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From the Chairman

Working Together: Modern Challenges Need “Whole-of-Nation” Effort

Every morning as I walk to my office at the Pentagon, I pass a corridor that pays tribute to one of our Nation’s finest leaders, General Omar Bradley.

A consummate gentleman and warrior, Bradley played historic leadership roles in World War II and the Korean War and served as the very first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—casting a long shadow for his successors to follow. He also happened to be a superb strategic thinker who thought deeply about how the Nation must marshal its resources—all of them—to overcome its gravest challenges.

Known as “the Soldier’s General,” he intuitively understood the limits of what the Soldiers he loved could—and could not—accomplish alone: “Battles are won by the infantry, the armor, the artillery, and air teams, by soldiers living in the rains and huddling in the snow. But wars are won by the great strength of a nation—the soldier and the civilian working together.”

General Bradley was right. But while many Americans associate his words with the unprecedented national effort the United States dedicated toward winning World War II, those words equally apply to another time of testing in our Nation’s history: the Cold War.

During this 40-year struggle, our Nation mounted a wide-ranging and comprehensive international effort to counter the Soviet Bloc. State Department diplomats, U.S. Agency for International Development administrators, Voice of America broadcasters, and Peace Corps volunteers, among many others, joined in this fight, and, just as importantly, represented America’s promise to the rest of the world.

And although these comprehensive efforts did not guarantee that we would succeed—or that our leadership would get every decision right in our struggle against a tough and determined adversary—they undeniably contributed to our victory in the Cold War. As the Nation approaches its tenth consecutive year at war, General Bradley’s wisdom endures and his words are, quite frankly, worth revisiting.

Today, we are engaged in wars the military will not win alone. Just as we learned in Iraq, we are not going to kill our way to victory in Afghanistan.

In fact, when I contemplate our current and future conflicts, I have concluded that military power should not—maybe cannot—be the last resort of the state. There will certainly be times when the military, because of its flexibility and speed, may be the first, best tool to use. But it should never be the only tool.

More broadly, defense and diplomacy cannot be discrete choices, applied sequentially after the other fails, but rather must complement one another throughout the often complex and messy process of international relations.

And I would argue that in future struggles that involve counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare, we should commit our troops only when other instruments of national power and our allies are ready to engage as well.

Right now, U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military. As President Obama noted in his West Point speech announcing his strategy for Afghanistan, we can’t count on military might alone. We have to strengthen homeland security; we have to improve and better coordinate our intelligence; and we will have to use diplomacy, because no one nation can meet the challenges of an interconnected world acting alone.

This will require investment. Secretaries Clinton and Gates have called for more
funding and more emphasis on our soft power, and I could not agree with them more. Should we choose to exert American influence solely through our troops, we should expect to see that influence diminish in time.

Yet these challenges are not just budgetary; they are institutional. Generating civilian capacity in a war zone for agency employees who had no expectation that they would serve in such a capacity is no easy process. Identifying, training, and placing—and ultimately building—the right leaders for the right place at the right time, over time, will be critical to creating this civilian capacity overseas.

This process will not occur overnight, but we are seeing some progress in our efforts to take a “whole-of-government” approach in Afghanistan. Recently, I visited with the men and women serving at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. These professionals representing the 1,100 U.S. Government civilian employees currently serving in Afghanistan, as well as the 600 Afghan nationals working there, are, like our military, making great efforts and personal sacrifices at an important time in history.

They represent a critical part of our success.

Of course, Iraq and Afghanistan are not the only places where cooperation between civilians and Servicemembers is increasing. Both U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command have demonstrated how integrating non-Department of Defense capacity can improve U.S. Government efforts including disaster response, counternarcotics interdiction, and theater security engagement. The enduring challenges we face don’t merely require a whole-of-government approach—they demand a “whole-of-nation” effort. And transparency, collaboration, and inclusiveness must be our watchwords if we want our long-term success to mirror that of previous generations like General Bradley’s.

As we think about enhancing our whole-of-nation efforts, important questions remain. What are the fundamentals in a campaign? How do we educate and train ourselves to build the capacity for a broad-based national effort? How do we work together before we are in a conflict? How do we plan together?

Many of these answers will come from you, leaders who have returned from Afghanistan and Iraq—leaders both military and civilian who have witnessed our progress and our setbacks. Leaders we need to listen to and learn from.

Because ultimately, the challenges that we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the world in general are not “DOD” issues or “State” issues or even American ones; they are global.

The future includes all of us. And safeguarding that future warrants a comprehensive effort using every instrument of power we have. Sometimes that first, best tool will be our military, but rarely should it serve alone. JFQ

Chairman answers questions during town hall meeting at U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan

Chairman holds shura with Afghan leaders in Marjah after troops pushed Taliban forces from area during Operation Moshtarak

MICHAEL G. MULLEN
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
To the Editor— Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Shrader’s “The End of Surface Warships” in JFQ 58 (3rd Quarter, 2010) may have a correct message, and he is doubtless right that a view from outside any establishment can be valuable. But the article might have been improved had it been run by a naval or airpower historian prior to submission. It is wrong in some details, the sample size is not large enough, and the cases selected to “prove” his point are inadequate. Moreover, as with many of us, he seems to make the assumption that history repeats itself.

First, a couple of the minor detail errors: Billy Mitchell was never in the U.S. Army Air Corps because he resigned his commission in January 1926, a few months before the Air Corps was established. Second, the Hellcat of World War II was not a jet.

Colonel Shrader argues that the battleship was made obsolete by airpower because of its vulnerability. He accepts the ancient arguments that the bombing tests of 1921, Pearl Harbor, and the sinking of the Japanese battleship Yamato prove this. In the 1921 tests, the Air Service bombers were guided to their target by a string of destroyers showing the way; they bombed from the suicidal altitude of 2,000 feet and attacked a stationary and undefended target using 2,000-pound bombs that could not be lifted from a carrier deck until many years afterwards.

Similarly, the battleships at Pearl Harbor were motionless and essentially undefended. The U.S. Navy never lost another battleship from December 8, 1941, though many were attacked even by kamikazes in World War II. On the other hand, the Navy had eight aircraft carriers commissioned before that date. Five went to the bottom in 1942 (USS Langley, off Java; USS Lexington, Coral Sea; USS Yorktown, Midway; and USS Wasp and Hornet, the South Pacific). USS Saratoga did not fight at Midway because it was in the yard on the West Coast with torpedo damage. Arguably, then, the carriers were far more vulnerable than the battleships.

Finally, the Yamato was sunk in the spring of 1945, but it left Japan on a suicide mission with insufficient fuel to return. Moreover, the ship was lost to an enemy enjoying nearly complete air supremacy. Its sister ship, the Musashi, went down in the Sibuyan Sea a few months earlier, again only without air support and unable to maneuver. Even then it did not go belly up until hit with more than 30 heavy bombs and torpedoes.

It seems clear, then, that it was not the vulnerability of the battleships that made them obsolescent, but rather the limited range of their offensive power as compared to that of carrier aircraft.

Colonel Shrader also seems to make some tacit assumptions that may not hold up. First, unaddressed is the fact that by far the greater part of commerce between continents and along their shores will necessarily be carried by surface vessels for many decades to come. Second, he seems to assume that surface vessels will be defenseless, a thought he shared with the likes of Billy Mitchell. Yet Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Walter Sweeney led the B–17s from Midway in 1942 and claimed many hits on the Japanese ships, but he did not get a single one. In the Southwest Pacific, General George Kenney also discovered the improbability of hitting a moving vessel from altitude and consequently developed low-level attack with positive results at the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.

What could make future surface ships easy to hit with missiles from 1,500 miles away? A modern surface ship with, for instance, 1 minute of warning could move perhaps 3,000 feet away from the coordinates that Colonel Shrader’s operator had punched in. How big a warhead would the missile have to carry to take out a vessel it had missed by 3,000 feet? Would the warhead have to be nuclear? Otherwise, would it not need sophisticated terminal guidance systems (in large numbers)? Could an attacker stake its national existence on the notion that its satellite communications could not be shut down with countermeasures? Billy Mitchell did not anticipate the formidable battle ship defenses that protected themselves along with the carriers with them. How much warning would the 21st-century surface commander have? Enough? Many of our current carriers carry more Americans than the number who died in the World Trade Center Towers. Would the missile attacker have to be prepared for a counterattack, perhaps with nuclear weapons?

Is the United States rich enough to move all of its seapower beneath the surface? Is it rich enough to build enough transport submarines to move the Army? Can piracy really be controlled with some combination of submarines and unmanned systems? Will the missile–armed enemy have access to satellite communications and surveillance and the command and control to track all the targets?

It is all too easy for us to look upon our predecessors as being pretty dull, and certainly not as smart as the current generation. But just plain accident or dumb luck can have major effects on the course of events. Dive bombing was not well developed as a tactic until the latter part of the 1930s. Engine power limitations prevented carrier aircraft from getting off the decks with bombs weighing over 500 pounds and then flying out any appreciable distance until 1940. Billy Mitchell died on February 19, 1936. If Pearl Harbor had happened any time before that, then “battleship sailor” would not be a euphemism for an ignorant man.

—David R. Mets
Niceville, FL

To the Editor— In JFQ 58 (3rd Quarter, 2010), Colonel Gian Gentile attempts to make the case that it is time for a dialogue on counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. He opens his argument with a personal story of how he was asked to provide input on the then-draft of Field Manual (FM) 3–24. He failed to provide that feedback and now pleads mea culpa.

The real argument in this opener is that Colonel Gentile had an opportunity to impact doctrine and failed to do so. But his illustration is symptomatic of a much wider and deeper root cause of the issues of doctrine and executing that doctrine—and that root cause is a lack of understanding and intellectual intent. What is really troubling is that he fails to understand the doctrine as one who is allegedly a practitioner.

Colonel Gentile, and a lot of officers like him, missed the most important element of COIN doctrine that is in a small paragraph in chapter three of FM 3–24. Paragraph 3–61 on social capital is probably the most critical single element in the entire document.
It is almost a shame that only a couple of paragraphs were devoted to the concept. One wonders if it might have been better just to leave it out as that would have provided us our window of blame on why the doctrine is all wrong.

But the authors did not leave it out, and now the blame on why COIN does not work rests with those charged with planning and executing COIN doctrine. I would say that there has been a lack of intellectual rigor in what the doctrine really means and how this translates to a practical utility in execution.

If we, and I use this term loosely, would have approached doctrine with real intellectual rigor, we would understand that social capital is tied to four basic elements that make up this concept and that these elements and concept are linked to the entire doctrinal premise of so-called hearts and minds, carrots and sticks, and transformation. Then perhaps we would not draw these false conclusions or wild inferences that protecting the population is only, or all, about a lot of feel-good, touchy-feely kind of stuff. Social capital and its calculated design and use are how one wields a carrot and stick that in turn reaches out to hearts and minds and then fundamentally, over time, becomes political and cultural transformation.

The problem here is not the doctrine or a debate about the doctrine. The root cause problem is that many still think that simply reading doctrine gives one everything they need to know about counterinsurgency, and that the CliffsNotes of doctrine is sufficient. The real debate should be about how much intent we are teaching in regard to how COIN doctrine is planned, designed, and implemented. In essence, what is missing is the “how to.” But how does one actually get to the “how to” if he does not even understand what the doctrine means? And we wonder why we have been struggling with this for 9 years now.

What is doctrinaire and dogmatic is the lack of real intellectual rigor by many regarding understanding and intent behind the very keystone of COIN doctrine. Like Rupert Smith said, “There is no such thing as impartial governance or humanitarian assistance. In this environment every time you help someone, you hurt someone else.” This is the essence of the elements of social capital in which we consciously decide how to wield that carrot and stick in a calculated effort to influence hearts and minds in an attempt to achieve political and cultural transformation.

—Terry Tucker, Ph.D. Analyst, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center

To the Editor— I take John Nagl’s side in the debate about the need for and value of counterinsurgency doctrine. But the record needs to be set straight about some of his assertions in “Learning and Adapting to Win” and “Constructing the Legacy of Field Manual 3–24” published in JFQ 58 (3rd Quarter, 2010) concerning U.S. Army doctrine development.

My perspective is from helping to develop major joint and Army doctrine publications in the field of operations other than war from 1991 to 1999 and publishing articles on this subject in both JFQ and Army. My article in the latter refuted the idea that doctrine for so-called unconventional operations was dead since the Vietnam War, but also outlined the problematic nature of such doctrine.

First, Dr. Nagl claims that the manual was developed with an “unusually open internal process.” Clearly, his discussion of this point proves the truth of the open process. However, such an approach to Army and joint doctrine is not unusual. In the case of Field Manual (FM) 100–23, Peace Operations (1994), for example, development proceeded with the involvement of all Army major commands, the Joint Staff, other Services, and unified commanders. It involved the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Partnership for Peace militaries, retired officers and diplomats, academia, think tanks, and even the U.S. Congress and NATO parliamentarians. At least a dozen staff talks and subject matter exchanges with allied militaries and academic conferences and forums addressed the draft doctrine. We also briefed and provided drafts to an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement.

My experience with FM 100–23 and many other doctrinal efforts in the “unconventional” arena involved casting a wide net, all of which belies his comment that “No previous doctrinal manual had undergone such a public review process.” The New York Times published two op-eds on the manual.

Second, Nagl is correct to state that “FM 3–24 is far from the Army’s only doctrinal manual, or the only one that shows the influence of a new pattern of thinking.” . . . In fact, the publication of FM 3–0, Operations, in February 2008 was arguably more important than the publication of FM 3–24.” The current edition of FM 3–0, however, has a distinct provenance, especially in addressing the whole gamut of operations, including counterinsurgency. It is therefore unfair to claim that the preparation of doctrine is “less about traditional practice handed down from past generations and more about constant learning and adaptation based on current experience and collaboration with a broad group of concerned partners.” It is both. We firmly stand on the shoulders of our history and doctrine.

Furthermore, the claim of Nagl and others that FM 3–24 broke a mold in its doctrine development process is inaccurate. If there is a mold that needs to be broken, it is the one that claims only innovation and singular achievement instead of humility and gratitude to a collective past plus innovation, learning, and adaptation that need to be continually used in creating a future for others to build upon.

—LTC Richard J. Rinaldo, USA (Ret.)
Executive Summary

As we reinforce policies, implement strategies, and continue to call on our Reserve Components, we must remember that “judicious use” is still the watchword.

— Dennis M. McCarthy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

In this issue, Joint Force Quarterly explores the Reserve Components (RC) of the U.S. Armed Forces and our progress in realizing the 1973 Total Force Policy as it evolves toward the operational reserve force delineated in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force (October 2008). An operational reserve provides capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a range of missions according to their Services’ force generation plans. While the current high operational tempo of the RC is commonly cited as a shift from a more traditional strategic reserve to an operational one, the difference between the two is not clear or even exclusive. To some degree, the RC seems a victim of its competence and flexibility, constantly in tension between demands for a strategic or operational reserve as assessments and perceptions of national security threats change. Because the RC will be used at a high operational level for the foreseeable future, some are inspired to predict permanence as an operational reserve. Undeniably, however, a strategic reserve will always be necessary to provide the Nation with the ability to deal with uncertainty and homeland defense in the face of evolving hybrid threats.

This issue’s Forum begins with RAND’s Dr. John Winkler, who provides readers with essential context for the evolution of U.S. Reserve Components from a strategic reserve to today’s operational reserve. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report holds that elements of the RCs have a role in preventing and deterring future conflict, despite the reality that budgeting for a transition to expanded responsibilities has not met requirements. The catalyst for expanding the responsibilities of Reserve and National Guard forces was 9/11 and the recognition that Active-duty forces alone could not meet the myriad requirements of robust homeland defense in concert with extended conflict abroad. Moreover, some critical skill sets for a lengthy war on terror were found primarily in the Reserve Components and
were limited by statutory and policy limits on availability. The demanded stress on the RC caused the rebalancing of capabilities between Active and Reserve forces as well as increased cross-training among occupational specialties. Dr. Winkler outlines eight key policy and practice developments over the past decade that enabled this transformation, and then analyzes the conclusions and recommendations in the 2008 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR),

prevent the loss of an operational reserve that they consider integral for addressing future national security threats. Moving beyond training to equipping, the authors acknowledge the difficulties in tracking procurement and distribution for the RC and endorse the public release of the new semi-annual National Guard and Reserve Equipment Delivery Reports. Meeting the future equipment needs of an operational reserve will not be easy. Although the February 2010 DOD recommendation to increase fully funded in-residence slots, DOD has instead pursued

in which he participated. Briefly, Dr. Winkler recommends that operational reserve utilization be incorporated in strategic planning, that the operational reserve be properly resourced, and for a true continuum of service, that a promotion system that is experience- and competence-based be incorporated. He concludes that DOD has made great strides in realizing the vision of an operational reserve, but much more needs to be done.

Deviating somewhat from the first article, frequent JFQ contributor Dr. John Nagl and his Center for a New American Security colleague Travis Sharp assert that both Congress and DOD have supported and fully resourced the transition from a strategic to an operational reserve. They caveat these observations by noting that the national security bureaucracy will not apportion future resources on the basis of contributions of the Reserve Components over the past decade. In fact, there is talk of restoring the status quo ante for budgetary reasons. The authors argue that convincingly answering the question “Operational for what?” is essential to Instruction 1235.12 mandated that the RCs receive resources to fulfill roles and missions associated with both an operational and strategic force, those roles and missions have yet to be defined. The failure of the Quadrennial Defense Review to see after these definitions has placed the Guard and Reserves behind the programming and budgeting curve, deferring execution until 2016 even later. The authors conclude their argument with three recommendations to advance the cause of seamlessly integrating the Reserve Component into the long-advocated “Total Force.”

The Forum concludes with a persuasive article focused on the need to eliminate cultural differences and prejudices between personnel serving in Active and Reserve Components. Speaking from his 16-year experience as a professor in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, retired Army Reserve Colonel Jim Currie argues that although the cultural divide between components will not be resolved soon, changes in law, policy, and procedures will go a long way toward eliminating prejudices and misconceptions. He begins his survey nonresident educational opportunities for Reservists, but there is a tremendous qualitative difference between resident and nonresident courses. The author identifies similar problems with National Defense University’s CAPSTONE program for general and flag officers. This course is required under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 for Active Component flag officers, but not for Reservists. As in the war colleges, CAPSTONE offers opportunities for interaction and prejudice reduction, and Colonel Currie offers three recommendations as a remedy for a condition that is inconsistent with a true operational reserve. He concludes with three additional recommendations for achieving a true Total Force in order of value: require greater Reserve attendance at senior Service colleges, place RC knowledge into the curriculum of the senior Service colleges, and increase Reserve attendance at CAPSTONE. A Total Force can exist in reality as well as in theory, but currently, it does not. JFQ

—D.H. Gurney
JFQ: For several years, the Marine Corps has been operating very closely with the United States Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. To what degree have sea service skill sets atrophied, and do you sense that some increasingly see the Marine Corps as a second Army?

General Conway: I’ll answer the second part first. The bottom line is that the Marine Corps, as we say, “does windows.” That has prompted us in both Iraq and Afghanistan to operate 500 miles from the smell of salty sea air. But that’s okay with us. If there’s a fight to be engaged in, we’re going to be there, and so we’ve made the necessary adjustments to make it all work. In 2003, we lined up alongside V Corps and 3rd ID [Infantry Division], and did something that no MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force] has ever done—that is, to attack 500 miles from Kuwait to Baghdad and beyond. It really strained our capacity to do that, but we were pretty proud of ourselves that in the end we were able to make those kinds of adjustments. Going back to Iraq in 2004, and subsequently in Afghanistan, we’ve had to heavy-up, because of the threat, because of the employment methodologies, and so forth. So yes, we have in some ways become a second land Army. I think we’re able to morph in and out of those kinds of conditions and missions based on events, but we do not feel as though we are being properly employed as a second land Army. We have more to offer the Nation. When I go to meetings and I hear “Army and Marine Corps” talked about in the same breath, I get uncomfortable. It should be “Navy and Marine Corps.” One day, again, it will be. But right now, we’re simply doing what the Nation asks us to do. We’re trying to keep current, and polish those Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard skills. My people get it, they buy into it, and as we see more dwell, 14 months at home between combat deployments, I think we’re going to be able to return to our naval and amphibious roots on an increasingly incremental basis.

JFQ: The United States continues to live beyond its means economically. Military personnel spending has grown 69 percent over the last decade, and the Secretary of Defense has mandated over $100 billion in cuts. Clearly, the outlook for Department of Defense resourcing over the long haul isn’t bright. What changes in Marine Corps materiel and force structure do you anticipate?
**General Conway:** People are expensive. Our manpower accounts constitute about 58 percent of our annual Marine Corps budget, and yet that’s a conscious thing. One of my priorities when I became Commandant in 2006 was to grow the Corps, so we could get to a one-to-two deployment-to-dwell ratio. We were authorized and funded by Congress to do so, and we made it happen 2½ years ahead of what we forecasted. We’re a very people-intensive organization. We know that 58 percent of our budget going toward people is a lot; it’s more than any other Service. That said, we see it as a necessity, and will continue to maintain our personnel strength until this fight is over.

So I foresee a future where a 202,000-man and -woman Marine Corps in a time of peace is probably too large. We would be hard-pressed to keep 202,000 Marines constructively engaged in peacetime, and it would continue to be expensive. I just don’t think at that point in time the Nation’s going to be able to afford it. So we’re going to form a force structure review group that will convene in Quantico that will look at what the Marine Corps ought to look like post-Afghanistan. And I think we’ll probably come down in tranches. We don’t want to adversely impact those great young Americans who have become Marines and separate them from the Corps prematurely. We want to make sure that we can say this long war is effectively over before we downsize, because the enemy gets a vote. We can’t choose to disengage if he’s still choosing to fight. So I think we’re going to come down in an iterative fashion. We will take a look around at the international environment, and then maybe come down more to the point where we can afford it, to the point where we have a hard, lean, compact Marine Corps that is serving the Nation. I hope by that point it is once again a Navy–Marine Corps team.

**JFQ:** Since our discussion today involves roles and capabilities of the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps’ contribution to the defense of our nation, can you broadly tell us your thoughts on emerging global threats and challenges? What does the future operating environment look like from your perspective, and how will the Marine Corps of 2025 address this?

**General Conway:** That’s a great question, and it’s one that I asked myself shortly after I became Commandant. One of our priorities was to prepare the Marine Corps for operations in the future, and so we looked at what that period ought to be. We arrived at the time period of 2020 to 2025 as a kind of sweet spot. Beyond that, you’re guessing, and short of that, you’re not influencing some fairly expensive programs that have to be played out over time.

Our Strategic Vision Group told us essentially what I think the Secretary of Defense also believes, and that is that we’re not going to see a major peer competitor, and we’re not going to go to war against some nation of our same size and strength. There are going to be regional conflicts. There are lots of titles you can hang on it, and we’ve chosen to call them hybrid conflicts. Nonstate actors, states that are in regional conflict, and access to potable water will be a factor out there somewhere.
But for the most part, the future will be a continuation of what we’re seeing today. So we’re shaping the Marine Corps to meet those future challenges.

