

The lack of functional, credible, and accountable governance adds to the frustration. Corrupt officials, protected from accountability by political benefactors, exploit the population and extort aid and development dollars for their own ends while the people see no benefit in return. These socioeconomic and political upheavals incubate violent extremism, providing the necessary conditions in which insurgent and terror groups can grow and thrive.

U.S. Soldiers patrol near Forward Operating Base Baylough, Zabul Province

U.S. Army (Tia P. Sokimson)

Insurgent Social Strategy

The various insurgencies are not held together by a coherent political ideology or compelling theory of social organization that attracts broad popular support. Instead, the insurgencies gain coherence through "negative integration"—they are defined more by a sense of common enemy rather than common vision. Their military efforts during the so-called fighting season mask the more important year-round efforts in governance, propaganda, and social control.

The more subtle—and more powerful—component of their strategy is the effort to exacerbate social atomization by gaining

control of the youth, carefully undermining the traditional authority figures, and using money and violence to retain popular control. The collapse of social cohesion is the Taliban's most powerful enabler. And their operations and methods are deliberately designed to exacerbate it.

Insurgent leaders play on the lack of economic opportunity, local feuds and grievances, resentment of outsiders (even Afghan officials are deemed to be outsiders), and religious and warrior narratives to attract young men. Extremist madrassas, training camps, and group dynamics strengthen identity.

Insurgent and terrorist leaders, meanwhile, subtly undermine traditional authority. They are careful not to openly challenge the control of the elders in the early stages until they gain a critical mass of popular control. Most elders do not support radicalism and retain the belief that they control their people. They often see the government and foreign counterinsurgents as a greater threat to their power and control than the local radicals, and will often passively support insurgent activity against the government to retain power. Over time, they grow increasingly incapable of competing with the radicals, but rarely detect the threat until it is too late. The insurgent leaders are well positioned to intimidate—or eliminate—elders who resist.

As the social strategy comes to fruition, charismatic radical leaders use violence

to secure their positions and deny competing forms of opportunity. Supported by armed enforcers, these leaders assert their authority in decisions affecting everyday village life. They use informal justice systems, for instance, to rapidly adjudicate land disputes and violations of social norms. They control movement and collect taxes through checkpoints. Although it is not

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popular, enough find harsh yet predictable justice preferable to the chaotic incompetence of untrustworthy government officials and constant, unpredictable violence. The poor, moreover, can be attracted to this system of justice because their rights are upheld against former powerbrokers and tribal elites.

Afghan children play in classroom, Wardak Province

The larger insurgent groups work from the bottom up to gain power and destabilize the government. They appropriate local militants and connect them into a larger geographic framework to build both sanctuary and control of the population. In Afghanistan, they expect ongoing violence will exhaust the government and counterinsurgents. When foreign forces leave, the insurgents expect the government to collapse.

Feedback

The power of this strategy becomes evident as violence escalates despite individually effective coalition tactical actions. In too many areas, the government is seen as an outside and corrupt influence, even an actively predatory force that directly threatens the authority of the elders and fails to serve the people. Perceiving threats to their authority from the coalition/government and the insurgents/local youth, elders naturally assume that they have a better shot at controlling their own people.

Kinetic operations inside villages confirm to most that the greater threat comes from the state and the coalition, not local extremists. The grievous affront taken from the violation of a man's home, damage to his property, and injury or death of members of his family or tribe inspires more radicalization of the youth and more support for the insurgents.

Local developmental projects contracted to "outsiders," which are often seen to benefit government cronies or wealthy businessmen, feed into the same underlying logic. Youth demographics, poor economic opportunity, and social anger enable foot soldiers to be replenished easily and provide a cadre ready for upward mobility if leaders are killed or captured.

Violence, and even poorly executed development, therefore, can enable the Taliban's social strategy if the socioeconomic and political conditions that make an insurgency attractive remain unaddressed. The problem is particularly acute if the actions of the government and coalition are seen as undermining, rather than supporting, the needs and interests of the people. Absent attention to such root causes, our tactics can create reinforcing feedback that undermines the government and the elders while increasing the hold of the radicals.

Problematic Thesis

The collapse of social cohesion and fragmentation of tribal integrity in the Pashtun areas make any silver-bullet solution to govern Afghanistan by tribal strongmen and powerbrokers a dangerous anachronism. Many of these individuals have been included in the government in an attempt to gain support among their populations. The fact that their tribal brethren are still involved in the insurgency speaks volumes about the waning power of the so-called strongmen and powerbrokers.