In discussions with the Secretary about the results from our Strategic Vision Group, we all also agreed that we’ve never predicted the future very well. We never end up fighting the fight that we’re planning for. Something always pops up unexpectedly—surprise is the opportune phrase—and we can’t afford to be surprised. So we need what we call a two-fisted Marine Corps: one that can engage in a hybrid conflict, and also one that can line up alongside a heavy Army outfit and fight and win. And by the way, we accomplish it all as the smallest of the Services. Extending into all these domains, we have a decisive advantage in the fact that 100 percent of our equipment procurement can be used either way. I believe that our nation needs fast, austere, and lethal expeditionary naval forces that can execute missions across the spectrum of conflict. The Navy—Marine Corps team is that key. So that’s the aspect that I think we have to take care of with regard to our training.

**JFQ:** Considering this uncertain future, what is the Marine Corps’ role in implementing our national security policy? What unique capabilities does the Marine Corps bring to the table?

**General Conway:** That’s an important question, and it relates to your last one as well. We’ve got to synergize. We cannot, in my mind, have duplication of effort across the joint force. I think it is incumbent on each Service to take a look at where we fit in to the whole patchwork effort of the Department of Defense. From the Marine Corps perspective, it is not being a second land Army unless the situation absolutely dictates that. We are most comfortable deploying as an expeditionary force afloat. In a peacetime environment, we can get more comfortable deploying as an expeditionary force best able to accomplish that mission. We’re going to need the Army and the Air Force, and certainly we’ll partner with the Navy in executing from the very get-go. But the fact is, I think in some ways our nation is looking at the last couple of fights where we’ve had a country that allowed us to move in, build a force structure, build the iron mountain, attack across their borders—there aren’t many places in the world that will let you do that. Our country will always need the ability to overcome antiaccess challenges and obstacles that impede us from entering foreign soil. We will lead that effort. And I think that’s a very important aspect of what the Marine Corps needs to be in the future.

**JFQ:** How has the Marine Corps strategy evolved from amphibious operations to support the current concept of joint assured access? Many think of the Marine Corps as solely an amphibious force based on World War II imagery, but the reality is that the Corps is a much more flexible force across the spectrum of conflict.

**General Conway:** You highlight something that we’re concerned about, and that is, when people think of Marines, they think of that recent wonderful series called *The Pacific* that was on television—people think of Marines as storming a beach, huge casualty percentages, courage and audacity and perseverance, and raising the flag over an enemy position. That’s not the way we would conduct a joint operation today to assure access. It won’t be a broad-based 0800 assault against a defended beach. We are smarter than that. So we somehow need to make people aware that if we were to conduct a joint assured access operation today, it would be very different than World War II and it would be very joint. The Marines would certainly be in the lead, but we would be relying on our joint brothers and sisters, and probably even other nations in a combined effort because I think our country tends to like coalitions. We have a powerful Marine Air-Ground Task Force concept, and our brothers in the air represent the real killing power associated with that MAGTF. But at the same time, we will also look at how we might integrate into Air Force capacity and into Navy aviation arms that come from the carriers. We’ve proven that we can fight very effectively alongside and integrated with the Army. In Iraq, for instance, in Ramadi, we had a Marine battalion that operated under an Army brigade that operated under a Marine Expeditionary Force that reported to an Army three-star in Baghdad. So we know how to do that, and we’ve proven that we can do it very effectively. We just need to make sure that there’s general agreement in terms of how it would be done in the doctrine that lays that...
out. We also need to exercise it so that if we ever are called forward to make it work, we can. I have every confidence that we can.

JFQ: What does the Navy–Marine Corps team need to make assuring littoral access a reality in terms of numbers of amphibious ships and other capabilities? How does MPF [maritime prepositioning force] support this? What is the future of MPF, and is seabasing still accomplishable?

General Conway: First of all, we need the right number of amphibious ships. We just recently completed the Quadrennial Defense Review, and we found that the day-to-day operational need of the combatant commanders is, interestingly enough, about the same as we would need for two brigades to work their way ashore—about 38 ships. We have an agreement—the former Secretary of the Navy, the current CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], and myself—that 38 ships is the established operational requirement. We realize that in the fiscal environment that we’re in, that might not be possible at all times, but we’ve set a baseline, a floor, if you will, of 33 ships. Thirty-eight ships is the requirement, but with 33 ships, we think we could still generally get it done. Now there’s a risk associated with it, but that is what we agreed upon.

In terms of the MPF, there’s a little bit of a misconception out there about what the MPF represents to us and to the Navy and the Nation. Some people see it just as a floating warehouse and that’s a terrible misconception. MPF was built from the very beginning—and I was there as a young major—to give this nation the ability to rapidly reinforce—10,000 Marines in 10 days—with forward-based equipment. Most of that is the heavy equipment that we would need to get to a fight using fast sealift ships and arguably the entire air arm of Transportation Command for the offload. The fact is we think that MPF is something that the Nation continues to need and that our partners and allies continue to depend upon.

MPF represents our ability as expeditionary naval forces to put three brigades and three squadrons ashore or to rapidly reinforce with one to three of those brigades if another nation should need it. MPF also constitutes the reserve capacity for any joint operational access requirement that might be out there. So we just need to make sure there’s a better understanding of what MPF truly represents.

Now, the seabasing concept allows us to get away somewhat from the whole thought process that you’ve got to have the port and the airfield because seabasing gives you that kind of capability at sea. The old program of record is no more, but quite frankly, the Navy and Marine Corps realize that we need something in its place. It may be less elegant and a little less expensive, but the Navy’s in
the process of building those types of ships, and we’re in the process of exercising the interchangeable nature of the vessels, the ability to offload and transfer the equipment and put it on the connectors, and get it ashore. But I think it’s also important from a tactical or operational perspective that an amphibious operation—any operation—previously had been pretty predictable to the degree that the first thing you had to do to allow for the follow-on force was seize a port and an airfield. The old amphibious task force objectives were always the port and airfield. Now, if a commander doesn’t have to have that for several days, he can land in lots of other places, his tactics are not nearly as predictable, and he can operate from that seabase more much effectively than we’ve ever had the capacity to do before. So we continue to stress the need for that kind of capability. The joint force gets it and, I think, supports it. In fact, we’ve had conferences where even the international community says, “Wow, that is impressive, that is really forward thinking. Will these ships match up with ours? Can we also take advantage of this joint and combined seabase?” And we think the answer is increasingly going to be yes.

**JFQ:** Is the current number of amphibious ships meeting the demand signals coming from the combatant commanders? Are we as a nation accepting too much risk by having too little amphibious lift capability?

**General Conway:** Today, we could not muster 33 ships. If you look at the availability, there’s a maintenance issue out there. So there is some risk. We continue to meet with our brothers in the Navy on how we could avoid that, though builds of new ships, and through decommissioning of old ships when their life cycles are fully completed. I think there is an element of risk. When we talk to the COCOMs [combatant commands], they would like more. With the war going in Central Command, they accept that that’s the theater that’s going to get most of the resources right now. But they’re cautioning us increasingly about losing traction in some of these places where we’ve done pretty well in the past, certainly before 9/11. So I think that virtually every situation that we play out from an operational perspective needs more amphibious ships, and the day-to-day routines of the COCOMs out there tell us that they certainly would like to see us as a full-up round so they can have what they need for the engagement and the exercising and those things that the amphib give us. The amphib is without question the most utilitarian ship in the fleet. I’ve heard CNO say that, and I certainly agree.

**JFQ:** How is the fight going for the Marine Corps in Afghanistan, and what successes and challenges spring to mind?

**General Conway:** Your question is very timely because I just had a conversation yesterday with our field commander, Major General Rich Mills. You know, it’s a close fight. The Sergeant Major and I and our wives just visited Bethesda [National Naval Medical Center] yesterday and awarded 10 Purple Hearts, and it comes back to you every week when we go up there and see those great young people. I sense that in Afghanistan today, we’re about where we were in Iraq in 2005. A counterinsurgency fight, by its very nature, just requires persistence and adaptability and day-to-day engagement in a way that would make an impatient person go nuts. But a person who understands how that type of fight is conducted realizes that he has to look at it in fairly large tranches of time: Where are we now compared to where we were 6 months ago? Where do we hope to be in the next 6 months? It can’t be 6 days, or even 6 weeks. You’ve got to view progress gradually, and you’ve got to keep the metrics out there that evaluate how the population is seeing it. They’re your real target; how do they see this fight going? You’ve got to keep pressure on the enemy, and that’s something that Rich Mills reiterated yesterday.

Previously, in the Marjah area, for instance, the Taliban retained the initiative. Okay, that changed in February. They’re still trying to work their way back in, but they like to fight us for a couple of days, and then go rest, recuperate, refit, and come back. We don’t let them do that now. Where they go to try to find safe haven, we’re there. We’re patrolling, we are overflying, we are looking to disrupt even while they’re in their rest areas. And that’s having a positive effect. They’re getting tired, because they’re not used to a counterinsurgency fight, by its very nature, just requires persistence and adaptability and day-to-day engagement in a way that would make an impatient person go nuts.
course Dave Petraeus and Jim Mattis get all that, and so we’re hopeful that they continue to pound that drum.

**JFQ:** Can you share with our joint leadership what your thoughts are on the evolution of U.S. Marine Forces Special Operations Command [MARSOC] and the Marine Corps’ integration with U.S. Special Operations Command? What lies ahead in this relationship?

**General Conway:** It was directed by Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld in his time when he was Secretary of Defense; it was one of those things that he saw as transformational for the Marine Corps, and so we signed on. We have assigned some of our absolute finest Marines to MARSOC, about 2,500 to date, and they’re doing great things. I mean, there were some initial stutter steps in Afghanistan, but I’ll tell you now, they’re there in strength. I won’t cite the exact numbers because they’re doing some pretty heady stuff; but in any event, they’re there on a standing requirement, and they are making a difference. We support them to the absolute best of our ability, even if their requirements expand beyond what Marines in MARSOC are able to satisfy.

It has put us back into a quandary where we’re once again trying to fix [reconnaissance]. A lot of these guys were reconnaissance Marines, the old 0321s, and pulling off some of the cream of the crop into the MARSOC organization has caused us to suffer some shortfalls in regard to our own force reconnaissance guys and even battalion reconnaissance guys because they now have an avenue where they can go. So we’re back into trying to see what that means for us for our own operational requirements. We’re trying to make sure that the internal MARSOC methods give us a high-quality Marine who is able to get the job done. The attrition rates are a little higher than I’m comfortable with as they go through their introductory programs, but we’ve got some generals and some very senior staff NCOs who are sorting that out. We’ll get through it—it’s a temporary blip on the screen. But in the end, I think their proven value is such that they’re going to be around for a long time.

Now, one thing that has happened that we’re going to need to resolve post-Afghanistan is that they’ve gotten away from the ships. In the past when MARSOC was assigned to the ships, it was an incredible enhancement to the MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit]. It allowed them to do some things in the special operations realm that your traditional trigger-pullers aren’t trained to do. It gave the MARSOC mobility, it gave them an automatic base for support, and we think that’s really the best employment in the future. But that will require those folks to also acknowledge that belief and allow us to work up with them and see them out on the MEUs doing that brand of special operations missions that the ARG/MEUs [Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Units] could encounter.

**JFQ:** What significant challenges do you envision the 35th Commandant having to contend with?

**General Conway:** I think the biggest thing that the next Commandant is going to face is probably going to be this whole thought process of how do we transition at the end of Afghanistan, and will there be conditions during his 4 years as Commandant where he’s both trying to fight the war, and fiscal conditions at the same time that dictate that he has to make hard choices. I could see where those things could occur simultaneously as opposed to sequentially, and that would be hard. My priority has been, and I’m sure it’s going to be his too, that we win this fight and that we support our Marines at the point of the spear, and take care of our families. We do look at the Marine Corps of the future, and try to lay in those things, the people and equipment, that we’re going to need to be viable downrange. I don’t say that was easy, but where we were well resourced, we were able to generally do those things. If those resources diminish, it’s going to be tough for him. There may be some very difficult decisions out there in terms of tradeoffs that he may have to make, and that the Corps writ large may have to make. So that is my biggest concern for his commandancy. He’s going to continue to have great young Marines, great young Americans who want to be Marines, and great Marines who will train them and integrate them and make them into a viable force. Some things killed, would somehow weigh on them. Just the opposite is true—the morale is sky-high. Retention and recruitment is off the page. You know, we go out to Bethesda to try to motivate these kids, and just the opposite takes place: they motivate us. They’ve been dealt a heavy blow; they’re there because they’re seriously injured, and yet their outlook is, “Hey, Sir, it’s what I signed on for, and I’m proud to have been a part of that, and by the way, I’ve still got a trigger finger, can you get me back in play?” And that’s just incredible. **JFQ**
Developing an Operational Reserve
A Policy and Historical Context and the Way Forward

By JOHN D. WINKLER

Reserve Soldier who served with Stryker Brigade in Iraq is now assigned to Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan

U.S. Army (Teddy Wade)
Today, much attention is paid to a concept of employment for the U.S. military Reserve Components (RCs), encompassing the Army and Air National Guard and the Reserves of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. This concept is entitled the “operational reserve.” The concept of an operational reserve, in which Reserve forces participate routinely and regularly in ongoing military missions, is viewed as a fairly recent development. This concept is distinct from an earlier view in which the RCs were seen mainly as a “strategic reserve” whose primary role was augmentation and reinforcement of Active forces during a major contingency—an event that was anticipated to occur at best once in a lifetime.

The operational reserve concept is now embodied in Department of Defense (DOD) policy in Directive 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.” It was recently endorsed in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, which stated, “Prevailing in today’s wars requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity—available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment.” The QDR further points to a role for elements of the Reserve Components for preventing and deterring future conflict. The operational reserve is further embodied in Service doctrine as well—for example, in “Transforming the Army’s Reserve Components into an Operational Force.”

The change from a purely strategic to a strategic and operational reserve, however, is not yet fully realized in DOD practice. In September 2009, the Government Accountability Office, for instance, focusing on the Army, noted that the Service “had not yet established the specific equipping, manning, and training levels required of an operational reserve” and “had not budgeted” for most of the costs it identified for transitioning its Reserve Components to an operational role.

Moreover, recognition and acceptance of the operational reserve has not come quickly or easily. As recently as 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve (CNGR) characterized the transition to an operational reserve as “unplanned,” requiring further scrutiny by the public and Congress. Nonetheless, the CNGR deemed the operational reserve a “necessity” and found “no reasonable alternative” considering “the threats that the United States faces at home and abroad, the looming fiscal challenges the nation confronts, the projected demands for forces, the unique capabilities resident in the reserve components, and their cost-effectiveness.”

The CNGR report was an extremely important and influential document that added legitimacy to the concept of an operational reserve and framed the ensuing debate on how to implement a force that is workable near term and sustainable in the long term. At the same time, it should be noted that the establishment of an operational reserve can be seen as part revolution and part evolution. The CNGR built on previous efforts that preceded it, including reviews by the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ and earlier efforts inside and outside DOD. Some of the changes recently observed with respect to RC roles, missions, and organization were rooted in changes occurring within the Guard and Reserve beginning in the 1990s.

Important developments that provide the foundation for today’s operational reserve can also be attributed to policies and practices established within DOD during the past decade that aimed to support Reserve forces, strengthen and sustain them, and keep them relevant to current and future national security requirements.

These events provide a policy and historical context for subsequently assessing the current state of the operational reserve and for determining a future course for further development, including how conclusions and recommendations made by the CNGR can continue to assist DOD in implementing an operational National Guard and Reserve.

**Key Events**

The first key event was 9/11 and its immediate aftermath. This event took the Nation into a new era that required a new national security strategy, new thinking about the application of national power, including military power, and new ways of thinking about military strategy, doctrine, and employment of forces—which included Reserve forces. As Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom unfolded, it seemed clear that reliance on Reserve forces in the operational environment would continue as far as could be envisioned.

forces, to provide capabilities to meet a range for future threats over a potentially extended period. In the DOD view, greater flexibility and new tools were required to capitalize fully and adequately on Reserve forces.

This document focused on two principal areas for building more flexible and capable forces; the first was by developing and adopting innovative approaches to unit structures and organization (that is, for fostering better integration between Active and Reserve forces). Organizations such as “associate units,” which integrate Active and RC personnel inside operational units, initially developed in the Air Force but also found in other Services, were proposed for expansion and broader adoption.

A second area sought to change and simplify personnel policies and systems (that is, by establishing a “continuum of service” that would provide greater flexibility and more streamlined personnel management governing Active and Reserve forces). The “continuum of service” construct, buttressed by statutory and policy changes subsequently proposed and implemented, sought to

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transform the compensation and benefits system to encourage volunteerism and extended service among Reservists and eliminate artificial limits to service and benefits. Examples of artificial barriers and limits included the 179-day rule (which required that Reservists on Active duty in excess of 179 days be counted as “Active duty” for end strength accounting purposes), and limitations on the availability of housing allowances and other benefits for Reservists. At the same time, benefits were expanded to encourage participation—for example, by making bonuses such as affiliation and critical skills bonuses more accessible and competitive with similar bonuses offered to Active-duty members.

Another key development in the aftermath of 9/11 and beyond was the recognition that homeland defense is a fundamental defense mission, that there is a requirement for defense support to civil authorities, and that the RC and National Guard in particular need to be fundamental players in the “front-line” across America. Furthermore, Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath in 2005 made clear the inadequacies of existing command and control and the need for improved unity of effort in the military response to a catastrophic event in the homeland.

An additional key development occurred in the early part of the decade, as operations were planned and executed in Afghanistan and Iraq. It began with a series of seemingly simple questions about Reserve forces posed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in a number of so-called snowflakes—for example, “Why are some key skill sets only in the Reserves?” “Why does it take so long to make Reserve forces ready to deploy?” and “Why are Reserve forces required in the early entry phases of contingency operations?” At the same time, statutory and policy limitations on the frequency and length of deployments conflicted with pressures for lengthy and repeated mobilizations of Reservists with needed skills.

The response and resulting dialogue between Secretary Rumsfeld and DOD staff eventually produced an overarching concept of “judicious use” to govern utilization of Reserve forces and the first set of utilization rules establishing limits on mobilization of Guard and Reserve members. These were contained in a memorandum dated July 9, 2003, and signed by Secretary Rumsfeld, which set a planning objective to limit involuntary mobilizations to a rate of 1 year mobilized to 5 years demobilized. This ratio rested on the assumption that there needed to be a substantial break between periods of activation, and that this ratio was seemingly sustainable over a military and civilian career and fell under existing protections provided by the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act, which provides job protections for up to 5 years of activation (therefore, extending over a 30-year civilian career).

Another key event grew out of discussions of Reserve utilization. DOD began to conduct quantitative analyses of a phenomenon referred to as “stress on the force,” which revealed wide differences in utilization of military skills and occupations in both the Active and Reserve forces. The analyses, for example, showed that Servicemembers in military occupations such as military police were deployed and/or activated at far higher rates than Servicemembers in other military occupations (for example, medical occupations). Overall, these analyses exposed large disparities between the force structure and the need for specific skills.
“Force rebalancing” resulted, which changed and improved allocations of capabilities within Active and Reserve forces relative to demand. Specifically, it led to the rebalancing of over 225,000 spaces from fiscal year (FY) 2003 to FY 2016, which relieved some of the burden across skill areas and components, preserving the sustainability of both for an extended period of utilization. This line of analysis also girded efforts to encourage cross-training of lesser used skills to create “in lieu of” capability, to use of military capabilities from other Services to help relieve strain on ground forces, and to identification of “alternative sourcing solutions” from coalition, interagency, and civilian sources to meet combatant commanders’ requirements while reducing demands on Active and Reserve military forces.

In 2005, DOD sponsored a symposium that researchers were invited to in order to present results of quantitative studies and analyses addressing the impact of mobilizations on Reservists, families, and employers. This event was stimulated by media reports and quotes from so-called experts whose descriptions of reality were strikingly at odds with perceptions held by DOD members. The adage of the symposium was “there can be many opinions but only one set of facts.”

The New Guard and Reserve Conference (also known as the “facts and myths” conference) provided a forum for discussion of the evolving role of the Reserve Components and for establishing a baseline understanding of Reserve force utilization and its implications. The proceedings were later published in an edited volume.10

Research findings presented stated that recruiting and retention were holding up well in the face of extended, repeated deployments. Indeed, attrition was higher among those Reservists who were activated and did not deploy than among those who were activated and deployed.11 On average, Reservists who were activated were better off financially than before activation in terms of total compensation, when the Federal tax exemptions and other allowances approved by Congress for troops in combat are taken into consideration.12 Many Reservists were willing to spend more time on Active duty simply because they liked that status and were willing to spend even more time as such in response to appropriate incentives.13

Shortly after assuming office, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates signed a memorandum entitled “Utilization of the Total Force.”14 The policies established in this memo institutionalized judicious and prudent use of the Reserve Components by limiting involuntary mobilization to 12 months. It reinforced and reestablished the policy goals of 1 year mobilized to 5 years demobilized (with planning objectives for Active forces set as 1 year deployed to 2 years at home station), and required alerts up to 24 months prior to activation, which had dramatic, positive effects on the sustainability of the war effort, employer ability to support Reservists, and predictability for Service-members and their families.

DOD Directive 1200.17 codified nine principles in policy for managing the Reserve Components as an operational force. This landmark directive recognized that the Reserve Components provide both operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Secretary Gates signed the directive, signaling it as a historic “Total Force” policy document that follows a precedent established by Melvin Laird in the 1970s and resulting for the first time in the incorporation of the “Abrams Doctrine” into written policy.

The key developments in the past decade in policy and practice that governed the transformation of Reserve forces and enabled the development of an operational reserve within the Department of Defense were as follows:

- recognition that the Nation had entered a period of extended conflict that would require continued operational contributions from the Reserve Components
The recommendations requiring further action were assigned to DOD offices for development of implementation plans. These plans were due in April 2009. A number of observers, however, believe that momentum has lagged since then and important steps still remain to be taken to fully realize the vision of an operational reserve. The last QDR, and renewed attention now being paid to the recommendations of the CNGR, provides an opportunity to review progress and ascertain where further effort may be needed.

It may less useful now to “grade” DOD on how well it implemented CNGR recommendations but instead to revisit and reevaluate them. Briefly, this author recommends that priority be given to the following areas, particularly in an era of growing concerns about Federal spending and the deficit, the size of the defense budget, and the need to reduce and control costs:}

- Recognition of homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities as a central defense mission with a fundamental role for the RCs and the National Guard in particular
- Rebalancing of force structure to enhance capabilities, spread and better equalize the burdens of deployment across the components consistent with their characteristics, and sustain utilization of Active and Reserve forces
- Promotion of integration, particularly at the unit level, between Active and Reserve forces to meet future defense missions
- Creation in concept, and to a degree in policy and law, of a continuum of service to encourage voluntary participation and make personnel management more seamless and transparent
- Establishment through experience and empirical research that Reserve members would join and stay in units subject to continuous activations
- Development of utilization rules to set goals and limits on the duration of activation and deployment and amount of “dwell time” between them
- Publication of a directive establishing policy principles for managing the Reserve Components as an operational force.

**Current State**

Let us now turn to the implications of the foregoing for the conclusions and recommendations made by the CNGR in its final report in January 2008. At the time of its publication, the CNGR report provided a comprehensive and extensive review and critique of how far DOD and the Services had come in implementing the operational reserve concept and how additional effort was still required. The report was and continues to be viewed as a definitive treatment of the topic.

In response to the report, DOD established a deliberative process for reviewing and assessing the final recommendations of the CNGR and developing responses and positions for the Secretary of Defense to endorse. This process was chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the working group that conducted the review was composed of 28 senior representatives, including representatives of the Services and components, National Guard Bureau, and Reserve Forces Policy Board. The day-to-day management and staffing were handled by staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, many of whom are determined outside DOD scope of responsibility and deferred to other departments.

Overall, DOD viewed 29 of the 82 “accepted” recommendations as “already implemented,” while 53 of the 82 “accepted” ones required further action to be taken. The recommendations requiring further action were assigned to DOD offices for development of implementation plans. These plans were due in April 2009. A number of observers, however, believe that momentum has lagged since then and important steps still remain to be taken to fully realize the vision of an operational reserve. The last QDR, and renewed attention now being paid to the recommendations of the CNGR, provides an opportunity to review progress and ascertain where further effort may be needed.

It may less useful now to “grade” DOD on how well it implemented CNGR recommendations but instead to revisit and recalibrate them. Briefly, this author recommends that priority be given to the following areas, particularly in an era of growing concerns about Federal spending and the deficit, the size of the defense budget, and the need to reduce and control costs: recognizing the objectives of existing policies; and others were deemed well-meaning but too far-reaching and therefore unachievable.

In general, however, the conclusions and most recommendations made in the CNGR final report appeared congruent with the developments in policy and practice described above. They identified issues of continuing importance for management of Reserve forces as an operational force and pointed to further changes needed in policy and/or statute. At the end of the process, DOD chose to endorse in whole or part 82 of the 95 recommendations and reject 11 recommendations. (Two additional recommendations were
Incorporating operational reserve utilization into strategic planning (CNGR Conclusion One, Creating an Operational Reserve). This step is necessary for establishing the overarching set of alterations and reforms to sustain a ready, rotational force. The overall conclusion, speaking to the necessity of an operational reserve, is wholly consistent and congruent with the recent policy developments governing transformation of Reserve forces described above.

Resourcing the operational reserve (CNGR Conclusion Four, Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available Operational Reserve). This step is vital to ensuring the sustainability of a viable operational reserve force. CNGR recommendations calling for increased transparency of RC procurement funding and tracking of RC equipment, as well as the recommendation concerning the development of funding plans to support the operational portion of the RC in future defense budgets (reinforced by the GAO report), are vital.

Establishing a true continuum of service (Conclusion Three, Creating a Continuum of Service). This step is necessary for achieving a 21st-century human capital strategy and is congruent with current private sector practices and consistent with recommendations made in previous studies by such bodies as the Defense Advisory Commission on Military Compensation in 2006. While some recommendations will require considerable time to accomplish (for example, merging the Defense and Reserve Officers Personnel Management Acts), they are important to pursue.

Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS) is a continuum of service tool of particular importance. ADOS was envisioned as a tool to provide the RCs with strategic operational capability. It allows RC members to be on Active duty for up to 3 years, without counting against end strength and without grade controls, to permit the creation of units that may be needed for a period of time but that may not be required within the permanent force structure. In FY10, it provides the RCs with 69,200 Full Time Equivalents on any given day to build such capability.

ADOS resulted from a compromise with staff of the House Armed Services Committee who wished to retain visibility over the number of RC members who serve voluntarily on Active duty—for reasons similar to why DOD must account to the Congress for Active-duty end strength. ADOS was not intended to be a fund to support augmentees in headquarters organizations on a permanent basis. That is why there is a so-called 1095 rule stating that individuals serving more than 1,095 consecutive days on Active duty should be counted as Active-duty end strength. The logic states that beyond such a limit, the position should be managed as full-time Active duty or Active Guard/Reserve.

There is also a good deal more that remains to be addressed as part of the continuum of service, which seeks to broaden participation by offering more options for serving and developing a career in the military. It provides for transitions back and forth between full-time and part-time service in the military and for greater connectivity to civilian society, civilian employers, and civilian skills. The Army Reserve’s employer partnership program is a good example of the latter. In addition, continuum of service is not a Reserve program and is equally applicable to the Active Component.

A true continuum of service does require fundamental changes such as, greater limited term and lateral entry opportunities, relaxation of “up-or-out,” and a promotion system that is experience- and competency-based and not cohort-based. For these reasons, CNGR recommendations regarding the promotion system and Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act/Defense Officer Personnel Management Act are key. Duty status reform and an integrated personnel pay system are also important for achieving simplicity and efficiency. These recommendations remain critical and should be pursued.

Remaining CNGR recommendations pertaining to the DOD role in the Homeland (Conclusion Two) and Support to Members, Families, and Employers (Conclusion Five) remain valid, while some of the initial CNGR recommendations pertaining to reform of organizations and institutions will not achieve their stated goal of promoting integration across components.

The Department of Defense and the military Services have come a long way in realizing the vision of an operational reserve. Much more, however, needs to be done. Continued progress, informed by recent experience and with continued focus on the worthy conclusions and recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, will be needed to achieve a fully capable and sustainable operational reserve.
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Operational for What?
The Future of the Guard and Reserves

By JOHN A. NAGL and TRAVIS SHARP

Dr. John A. Nagl is President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), Travis Sharp is a Research Associate at CNAS. They coauthored the Two-Year Report Card: Implementing the Recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNAS, 2010).
Since the end of the Cold War, the National Guard and Reserves have been transformed from a strategic to an operational force because of the demands of U.S. military involvement in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and—most significantly—Afghanistan and Iraq (twice). While still providing strategic depth in the event of a major war, the often derided “weekend warriors” of yesteryear have been replaced by men and women who join the Guard and Reserves knowing full well that they will participate routinely and regularly in ongoing military missions. This transformation of the Reserve Component (RC)—comprised of approximately 1.1 million Servicemembers in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard Reserve, along with the Army and Air National Guard—has been widely acknowledged by U.S. political and military leaders. As Vice President Joe Biden said earlier this year, “This ain’t your father’s National Guard.”1 Officials also have recognized the need for new policies that will support an operational reserve. Department of Defense (DOD) Secretary Robert Gates observed, “Since the Guard was considered in the past a strategic reserve, it was a lower priority for funding. That has changed.”2 Congress assisted by fully funding RC budget requests and by instituting legislative changes to fund requirements, such as improved medical and dental screenings, that bolster operational readiness.

On balance, the United States has come a long way in developing a ready, capable, and available operational reserve. DOD should be commended for its improvements during both the Bush and Obama administrations. Yet two strands of unanswered questions relating to strategic roles and missions as well as readiness and funding threaten to unravel the progress made so far. In a budgetary environment where defense spending is expected to decrease, postwar reset expenditures loom, and structural cost growth is intensifying internal competition for Pentagon resources, a fundamental question must be answered about the future of the Guard and Reserves: “Operational for what?”

Strategic Roles and Missions

The Guard and Reserves have contributed considerably to the U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Over 770,000 RC Servicemembers have been activated since September 11, 2001, and half of all Army RC personnel are now combat veterans.4 President Barack Obama has highlighted specific

He later added, “Today, the standard is that the Guard and Reserves receive the same equipment as the Active Force.”3 DOD has moved to support an operational reserve thanks in no small part to the influence of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, which released its landmark final report in January 2008. Besides developing implementation plans for the majority of the commission’s recommendations, Secretary Gates issued Directive 1200.17 (October 29, 2008), Directive 1235.10 (November 26, 2008), and Instruction 1235.12 (February 4, 2010), which collectively enshrined the principles and policies required to sustain the Reserve Component as an operational force.
policies and apportion future resources based solely on the Reserve’s wartime contributions over the past decade. Current necessity does not equal continued relevance. Today, there is already talk of placing the RC “back on the shelf,” or restoring it to a strictly strategic or “weekend warrior” status, in order to save the additional money required to keep it operational. This is nothing new; the RC has historically been targeted for downsizing during times of diminishing Pentagon budgets, in part due to the counterproductive yet persistent rivalry between the Active and Reserve Components. Secretary Gates may have issued the directives to sustain the RC as an operational force, but unless

incorporates its 500,000 to 800,000 reservists directly into its order of battle, requires reserve units to train alongside active-duty forces, and is increasing the funding and time devoted to reserve training and equipment. The majority of PLA reservists are former active-duty soldiers, and every reserve unit includes a small contingent of active-duty personnel that forms a continuous management nucleus between and during mobilizations. In recent years, the PLA has increasingly recruited civilian reservists who lack prior military service but possess high-tech skills with military applicability. For example, reservists employed in the chemical industry serve in chemical warfare units, and reservist telecommunications workers have

been assigned to new PLA units specializing in information warfare and information operations. These highly skilled reservists play a growing role in China’s evolving antiaccess/area-denial strategy of using sophisticated cyber and electronic attacks to degrade the U.S. military’s battle networks, forward bases, and maritime forces and thereby inhibit U.S. power projection capabilities.

The 2010 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was supposed to offer a similarly forward-oriented vision of the future role of the Guard and Reserves. While comprehensive in its description of the emerging international security environment, however, the QDR spent much less time on the RC. It stated:

prevailing in today’s wars requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity—available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment. Preventing and deterring conflict will likely necessitate the continued use of some elements of the Reserve Component—especially those that possess high-demand skill sets—in an operational capacity well into the future. . . . The challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require us to employ National Guard and Reserve forces as an operational reserve to fulfill requirements for which they are well-suited in the United States and overseas. For example, the National Guard often serves at the forefront of DoD operations.

On the positive side, the QDR codified the “likely” need for an operational reserve “well into the future,” including in “preventing and deterring conflict,” one of the QDR’s four priority objectives. The RC’s inclusion under this objective is important because it confirms that the RC has an operational role, aside from prevailing in today’s wars (another of the priority objectives), in the initiatives listed under the “prevent and deter” heading. Because of the enduring phenomenon Secretary Gates calls “next-war-itis,” these future-oriented initiatives are already attracting more of defense policymakers’ attention and resources. This trend is sure to accelerate as U.S. forces leave Afghanistan and Iraq. From the perspective of the RC, it is positive to have gotten in at the ground level, doctrinally speaking, on the “prevent and deter” objective that is likely to dominate the post-Afghanistan/Iraq defense planning era.

On the negative side, the QDR failed to identify which specific roles and missions it envisioned the RC fulfilling. Instead, it vaguely stated that “some elements” of the RC, especially those with “high-demand skill sets,” would be needed “to fulfill requirements for which they are well-suited.” But which elements, which skill sets, and which requirements? As noted above, “The National Guard often serves at the forefront of DoD operations” was all the QDR could offer as an example. Since millions of DOD civilian and military personnel undertake scores of operations every day, however, this example did not exactly narrow things down. By specifying neither the roles and missions anticipated for the RC, nor the strength, capabilities, or equipment needed to perform those roles and missions, the QDR failed to address directly one of the 17 reporting items required by law (10 U.S.C. Section 118, as amended).

To compensate for this disappointing omission, the QDR pledged to conduct a comprehensive Pentagon review of future RC roles and missions, including an examination of the balance between Active and Reserve forces. The last government study to devote serious thought to this issue was the 2001 QDR-directed Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense published in December 2002—3 months before the U.S. invasion of Iraq intensified what would become years of heavy reliance on the Guard and Reserves. The results of the new review being spearheaded by General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and Dennis McCarthy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, are expected by spring 2011. What conclusions will this review reach, and what will the implications be?

In its discussion of the future character of conflict, the 2010 QDR offered some helpful hints. It posited that in the 21st century, conventional U.S. military superiority will increasingly drive potential adversaries toward asymmetric responses to American power. It emphasized the nontraditional threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorist attacks, hybrid warfare combining high- and low-tech tactics, and the loss of shared access to the global commons in sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Cueing off this assessment, the QDR’s future-oriented “prevent and deter” objective, mentioned above as a place where RC capabilities will likely be applied operationally, included such high-profile U.S. missions as:

- contributing to homeland defense and civil support capabilities
- assisting partner nations in developing and acquiring the capabilities and systems required to improve their security capacity
- maintaining awareness of global threats and opportunities, including the capabilities, values, intent, and decisionmaking of potential adversaries
- supporting U.S. diplomatic and development efforts and strengthening governance as homeland defense and disaster response; security forces assistance; intelligence (including language skills) and reconnaissance (including unmanned aircraft systems); civil and public affairs; overseas peacekeeping, logistics, and maintenance activities; space, cyber, and missile defense–applicable technical and engineering skills; and air traffic control and air control. Where will these capabilities come from?

Aside from the National Guard’s obvious centrality in the homeland defense mission, large portions of these capabilities already reside in the Reserve Component. For example, the Army Reserve provides the total Army with 87 percent of its Civil Affairs capacity, more than two-thirds of its expeditionary sustainment commands, and nearly half of its military police commands and information operations groups. The Air Force Reserve provides the total Air Force with roughly half of its aerial port and strategic airlift capacity, not to mention approximately one-fifth of its theater airlift, intelligence, and air operations center capacity. The Air National Guard currently supplies 25 percent of both remotely piloted vehicle sorties and processing, exploitation, and dissemination services to the joint force.

Navy Reserve personnel, who have provided over two-thirds of all individual Augmentees to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility since September 11, 2001, constitute 53 percent of all Navy Expeditionary Combat Center forces, which support such operations as explosive ordnance disposal, construction and engineering (Seabees), port and cargo handling, document and electronic media exploitation, and building partner security capacity.

The National Guard State Partnership Program helps build whole-of-government security and political capacity in 62 nations allied with the United States throughout Central and South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. National Guard Agribusiness Development Teams help provide postconflict economic opportunities in Afghanistan, a country that employs nearly four-fifths of its labor force in agriculture. The Guard also provides forces for Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams and Embedded Training Teams, which offer training and mentoring to the Afghan National Army, as well as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which assist reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Recognizing the value of such programs, Secretary Gates stated last year that “[m]ore programs like this can be developed and we are working with the Services and their Reserve components to find appropriate force structures that can capitalize on the professional skills of Reservists and Guardsmen, while not detracting from the readiness in our conventional formations.”

The QDR failed to identify which specific roles and missions it envisioned the RC fulfilling.
RC Servicemembers’ civilian careers provide them with the opportunity to acquire skills and expertise that are difficult to train and retain in the Active Component, particularly in specialized and high-tech fields. DOD could certainly pay for an Active-duty infantry Soldier to be schooled in the latest police training and tactics so he could advise host nation forces. But perhaps it makes more sense just to get an Army Guardsman or Reservist with 20 years of experience as a law enforcement officer to do the job. Or to get a Navy Reservist who just happens to work as a Google software engineer to fill a critical cyber security billet, or to get an Air Force Reserve intelligence officer with a graduate degree in European studies to liaise with a fledgling Balkan defense ministry. Leaving aside difficult but solvable personnel management issues related to quantity, accessibility, predictability, and cost, the U.S. military cannot afford to bar these skill sets from being used operationally.

The Reserve Component contains some of the best qualified people the United States has to offer, and they joined (or rejoined) the RC with the expectation that they were to become members of an operational, not a “weekend warrior,” force. The RC absolutely must be part of the solution for a complex future security environment that will compel the United States to stabilize failed states, cultivate political and military capacity in allied nations, and maintain military access to domains congested by cyber and electronic attacks.

Just this rundown suggests that the RC possesses many of the capabilities DOD will need in the future, particularly within ascendant mission sets such as conducting irregular warfare and postconflict stabilization operations in failed or failing states; building security capacity to enhance the U.S. military’s relationship and interoperability with its allies, thereby strengthening coalitions that can prevent and deter conflict; and ensuring access to space and cyber networks and blunting attacks against civilian and military cyber nodes. This is impressive considering that the RC currently makes up 43 percent of the total DOD force but consumes just 9 percent of DOD’s annual base budget. Several independent reports have concluded that the RC could make an even larger contribution in the near future. For instance, recent RAND assessments of the Air Force judged not only that RC Servicemembers employed in high-tech fields such as information technology “can be tapped to provide the most current knowledge, tools, and techniques,” but also that doing so “could offset additional staffing requirements that may be needed in the active component for these operations.” The use of “reachback,” in which RC Servicemembers perform functions in support of the warfighter without physically deploying (for example, operating unmanned aircraft systems) offers one method for bringing these high-demand, low-density RC abilities to bear overseas.

Readiness and Funding

Many American policymakers and citizens believe that government spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will end as soon as the majority of U.S. combat troops are withdrawn. Yet this belief ignores the significant costs that will need to be incurred to safely reduce troop levels and to reset training and equipment so returning units are capable of performing full-spectrum operations. Additionally, the Pentagon budget is being increasingly put under pressure by rising personnel, operations and maintenance, and procurement costs, as well as ballooning non-DOD Federal mandatory spending. Because of its close ties to local communities across the United States, the RC is always going to be looked upon favorably by Congress. But it will be far tougher to convince Pentagon planners operating in a resource-constrained environment to make the investments necessary to fully transition the Guard and Reserves to an operational force—particularly given the hefty past and future sums required to generate readiness standards consistent with an operational reserve.

Since 2001, the RC has demonstrated a track record of securing levels of funding consistent with its invaluable wartime
contributions and the ever-growing U.S. defense budget. In inflation-adjusted dollars, RC funding for personnel increased by nearly 50 percent, operations and maintenance by 33 percent, and procurement by 157 percent between fiscal year 2001 (FY01) and FY10. During the same period, each RC’s share of its respective Service budget remained relatively stable and rarely fluctuated from year to year by more than 2 percent.

This steadily increasing investment has yielded improvements in readiness that have helped to enable the responsible and effective use of an operational reserve. Marked progress has been made in providing adequate notification prior to mobilization, so RC Servicemembers can prepare personally and professionally for deployment. The Army also has made improvements in employing the “train, mobilize, deploy” model. For example, the Army Reserve has used its new regional training center concept to reduce postmobilization training time from 70 to 80 days to 30 to 40 days. This leaves more time for units to perform theater-specific training after mobilization, and anecdotal evidence suggests that fewer units are being forced to endure frustrating revalidations and recertifications at mobilization stations. Finally, Individual Medical Readiness reportedly improved between 2008 and 2009, particularly on dental readiness has been made, but much more remains to be done. On the plus side, there have been significant advancements in ensuring oversight and transparency of RC procurement funding and equipment distribution—perennial problems that detract from accurately assessing readiness. Yet the process is still convoluted and the data are still difficult to track independently.

### Reserve Component Equipment Shortages at Beginning of Fiscal Year 2010

(In millions of $; totals may not be exact due to rounding)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserve Component</th>
<th>Requirements ($)</th>
<th>On-hand ($)</th>
<th>Shortage ($)</th>
<th>Shortage (% of Required $s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
<td>1,307</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>109,355</td>
<td>79,090</td>
<td>30,265</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>23,206</td>
<td>22,433</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>6,686</td>
<td>4,007</td>
<td>2,679</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy Reserve</td>
<td>10,007</td>
<td>9,476</td>
<td>531</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>27,659</td>
<td>17,173</td>
<td>10,486</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard Reserve</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Requirements, on-hand, and shortage entries are total equipment value, excluding substitutes.
media and congressional attention in part because National Guard Bureau Chief General Craig McKinley, despite expecting greater access to key decisionmakers after receiving his fourth star, was not consulted as the decision was being made.36

The Army Reserve is also facing equipment challenges. “The reality is current operations are consuming Army Reserve readiness as fast as we can build it,” the 2010 Army Reserve Posture Statement noted.37 As of April 2010, the Army Reserve reported 80 percent equipment on hand. Yet because only 65 percent of it is modernized, equipment must be continuously cross-leveled to meet the requirements of deploying units. When Army Reserve Soldiers do not possess skills with or get the opportunity to train on the type of modernized equipment they will be expected to use in theater during deployments, the resulting inexperience can erode premobilization readiness, boots-on-ground time, morale, and the flexibility to reassign units from one mission to another. For instance, a unit scheduled to deploy to Iraq—where Soldiers fall in on equipment already stationed there—cannot be quickly reassigned to Afghanistan, where there is no provided equipment.38 The Army Reserve currently projects that it will need approximately $11 billion through FY16 to become fully modernized with the capabilities the Army is increasingly looking for, such as engineering, military police, and transportation.39 “We’ve got to get more resourcing into our budgets for the Reserve Component if we expect to use it as an operational force,” insisted Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, Chief of Army Reserve, in March 2010.39

Yet meeting the future equipment needs of an operational reserve will not be easy. While the Services and the DOD comptroller have worked together to ensure that RC operational requirements are funded in Overseas Contingency Operations requests, these supplemental requests are transitory and will evaporate in the years ahead as military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq wind down. As General Stultz told Congress, “If we operationalize the Reserve—and in my opinion, we don’t have a choice—then we’ve got to put those dollars required for training, for equipping, all that, into the base budget.”40 DOD Instruction 1235.12, released on February 4, 2010, mandated that the RC be allocated resources “to fulfill roles and missions as both a strategic and operational force.”41 Since those roles and missions are not yet defined, however, the inertia of current practice, not newly issued memoranda, will continue to drive the Pentagon’s budgetary priorities, and the current practice is to fund the operational requirements of the RC through the Overseas Contingency Operations budget.

Shifting RC operational requirements from war supplemtals to the base budget is going to be difficult, especially for the Army. A September 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that while the Army plans to request billions of dollars between FY12 and FY17 to transition its Reserve Components to an operational force, “the Army has not established firm readiness requirements for an operational reserve component or fully incorporated the resources needed to support the operational role into its budget and projected spending plan.”42 This is directly tied to the lack of agreement on RC roles and missions. According to GAO, the Army also lacks a detailed implementation plan that outlines requirements and monitors progress for transitioning to an operational reserve. The lack of such outcome-related metrics means that “DOD decision makers and Congress will not be in a sound position to determine the total costs to complete the transition and decide how to best allocate future funding.43 This does not bode well for stable, predictable funding of an operational reserve in DOD’s future base budgets.

Learning Hard Lessons

Due to the QDR’s failure to broach any discussion of RC roles and missions, the Guard and Reserves now find themselves in a race against the clock. By the time the QDR-mandated roles and missions study is completed in spring 2011, incorporated into programming and budgeting documents, and approved by Congress, execution may not begin until 2016 or later. Between now and
seamlessly integrated Total Force that can meet tomorrow’s challenges. When it comes to the Guard and Reserves, DOD can best advance this Total Force objective by:

n expeditiously completing and widely disseminating the new RC roles and missions report, which must evaluate how the RC’s recent combat experience and specialized, high-tech skills and expertise should be used as a “force of first choice” to meet the complex security challenges of the future
n strengthening its commitment to the continuum of service concept, which must include more options for flexible service, more requirements that Active-duty personnel serve with the RC, and more opportunities for RC Servicemembers to attend senior Service colleges in-residence
n obtaining an updated, independent, and comprehensive analysis that compares the cost and value of the Active and Reserve Components—or at the very least verifies the costing methodology currently being developed by the new RC roles and missions report—using a variety of up-to-date assumptions and methodologies (RAND or the Congressional Budget Office would be the best organization to conduct such an analysis because of their independence and rigor).