Although specific areas experience cross-border insurgent movement and attacks, most Afghan insurgents operate not from Pakistan but within a finite distance from their villages and communities. In a Venn diagram with a large circle depicting the community and a smaller circle the insurgents, most of the smaller circle would fit inside the larger one. The limited portion outside the community represents external leaders, supporters, and facilitators. Placing U.S. forces along the border would not only be futile, but it would also further cede population control to the insurgents.

The bottom-up approach to social control militates against stability through a CT-only campaign, or the more conventional approach of protecting the population by killing militants. The Taliban and other insurgent networks generally do not travel about in large formations that present inviting targets to coalition firepower and CT strikes. Most have learned that painful lesson over the past 8 years, so the insurgents have adopted a more subtle approach of violent intimidation, attraction, and population

U.S. Air Force (Ryan Crane)

control. Doing so enables them to hide in plain sight.

The social fragmentation and lack of opportunity combined with the large 18- to 25-year-old demographic makes the attrition strategy that C and others advocate counterproductive. Put simply, we can kill 10 and the insurgents can recruit 10 more. We can kill 100 and the insurgents can recruit 100 more. Attrition simply does not matter when the underlying social, economic, and political logic makes insurgency more attractive than peaceful existence. When kinetic strikes involve civilian casualties or damage to homes and property, insurgent recruiting becomes easier. Simple attrition of militants is a losing battle. Targeting is most effective when insurgent and terror leaderships are isolated from the local population as a complementary effort to the counterinsurgency strategy.

For a CT approach to be truly effective, the state requires a functional security and intelligence apparatus and a basic level of law enforcement. Absent these prerequisites, CT strikes are at best disruptive, at worst counterproductive. A withdrawal of ISAF forces would leave vast swaths of the country under insurgent control. The prospect of sufficient intelligence emanating from such environs to permit precise CT strikes is minimal. Much of the reporting and targeting will almost certainly involve blood feuds and local disputes masked as intelligence, which would ultimately heighten rather than diminish insurgent control.

The administration of Barack Obama rejected a CT approach to Afghanistan during the Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy Review for good reason. The conditions have not changed sufficiently since then to justify the approach as having any strategic merit. Perhaps the person most qualified to understand the capabilities and limitations of the CT approach is General McChrystal; if he thought such an approach would work in Afghanistan, he would have advocated it.

Governance

The notion that Afghans are incapable of forming a government is as false as it is narrow-minded. Afghanistan has always included elements of a mediated state—some periods more than others. As Clare Lockhart, the director of the Institute for State Effectiveness, argued in her September 17, 2009, testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, throughout much of the 20th century

Afghanistan had a reasonable degree of public administration that met the basic expectations of the people. These expectations are not vast and can certainly be met once again.

The current state of weak and bad governance is at the heart of political dissatisfaction, not the existence of government itself. Although several institutions have made significant progress and many national level

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ministers have proven quite capable, the same is not true at the subnational levels where the government meets the people.

Weak governance is the lack of capacity to perform the basic competencies of security, rule of law, and limited services that people expect, such as jobs, education, and health care. Traditional governance systems, such

U.S. Marine Corps (Phillip Elgie)

Men prepare meal for shura attended by members of Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and U.S. Marines in Helmand Province

as village and community shuras (councils), are too often disenfranchised by subnational government officials. The breakdown of social cohesion exacerbates the problem; authoritative councils often do not exist that are capable of resolving local disputes or enforcing basic social contracts. The official system is corrupt and inefficient. The armed justice by local militant leaders is the only functioning system in these communities.

Bad governance—the abuse of power for personal interest—is a greater problem in the eyes of Afghans. Nearly every conversation I have with rural Afghans aligns with myriad surveys and analyses—corruption and abuse of power are at or near the top of themes cited as major drivers of instability.[2] To be sure, if such problems were considered "normal," Afghans would not resent them so much. The

levels of popular discontent suggest powerfully that Afghans view them as antithetical to their expectations.

The discontent with the current state of weak and bad governance does not imply that Afghans reflexively reject government or that Afghanistan is ungovernable. In fact, they suggest the opposite: Afghans expect a responsive and accountable government that meets their basic expectations.

Concept for Success

"What is of supreme importance in war," remarked ancient Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu, "is to attack the enemy's strategy."

To defeat their strategy, we must take from the insurgents what they cannot afford to lose: control of the people. We do so by

addressing the underlying logic that provides the local conditions necessary for the insurgency to fester, while crushing the militants in every fight. There is nothing more demoralizing than getting clobbered for a cause that people no longer support.

We need to combine direct action against hardcore insurgents and terror networks with an indirect approach that targets the sources of their strength. The critical weakness in the insurgents' strategy is their reliance on popular disaffection and their inability to muster public support (the Taliban consistently polls in the single digits). The breakdown in social cohesion, particularly in Pashtun areas, requires mobilization at community rather than tribal levels.

The community level will be decisive—and that support is entirely up for grabs. Communities have been neutral thus far, in part out of a survival psychology that has emerged over the past 30 years. Moreover, the sentiment of many community leaders is that they have not taken a side in this conflict because no one has taken *their* side. As several elders have remarked, "We are robbed by our government, bombed by international forces,

and beaten by the Taliban." The side that mobilizes their support will tip the balance.

Addressing the underlying conditions enables us to earn local support, disaggregate the enemy, and then apply appropriate means to coopt and reintegrate local fighters, while isolating and destroying the ideological hardcore in detail. Effective security, governance, and development that enfranchise local communities are existential threats to the insurgency.

First, the mission must be properly resourced in both military and civilian capabilities. While sufficient numbers alone will not ensure success, insufficient resourcing significantly increases the risk of failure. Just as a poorly trained and prepared force with sufficient numbers is likely to fail, so will a highly trained force with a sound plan that is improperly resourced.

The security force must be of sufficient size to create contiguous security footprints for the population in key geographic areas. The argument that increasing ISAF presence risks a popular backlash against occupation is a well-noted caution, but it is the *style* of the footprint rather than the *size* that matters

most. Afghans know what will happen if we leave before the major insurgent groups no longer pose a threat. Although they do not want foreign forces permanently, they also do not want a return to civil war. While we are there, they want us to act as good guests.

Partnering with and protecting the population must be the focus of ISAF rather than chasing militants. This approach is not, as C suggests, feeding the enemy and kissing his kids. It is the product of a thorough analysis of the nature of the conflict and the requirements to be successful in this culture. Certainly C acts as a good guest with his Afghan hosts. Why should ISAF act any differently?

An ISAF force must also be of sufficient size to partner with an expanded Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). We tried in Iraq to stand down our forces while the Iraqi Security Forces stood up. What we found was the Iraqi forces possessed neither the competence nor the confidence to stand on their own at the beginning. Building ANSF is not a matter of simply cranking out more recruits. Building combat effectiveness and self-reliance will require a partnership in which

Soldier speaks with Afghan woman in Khost Province during Operation *Champion Sword*

U.S. Army (Christopher Nicholas)

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our forces live together on the same outposts, train, plan, and execute operations together, and share information and capabilities. There is no better trainer for an Afghan battalion commander and his staff than an ISAF battalion commander and his staff.

Second, the problems of weak and bad governance must be addressed appropriately, particularly at subnational levels. Effective governance is decisive. We must facilitate the development of governance capacity that serves the interests of people. Until the government is seen as less hostile to those interests, it will never gain trust and respect. Supporting the technical assistance requests by the Afghan Ministry of Finance and increasing the numbers of technical experts at provincial and district levels will help develop basic public administration systems while providing necessary overwatch to ensure accountability. Key sector roadmaps and transparent public finance are necessary com-

ponents of credibility. The government should champion the interests of the poor as its ethos to balance tribal elites and powerbrokers that often remain wedded to benefiting their peers.

Third, the concept of official governance should be expanded by incorporating traditional structures such as village and district shuras to provide an effective check and balance to district officials. The National Solidarity Program Community Development Councils, District Development Assemblies, and similar representative bodies should be expanded into the fabric of the Afghan government. Such efforts to link the central government to local communities and provide local control and responsibility hold the potential to be a self-organizing alternative to local insurgent governance. The combination of local shuras and councils with a government that demonstrates service to all people will begin to provide governance attractive to rural Afghans.

Fourth, increasing access to education, health care, and economic opportunity provides powerful and visible asymmetries that the government can provide and that insurgents cannot match. The government must outperform the insurgents in the delivery of basic services and the fostering of economic opportunity.