If the landmark 2008 report by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves helped expedite the “first wave” in transforming the Guard and Reserves into a 21st-century operational force, it appears that the “second wave” is now under way. The forthcoming RC roles and missions study, in conjunction with the 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation and the Guard and Reserves “report card” recently published by the Center for a New American Security, will hopefully encourage continued reform. Senior policymakers and Active Component leaders must review these source materials and better acquaint themselves with the important issues facing the RC—an education effort that has come up short in far too many cases. Armed with this knowledge, decisionmakers will be better prepared to answer the “Operational for what?” question and make wiser choices about how best to protect the United States against the complex security threats of the 21st century. JFQ

NOTES

9 Ibid., 81–87.


Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.


Personnel figures exclude Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Funds. With the exception of FY10, for which the complete data are not yet available, procurement figures include President’s Budget P–1R exhibit, congressional additions, supplements (where applicable), and National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation. Personnel and operations and maintenance figures are from DOD “Green Books.” Procurement figures are from DOD, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington, DC: DOD, February 2009), 1–7, available at <http://ra.defense.gov/documents/NGRER%20FY10.pdf>.


Stultz, April 27, 2010.


Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Consolidated Report to Congress on Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force” (unpublished draft dated May 2010).


Raymond Carpenter, testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, April 27, 2010.

Raymond Carpenter, testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, April 22, 2010.

National Guard Bureau, 15.


U.S. Army Reserve, 5.

Jack Stultz, testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, April 22, 2010.

Jack Stultz, testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, April 14, 2010.


Ibid.


GAO, Army Needs to Finalize, 37.

Ibid., 38.
When the congressionally chartered Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) issued its report in 2008, two of the recommendations that jumped out for many of us who had spent years in the Reserve Components (RCs) were numbers 81 and 84, both of which addressed the need to eliminate cultural differences and prejudices that still exist between Active Component (AC) and RC personnel. Many Reservists said, “It’s about time.” The reaction on the part of at least some members of the AC was different: “What prejudice?”

Indeed, after the report was issued, I engaged my students at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) in discussions on some of its findings, and these discussions, which were totally informal, led me to understand that there remains a cultural divide between AC and RC personnel that will not soon be erased but that changes in law, policy, and procedures would go far toward eliminating. In at least one of the discussions was an Army Reservist who tried to relate to his AC counterparts the difficulty of being a Soldier—which he was to the core of his being—while also trying to pursue a civilian career. “I wish I could only concentrate on being a Soldier,” he said in effect, “but I work for the Federal Government, and even the most supportive boss is not always totally supportive of what I do for the Army and the time it takes away from my government job.” This individual attended ICAF in a civilian capacity, but his presence in the discussion made all the difference for his fellow students who had not juggled the demands of the combined military-civilian world.

Even after a bracing and sometimes passionate discussion, some of his fellow students from the Active side of the house still did not
fully understand how this individual, who had deployed to Bosnia and then to Iraq within a 10-year period, could maintain that there were cultural prejudices against him and his cohorts in the Reserves. But any of us who have served in the Reserve Components could probably offer quite a list—which I will not attempt to do here. Please bear with me and accept my contention that there are prejudices and allow me to address the issue of how these prejudices and misconceptions can be eliminated.

Changing law and regulation and practice is a start, and one place I would start is with in-residence attendance at senior Service colleges, where future generals and admirals are groomed every year.

Diversity of Opinion

I taught at ICAF for 18 years. Most years there were no more than four to six Reservists in attendance officially, plus about the same number who slipped in as civilians. That is a maximum of a dozen or so RC officers out of over 300 students in attendance at ICAF. Two years ago, the college even had a senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) Army Reservist (E–7) in residence as a civilian, the first time to anyone’s knowledge that an NCO had attended a “war college” in residence.

There are 20 seminars at ICAF, carefully balanced among the Services, though for many years there was a dearth of Marines, such that many seminars were without a USMC presence. The college persisted in badgering the Pentagon and Marine Corps, however, until each seminar had a Marine because the school’s leadership saw the value of someone who could express a “Marine point of view”—assuming there is such a thing. ICAF is unique, too, in that it has what are called “industry fellows,” whose corporations pay large sums in tuition to the National Defense University so one of their promising executives can get the exposure and education offered by attendance at the 10-month curriculum. Federal law limits the number of such fellows to 10 per class, but the college’s leadership is constantly trying to get the law changed so there can be one industry fellow per seminar—just like with the Marines.

ICAF leadership saw immediately and intuitively the value of having a diversity of opinion in each seminar or retired AC officer—to see the value of this particular type of diversity in the classroom. And as I read through the Department of Defense (DOD) and Service responses to the CNGR recommendations, this lack of appreciation of the value a Reserve point of view would bring to any discussion came through loud and clear.

For example, instead of addressing the CNGR recommendation to increase
the “fully-funded slots allocated to reserve component officers at the National Defense University, senior war colleges, and 10-week [joint professional military education (JPME)] . . . in-residence course,” DOD seems to be looking for ways to extend JPME nonresident opportunities for Reservists. While this is admirable, it is also cheap and unresponsive. There is a tremendous difference between residence and nonresidence courses. As any graduate of an in-residence course would testify, one of the most valuable aspects of such a course is the connection among the students as they carpool to class, participate in a free-flowing classroom exchange, or engage in after-class discussion in their study rooms. Such connections build not only knowledge of each other, their components, and their Services, but also confidence in professional competency. Moreover, they contribute to the informal networks that are so valuable when crises occur. In other words, they help eliminate the cultural prejudice between AC and RC.

One of the charts that accompanied the DOD response to this recommendation was especially illuminating. For academic year 2009–2010 (AY09–10) and fiscal year 2009 (FY09), the table indicates the total number of quotas allocated for attendance by the Army at the various colleges and schools and the types and number of individuals filling these quotas. Reservists’ Views Needed

As mentioned above, ICAF generally has half a dozen to a dozen Reservists in attendance out of a class of over 300, counting civilian students who are also in the Reserves. The National War College averages two to three Reservists per class, plus perhaps one more who attends in a civilian capacity. The Air War College does better with 16 or so Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard officers in a given class, plus perhaps 5 to 10 other RC personnel, including civilian students in the Reserves. As indicated in the table, Air War College had one person from the Army National Guard in attendance this past year. The AWC Reserve advisor also said that this was the first student from the Army National Guard to attend the Air War College in 7 years. The Naval War College has a limited number of RC personnel in attendance at its senior Service college (10-month) course. For the past 3 years, the college has enrolled an average of two Army Reservists and two Marine Corps Reservists per year. This past year (AY10), it also enrolled two Air Force Reservists. For AY09–10, the Army War College had a larger percentage of Reservists in its resident class than did any other senior Service college, probably because of the large number of Reservists (Army Reserve and Army National Guard) in the total Army force. In fact, of the 336 students who graduated from the Army War College in-residence program this past year, 43 were members of the Army’s Reserve Components (21 Army Reserve and 22 Army National Guard). In addition, the class contained three members of the Air National Guard, four from the Air Force Reserve, three Navy Reserve, and three Marine Corps Reserve. With one-sixth of its in-residence class representing the Reserve Components, the Army War College might well be seen as an example for the other senior Service colleges to emulate. One fact that comes through clearly in the table below is that the Army’s RC officers are given a disproportionately small opportunity to attend one of the senior schools in residence, despite the fact that the Reserve Components make up just over 50 percent of the total Army force.

The National Defense University’s CAPSTONE program for general/flag officers presents problems of a different sort when it comes to RC attendance. The program itself is only 6 weeks long, which largely eliminates, for this author at least, the argument that Reservists cannot attend because they cannot spare the time away from their civilian positions, though the Marine Corps argued to the contrary in its response to CNGR Recommendation 13. The program is roughly split in half, with approximately 51 students attending lectures and discussions together for 3 weeks, then dividing into three equal cohorts and traveling to overseas locations for 3 weeks.

CAPSTONE is not required for RC general officers as it is by Goldwater-Nichols for AC officers. According to informal discussions with individuals who are familiar with the program, the usual CAPSTONE class has 7 or 8 RC personnel in attendance, out of the 51 or so total. Increasing either the number of classes in a year (from four) or increasing the number of students (from 51) is not viewed favorably by those associated with the program. They make the argument that class size cannot increase because of limitations on travel and suggest that the high-level speakers who give their time to CAPSTONE would not want to do more than four such presentations per year. While recognizing somewhat the validity of these arguments, it seems that there is in part an artificiality to these limitations. ICAF and the National War College (NWC), for example, take 300 (ICAF) and over 200

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Quotas and Attendance at Various Service Colleges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quota/Attended</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reserves</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>Army War College</td>
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<td>National War College</td>
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<td>Industrial College of the Armed Forces</td>
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CAPSTONE, the first step would be to identify more joint positions a Reservist could fill. Second would be to pass legislation requiring CAPSTONE attendance for the individuals in these billets. Third would be to increase the program’s carrying capacity, by increasing either the size of the class, its frequency, or some combination thereof.

Calling Out the Air National Guard

Another area where cultural prejudice—or perhaps just lack of information—can be addressed by incorporating material on the Reserve Components into the curriculum of the senior Service colleges. On this topic, the colleges have a distinctly mixed record. Though one might assume that learning about the structure, composition, mobilization requirements, and employment of over 900,000 trained military personnel would automatically be a part of the curriculum for a “war college,” this is simply not the case. The Army War College seems to be doing the best job of integrating the Reserve Components into its course of instruction. While its curriculum does not have a “Reserve 101” section—meaning a basic introduction to the RC as a stand-alone piece—it does even better, incorporating material on the Reserve Components into discussions of homeland security and defense and force generation.

The Naval War College also incorporates discussion of the Reserve Components into its courses. According to the Dean of Academic Affairs, “We routinely—in multiple contexts—refer to the Reserves in class discussion, resulting in most students leaving with a richer understanding of the strengths and limitations of the Reserve force.” In the course on Joint Military Operations, he stated, “Reserve recall/mobilization and selected capabilities are discussed in general during strategic mobility and operational logistics sessions.” Additionally, the National Security Decision Making course “also refers to the Reserves, as students are required to develop a national military strategy for the outyears.” The Naval War College does not offer an elective course on the Reserve Components.

ICAF, in contrast, does little to integrate material on the Reserve Components into its curriculum. This was brought home vividly a few years ago during a joint ICAF—NWC wargame exercise. The scenario included tens of thousands of Mexicans streaming across the southern U.S. border to escape drug-related violence in Mexico. An AC colonel who was playing the role of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded to a question during a mock congressional hearing by stating that she would call out the “Air National Guard” to deal with the refugee problem. Asked whether she intended to strafe the refugees, she exhibited total perplexity, making it clear that she had no idea of the difference between, or respective roles of, the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. Even the RC elective that is sometimes offered at ICAF was generally, if not exclusively, populated with RC students—precisely the individuals who were least in need of such knowledge augmentation.

The National War College does not offer an elective on the Reserve Components, nor does it have any stand-alone section on the Reserves in its core curriculum or incorporate Reserve-focused material. The Air War College, on the other hand, does offer an RC elective, taught by the Reserve advisor, and controls enrollment so only a limited number of Reservists are allowed in. The Army War College, on the other hand, does offer an RC elective, taught by the Reserve advisor, and controls enrollment so only a limited number of Reservists are allowed in.
College elective, entitled “Reserve Components: Organization, Roles, and Missions,” is also populated by a mix of RC and AC students and is team-taught by officers from the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. In fairness, the core curricula of the various war colleges are full of required materials, covering everything from foundational concepts in the Constitution to strategic thinking to military planning to current operations in Afghanistan. Mandatory curricular requirements are set for the colleges by the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), which prescribes the topics that have to be taught for the school to be accredited by the Joint Staff. The document is extensive, with specific guidance for each of the senior Service schools. The OPMEP, however, is ultimately created by the colleges themselves, so blaming a lack of curricular emphasis on Reserve matters on the dearth of OPMEP requirements is little more than circular reasoning. The other source of guidance for the colleges is the Chairman’s “Special Areas of Emphasis” (SAE), which are suggested by the Joint Staff and considered by senior Service college faculty at 2-day meetings each summer. In the many years that I was a faculty member at ICAF and sat in on these sessions and voted on proposed SAEs, there was never a suggestion that study of the Reserve Components be an SAE.

Increasing In-Residence Attendance

Another issue not directly addressed by the findings of the commission and the responses from the Services is the type of Reservist sent to senior Service colleges in residence. In my experience, the few RC members sent to senior colleges, whether Federal Reserve or National Guard, were almost always the full-time Active-duty Reservists, rather than troop unit personnel. There was the occasional exception, but at ICAF and NWC, at least, full-time Reservists were the norm as students. These comments are not intended to cast aspersions on the full-timers, but such Reservists are not usually the individuals who rise to the level of general/flag officer in the Reserve Components. These highest level positions, whether in one of the Federal Reserves or in the National Guard, are almost always filled by drilling, troop unit Reservists, and not by personnel from the ranks of the Army and Air Force’s Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) program or the Navy’s Training and Administration of the Reserves (TAR) program. Given the few billets available for RC personnel to attend these colleges in residence, sending an AGR or TAR to a senior Service college is probably not the most effective use of resources.

In discussions with one of the Chiefs of the Army Reserve (CAR) during the late 1990s, I raised the issue directly. The response from the CAR was that troop program unit (non-full-time) Reservists could not spare the 10 months away from their civilian jobs to attend senior Service colleges. This rationale, of course, has been totally eliminated by the near-constant deployment of Reservists overseas since 9/11 and the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003. The CAR’s rationale is even less persuasive when one considers that in-residence attendance at a senior Service college is a voluntary matter on the part of the officer. If officers do not wish to take 10 months away from their civilian position to attend a senior Service college, there is nothing in law or regulation that could compel them. Credit for senior Service college completion can still be gained through the Army War College’s distance education program, though such an experience does not afford the intangible benefits of in-residence schooling.

As to specific next steps that might be taken, I suggest that focusing on greater Reserve in-residence attendance at senior Service colleges would pay the greatest immediate dividends and would go furthest toward reducing cultural prejudice between AC and RC personnel, while working with the Joint Staff to put RC knowledge into the OPMEP would have the second greatest effect. Increasing attendance of Reservists at CAPSTONE is the third leg of the triangle, but it is of lesser import than the first two.

In my opinion, based on a careful reading of the DOD and Service responses to the CNGR recommendations, as well as my 18 years as a war college faculty member, cultural prejudice still exists between Active Component and Reserve Component personnel, primarily because of misconceptions about, and misunderstanding of, the RC by the AC. Such cultural prejudice weakens us as a fighting force and should be addressed and eliminated. This country will inevitably continue to rely on its Reserve Components for both homeland defense and overseas assignment for the foreseeable future, and it is critical that we create a Total Force in reality, as well as in theory. JFQ

NOTES

1 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force; Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, January 31, 2008. Recommendations #81 and 84, 331.

2 Ibid., Recommendation #13, 20.

3 Commission on the National Guard and Reserve Implementation Plan, Recommendation #13.

4 Email from Mark Pizzo, National War College, to James T. Currie, July 8, 2010. These numbers differ slightly from those in the chart, but they represent averages and not a specific academic year.


6 Ibid.

7 Email from John F. Garofano, Naval War College, to James T. Currie, July 9, 2010.


9 Army Demographics: FY09 Army Profile (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, September 30, 2009). Army Reserve Components (Army National Guard and Army Reserve) numbered 564,000; the Active Army force was at 549,000.

10 Having more Marine Corps Reserve general officers attend CAPSTONE, stated the Corps, would be difficult because “by the time General officers reach that point in their Marine Corps career, they are probably also working equally hard to achieve such pinnacles in their civilian careers. As a result, their ability to commit six weeks away from a civilian career may be limited.” Navy response to CNGR Recommendation #13, April 27, 2010.

11 Telephone interview with Scudieri.

12 Email from Garofano.

13 Email from David Auerwald, National War College, to James T. Currie, July 8, 2010.

14 Telephone interview with Paul.

15 Telephone interview with Scudieri.

16 For the current OPMEP, see <www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/1800_01.pdf>.

17 Email from Pizzo.
In 2006, General James Jones, USMC (Ret.), led a team of analysts assessing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) at the height of the sectarian violence in that country. The basic tone of the Jones report reflected uneven progress in the overall ISF structure. However, while the Iraqi military was generally considered capable, the analysts found Iraqi police forces to be almost universally problematic. The report’s most scathing assessment was leveled against the Iraqi National Police (INP), which were described as riddled with sectarianism, deeply mistrusted, and suffering from a potentially paralyzing identity crisis. This crisis stemmed from the lack of understanding about the nature of the force—specifically, whether it was supposed to be a counterinsurgent force or a local police force with national jurisdiction. While acknowledging the need for a national level police force under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, the report nevertheless recommended that the INP be disbanded. This recommendation was a stinging rebuke to the police wing of U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in Iraq, essentially concluding that significant portions of its work had been wasted.

By E R I C E. G R E E K

Major Eric E. Greek, USA, is a Training and Operations Officer in the 4th Battalion/23rd Infantry, 5th Brigade/2nd Infantry Stryker Brigade Combat Team at Fort Lewis, Washington.
Background
I began serving with the INP in June 2008 and found that many of the critical problems within it—particularly the perception of sectarianism—had been addressed and largely solved. Helping to dispel that perception was the INP performance at the battle of Basrah, where two INP brigades fought for 3 days against Shia militias within the city even as the Iraqi army initially collapsed. Although the INP remained haunted by the perception of sectarianism, the problem was significantly reduced. In practice, the organization’s loyalty was to the central government. By the middle of 2009, the force was perceived as politically reliable enough that there were efforts to put a Sunni general in charge as a balance to the Shia-dominated Iraqi army. The INP had also become an effective counterinsurgent force that successfully fought rebels in Diyala Province and was an instrumental element in calming problems in Iraq’s northern Nineva Province. The INP was, for all practical purposes, a highly potent light infantry force conducting COIN operations.

Despite the clear improvements in its capabilities and its undeniable success against Iraqi insurgent groups, however, there were looming problems in the force. The observation in the Jones report that the INP suffered from “a lack of clarity about its identity—specifically whether it is a military or police force” proved to be particularly astute. With the relative decline of insurgent forces across Iraq in early 2009, there was a push to remove Iraqi military forces from the cities and shift the burden of security there onto police forces. This process demanded a skill set that an infantry-centric COIN force was ill prepared to execute. The INP had few ties with and little understanding of the Iraqi judicial process, its evidence collection procedures were archaic and ineffective, and its primary motivation remained defeating insurgents rather than deterring or capturing criminals. Simply put, the INP was a force in name only and was unprepared to assume the responsibility of a force proper. Worse, the local police—insufficiently equipped and staffed with 60,000 completely untrained personnel—were wholly unable to take on a prominent security role.

After 6 years of war and a return to normalcy seemingly within grasp, it came as a shock to many to discover that there basically was no police force to facilitate that return. Coalition forces often exacerbated the problem of creating an effective police force. U.S. military forces tended to push Iraqi police into extremes of usage. Police battalions, both local and national, were sometimes utilized as static guard forces with no police function or in roles that duplicated U.S. and Iraqi military efforts, such as manning checkpoints and conducting deliberate clearance missions and cordon and search operations. Military forces had little understanding of the role of police in security. Civilian advisors were embedded within many police organizations, but they were often confined to coalition base camps, and their advice on developing police security functions was either poorly understood or ignored by commanders, whose overriding concern was the defeat of the Iraqi insurgency. This was the situation that drove me to take a fresh look at the relationships between police and military forces.

COIN and Police Forces
What is the role of military forces in counterinsurgency? What is the role of police forces during and after a counterinsurgency? More important, how do these two professions cooperatively divide the security requirements of counterinsurgency? It is clear that they have vastly different approaches to a defined enemy—as either a combatant or a criminal—and the two approaches often run at cross purposes.

The COIN effort in Afghanistan is a complex environment that brings many of the problems of developing a police force to the forefront. After 9 years of war, there are significant problems with the Afghan police. Saying that the effort to develop these forces has been chaotic would be an understatement.

The problem of ineffectiveness begins at the highest level, and there is little concurrence among the multiple agencies working to develop the police. In addition, there appears to be no consensus on how to define the problem of Afghanistan. For example, in academic circles, Thomas Barnett considers Afghanistan a gap state: the root of the problem is that Afghanistan is not linked into the global economy. This idea assumes that the role of the Afghan police force would be to protect economic development sites and transportation networks rather than to deter crime and defeat insurgent groups. In contrast, many international agencies define...
Afghanistan as a failed state and posit that building institutions within Afghanistan is a solution. This focuses the police effort on protecting government facilities and carrying out the rule of law. Furthermore, the U.S. Army’s doctrine on stability operations defines Afghanistan as a fragile state and lists police forces as an integral part of almost every aspect of the stabilization effort. Finally, the situation in Afghanistan is believed to require a COIN strategy, and our doctrine envisions the police force’s primary role as one of counterinsurgency. These multiple views bring us no closer to answering the question: What is the role of Afghanistan’s police force?

The diverse interpretations of the role of Afghanistan’s police force have created many competing, unprioritized programs that have pulled the small force in different directions. To envision these requirements properly, we have to consider the differing capabilities of military and police forces. For example, we would never expect the Los Angeles police department to engage and defeat an entrenched enemy force. Conversely, we would not expect U.S. Army paratroopers to be in Los Angeles enforcing zoning laws.

Nevertheless, these competing visions of the Afghan police force have created the expectation that it will be able to produce the security effects of both a military and a police force. Whether this is feasible is debatable, but it is clear that Afghan police forces are having problems adjusting to so many different demands. At some point, these contending visions must be prioritized, and it is interesting to see how the security realm was divided in Afghanistan (see figure 1). According to Robert Perito:

The Afghan security sector was divided into four pillars with one lead nation assigned to each pillar to oversee support and reforms. Under this plan, the United States was assigned responsibility for the military; Germany, the police; Italy, the judiciary; and Britain, counternarcotics. The framework was meant to ensure burden sharing, but assignments were made with little expertise, experience, or resources, and there was no mechanism to ensure a coordinated approach to reform efforts.

The problems of training a force in capabilities mirroring those of the German police and then using that force as “little soldiers” to perform military COIN tasks that they simply are not prepared for are evident. In fact, there appears to be little coordination between the training base and the combat forces that subsequently employ the Afghan police. The Afghan National Police were being pulled into all four areas of security under the auspices and conditions of four different nations. In direct contrast, the Afghan National Army benefited from the priority of effort and mentorship of the parallel U.S. military force. It should come as no surprise that the Afghan National Police are struggling to become an effective force as a result of this disjointed effort.