Local education is critical in keeping young men under the control of their families and out of Taliban clutches. Educating girls decreases infant mortality and reduces social violence. Young men generally seek permission from their mothers prior to going on jihad. Educated women tend not to give that blessing; young men with viable opportunities tend not to seek it in the first place. The persistent attacks on girls' schools indicate the threat of women's education to the Taliban strategy.

Concurrently, investing locally in infrastructure development, security, governance, and legitimate economic opportunity will bolster community councils in the eyes of their people and give them a reason to support the government. Although big development projects are important, projects controlled and owned by the local population are often more critical to stability and progress. As the Afghans say, "If you sweat for it, you protect it." The National Solidarity Program and Greg Mortenson's Central Asia Institute operate on this principle.

Fifth, active measures must be taken to thwart corruption and abuse of power. Deliv-

ering aid and development funding directly to village and community councils, as programs such as the National Solidarity Program and the National Area Based Development Program do currently, bypasses corrupt officials and ensures all of the money goes directly toward the project. The U.S. Agency for International Development and Commander's Emergency Response Program projects should employ a similar methodology.

Oversight and accountability structures must also be emplaced to protect U.S. assets—our aid and development dollars—from theft or misappropriation by corrupt officials or powerbrokers. That only 10 to 15 percent of aid and development money has local economic impact, while an estimated 40 percent goes back to donor countries in the form of profit and consultant fees, is scandalous.[3]

Finally, effective local dispute resolution mechanisms must be developed that can outmatch the rough justice meted out by extremists. With effective and trusted courts decades away, local shuras and jirgas can provide legitimate alternatives for conflict resolution, provided they serve the poor as well as the local elites.

Winston Churchill famously intoned that Americans generally find the right strategy *after* they have exhausted the alternatives. After 8 years, there *is* a credible strategy for Afghanistan.

Targeting sources of popular disaffection is an important part of the way forward. Doing so alters the socioeconomic and political landscape and provides alternatives to insurgency. Once the population is actively supporting the government and resisting insurgent influence, the effort reaches a tipping point at which we can transition to Afghan-led counterinsurgency with ISAF in overwatch. Special operations forces–led, enemy-centric actions can then finish off isolated insurgent and terrorist leadership without negative feedback. The battle is as much about whom we win over as whom we go after. We need to focus on winning allies as well as destroying enemies.

The Obama administration's strategy and the implementation approach outlined in General McChrystal's initial assessment set the right direction but must be resourced and implemented properly to have the intended effects. Defeating the Taliban's strategy, and preventing the return of al Qaeda to Afghanistan, requires a bottom-up

approach toward governance, security, and development to complement renewed and more effective efforts at the national and subnational levels.

Success in Afghanistan does not require the development of a modern European state. A reasonable degree of security in which insurgents no longer pose an existential threat to the state, and the country can protect its sovereignty, will suffice. Governance needs to meet the basic expectations of people in terms of political enfranchisement, justice, and economic opportunity. This will not be easy. But difficult is not impossible. The administration's strategy and the ISAF plan provide a more plausible range of outcomes that support our national interests than the alternatives. Implementing them stands the best chance of attaining C's well-articulated goal to "bring our Afghan enterprise to a close quickly and in a manner that gives some hope of future stability without further alienating the Afghans," while denying recruits to terrorist organizations and destroying those aligned with them. **JFQ**

NOTES

[1] International Republican Institute (IRI), *Afghanistan Public Opinion Survey*, May 3–16, 2009. Forty-six percent of those surveyed were Pashtuns. Ten percent referred to themselves as Pashtuns first.

[2] Clare Lockhart, testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 17, 2009; Sarah Ladbury, in collaboration with the Co-operation for Peace and Unity, *Drivers of Radicalization, Independent Report for the Department of International Development*, August 14, 2009, 7; Thomas Ruttig, *The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors, and Approaches to "Talks,"* Afghan Analysts Network, July 2009, 2, 6; Gilles Dorronsoro, *The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), 12, 17–19. In the IRI survey released on June 16, 2009, 81 percent of respondents cited corruption as a somewhat serious (26 percent) or very serious (55 percent) problem.

[3] Matt Waldman, *Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,* Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) Advocacy Series (Kabul: ACBAR, March 2008), 5, 11.