The problems arising in creating police forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan are not only a cause for concern, but also should be genuinely alarming given a U.S. military doctrinal focus that advocates that the “primary frontline COIN force is often the police—not the military. The primary COIN objective is to enable local institutions. Therefore, supporting the police is essential.” We continue to grapple with the role of the police, often allowing our competing visions to make this task more complex than it needs to be. The requirement for a single concept for police forces is paramount when we involve the whole of not just our own government but also of multiple national governments in COIN efforts. Without this concept, the probability of unfocused and overlapping solutions regarding the development of police forces will remain high.

Figure 1. The Afghan National Police Problem

Afghan Police Problem?

Police trained on both British and German models (with significant input from the United States) functioning within an Italian judicial process while performing U.S. military tasks
The Security Trinity

A look at the general security model of stable states is worthwhile in order to understand what we are trying to create with police forces. Generally speaking, most nations have three arms to their security forces: the military, a national police force, and local police forces. As we envision this security arrangement, we must be mindful of the professional cultures and predispositions of the security agencies involved in each of the wings of security (see figure 2).

When considering the professional requirements of each arm, we see the divergence between police and military views of security. For example, the function of the police is described as “crime control, crime prevention, [and] problem solving,” while it is said of the military function that, “once deployed, the Army operates for extended periods across the full spectrum of conflict, from stable peace through general war.”

These different views about what constitutes security create organizations and professional cultures best suited to establishing that envisioned endstate. It is therefore probable that indigenous police forces in COIN operations will be influenced by and attempt to emulate the culture and capabilities of the profession that is developing them. We can clearly see this problem in the debate surrounding the Afghan police.

As a general example of how these differing cultures can become problematic, we need look no further than terminology. For example, it is clear that the term campaign has different meanings within the two security organizations. The military defines a campaign as a joint process involving major operations to achieve a national strategic endstate, but the word can also refer to a comprehensive plan to address a single issue (for example, the British police campaign to raise awareness of the National Terror Hotline). There is likely to be considerable friction between police and military advisors without adequate consideration of these differing professional cultures. This problem is heightened when police advisors try to replicate a necessary local police function at the same time that military advisors are attempting to develop a counterinsurgency capability within the same force.

The divisions between the police and military can be further exacerbated by professional differences between local and national police forces (see figure 3). Additionally, these cultural norms are influenced by the history
and culture of a given nation and thus can vary widely.\textsuperscript{21} For example, Russia currently has a Ministry of Interior national police force that is robust enough to participate in large-scale combat operations.\textsuperscript{22} The French and Italians have national gendarmeries and Carabinieri, while the United States has a federalized police force in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In nations that have a history of revolutions and coups such as Russia, the need for a robust national police force as a counterweight to the military is an important consideration. However, an attempt to establish a police force with enough capability to match military forces would be met with derision in the United States.

Every national level police force is organized based on specific historical, cultural, political, and security requirements of the founding nation. Although this can lead to vastly different capabilities among national level police forces, the basic requirements of local and national police forces remain similar. For example, we would not expect the Boise, Idaho, police department to combat human smuggling among several West Coast ports. Conversely, we would not expect FBI agents to hand out speeding tickets or respond to a robbery in Boise. The issue is one of understanding what security forces are expected to do within the role they are assigned. Creating a police force for Afghanistan without reference to its history and culture not only produces a suboptimal police force, but also precludes the prioritization of police advisors (see figure 4).

Likewise, the issue raised by Afghanistan’s police problems is identifying what the country’s security requirements are. How will we fill the three security arms for Afghanistan? Does Afghanistan require a national police force capable of countering the Afghan National Army? Would Afghanistan be better served by a European model national police force that has larger organizational combat capabilities than the FBI? Would it be sufficient to have a police force capable of defeating criminal networks and reinforced by the Afghan National Army when an insurgent force overwhelms local security capability? How much overlap in capability is required by the Afghan military and police forces?

Answers to these questions are well beyond the scope of this article. However, it is apparent that the unfocused efforts with regard to Afghanistan’s police forces are expensive and time consuming and may delay a positive outcome for years if not properly addressed.\textsuperscript{23} There have clearly been successful police functions within previous COIN efforts, and it is incumbent on us to identify and implement these lessons to avoid further complications with police forces in our current operations. \textbf{JFQ}

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2. Ibid., 113.
3. Ibid., 112.
4. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 1.
12. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 18–19.
19. Ibid., 1–9.
Understanding SRI LANKA’S Defeat of the TAMIL TIGERS

By NIEL A. SMITH

After three decades of conflict, Sri Lanka’s government defeated the ethnic separatist insurgent group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), popularly known as the Tamil Tigers, in May 2009. The violence and brutality employed by both sides in the final years of the conflict drew significant interest from the global civilian and military communities, especially when Sri Lanka credited its callousness to civilian casualties as a key to its success. The defeat of the LTTE added to the debates over U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and the role of lethal force in counterinsurgency. Some have advocated that the United States consider employing such tactics as part of an effective COIN campaign, utilizing recent cases such as Sri Lanka and Chechnya to bolster their case.

In October 2009, Indian Defense Review author V.K. Shashikumar listed eight principles, the so-called Rajapaksa Model, of Sri Lankan COIN.1 Sri Lankan military and civilian leaders believe the application of these principles enabled the government’s victory:

- political will
- go to hell (that is, ignore domestic and international criticism)
- no negotiations
- regulate media
- no ceasefire
- complete operational freedom
- accent on young commanders
- keep your neighbors in the loop.

These harsh principles stand in stark contrast to the population-centric approach articulated in U.S. military doctrine. Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency, counsels an approach that attempts to influence and persuade the population to willingly side with the counterinsurgent by providing a superior alternative to the insurgent cause. Key to this philosophy is the concept of protecting civilians from insurgent influence and avoiding unnecessary collateral damage.2 The differences between the two approaches are significant and cut to the heart of ongoing doctrinal debates over the way ahead in Afghanistan and future counterinsurgency operations. Do Sri Lanka’s eight fundamentals account for the defeat of the LTTE and validate the effectiveness of ruthless counterinsurgency tactics? If so, what are the lessons for U.S. COIN operations?

Overview

The LTTE is the main insurgent group representing the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka.3 The British imported the Hindu Tamils from southern India in the 18th century as
laborers for colonial plantations. Eventually, the Tamils multiplied to become 13 percent of the population of Sri Lanka. Most of the island’s population comprises the majority Buddhist Sinhalese, who due to their numbers controlled most major organs of civil society following independence in 1948. Since that time, the Sinhalese have implemented a series of laws imposing their culture on the Tamil minorities, isolating them and de facto rendering them a subclass. After years of political strife and unrest, the Tamils formed legitimate and illegitimate resistance movements in the 1970s. Small-scale attacks against government forces by Tamil rebels expanded during that decade and became widespread by the early 1980s.

Unrest culminated in full-scale guerrilla war beginning in 1983 in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, where significant Tamil populations lived. The Tamil insurgent groups united into the LTTE, or Tamil Tigers, and began a campaign of violence to overthrow the government and gain autonomy in Tamil areas. Led by the brilliant but ruthless Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE embraced the widespread use of terror tactics in addition to standard guerrilla warfare. The Federal Bureau of Investigation credits the LTTE with mainstreaming suicide tactics as a terror tool globally. Throughout the conflict, the LTTE employed suicide tactics against military and civilian targets, causing hundreds of casualties. Armed with external funding from Tamil expatriates in India and the West, the conflict steadily escalated. Thanks to its superior tactics and Prabhakaran’s intellect, the LTTE achieved control of significant areas of Sri Lanka, winning decisively against poorly trained government forces.

The conflict remained bloody throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with atrocities against civilians alleged by both sides resulting in mass migration and displacement of a quarter-million people. The LTTE continued to employ suicide bombing to destabilize the government and cause unrest. Eschewing international norms, the group recruited child soldiers in its campaign against the government. Despite the international outcry, the LTTE maintained funding and logistical support through its well-organized expatriate network, supplemented by arms trafficking and other criminal enterprises.

The war attracted the involvement of numerous regional and global powers, which pressured both sides to negotiate an end to the conflict. A temporary ceasefire brokered by India in 1988 resulted in the brief deployment of Indian peacekeepers to the island. The Indian army soon found itself in violent conflict with the LTTE and distrusted by the majority Sinhalese. Frustrated and caught in a no-win position, the Indians withdrew in 1990 after sustaining over 1,200 casualties. In retaliation for the intervention, the LTTE...
targeted and assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. This mistake cost the group significant support among Indian Tamils, alienated by the assassination of their prime minister and the ruthless terror tactics employed by the LTTE. Undeterred, the LTTE continued its violent strategy, refusing to renounce terrorism as a tool in its struggle. Although momentum shifted regularly in the conflict, by the late 1990s both sides reached a temporary stalemate. Negotiations resulted in a shaky ceasefire from 2001 to 2006. How each side used the ceasefire would prove decisive once hostilities resumed.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government came to power in 2005 promising to crush the LTTE. In late 2006, large-scale fighting resumed. Newly invigorated government forces launched an unrelenting—and stunningly successful—campaign to destroy the group at all costs. Over the next 2 years, a revitalized Sri Lankan military defeated the LTTE in numerous battles. The army liberated many population centers from rebel control. Prabhakaran was unable to stymie the assault into the LTTE heartland by government forces, who killed him in March 2009. The rebels, isolated and forced into a tiny corner of the island, were broken by a final government offensive. An LTTE representative conceded defeat on May 17, 2009, ending 26 years of open conflict.

**Reaction to Defeat**

Contemporary news reporting on the defeat of the LTTE contributed to the idea that Sri Lanka’s victory stemmed from the employment of ruthless tactics. In the *Los Angeles Times*, reporter Mark Magnier characterized the government’s victory as a “rare success story for governments fighting insurgencies.” In the same article, the retired head of India’s Sri Lankan peacekeeping force characterized the defeat of the LTTE as having turned conventional COIN theory on its head. Other commentators and bloggers have echoed these sentiments or used them to criticize America’s approach to the insurrections in Iraq and Afghanistan. The subject of lethal force in COIN has been a recurring topic on counterinsurgency blogs and in recent articles.

Sri Lanka’s own generals credit lethal tactics for defeating the LTTE. The government and military unquestionably strived to destroy the LTTE regardless of the outcry about civilian deaths. Sir Lanka’s defense minister, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, confirmed to the BBC that “there was a clear aim … to destroy the LTTE no matter what the cost.” The United Nations estimates the final LTTE offensive from January to May 2009 resulted in 7,000 civilian deaths and 16,700 wounded—a controversial figure that represents the high end of death estimates. In addition to the casualties incurred, the final fighting caused the displacement (and the problems inevitably accompanying it) of over 200,000 civilians.

Numerous human rights groups criticized Sri Lanka’s lack of regard for civilian casualties and the summary justice meted out against suspected LTTE sympathizers by Sri Lankan soldiers during the offensive. Although the exact numbers of civilians killed is subject to much debate and question, the Sri Lankan government offensive made no special effort to avoid harming civilians when it suited the military need of destroying the LTTE. In addition, the LTTE displayed little regard for its own people, increasing the human toll by using civilians as shields from attack and executing those fleeing or defecting to Sri Lankan army lines. The relatively rapid and decisive results of Sri Lanka’s aggressive tactics and final offensive require further analysis to validate the effectiveness of brutality in counterinsurgency.

**Decisive Years: 2004–2009**

Evidence indicates Sri Lanka’s victory was the product of far more than simple changes in tactics and decisions to ignore the international outcry over civilian casualties. From 2001 to 2006, numerous seismic shifts occurred in the regional and global strategic environment that moved the balance of power decisively in favor of the Sri Lankan government. Taken together, these evolutionary changes hollowed the LTTE as an effective organization, enabling the decisive government victory. Critical factors included the defection of key personnel from the LTTE, significant reductions in LTTE external funding, an improved Sri Lanka Army and Navy, support from China, and fallout from the 2004 tsunami. The cumulative effect of these changes devastated the rebels’ ability to continue the conflict.

The LTTE loss of income to sustain its campaigns proved crucial to the outcome of the insurgency. Long a pariah of the international community because of its terror campaigns, the LTTE relied on expatriate support and smuggling to fund ongoing operations and governance in insurgent-held areas. To support its cause, the LTTE developed an extensive expatriate funding network across numerous Western countries that provided millions annually in assistance. This network began to unravel in the 1990s following the assassination of Gandhi. The LTTE’s suicide campaigns and attacks against civilians resulted in the United States declaring the LTTE a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997, and the group was upgraded to Specially Designated Global Terrorist status in 2001 following the 9/11 attacks due to its role in supplying global terror groups.

Most decisively, Canada outlawed the LTTE’s funding networks in 2005. The loss of expatriate funding was devastating. The networks in Canada alone provided an estimated $12 million annually to support the LTTE. The European Union undertook similar measures in 2006 to prevent expatriate
remittances. In an extremely short period, the LTTE lost almost all financial support from expatriates in the West, at a time when the government was growing stronger even as the LTTE organization was under great stress on numerous fronts.

A major shift in the Sri Lankan balance of power occurred in 2004 when senior LTTE commander Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, so-called Colonel Karuna, defected from the LTTE after a disagreement with Prabhakaran. Karuna’s split and reconciliation with the Sri Lankan government deprived the LTTE of several hundred experienced fighters and significant support.2 In exchange for amnesty, Karuna provided assistance to the Sri Lanka army and advice on defeating the LTTE. The defection highlighted growing internal dissent within the hierarchy and also eroded popular legitimacy within the Tamil population.

As the LTTE struggled with internal dissent and resource constraints, Sri Lanka embarked on a crash program to improve its military and economic capability to defeat the rebels. The most decisive factor enhancing Sri Lanka’s ability to combat the LTTE involved significant economic and military aid from China. Traditionally, the United States, European Union, Japan, and Canada provided the majority of military assistance for the Sri Lankan government.

Beginning in 2005, China stepped in to provide an additional $1 billion of military and financial aid annually, allowing the LTTE to sever the strings attached to Western aid regarding the conduct of anti-LTTE operations. In exchange for the aid, China received development rights for port facilities and other investments. These actions enabled China to increase its influence in South Asia against its regional rival India and secure stability on its southern flank.20

China’s aid enabled the Sri Lankan government to attain the military superiority needed to defeat the LTTE. The Sri Lankan military budget rose by 40 percent between 2005 and 2008, and the army’s size increased by 70 percent, an addition of nearly 3,000 troops per month.21 Sri Lanka army professionalism grew as result of a decade of investment in professional military education. Increased funding and capable, aggressive leaders allowed the formation of elite counter-guerrilla units to combat the LTTE. These units were able to acquiesce themselves well in combat, demonstrating this capability repeatedly in the 2007–2009 offensives.22

In addition to the army expansion, the improvement of the Sri Lanka navy between 2002 and 2006 played a critical role in strangling the LTTE’s lucrative smuggling trade. Significant investments in small boat forces proved decisive. The navy invested in hundreds of 14-meter and 17-meter boats to complement its existing force of Israeli-built Super Dvora fast attack craft. With the breakdown of the ceasefire in 2006, the navy took the offensive with new equipment and better trained officers. Armed with light weapons on fast boats, the army was able to swarm and overwhelm the LTTE’s limited naval forces. By fighting a series of small boat engagements, the navy isolated the northern coast of Sri Lanka in 2007, defeating the LTTE’s small boat force and sea-based warehouses used to support smuggling operations. These operations effectively shut down the LTTE’s ability to acquire revenue through illicit arms trade, further exacerbating its financial crisis.23

China provided more than simple financial support. It, and several other states, furnished the government with crucial political cover in the United Nations. Western countries long demanded that Sri Lanka respect human rights and avoid civilian casualties as a condition of continued aid. The government viewed these conditions as a hindrance to its ability to defeat the LTTE. The substitution of Western military aid with that from China enabled the government to disregard Western concerns about human rights and pursue its campaign of attrition unimpeded.

China prevented introduction of resolutions at the United Nations critical of Sri Lanka’s renewed offensive, giving it a free hand in the conduct of its operations despite the protests of human rights groups and Western governments. Without this diplomatic coverage, Sri Lanka would have faced a much tougher time sustaining its military expansion and pursuing its ruthless campaign to defeat the LTTE.24 In exchange, China received several lucrative development contracts in Sri Lanka and greater influence against rival India in South Asia.25

The devastating tsunami in December 2004 also contributed to the collapse of the LTTE. The damage was most extensive in the LTTE-dominated northeast region.

China prevented introduction of resolutions at the United Nations critical of Sri Lanka’s renewed offensive, giving it a free hand in the conduct of its operations despite the protests of human rights groups

Political wrangling prevented large amounts of aid from reaching LTTE-controlled areas, contributing to the isolation and financial ruin of the Tamil population. The Sri Lankan high court blocked a tentative agreement in June 2005 to allow sharing of tsunami aid with the LTTE. Allegations of corruption tainted the limited aid that did arrive, undermining the credibility of LTTE leaders among the people. Shortly thereafter, the tenuous ceasefire began to break down, preventing further aid from reaching the LTTE. Under intense pressure, the United...
Internally displaced Sri Lankans receive medical treatment at camp clinic

United Nations

Nations and other development agencies caved to the government’s demands. Economic losses and the devastation of Tamil areas affected popular will to continue the struggle and support the LTTE.

An examination of Sri Lanka’s victory reveals the LTTE’s collapse was the result of cumulative external and internal forces, not simply the employment of ruthless new tactics. Indeed, there is little beside the ability to disregard Western criticism that distinguishes Sri Lankan tactics or brutality post-2005 from earlier eras, as the conflict was already one of the most violent and ruthless in the world. Critical blows from internal defections, loss of external funding, a global antiterrorist mindset after 9/11, and second-order effects of the 2004 tsunami crippled the LTTE. At the same time, foreign aid, domestic politics, and external political cover from China enabled the Sri Lankan government to resume its COIN campaign from a position of strength. The combination of these factors proved decisive in the defeat of the LTTE.

Those who wish to use the LTTE’s defeat as a foil for criticizing U.S. COIN doctrine have adopted an overly simplistic narrative of the LTTE’s defeat. These critics have missed the larger picture of what occurred in Sri Lanka. Appropriate and legitimate debate continues as to the significance of population-centric tactics practiced by the U.S. military during the surge to the successful reduction of violence. Without doubt, numerous changes in the wider internal and external dynamics of the conflict coincided with the tactical shift and accelerated the turnaround in Iraq.

Likewise, by 2009, the LTTE was a shadow of its former self, bankrupt, isolated, illegitimate, divided, and unable to meet an invigorated government offensive of any kind. At almost every turn, the LTTE made profound strategic miscalculations in the post-9/11 environment by continuing its use of terror tactics despite a fundamentally changed global environment. Failing to realize this shift, Prabhakaran made poor strategic and tactical choices that doomed his movement long before the government began its final offensive. Taken together, these conditions proved essential to the collapse of the LTTE after nearly 30 years of conflict.

NOTES


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24 Sengupta.

25 Ibid.

Alliances are difficult. They are an imperfect form of collective statecraft that often directly affects the security and well-being of the majority of the world’s population. Although specific alliances often morph or fail, the practice of alliance persists. In fact, alliances have been alive and well at least since the Delian League in Greece in the 5th century BCE. There have always been a need and a reason to form one.2

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is no exception. Signed on April 4, 1949, the Alliance was "conceived in fear and born in a fatigued Europe"3 and has survived for over 60 years. Since inception, its membership has grown, its focus has transformed, and its reason for existing has come under intense assault. Yet it still exists.

More recently and under United Nations (UN) mandate, NATO has assumed leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with a charter that includes providing security, governance, and reconstruction and development.4 This was NATO’s first "out of area" mission, and the stakes were (and still are) high. Many international scholars, leaders, and diplomats claim that ISAF is on shaky ground, and if it fails in Afghanistan, NATO may suffer a fatal blow. On balance, however, and despite its imperfections and occasional inefficiency, NATO will survive even if ISAF fails. Although aspects of them will be mentioned, the focus herein is not an examination of ISAF operations per se, but rather the persistent resiliency of an imperfect NATO Alliance. In the end, members simply have more to lose than to gain by allowing NATO to disintegrate.

There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.1
—Winston Churchill

ISAF and Afghanistan
The Impact of Failure on NATO’s Future

By T A R N D . W A R R E N

Alliances are difficult. They are an imperfect form of collective statecraft that often directly affects the security and well-being of the majority of the world’s population. Although specific alliances often morph or fail, the practice of alliance persists. In fact, alliances have been alive and well at least since the Delian League in Greece in the 5th century BCE. There have always been a need and a reason to form one.2

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Once it was over, there was widespread sentiment disbanding NATO and reducing U.S. defense spending. Indeed, many in Congress pressured President George H.W. Bush to consider disbanding NATO and reducing the U.S. debt that had accumulated in the 1980s largely due to military expenditures. Even in Europe, ground zero for NATO’s original purpose, many wanted to escape American dominance and looked for ways that the European Union (EU) could supplant NATO politically and militarily. Hence, why would NATO be different enough to defy trends found throughout history?

Several factors were at work that helped preserve the Alliance just after the end of the Cold War. First, the elimination of the Warsaw Pact created a large power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, nobody could really predict the intentions of the “new” Russia, especially considering how it historically treated its “near abroad.” The Bush administration recognized this problem and, with strong Western European support, began to strengthen political and military ties with the newly independent Central and Eastern European states. His policy goal was to foster a Europe “whole and free,” and NATO was the catalyst. Another factor was a moral one. Some stated that the United States “owed” not be able to handle the issue alone. Furthermore, this conflict showed that even with U.S. political support, NATO military operations were not going to happen without direct American involvement and leadership.

In the end, U.S. leadership and military involvement proved vital. The resulting Dayton Accords exposed just how vital the United States was to post–Cold War NATO. Kosovo showed similar problems for the Alliance. With the United Nations unable to reach agreement in the Security Council, the task again fell on NATO to solve. Even with political consensus in the North Atlantic Council concerning what had to be done, bureaucratic hurdles inhibited efficiency during execution. For example, basic conventional targeting of the enemy became, according to one observer, a comic exercise. Each target had to be approved by every foreign nation involved prior to execution. This is hardly the way the most capable security alliance in the world is expected to perform.

But we must remember that NATO is also a political alliance, requiring consensus as a sine qua non for legitimacy. Furthermore, scar tissue from the Cold War remained: NATO enjoyed a conventional high-intensity war mindset, and, although all the stakeholders agreed transformation was needed, the Alliance was not structurally prepared to conduct expeditionary operations, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement. Nevertheless, NATO successfully adapted in stride to get a grip on both Bosnia and Kosovo, learned as an organization, and gradually improved its effectiveness. In fact, it could be argued that the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo helped save NATO in the otherwise uncertain 1990s. The Alliance showed resilience under strain.

Aside from the significance of Bosnia and Kosovo, the debate over transformation added friction to the diplomatic, military, and bureaucratic machinery within NATO. Most of the stakeholders realized that the Alliance had to change to meet the new realities of the post–Cold War world, but how, where, and why? As mentioned already, the “what” had largely been settled, at least in the decade after the Cold War; in some form, NATO was still the only guarantor of collective security for its members, and it felt intuitively comforting to keep this arrangement. Others saw the new NATO as an expensive enterprise in desperate search of a lasting threat. But that threat was in neither the transatlantic nor the European areas. As the debate intensified, cooler heads prevailed who realized that emerging threats to stability, such as humanitarian crises and transnational terrorism, could affect the West from a great distance. Facilitated by modern technology and mass media, the world got smaller, and as a result, NATO would gradually have to go global. According to one expert, although NATO’s core mission of collective security has not changed, the location has. NATO would have to become expeditionary.

NATO survived the trials and turbulence of the post–Cold War 1990s; expanded membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic; and, in 1999, delivered a new strategic concept for the use of its forces in contingencies outside of Europe. This new concept included a deployable NATO Response Force and the formation of a new expeditionary command and control headquarters similar in capability to a U.S. three-star joint forces land component command.
Unfortunately, the events of the next decade would test the resiliency and coherence of NATO at levels never seen before.

The Birth of ISAF

The 9/11 attacks triggered a chain of events that inevitably and directly involved NATO. It seemed the tidy days of nation-state wars were over. Fighting transnational terrorism required new thinking and new responses. By 2002, the American response to the events of 9/11 was clear and in progress. And for the first time in the history of NATO, the members unanimously invoked the core principle of the Alliance: Article V, which clearly states that an attack on one member shall be considered an attack on all and that each member nation has an obligation to assist the attacked member by any means possible. While “by any means possible” deliberately affords maximum political and military flexibility to its members, the symbolism of this act showed true solidarity. Figuratively, NATO flexed its collective muscles and showed resolve to aid its wounded strongest member. But how long would this resolve last?

Conceived during the December 2001 Bonn Conference and created on December 20, 2001, by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386, the International Security Assistance Force was the UN response to the situation in Afghanistan. Restricted to the capital, Kabul, the intent was for ISAF to provide security to facilitate the progress of the nascent and fragile Afghan Transitional Authority and UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Perhaps inevitably and because of the need to maintain relevance, NATO took over the mission on August 11, 2003. Simultaneously and particularly in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom conducted largely counterterrorism operations.

While ISAF and Enduring Freedom amicably coexisted, their operations were not well synchronized due to significant differences in purpose, geography, and technical compatibility. But on the surface during these early days in theater, it did not seem to matter. Indeed, the United States initially resisted the idea of expanding ISAF’s mandate beyond Kabul, a position that would later be problematic for U.S. pleas to increase NATO’s mission in the country. Also, many argue that the U.S. invasion of Iraq caused a hard split within NATO over Afghanistan and that nations such as France, Germany, and Turkey refused to offer more timely help to ISAF because of it. As a result, the United States pursued its counterterrorism (soon changing to counterinsurgency [COIN]) mission with a coalition of the willing, largely absent NATO. But with the unremitting gravitational pull of Iraq, America had to reconsider its Afghan policies. The United States needed more help.

That help came in late 2003 in the form of UNSCR 1510, which permitted ISAF, under NATO command and control, to expand beyond Kabul. It also reaffirmed that the ISAF mission was operationally restricted to providing a secure environment so that the Afghan authorities and international organizations could continue nationbuilding and strengthening the reach of the central government. The differences in the Enduring Freedom and ISAF missions were gradually becoming more salient. They would not be as thorny in the largely peaceful north but would, as we shall see, cause more serious issues as ISAF expanded to the south and east.

To be fair, neither UNSCR 1510 nor the ISAF mission statement specifically forbade NATO forces from conducting offensive combat operations. The wording simply had to remain vague enough for consensus passage and to allow national flexibility during execution. While ambiguity is frustrating to some, it is not unique to ISAF, NATO, or the UN. Alliances through history have had to deal with vague or diluted language as the price of consensus and legitimacy. Simply put, ISAF operates with a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, the fact that NATO was the executive agent spoke well for its legitimacy and resiliency.

ISAF’s expansion in Afghanistan was a four-stage process that began in late 2003 and ended in October 2006 when NATO completed its fourth and final phase of expansion into the eastern part of the country. Like the south, this region had been under...
Afghanistan had to accept what was left over. These conditions might have given the Taliban some breathing room to accelerate their insurgency. Nevertheless, by August 2009, ISAF consisted of approximately 64,500 troops from 42 countries with all 28 NATO members providing the bulk of these forces.38 Overall, ISAF’s performance in Afghanistan under NATO since 2003 has been mixed but impressive in several respects.

First, the fact that NATO has achieved consistent contributions (some quite significant) from all of its members during its first “out of area” operation is strong testament to the intrinsic value of the Alliance. Additionally, and despite domestic resistance from many contributing nations’ electorates, NATO and ISAF have stayed the course in Afghanistan for over 6 years. Second, there have been a number of specific improvements to the security, governmental, economic, and daily life spheres in Afghanistan that are rightly attributed to ISAF’s presence and efforts. Starting at zero in 2002, the Afghan National Army (ANA) now numbers over 82,000 thanks to ISAF’s training and mentoring and is increasingly taking the lead in the planning and execution of security operations and COIN, even in the more contentious regions of the country.29 The ANA has also earned substantial levels of trust from the people.

ISAF and the ANA have secured several national and provincial elections, and approximately 67 percent of Afghans polled believe that the central government presence in their local area is significant.30 This speaks well of ISAF’s commitment to facilitate a strong and legitimate central Afghan government. On the economic, educational, and health fronts, Afghanistan has experienced consistent growth in gross domestic product since 2001, and legitimate agricultural production has doubled in the same timeframe.31 ISAF has built or facilitated the construction of 3,500 schools, allowing over 7 million children, including 2 million girls, to receive a basic education. Additionally, ISAF has aided in the construction of clinics and programs that today provide 85 percent of the population access to basic health care.32 Finally, ISAF enjoys popular support; 70 percent of Afghans support its presence in their country.33 This fact cannot be overemphasized and by extension gives NATO excellent credibility as an alliance with a solid reputation and altruistic intentions.

Under Pressure

If ISAF seems to be doing so well, why do so many politicians, scholars, and pundits state otherwise? Many of these same voices further warn of deeper problems within ISAF that threaten the future of NATO itself. The well-worn NATO issue of burdensharing has surfaced again, but this time with military personnel dying. The lack of true unity of command and effort inside ISAF is a thorny problem that creates friction, especially when U.S.-driven COIN efforts clash with the softer NATO-driven mission to “provide security and stability.” And finally, national caveats—a NATO member’s ability to pick and choose from a menu of missions—seem to split ISAF into many hard-to-manage pieces. These issues put tremendous pressure on ISAF and paint a questionable future for it and the Alliance.

To most observers, the situation in Afghanistan is a classic insurgency led largely by the Taliban. Although many think that victory via a stable Afghan government and barely capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is possible, almost everyone admits these conditions will take a long time to achieve. President Hamid Karzai stated as much and added that widespread corruption, narco-dollars, and criminality inhibit the development of stable and legitimate institutions in his country.34 These sentiments and a raw acknowledgment of the renewed potency of the Taliban’s effectiveness were recently echoed by President Barack Obama’s Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, and by the former ISAF commander, General Stanely McChrystal.35 For example, between 2005 and 2006, the number of suicide attacks by insurgents and terrorists went from 27 to 139, an increase of more than 400 percent; the use of improvised explosive devices more than doubled, from 783 to 1,677; and the number of armed attacks almost tripled, from 1,558 to 4,542.36 Combined with an initially nonexistent and later weak U.S. and ISAF presence in the narco-fueled south, it is easy to see why one observer asks, “How could America’s 'good war' have gotten so badly off track?”37

More recently, the Taliban have continued to press their insurgency. In 2008, there was a 30 percent increase of Talibain attacks against ISAF and ANSF, and this trend continued into 2009.38 Pleas from President Karzai for more NATO troops have largely fallen on deaf ears. For example, his request for 3,500 more troops at the 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit got him half as many and for less time.39 This situation repeated itself several times until President Obama’s pledge in December 2009 to send significantly more forces to Afghanistan. This prompted additional, albeit smaller, troop increases from European NATO nations. The President’s decision represents a change in emphasis, if not strategy, and was the result of a stark, candid, and comprehensive assessment by General McChrystal. His assessment underscored a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, a resilient and growing insurgency, and an urgent need to change to a strategy that focuses on the people, their security, and their political inclinations.40

Significantly, General McChrystal “up-gunned” the ISAF mission statement. Apparently attempting to merge the more kinetic and COIN-focused former Enduring Freedom mission with the necessarily vague and softer ISAF mission statement focused on “providing security and stability,” the new mission statement asserts that “ISAF... conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency.”41 For NATO, this is a radical change; words matter. In no other NATO document related to ISAF will we find the word insurgency or insurgent or mention of the intent to conduct operations against insurgents. NATO widely uses the more imprecise terms militant and security incident rather than insurgent attack. This should not be a surprise; as already stated, NATO technically operates under a UN Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate. The fact that the North Atlantic Council allowed this new mission statement to stand might just be cosmetic; after all, contributing nations still have the ultimate “opt-out” card: the national caveats. As one expert noted, member nations no longer agree on the NATO mission in Afghanistan.42

Others point to the chronic tension between Europe and the United States over the fact that NATO has achieved consistent contributions from all of its members during its first “out of area” operation is strong testament to the intrinsic value of the Alliance.

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what is viewed in much of Europe as largely an American problem rather than a NATO problem. These European NATO members want their troops to serve NATO, not the United States. To be fair, U.S. sentiment, by occasionally dismissing European contributions as useless, has not helped foster unity of effort either. The most constructive and cerebral criticism came from General McChrystal himself, who noted that much of ISAF is not trained or equipped for COIN, that several contributing nations should increase their tour lengths in order to develop meaningful relationships with the locals, and that unity of command and effort is needed for mission success. The Taliban are paying attention and are aware of the fissures in the Alliance. According to some NATO and German officials, the Taliban have begun to specifically target German troops in the relatively safe north in an attempt to force Germany to quit and go home.

Burdensharing is a fundamental requirement of a healthy alliance. All should sacrifice blood and treasure roughly equally in proportion to capability. This is not happening in ISAF. But cries of unequal burdensharing within NATO are certainly not new; even the Cold War saw this issue frequently. But in Afghanistan, it is not just a matter of taxpayer burden but of real lives lost. Due largely to entrenched social and labor programs, many European governments have consistently evaded the defense-welfare tradeoff by promising fair military contributions to NATO, but often failing to deliver. In effect, they could hide in the NATO security blanket and receive security equipped for a deployment at any given time. When pressed, these governments often use the soft power alibi to try to compensate. They either do not have the troops to send or do not want to send them.

The current imbalance has a political aspect as well: protest over the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which further threatens NATO’s cohesion. According to the Spanish foreign minister, “The threat of mutual destruction during the Cold War had kept the boiling cauldron covered and the rifts hidden; Iraq blew the lid off to reveal all the fault lines in the Alliance.” Accordin to other experts, this time it is not politics as usual. Many European nations have had enough of what they view as excessively aggressive and militant American unilateralism, especially in Iraq. As a result, U.S. pleas for help in Afghanistan have received a muted response. Many question why Europeans should value an alliance that the Americans ignore when they choose. In particular, France’s and Germany’s political hostility over Iraq has seriously eroded transatlantic solidarity.

And finally, the most visible expression of an ISAF member nation’s will or intent is the use of national caveats. While some NATO nations, such as Germany and Italy, contribute significant numbers of troops to ISAF, giving a strong appearance of burdensharing and solidarity, their troops are restricted to certain roles or geographic areas or both. For example, the Germans refuse to execute offensive combat operations or deploy outside Regional Command North, and the Turks will not deploy outside Kabul. According to some experts, these specific caveats, among others, have poisoned ISAF. General McChrystal felt their deleterious effect on the ISAF mission and addressed them by stating that some nations in ISAF are overly protective of their own forces and need to get out of their bases and armored vehicles, engage the people, and physically collocate with the ANSF in order to be effective.

Although some NATO nations are caveat-free, the situation is dire enough for the U.S. Secretary of Defense to declare that national caveats have created a two-tiered alliance of those who are willing to sacrifice and fight and those who are not, creating a state of affairs that will “effectively destroy the Alliance.” In addition to all of these problems within the Alliance, the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia has caused many European leaders and electorates to reconsider threats closer to home. They question the direct threat of the Taliban to Europe compared to the threat of an enigmatic and resurgent Russia. While this sentiment may buoy the need for NATO in Europe, it does not help matters in Afghanistan.

NATO Impact If ISAF Fails

ISAF and NATO are clearly struggling with many issues, but does this mean that NATO, resilient and steadfast as it has proven to be through several crises up to this point, will effectively collapse if ISAF fails in Afghanistan? Some prominent leaders and experts invoke this possibility. According to Richard Holbrooke, “NATO’s future is on the line” in Afghanistan. Others assert that...
NATO must remain expeditionary, implying required success in Afghanistan, or seriously risk alliance-destroying U.S. disengagement. Indeed, what is the incentive for America, considering its global security requirements, to remain in an alliance that lacks the will to tackle complex transnational security crises that also have an indirect impact on the security of Europe? If ISAF fails in Afghanistan, it would join the ranks of the British and Soviets in the shameful list of previous attempts to succeed by force in that country. More significantly, this outcome would bolster the Taliban and al Qaeda, and encourage wider unrest in the Middle East. Furthermore, it would probably ensure that the United States would not rely on NATO in the future, in effect rendering it useless. Afghanistan may well be NATO’s “do or die moment.”

Even President Obama remarked recently that “NATO’s credibility is at stake in Afghanistan.”

In the backdrop of the crisis in Afghanistan, the EU is another possible threat to NATO’s future. Several influential voices in Europe are calling for it to militarily replace NATO, freeing Europeans from what they see as American dominance in Europe and beyond. They are bitter about global “Americanization” and its attendant foreign policy, both of which are toxic to many Europeans. During its 1999 Helsinki Summit, the EU took the first steps toward independent collective security outside of NATO when its members agreed to form a 60,000-strong EU Multinational Corps. But this corps exists only on paper; it never materialized. In fact, and with required U.S. support, it would end up borrowing the troops from NATO if needed.

Simply put, the EU is not threatening to replace NATO. European taxpayers will not pay for it. And the United States is content with this position, for it will ensure U.S. influence, via NATO, in the affairs of Europe.

A more cynical view is that NATO, with U.S. leadership, is useful to the EU. The United States will do all the dirty work in the world while the EU retains the moral high ground of noninvolvement plus the added bonus of security on the cheap.

The question remains: If ISAF fails, would NATO go with it? Despite all the credible warnings by many respectable leaders, scholars, and observers, the answer is probably no. Not one NATO head of state or foreign minister, despite other grumblings, has suggested dissolving the Alliance. NATO was, is, and will remain critical for transatlantic security and for other reasons. NATO is the only institution in the world with the experience, structure, and capacity not only to handle large-scale security crises, but also to act as the hub of a global web of cooperative security initiatives.

Contrary, Europeans will continue to support NATO not only because Russia is in their peripheral vision, but also because continuing to play the “burden-shifting” game gets them the best security at the cheapest price, far less than they would be forced to pay on their own. They would rather tolerate an alliance with a hard-to-heel America than go it alone.

From the U.S. perspective, NATO is still relevant and useful despite the apparent unfair burdens on American troops and taxpayers. NATO is still the best means for America to remain involved in the affairs of Europe, and it also “augments the global prestige, political influence, and military power of the United States.” America cannot indefinitely solve the world’s problems alone. NATO brings international legitimacy, the kind that matters when the United States has to defend its global adventures to a skeptical world.

Although at times relations are strained, the United States and Europe are too tightly linked for the Alliance to dissolve. The political, economic, and cultural ties, cemented by shared values, will help hold NATO together. Finally, if the threat of ISAF failure portends the same for NATO, why is NATO still growing? In 2009 alone, Croatia and Albania joined, and France agreed to rejoin militarily.

NATO has faced many challenges to its legitimacy and relevance since its inception and especially since the end of the Cold War. It has searched for and found new doctrines and strategic visions. It has at times been slow to react to crises and clumsy in mission execution. Several have declared the Alliance hollow, others that the problems within ISAF and possible failure in Afghanistan will be the death knell for NATO. The issues of burden-sharing, unity of effort, and national caveats (among others) are indeed serious and need to be addressed. They threaten the cohesiveness and credibility of the Alliance. But these problems are not unique to the ISAF mission; to a lesser degree, they existed in Bosnia and Kosovo. Burdensharing has been an issue practically since NATO’s birth. Furthermore, one would be hard pressed to find any alliance in history that did not have unity of effort issues or restrictions, however slight, placed on troops by their own nations. Sovereign nations have their own foreign policy goals, and these matters.

If ISAF fails in Afghanistan, NATO will suffer a tremendous blow to its credibility, but one from which it will eventually recover. The United States would carry on the mission with a coalition of the willing and may not choose NATO as a partner for a while, but it would...
not disengage from the Alliance. Neither would Europe. There are other simmering global security concerns on the horizon that for several practical, psychological, and economic reasons require a networked and experienced security structure with shared values. NATO is the only response. In the long run, the core members have much more to lose without NATO than they would gain by its demise. JFQ

NOTES

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A QDR for All Seasons?
The Pentagon Is Not Preparing for the Most Likely Conflicts

By ROY GODSON and RICHARD H. SHULTZ, JR.

The end of the Cold War and the massive changes in the conflict environment that ensued launched the United States on a transformational path in military force planning. In 1996, the first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) set out a vision of the two regional contingencies model, with the Nation equipped and able to dominate in two major conventional wars at the same time. But the outlines of a different kind of conflict setting began to emerge as the United States attempted to protect its interests in several different regions. The first decade of the 21st century has shown clearly that the way the Nation thought about and prepared for war in most of the 20th century requires a major overhaul. But change comes slowly.

The years following the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq were filled with adversity and indecision among the
military leadership about how to overcome a different type of foe. The 2006 QDR appeared to be an attempt to refocus the Pentagon’s warfighting approach to meet the challenge. In that assessment, the Department of Defense (DOD) acknowledged that a serious gap existed between the changed nature of conflict and the doctrine and means it had available for fighting it. DOD stipulated that irregular warfare (IW) had become a vital mission area for which the Services needed to prepare. Post-9/11 combat was depicted as “irregular in its nature.” Enemies in those fights were “not conventional military forces.” Rather, they employed indirect and asymmetric means. Adaptation was the way forward.

The 2006 QDR also set in motion IW initiatives inside DOD leading up to the December 2008 release of DOD Directive 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare.” That directive was unambiguous about 21st-century conflict, declaring: “Irregular warfare is as strategically important as traditional warfare,” and it is essential to “maintain capabilities . . . so that the DOD is as effective in IW as it is in traditional [conventional] warfare.” Moreover, according to Directive 3000.07, the capabilities required for each type of fight were different.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had been among the most vociferous advocates, reinforcing the message in numerous statements, lectures, congressional testimony, and popular articles. Gates was by no means alone in the Pentagon and administration. But despite direction at the top, consensus was elusive. Many within the Joint Chiefs organization, Defense bureaucracy and industry, and Services viewed post-9/11 irregular fights as anomalies—ephemeral trends generated by particular circumstances. Furthermore, they held that conventional or general purpose forces could handle them.

And those who saw the future that way pushed back. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review contains no reference to irregular warfare as a central organizing concept, shedding the focus of the preceding 4 years. Rather, the 2010 QDR postulates an uncertain, fluid conflict environment posing a plethora of threats—all of which must be prepared for simultaneously. In some ways, it should not be surprising that DOD, one of the most centralized organizations in the world, has difficulty realigning itself to counter inherently decentralized nonstate actors and coalitions. The result is indeed a “QDR for all seasons,” one that directs attention—and defense dollars— to less likely contingencies and the most expensive capabilities to deal with them.

This approach has already raised congressional eyebrows on both sides of the aisle. House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Ike Skelton (D–MO) hoisted a subtle red flag by questioning how the QDR could “advocate for a force that is capable of being all things to all contingencies.” The HASC ranking minority member, Howard McKeon (R–CA), was not so delicate. “It’s tough to determine what the priority is,” he complained, “what the most likely risks we face may be, and what may be the most dangerous.”

Adaptation and Prioritization
The Pentagon needs to refocus how it assesses the predominant sources of conflict in the 21st century, the primary missions to manage and counter them, and the forces to accomplish those missions.

The “diverse threat scenarios” conceptualized in the QDR give short shift to the real-world irregular conflicts or criminal networks are missing in the QDR. Instead, it presents the mission to meet these challenges—counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations—as just one of six mission areas. The interconnections between this mission and the others, particularly building the security capacity of partner states, are overlooked. So too are the capabilities for irregular conflicts. A creative, relatively inexpensive security agenda of key skill sets housed within dedicated units to manage this enduring irregular security landscape could greatly strengthen U.S. capabilities. But this is not recognized in the 2010 QDR.

Conversely, the 2010 QDR elevates the need to prepare to deter and defeat hostile state aggressors utilizing antiaccess strategies. This leads the Pentagon to call for the military to be ready to fight two major regional conflicts against “two capable nation-state aggressors,” who will utilize
conventional military forces enhanced by antiaccess capabilities. To be sure, competent authoritarian states—China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia—may well constitute future conventional security challenges for the United States, and attention to their long-term maturation is essential. However, this should not take priority over preparing for the most likely security threats and predominant conflicts.

Pattern of Instability

What might the future security environment look like? The 2010 QDR states that the United States will face a complex, uncertain, and fluid 21st-century security environment. Fast-paced and accelerating change driven by globalization and technological innovations will make continuity in the sources of conflict problematic.

New major state competitors to the United States—most immediately China—will emerge. And empowered nonstate actors will also have a growing impact on world affairs. Yet the only empowered nonstate actor that the 2010 QDR gives attention to is “al Qaeda’s terrorist network.” Other than al Qaeda, there are only passing references to insurgents and criminals.

As a result of a “shifting operational landscape,” the new QDR warns that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other “antiaccess weapons” will spread, particularly to states seeking to dominate their region of the world. That might curtail America’s capacity to project power into those regions to protect friends, manage crises, and counter emerging threats. Nonstate actors, adds the QDR, may also acquire these weapons.

The QDR states, “Other powerful trends are likely to add complexity to the security environment. Rising demand for resources, rapid urbanization of littoral regions, the effects of climate change, emergence of new strains of disease, and profound cultural and demographic tensions in several regions are just some of the trends whose complex interplay may spark or exacerbate future conflicts.” In addition, “The changing international environment will continue to put pressure on the modern state system, likely increasing the frequency and severity of the challenges associated with chronically fragile states.”

The QDR’s forecast is flawed on several counts. Rather than uncertainty and a multiplicity of different conflict possibilities, trends that can be observed and gauged reveal a prevalent and enduring pattern of irregular conflict that will persist. This is occurring in many regions. An irregular conflict framework can help to connect the dots and make sense of it.

Why will the pattern persist? Because over half of the world’s approximately 195 states are weak, failing, or failed. They will generate a significant number of future conflicts. These states are vulnerable to scores of decentralized armed groups—terrorists, criminals, insurgents, and militias—with their territories. De facto coalitions and loose associations comprised of states, armed groups, and other nonstate actors will exploit these conditions through violence and other means.

This violence will manifest itself in continued insurgent attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan; atrocities in Darfur; terrorist plots; weapons dealing by rogue individuals; the use of the Internet to instill fear, influence politics, and recruit operatives; proxy wars; and criminal armies threatening major actors in our geopolitical backyard. These are not isolated incidents but examples of the new norm for conflict in far-flung corners of the world. Nor are they a temporary disruption of world affairs. They are symptoms of a new security environment, and they will be—in one form or another—major threats in the first part of the 21st century.

But the QDR is concerned about major authoritarian states. It proposes that conflict in the years ahead will result from such states exercising conventional power to achieve regional dominance. To deter this, the Pentagon contends that the United States must be prepared to fight two major regional conventional conflicts against “two capable nation-state aggressors.” This echoes the 1996 QDR. Of course, the Nation must prepare for such possible contingencies by maintaining superior conventional might. But those states identified in the QDR will not be able to take on the full conventional might of today’s U.S. military for at least a decade. And to prevent that from ever happening, we must maintain robust deterrent and conventional forces. Still, this is a less likely scenario and should not take priority.
Interconnected Missions

The 2010 QDR proposes to take a “strategic approach that can evolve and adapt in response to a changing security environment.” Six primary mission areas are deduced from “diverse scenarios of plausible challenges that the U.S. needs to be prepared for”:

- Providing support and assistance to civil agencies that have primary responsibility for responding to major catastrophic events on the home front.
- Retaining capabilities to “succeed in today’s large scale counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations”; preparing for “diverse geographical settings in the future involving weak states facing insurgencies, transnational terrorists, or criminal networks where the U.S. has interests at stake.”
- Building security capacity of partner states. Critical to achieving that is an adjunct mission (although the QDR does not make the connection or see synergy between this and the other missions). Expanding security force assistance to weak states so they can protect their populations, resources, and territory is essential.
- Deterring and defeating aggression by hostile nation-states in key regions that “may use anti-access strategies . . . to deny the U.S. the ability to project power into [those] regions.” This mission is critical for maintaining the “integrity of U.S. alliances and security partnerships.” Robust forces that can “protect U.S. interests against . . . two capable nation-state aggressors” utilizing conventional military forces enhanced by antiaccess capabilities are needed.
- Preventing and countering WMD proliferation are “top national priorities.” As the capacity to produce and/or acquire WMD spreads to both state and nonstate actors, the U.S. capacity to “deter, interdict, and contain the effects of these weapons” must grow accordingly.
- Operating effectively in cyberspace. American military forces require the means to actively defend their information and communications networks against emerging threats from cyberspace.

Preparing for all contingencies means taking our eye off the most significant challenges. Rather than planning for “diverse scenarios” deduced from “plausible challenges,” priority should be focused on challenges that predominate now and will continue to do so in the years ahead. By focusing on “diverse scenarios,” the Pentagon misses the opportunity to capitalize on real-world experiences and hard-won expertise.

The QDR does say (in one sentence) that the United States needs to develop the means to respond to threats “involving weak states facing insurgencies, transnational terrorists, or criminal networks.” But there is no analysis or diagnosis of these instances or how to counter them. And the QDR evinces no understanding of how complex, dangerous, and pervasive they are.

Since the late 1980s, armed groups have burgeoned in number and in the harm they can inflict. They have become more diverse in terms of subtypes—terrorists, insurgents, criminals, and militias—and they have evolved from local to regional to global players. Many of these actors are capable of causing major geopolitical damage in their own states, to various regions, or to the United States itself. Their challenge is magnified because they often act in association with other armed groups, authoritarian states, and other superempowered nonstate actors. These associations can be found at the local, regional, and global levels.

Greater emphasis on these irregular conflicts could have sharpened the QDR’s assessment of the major actors—state and nonstate—who will challenge U.S. security in the 21st century, the visions and cultures that shape the goals and policies of those actors, the diverse means they will employ, and the linkages and decentralized relationships that increasingly exist among these state and nonstate actors.

That assessment would have provided the details—the “known knowns”—about those actors, their strategies, the means they employ, and the associations forged among them. That would provide insight into the key irregular missions DOD needs to prepare for in the near term, as well as for the long haul.
“scenarios” envisioned by the QDR staff are said to represent the spectrum of “plausible future challenges that might call for a response by U.S. military forces”

allocated to ensure their successful execution. But other contingencies are less likely, and resourcing on those should be more stretched out. To follow the recommendations of the QDR will result in insufficient capabilities and attention for those persistent irregular fights the United States cannot avoid and cannot fight effectively with general purpose forces.

A more optimal approach is to prioritize the acquisition of capabilities, beginning with those needed for irregular contingencies—counterinsurgency; counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; local intelligence dominance; security, stability, reconstruction, and rule of law operations; and foreign security force assistance. This would allow the United States to focus on configuring new units and force packages with the appropriate tools and skill sets for these operations. It should not take another crisis or commission of inquiry investigating a conflict gone wrong to tell us we need to take these steps.

What follows is an agenda of capabilities to meet these irregular challenges. These capabilities either are in short supply or do not exist at all in the U.S. inventory:

- Selected Army Brigade Combat Teams and Marine Corps Regimental Combat Teams adapted, reoriented, and retrained for irregular conflict as their primary mission. The answer is not to add more manpower or firepower, but to make different and better use of the existing forces to execute irregular missions.
- Intelligence focused on the local level. Such intelligence can be acquired if the United States develops new units able to train frontline foreign police, military and security collectors, analysts, and others to operate at the local level to complement the formidable capabilities of the Nation and its allies.
- Security, Stability, Reconstruction, and Rule of Law/Culture of Lawfulness Teams that are professionalized in greater numbers to prevent the outbreak of irregular conflict and to strengthen weak governments and civil society.
- Enhanced strategic communication management. Senior U.S. leaders, national security managers, and local implementers must have the skill sets to understand and manage their words and actions so they resonate with and influence the perceptions and behavior of foreign audiences.
- Creation of a dedicated corps of professional skilled personnel—military and civilian—capable of building local, national, and regional coalitions of foreign state and nonstate actors to prevent or prevail in 21st-century irregular conflicts.

Of course, the specific configuration and deployment of these capabilities will be determined by the political and security context or conflict zone in which the United States is engaged. These will range from small advisory missions to those involving limited U.S. presence “on the ground”—such as in Pakistan and Colombia—to war zones where the U.S. military is or was the main security force, as in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The first—small advisory missions—is mainly preventative in scope and has as its objective assisting or building local capacity, particularly in fragile democracies. These missions aim to address the origins of weaknesses before they generate violent instability that might spread from local to regional levels. They should receive a high priority. However, the capabilities identified above are also needed for larger missions, to include those where U.S. military forces—adapted and reoriented combat brigades—are engaged in major population-centric security operations against robust armed groups.

Unlike the QDR, which proposes capabilities for all possible contingencies, those recommended here are prioritized for irregular missions that predominate today and will do so tomorrow. If developed, meshed, and deployed, they will substantially enhance the ability and capacity of the United States to manage these challenges.

Building up these capabilities will not entail major additional budget commitments. In national security terms, they are not “big-ticket items.” But it will require an adaptation in thinking within U.S. security institutions, which will have to make a paradigm shift in how they understand security threats, the capabilities needed to protect and defend against security challenges, and how best to organize, recruit, train, and educate to develop defense capabilities. 

NOTES

1 The 2010 QDR focuses on air and sea antiaccess weapons. The former include rapidly deployable, highly mobile radars, surface-to-air missiles, counterstealth radars, passive geolocation sensors, and advanced digital air command, control, communications, and computers systems. In the maritime domain, these technologies consist of supersonic antiship cruise missiles, terminally guided antiship ballistic missiles, and quiet subma- rines armed with digital torpedoes. These weapons, notes the QDR, will seriously challenge the ability of the United States to conduct military interventions in key regions of the world in the near future. A nation that is so equipped in the future will be able to hold U.S. forces at serious risk.

2 For a detailed elaboration of what each of these capabilities entails, see Roy Godson and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Adapting America’s Security Paradigm and Security Agenda (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 2010). This report is based on extensive research and analysis that benefited from the assistance of a working group of leading security practitioners from democracies around the world. Those individuals shared their first-hand experiences and insights about the contemporary conflict environment—all having held senior-level positions in their nation’s military, diplomatic, or intelligence services. They also reviewed and helped refine the report’s major findings and recommendations. The report is available at <www.strategycenter.org/files/adapting_the_paradigm.pdf>.
Is the Conduct of War a Business?

By MILAN VEGO

The U.S. military has long used various business models in managing its bureaucracy and budget and planning its force. During the 1960s, however, the Pentagon used a business model extensively in its conduct of the war in Vietnam, ultimately leading to disaster. Despite this, since the late 1990s, the U.S. military has increasingly embraced the notion that business models can and should be applied to the conduct of war.

But business models cannot be applied to war; their basic purposes are so hugely different that they cannot be reconciled. Instead of focusing on leadership, the U.S. military increasingly puts emphasis on management, military efficiency instead of effectiveness, and the application of various quantifiable methods called metrics based on business models in order to assess the performance of military forces in combat. Another problem in the U.S. military is the increasing use of business terms to describe purely military activities. This, in turn, further weakens the emphasis on leadership and warfighting.

Use of Business Models

During World War II, both the United States and United Kingdom used business statistical methods extensively to analyze the effects of strategic bombing. They also used various operations research techniques for the analysis of antisubmarine warfare in the Atlantic and offensive mining in European waters and the Pacific. In the late 1950s, the U.S. Navy developed a network model called the Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) for managing the work of thousands of contractors in its highly successful Polaris missile program. PERT provided managers a graphical display of employees’ various activities, estimates of how long each activity and the entire program would take to complete, and which activities were the most important to ensure timely completion of the program. PERT offered a successful tool for planning, coordinating, and controlling large, complex military programs.

A major effort to introduce business models into the U.S. military came during the 1980s under Secretary Robert McNamara (head of table) and private industry officials discuss ways to avert nationwide strike during Vietnam War.

Secretary Robert McNamara (head of table) and private industry officials discuss ways to avert nationwide strike during Vietnam War.

DOD (Frank Hall)
the tenure of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (1961–1968), whose main reason for adopting business practices was his almost exclusive focus on improving the efficiency of the U.S. military. Among other things, he introduced a “game theory” approach to the war in Vietnam at the political-strategic level. The United States would send messages to the enemy, whose responses could then be predicted. He also used various metrics such as body counts to measure the progress of war in Vietnam. This approach had predictable and catastrophic consequences for the U.S. military. McNamara also extensively applied systems analysis run by civilian “whiz kids” as a basis for making key decisions on force requirements and designing weapons systems.

William Cohen directed the Pentagon to use as an example the U.S./coalition victory against overreliance on technology in the U.S. military. The Tofflers expressed a clear technological bias by arguing in favor of a smaller number of highly sophisticated weapons, using as an example the U.S./coalition victory against Iraq in the Gulf War of 1990–1991.

By the late 1990s, leading proponents of the emerging NCW concept embraced the Tofflers’ idea that power flows from society and its methods of creating prosperity and wealth. Hence, in their view, the U.S. military should not read the works of Clausewitz and other classical military thinkers but rather books about how nations create wealth and prosperity.

In the late 1990s, Secretary of Defense William Cohen directed the Pentagon to take advantage of the “revolution in business affairs” to improve efficiency and cut waste. The military adopted business fads such as total quality management and velocity management in logistics. These changes coincided with the increased influence of information warfare enthusiasts who argued that the practices of the so-called new economy could be applied to waging war. Some prominent military officials apparently were influenced by Alvin and Heidi Toffler’s 1993 book *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. The central theme of the Tofflers’ work was that “the way we make war reflects the way we make wealth; and the way we make anti-war must reflect the way we make war.” They claimed that a revolutionary “new economy” was arising based on knowledge against overreliance on technology in the U.S. military. The Tofflers expressed a clear technological bias by arguing in favor of a smaller number of highly sophisticated weapons, using as an example the U.S./coalition victory against Iraq in the Gulf War of 1990–1991.

They wrote that in the new economies, the pace of operations and transactions is accelerated. Economies of speed are replacing economies of scale. Competition is so great, and the speed required so high, that the old “time is money” rule is increasingly updated to “every interval of time is worth more than the one before it.” The Tofflers also introduced the concept of “demassification” by arguing that the defining characteristics of the “second wave” economy become increasingly obsolete as firms install information-intensive, often automated manufacturing systems capable of endless and inexpensive variation and even customization. The revolutionary result is, in effect, the demassification of mass production.

A major effort to adopt various business models in the military was undertaken by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld (2001–2006). His aim was to streamline the Pentagon by applying maximum business practices. The logical outcome of Rumsfeld’s approach would have been almost complete homogenization of all the Services, which would have essentially the same capabilities. This redundancy in capabilities would in turn be used as justification for canceling additional weapons systems. The end result of this single-minded quest for military efficiency would be a much smaller but supposedly more mobile and lethal U.S. military force. The Pentagon also became enamored of outsourcing and just-in-time logistics that eliminated supply depots and warehouses for spare parts.

NCW became the heart of Rumsfeld’s force transformation of the U.S. military. The leading advocates of transformation repeatedly asserted that the information revolution had fundamentally altered the ways of both business practices and the conduct of war. They explained that in business, success increasingly relied on the ability to move material objects around. Businesses that could produce items rapidly and ship them quickly and inexpensively were more successful than those that could not. The businesses that could rapidly acquire, disseminate, and analyze information would be more successful than the others. Likewise, armies succeed by moving their forces to...
The human element is the single most critical element of warfare. War is lost or won by humans and not by machines. In contrast to a business organization, humans in the military live and work in close proximity to each other. There is far less room for privacy than is the case in civilian life. The success of a military force in combat is largely dependent on small-unit cohesion. The higher the cohesion of tactical units, the higher the cohesion of large forces and formations taking part in a campaign or major operation. A commander cannot be successful without a thorough understanding of the capabilities and limitations of human nature. Materiel represents the means, not the ends, in warfare.

Warfare is shaped by human nature and its complexities and the limitations of human and physical conditions. Clausewitz wrote that victory does not consist only in the conquest of the battlefield, but in the destruction of physical forces. He believed in a close linkage between morale and willpower. Because all wars are conducted by humans, the actions and reactions of actors are hard or impossible to predict. The psychological state of individuals or groups and their possible reactions under stress cannot be entirely known. This is even truer when dealing with enemy forces. War is a field of danger. Clausewitz observed that danger is “a part of the friction of war and without accurate conceptions of danger one cannot understand war.” In the face of acute danger and fear, human behavior cannot be anticipated or measured in any meaningful way. It is largely unknowable.
not want their houses to go into foreclosure and that they would act accordingly. The first assumption was correct, but the second assumption was wrong.20

The rationality of the economic model assumes that investors react to changes in economic events and are either fully aware of the long-term implications of these changes or have superhuman vision to see the future.21 There are situations in which individuals might engage in economic activity rationally, but the market might behave irrationally. The rational behavior on the part of individual investors can lead to collective irrational outcomes or so-called bubbles, as was the case in the U.S. housing collapse.

In business activity, the relationship between a rational individual and an irrational group of individuals can be extremely complex. One possibility is mob psychology or a sort of groupthink, when virtually all of the participants in the market change their views at the same time and move as a “herd.” Alternatively, different individuals change their views about market development at different stages as part of a continuing process. Most of them start acting rationally, but then more of them lose contact with reality, at first gradually and then more quickly. Another view is that different groups of traders, investors, and speculators succumb to the hysteria as asset prices increase.22 Periodic bouts of irrational exuberance (a term coined in 1996 by Alan Greenspan) are endemic to the financial system.23 Stock investors cause the market bubble through their greed and frenzy when a bull market exists. This irrationality, in turn, leads stock investors to overlook deteriorating situations because of their single-minded pursuit of ever higher returns. Eventually, the frenzy of greed turns into panic, and this drives investors to sell at any cost. This collapse in stock market prices can spread to the entire economy.

Clausewitz wrote that war is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass but the collision of two living forces that interact.24 The enemy has his own will and will not behave the way one wants him to. He can react unpredictably and even irrationally. The timing and scope of irrationality can be neither predicted nor measured. The irrational decisions on either side in a conflict can have significant consequences on both the course and outcome of a war. It is difficult or even impossible to rationally explain the continuation of hostilities for 2 more years on the Western Front after 1916 despite huge losses in personnel and financial exhaustion.25 Likewise, one cannot explain why Adolf Hitler continued the war after 1943. It is also hard to rationally explain interminable interclan fighting in Somalia, genocide in Rwanda in 1994, or the Serbian ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s.
Risk-taking

Both business executives and military leaders must take risks in making decisions. The higher the level of authority and responsibility, the higher the stakes in taking risks. Business theory acknowledges the importance of risk. The opportunity cost of capital depends on the risk of the project. Reward as profit is determined by the risks one is willing to take. By failing to understand business risk, one can make his business vulnerable to sudden collapse. However, in contrast to the conduct of warfare, business theory postulates that individual risk does not necessarily matter. Rather, what matters is the risk in shares of similar businesses on the stock market adjusted for a further risk weighting. Some large businesses grow by transferring their business risk onto other people, as is the case in a buyout model.26

Despite technological advances, a commander rarely knows all the elements of any given situation. This is especially the case at the operational and strategic levels of war. And it is at these levels where wars are won or lost. In the absence of positive knowledge of a situation, commanders must make certain assumptions that might be partially or completely wrong. Then they have to make decisions by taking prudent risks. Willingness to take such risks means making operational decisions in varying degrees of uncertainty. Such decisions are critical for success, especially when the operational commander’s forces are weaker than those of the enemy. They are not gambles, but carefully made calculated decisions.27 In contrast to the conduct of business, decisions made by the military commander can cause huge losses in one’s personnel and materiel. Another difference is that a commander cannot share with or delegate risk to subordinate commanders. He is solely responsible for making decisions pertaining to the planning, preparation, and execution of campaigns or major operations.

Leadership versus Management

In generic terms, leadership can be described as the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for sustained organizational success in achieving desired results.28 In contrast to leadership, management deals with the allocation and control of resources, whether human, materiel, or financial, in order to attain the objectives of an organization. Good management skills require neither an overabundance nor a shortage of resources.29 The objective of management is to make people capable of joint performance through common goals, common values, correct structure, and training and development.30 The superiority in materiel was one reason the U.S. military traditionally emphasized management thinking and a business approach to solving military problems. Among other things, the prominence of managerial values and entrepreneurial ethics was the main reason for the inability of U.S. Army officers to perform well in Vietnam.31 Leadership is one of the most critical yet most complex aspects of warfare. The higher the level of command, the more

Efficiency versus Effectiveness

The uncritical acceptance of a business model for the conduct of warfare by the U.S. military led to an increasing emphasis on efficiency rather than on effectiveness. Efficiency is the ratio of the output to the input into any system. It deals with one’s skillfulness in avoiding the wasting of time and effort. A business can improve its bottom line by focusing on the few things that it does well and abandoning markets in which it is performing poorly. By eliminating redundancies and focusing on the areas in which they can excel, companies can dramatically improve their competitive position in some markets, even at the cost of sometimes abandoning others.

In business terms, effectiveness is related to the enterprise’s objective rather than the technical quality of output. A common indicator of effectiveness is related to customer satisfaction rather than output. Therefore, the effectiveness measure of a business process can be indicated by the resource inputs needed to produce a level of an enterprise objective. In a military context, effectiveness pertains to one’s ability to accomplish the assigned objective—the starting point and a single most important element of both planning and execution in the employment of one’s combat forces. Yet Rumsfeld’s vision of U.S. military transformation was focused almost exclusively on efficiency rather than effectiveness.28 For example, the U.S. Navy made a series of decisions regarding its force structure based almost entirely on the requirements of military efficiency rather than military effectiveness. Among other things, most newly built ships and aircraft were assigned a growing number of missions so that fewer platforms had to be built, thereby reducing the costs. No one should dispute the need to have the highest degree of efficiency in managing a large military organization and for force planning. However, when a choice has to be made, military effectiveness should never be sacrificed for efficiency.

in the absence of positive knowledge of a situation, commanders must make certain assumptions that might be partially or completely wrong
important leadership skills are. The quality of one’s leadership cannot be measured; it is essentially intangible. No weapon, no impersonal piece of machinery ever designed, can replace the human element in warfare. The excessive emphasis on management skills in the U.S. military today cannot but weaken the quality of leadership, especially at the higher command levels. In contrast, militaries that traditionally emphasized leadership and war-fighting, as the German military did, proved much more effective as a fighting force. The Germans focused on leadership as one way of enhancing combat power and compensating for inferiority in materiel.

**Logistics**

One of the key transformational concepts during Rumsfeld’s tenure at the Pentagon was so-called just-in-time logistics, the purpose of which was to reduce inventory to a minimum. Its proponents apparently believed that logistics planning is outdated. They claimed that demand is the true control signal in the logistics system containing more information about local operational conditions than a classic aggregation of supply.

U.S. forces used the just-in-time logistics concept during Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, but they encountered numerous difficulties due to poor planning and overreliance on information technology. Logistical problems during the major combat phase of *Iraqi Freedom* included stretched supply lines during the rapid advance to Baghdad. Priority was given to the supply of fuel, ammunition, and food, causing delays in supply of some critical spare parts. Logisticians were often unable to distribute many items from ports to tactical units in an accurate and timely way. Logistics units had inadequate communications and could not track transit time once items were removed from their shipping containers.33

Just-in-time logistics was an attempt to apply commercial practices to trim inventory and make the logistics system more efficient. However, it could work properly in ideal conditions on the battlefield but not in the face of a determined enemy’s opposition. It is inherently inflexible, vulnerable to damage, and unable to service prioritized needs. The U.S. military also adopted the commercial enterprise resources planning system to its logistics. The result was sense-and-respond logistics, a system supposedly grounded in NCW theory and joint expeditionary warfare practice. It also borrowed from the commercial sense-and-respond adaptive managerial framework originally developed by IBM. Sense-and-respond logistics is based on the premise that changes in business, security, and technology environments are so rapid that they have outstripped the ability to be foreseen and planned for. A successful response would come from rapidly sensing and adapting to change rather than relying on process designs, hierarchies of authority, and industrial age command and control action plans designed for more predictable events.34 However, employment of combat forces during a major operation or conventional campaign is relatively short. Thus, the argument that one cannot properly plan for operational logistics support and sustainment is false. Among other things, the commander and planners must properly synchronize operations and logistics; otherwise, a campaign or major operation might fail. This, in turn, requires thorough and timely logistical planning.

**Walmart and NCW**

The Pentagon became enamored with Walmart’s approach to business. NCW proponents described Walmart as a self-synchronized distributed network with real-time transactional awareness. The stores’ cash registers automatically transmit sales data to Walmart’s suppliers. The inventory is managed through horizontal networks rather than through a traditional head-office hierarchy.35 The conglomerate was successful because it used vast computer systems to lower inventories, respond better to consumer demand, and even predict where prospective markets were headed. The Walmart system comprises three grids: infrastructure, sensor, and transaction. The infrastructure grid or sensor grid generates competitive space awareness, a key competitive advantage in the retail sector, while the transaction grid exploits high levels of awareness to increase competitiveness.

The entire NCW concept is essentially based on the Walmart business model. Only the names of the grids have been changed to reflect the use of weapons and sensors.
of a network of networks encompassing numerous communications paths, computational nodes, operating systems, and information management applications, allowing network-centric computing and communications across the joint battlespace. It is designed to provide the means to receive, process, transport, store, and protect information for the joint and combined forces. The shooter (or engagement) grid consists of geographically dispersed platforms capable of delivering more responsive, accurate, and lethal fires.

NCW proponents misapplied the business theory of Metcalfe’s law in their claims that one of the great benefits of networking one’s forces is the significant increase in the forces’ combat power. Metcalfe’s law as applied to business states that the value of a network increases with the square of the number of users of the network. That the value of a network increases with the square of the number of nodes and reliability in inverse proportion to complexity. The more complex the system, the more likely it is that something will not work as designed or even lead to a complete breakdown.

NCW thesis implies substantial centralization of authority and control. Also, one might add that complexity of a system is proportional to the cube of the number of nodes and reliability in inverse proportion to complexity. The concept of locking out a competitor might work in business but is highly unlikely to work in war. For example, the Israelis showed high tactical agility on the battlefield in their invasion of Lebanon in 1982. However, they still failed at the operational and strategic levels because their opponents outthought them.

NCW advocates introduced the term self-synchronization to replace the well-understood term initiative. This concept was copied from the Walmart model of sharing inventory control information in near–real time with its suppliers using network technology. The sale of an item off Walmart’s shelf automatically initiates a purchase requisition with the supplier to replace the item without the need for an intermediate central purchasing department. Supposedly, self-synchronization increases the value of subordinate initiative to “produce meaningful increase in operational tempo and responsiveness and . . . assist in the execution of the commander’s intent.” NCW proponents asserted that the traditional top-down method of synchronizing the actions leads to unnecessary losses of one’s combat power due to supposed errors in force movements. It can also cause repeated breaks in the fighting at the operational level, giving the enemy the opportunity to recover as one’s force is compelled to have what is called “operational” (actually “tactical”) pause before making another step. The use of the term self-synchronization is yet another example of the almost exclusive mechanistic focus of NCW proponents.

As mentioned above, NCW proponents also borrowed another term from the Tofflers’ book: demassification. They explained that NCW would enable a move from an approach based on geographically contiguous massing of forces to one based upon achieving effects. They explained that the use of information would lead to achieving desired effects, limiting the need to mass physical forces within specific geographic locations. Demassification increases tempo and speed of movement throughout the battlespace to complicate the opponent’s targeting problem.

**Use of Business Metrics**

Since the end of World War II, the Pentagon has used various quantifiable measures based on mathematical and statistical methods in trying to evaluate the effectiveness of bombing or ground forces involved in low-intensity conflict. It
was not surprising that both McNamara and Rumsfeld, because of their business backgrounds, tried to use business metrics in running the Pentagons. McNamara and his “whiz kids” believed that computers would transform the management of business. They invented a world where all decisions could be made based on numbers. They found power and comfort in assigning values to what could be quantified—and deliberately ignoring everything else. McNamara brought analytical discipline to the military. But he went too far by trying to conduct war by using the Ford Motor Company business model where if an investment would not bring immediate profits, it was vetoed. However, Ford’s model for quantifying customer loyalty and the value of new equipment and quality was not available. The whiz kids did not look far enough ahead with their cost-cutting calculations. They did not anticipate that they would lose customers and their engineering innovation in the long run.

Since the late 1990s, the emphasis on business practices by the Pentagon led to an excessive reliance on various “metrics” in evaluating the progress toward accomplishing battlefield objectives.

Critics of applying metrics in war in Afghanistan pointed out that too many current measures of progress have little or no value, report meaningless nationwide data, or are more designed to spin immediate success than to win over time. The true complexities, uncertainties, and risks involved in dealing with ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and regional problems are downplayed or ignored. One of the most damaging aspects of U.S. intelligence and advisory reporting is the tendency to focus on orders of battle that, at best, show manning levels and sometimes major equipment; it says little about unit progress and activity. Overt violence is always an uncertain measure of insurgent activity and success.

There are a number of similarities between business activity and conduct of war. The human factor plays a critical central role in both business and warfare. Emotions, uncertainty, chance, and pure luck are characteristics of both business and warfare. Successful business managers and military commanders must often take calculated but high risks. Rationality and irrationality pervade decision making and reactions in both business and warfare.

However, for all the similarities, there are some significant differences between business and warfare. Clearly, the single most important distinction between the two is in their respective purposes. Management is much more important in business, while leadership counts far more in the conduct of war. Military effectiveness is the key for success in war, while efficiency is the primary consideration in making profits in business activity. Yet in their zeal to adopt business models, military technocrats focused almost exclusively on efficiency rather than military effectiveness.

The Walmart business model cannot be literally applied to the conduct of war as NCW enthusiasts tried to do. Likewise, just-in-time and sense-and-respond concepts work well for business but might not be suitable for logistical support and sustainment in combat. There is no similarity between the conditions of the marketplace and the battlefield. Errors or an inability to bring certain items on the market do not result in lives lost or property destroyed. Similar deficiencies of fuel, ammunition, and water can doom the military effort and result in large losses of life.

In adopting various business metrics, the U.S. military paid little or no attention to intangible factors in the military situation. Such quantification methods are often unsuccessful even in business because managers do not properly evaluate intangible factors in the marketplace. Metrics might have some limited utility in assessing the situation on the battlefield, but ultimately success will be achieved by the decisions made by the commander based on his judgment and experience.

By its uncritical acceptance of business models, the U.S. military has neglected the critical and timeless importance of leadership and the human factor in the conduct of war. It has also blurred the need for the distinction between business activity and warfare. The U.S. military should use business practices whenever possible in enhancing the efficiency of the military establishment and services, force planning, and weapons and equipment design. However, using business models in the planning and conduct of war itself and in assessing the performance of one’s forces in combat can have disastrous results, as the U.S. experience in Vietnam shows. One can ignore lessons of history only at great peril.
NOTES


2 Ibid.


4 Ibid., 5.

5 Ibid., 63, 65.

6 Ibid., 59.


15 Drucker, 23.


19 Clausewitz, 133.


22 Ibid., 41–42.


24 Clausewitz, 86.

25 Hammes, 23.

26 A leveraged buyout or highly leveraged transaction (or “bootstrap” transaction) occurs when a financial sponsor acquires a controlling interest in a company’s equity and where a significant percentage of the purchase price is financed through leverage (borrowing). The assets of the acquired company are used as collateral for the borrowed capital, sometimes with assets of the acquiring company. The bonds or other paper issued for leveraged buyouts are commonly considered not to be investment grade because of the significant risks involved.


29 FM 22–103, 3.


31 Drucker, 18.


37 Ibid., 2–4, 6–7.

38 Metcalfe’s law (proposed by Robert C. Metcalfe, inventor of the Ethernet) says that the total value of a network to its users grows as the square of the total number of its users; hence, the ratio of value to cost of adding one more network user grows disproportionately as the network grows larger.

39 They claim that the reason for this is that according to Metcalfe’s Law, the power (value) of a network increases as the square of the number of nodes in the network (N²).


42 Reid and Giffin, 6.

43 Hammes, 23.


45 Hammes, 25.

46 Cited in David P. Wells, Managing the Double-edged Sword of Network-centric Warfare (Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 30, 2003).

47 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare. 9.

48 Cebrowski and Garstka, 33.

49 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare. 9.

50 In business terms, metrics is defined as any type of measurement used to gauge some quantifiable component of company performance. They are a part of the broad area of business intelligence that comprises a wide variety of applications and technologies for gathering, storing, analyzing, and providing access to data to help enterprise users to make better business decisions. Systematic approaches such as the balanced scorecard methodology can be used to transform an organization’s mission statement and business strategy into specific and quantifiable goals and to monitor the organization performance in terms of achieving these goals.


The NDU Foundation Congratulates the **Winners** of the 2010 Writing Competitions

**Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition**

The 2010 annual competition was intended to stimulate new approaches to coordinated civilian and military action from a broad spectrum of civilian and military students. Essays were to address U.S. Government structure, policies, capabilities, resources, and/or practices and to provide creative, feasible ideas on how best to orchestrate the core competencies of our national security institutions. The competition attracted the largest number of entries since it began in 2007. Three winners were selected. The NDU Foundation awarded the First Place winner a generous Amazon.com gift certificate.

**FIRST PLACE**
Brigadier General John Frewen, Australian Army, U.S. Army War College
"Harmonious Ocean? Chinese Aircraft Carriers and the Australia-U.S. Alliance"

**SECOND PLACE**
COL Richard G. Zoller, USA
U.S. Army War College
"Russian Cyberspace Strategy and a Proposed U.S. Response"

**THIRD PLACE**
Lt Col Matthew C. Smitham, USAF
Air War College
"The Need for a Global Space Traffic Control Service: An Opportunity for U.S. Leadership"

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition**

This annual competition, in its 29th year in 2010, challenges students at the Nation’s joint professional military education institutions to write research papers or articles about significant aspects of national security strategy to stimulate strategic thinking, promote well-written research, and contribute to a broader security debate among professionals. The First Place winners in each category received a generous Amazon.com gift certificate courtesy of the NDU Foundation.

**Strategic Research Paper**

**FIRST PLACE**
LtCol Mark Schrecker, USMC
National War College
"U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: Flawed Assumptions Will Lead to Ultimate Failure"

**SECOND PLACE**
(Tie) COL Tarn D. Warren, USA, U.S. Army War College
"ISAF and Afghanistan: The Impact of Failure on NATO’s Future"

**SECOND PLACE**
(Tie) Lt Col Brad C. Felling, USAFR, Air War College
"Under Siege: Responding to a Mumbai-Style Attack on the Homeland"

**THIRD PLACE**
Lt Col Vanessa Dornhoefer, USAFR, Industrial College of the Armed Forces
"A Tale of Two Villages: Bridging the Development Gap in Afghanistan"

**Strategy Article**

**FIRST PLACE**
Lt Col Hans F. Palaoro, USAF
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
"Information Strategy: The Missing Link"

**SECOND PLACE**
Maj Jeff Donnithorne, USAF, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
"Building a Potemkin Village: A Taliban Strategy to Reclaim the Homeland"

**THIRD PLACE**
LtCol Christian Wortman, USA, National War College
"Mullahs, Maliks, and Madison: Political Culture in Counterinsurgency Operations"
The National Defense University (NDU) Foundation is proud to support the annual Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Force Quarterly writing competitions. NDU Press hosted the final round of judging on May 18–19, 2010, during which 23 faculty judges from participating professional military education (PME) institutions selected the best entries in each category.

Each year, judges select the most influential articles from the previous year’s four issues of Joint Force Quarterly. Three outstanding articles were singled out:

**Best Feature Article**
Don J. DeYoung
Center for Technology and National Security Policy
“Breaking the Yardstick: The Dangers of Market-based Governance”

**Best Recall Article**
Thomas Alexander Hughes
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University
“A General Airman: Millard Harmon and the South Pacific in World War II”

**Best Forum Article**
Marvin Baker Schaffer
The RAND Corporation
Ike Chang, Consultant
“Mobile Nuclear Power for Future Land Combat”

NDU Foundation

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East Asia is in many respects the strategic anchor of the entire region in that the vital interests of the world's three most economically powerful states, the U.S., China, and Japan intersect. . . . [I]t is in East Asia that continued American supremacy, the rise of China and corresponding Japanese anxiety—all fuelled by a range of national pathologies, painful historical memories, unresolved territorial and maritime disputes—have the potential to collide.¹

—Dr. Michael Evans
Australian Defence College

Harmonious Ocean?
Chinese Aircraft Carriers and the Australia-U.S. Alliance

By JOHN FREWEN

Brigadier General John Frewen, Australian Army, wrote this essay while a student at the U.S. Army War College. It won the 2010 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition.
In March 2009, China’s Defense Minister, Liang Guanglie, announced that China planned to equip the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) with two conventional aircraft carriers by 2015. China has not previously pursued this capability formally. Unconfirmed media reports suggest that China will possibly also seek two additional nuclear-powered carriers by 2020. China justifies the procurement of carriers as logical for a nation of its size and economic influence, and necessary to defend its interests. For the Chinese people, carriers will be the jewels in the crown of a powerful navy, one befitting China’s rising great nation status.

Having shaken off subjugation by foreign powers during the 18th and 19th centuries, China is moving rapidly toward the center of the international stage. After 30 years of remarkable economic growth and a reshaping of the world’s economic landscape in its favor, China is poised to step into a new, possibly global, era. Proud of its culture, traditions, and rising international status, China views the next 15 to 20 years as a “strategic window of opportunity”—a time for “national revitalization through continued economic, social and military development.”

China’s emerging role in global affairs is, as yet, uncertain. The nation has unresolved historical and domestic issues that color its strategic judgments and make its intentions difficult to predict. It is also possible that China is growing and changing in ways the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cannot control or predict. Accompanying rapid economic growth are burgeoning maritime trade and energy requirements, a growing middle class, and an increase in nationalism. In addition to these challenges, the CCP faces domestic poverty, rising unemployment, criticism of its own performance, a leadership transition in 2012, and a range of separatist movements.

Of all of these, the CCP’s uneasy social contract with its increasingly affluent middle class is most notable. If the CCP is to retain its one-party rule, it must continue to deliver increasing prosperity and individual convenience, in part by ensuring China’s access to trade and resources, particularly oil. Chinese strategists are acutely aware that they could do little in response if the United States chose tomorrow to constrict China’s maritime access to oil, minerals, and markets. China’s concern for its strategic sea lanes, and a sense that great nations have great navies, has drawn it to a carrier force of its own.

The appearance of the first Chinese aircraft carrier in the Pacific will resonate throughout the region and change the current dynamic. In Australia’s case, the carriers present a particular conundrum. Australia’s defense and security policy has been underpinned by its traditional friendship and alliance with the United States since World War II. However, since 2007, China has become Australia’s primary trading partner. Any future tensions or conflict between the United States and China in the Pacific could place Australia in a potentially invidious position—torn between security and trade.

This article discusses what Chinese carriers might mean to the Asia-Pacific region and the implications for Australia. For Australia’s long-standing alliance with the United States, particularly in the event of escalating U.S.-China maritime tensions. Short of open conflict, the greatest risk presented by Chinese carriers is a self-fulfilling prophecy of a U.S.-China cold war. If conflict rather than accommodation is to mark China’s rise, Australia must weigh the relative benefits of its U.S. alliance against other alternatives—such as neutrality or defense self-sufficiency—before being caught in a conflict contrary to its long-term national interests.

Background

Uncontested U.S. primacy in the Asia-Pacific has been a source of great stability for over half a century. For instance, between July 1995 and March 1996, the deployment of two U.S. carrier battle groups to the South China Sea defused escalating tensions between China and Taiwan. At the time, the role of the carrier groups in the standoff infuriated the Chinese. This response, and U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry’s boast that “while the Chinese are a great military power, the premier—the strongest—military power in the Western Pacific is the United States,” contributed to a long-term Chinese determination to counter overwhelming U.S. maritime might.

The People’s Republic of China began a military modernization program in the 1990s to develop the ability to fight “local wars under modern, high-tech conditions.” This process accelerated following the intervention of U.S. carriers regarding Taiwan. A study of U.S. tactics in the first Gulf War, and the role of U.S. carriers in the Taiwan dispute, overturned the PLAN’s longstanding preference for submarine forces that, until then, had been more prominent in China’s naval development. China has since undertaken a range of activities to develop a carrier capability.

In 1992, the CCP authorized a program to study the development of a carrier. The PLAN subsequently acquired four retired aircraft carriers for research purposes (including the former Australian HMAS Melbourne). Another of these four, a former Soviet Kuznetsov-class carrier, the Varyag, has been refitted in China’s Dalian shipyards to “operational” status as a training carrier. It is likely that the PLAN’s next step will be to produce a medium-sized carrier (40,000–60,000 displaced tons) capable of handling conventional takeoff and landing or vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft.

Although China’s shipbuilding industry faces significant challenges in producing carriers, it could deliver a moderately effective indigenous aircraft carrier within a decade. However, it will take China longer than that to acquire a sophisticated and mature carrier capability comparable to U.S. equivalents. This will require advanced technologies, command and control systems, aviation abilities, and ship defenses that will take years to perfect—and training personnel will take time. It is unlikely that China could surpass U.S. technological and naval dominance in any broad sense for decades. Therefore, the region has the opportunity, albeit a fleeting one, to prepare for the impact of Chinese carriers.

The Geopolitical Reality

China shares borders with 14 countries and has ongoing maritime disputes with a number of them. China’s dispute with the United States over Taiwan is ongoing, as are standoffs with Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines over the Spratly Islands archipelago (which straddles international shipping lanes through the South China Sea) and other contested territories.

China also faces internal secessionist movements in Tibet and from the Uighurs (the
China’s rise is making the United States more relevant, not less, and there is little risk of U.S. influence waning in the region.

The carriers will compound existing regional concerns about China’s lack of transparency in governmental processes, including uncertainty about the role of its military in policymaking and the increasing use of “soft power” diplomacy to expand global influence. Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper called on China to “do more” to explain why its military modernization appears beyond the scope required for a conflict over Taiwan. At best, uncertainty “dominates the circumstances of China’s economic rise.”

Chinese leaders argue that their country “is totally transparent in strategic intentions” and that the United States maintains a Cold War mentality with respect to China. The United States insists on the right of military aircraft to operate 12 nautical miles from China’s coastline in defiance of China’s stated 200-nautical-mile exclusion zone (the same distance the United States and Russia maintained off each other’s coasts during the Cold War). This has created overt animosity between the U.S. Navy and PLAN for over a decade. Future incidents are likely to be exacerbated by the intervention of a Chinese carrier group.

In a practical sense, 2 or even 4 Chinese carriers would not alter the overwhelming military advantage maintained by the U.S. Navy’s 11 sophisticated carrier battle groups. The U.S. experience is that it takes three carriers to maintain one ready for sea. In this light, it will be many years before the PLAN could hope to generate a consistent carrier presence. Others argue that the U.S. Armed Forces will maintain their qualitative military and technological edge, particularly in space, and Chinese carriers will merely become additional targets for U.S. aircraft and cruise missiles.

China is, therefore, also pursuing complementary technological and asymmetric capabilities that could counter or neutralize overwhelming U.S. military advantages. These capabilities, often generically referred to as the “Assassin’s Mace” reportedly include antiship cruise missiles, antisatellite missiles, and stealth, nano-, and cyberwarfare technologies. The successful Chinese test of an antisatellite missile in January 2007...
and the potential for mysterious Chinese capabilities fuel concerns about Beijing’s strategic intentions.

Some believe these technologies are beyond China’s immediate reach or that they can be defeated by emerging U.S. capabilities. Others portend a “technological Pearl Harbor” (consistent with a Chinese strategic culture that values surprise and deception) in which U.S. command systems are paralyzed or a major platform is destroyed by potent secret weapons. On balance, it is reasonable to assume that China is seeking capability advantages, as do all military powers, but as yet it has not exhibited any aggressive intent.

**What Will Chinese Carriers Do?**

In 2004, President Hu expanded the PLAN role to include “safeguarding China’s expanding national interests and ensuring world peace.” This extended the PLAN focus beyond Taiwan and maritime sovereignty toward protection of China’s increasingly important international sea lines of communication. China’s role in recent years in international institutions, including supporting UN Security Council resolutions (a shift from the previously strict belief in noninterference in the internal affairs of states) and participation in coalition counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia, supports this intent.

Major General Qian Lihua, director of the Defense Ministry’s foreign affairs office, stated, “The question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier.” He added, “Unlike another country, we will not use [a carrier] to pursue global deployment or global reach.” Instead, he described a carrier’s purpose as offshore defense. However, there is little utility for carriers in sea denial of China’s coastal areas or in a direct role in an operation to seize Taiwan, as airpower can be projected from the mainland.

The real utility of carriers is providing air cover for forces conducting sea control and sea denial away from China’s shores and outside the range of its land-based air defense. In this context, “PLAN officers speak of developing three oceangoing fleets, one to patrol the areas around Korea and Japan, another to push out to the Western Pacific and a third to protect the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca.”

Chinese carriers could detect and interdict forces in the Pacific Ocean, ensure sea passage through the Malacca Straits, or protect string-of-pearls bases across the length of China’s strategic sea supply routes into the Indian Ocean.

The high risk of losing a carrier to U.S. weapons or provoking an escalating American or regional response (including a nuclear one) makes an aggressive carrier posture unlikely. However, it is possible that a Chinese carrier group could deter or delay an intervention by U.S. carrier groups, or apply pressure during a standoff or negotiation, while avoiding direct confrontation. It is also conceivable, in a conventional sense, that China could achieve some form of limited local sea dominance against U.S. or coalition naval forces, or win a localized, short, high-intensity naval engagement for strategic advantage. In these circumstances, Chinese carriers would challenge the perception of U.S. maritime dominance in the Pacific.

Carriers also offer the CCP the means to posture in ways not available to them at present. Carriers could be used with economic and cultural tools to persuade and coerce, such as protecting blockading ships from air, surface, and subsurface threats. Furthermore, a carrier might play “smart power” roles, such as evacuation operations in support of China’s immense international diasporas or humanitarian interventions.

In one sense, a carrier group may present China with a “Great Red Fleet” to extend influence and authority in a manner reminiscent of President Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet of 1907–1909. At a minimum, the carriers herald an increasing presence in the Pacific that will require accommodation by the United States and other regional nations. Short of the unlikely event of open conflict, Chinese carriers will be as much about perceptions as tactical effect, and will complicate the strategic calculations of others.

**The Risks of Chinese Carriers**

In 2008, a Chinese admiral offered the commander of U.S. Pacific Command a division of the Pacific Ocean between their two countries once China had carriers. In 2009, China hardened its position on the Spratly Islands, pushing for bilateral rather than international resolution of the territorial disputes. Both stances indicate China’s growing diplomatic confidence and a determination to avoid checking of its strategic intentions.

The United States is wary of Chinese military intentions in the Asia-Pacific and conscious of regional nations’ unease. Militarily speaking, China’s procurement of antiaccess and area-denial weapons is of the most concern. Strategically, there is a risk for the United States that regional nations might shift from U.S.-China fence-sitting to “bandwagoning” with China. As Australian strategist Hugh White asserts, “As the British discovered and as the Chinese discovered, once you lose economic primacy, strategic primacy follows pretty quickly.”

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Washington’s policy will remain a key variable for the region, and its responses to Chinese carriers will be closely watched. The region will act with confidence if the United States remains economically significant and a security guarantor. It could become unsettled if the United States is perceived as inadequately committed or if it engages China insensitively. At worst, an ambiguous U.S. response could trigger a militarily resurgent Japan or accelerate the current widespread regional naval modernization into a maritime arms race.

In 2007, the U.S. Pacific Fleet for the first time had more ships assigned to it than the Atlantic Fleet. While this is a prudent military contingency response, and reassuring to allies, it could conversely be perceived by China as an aggressive U.S. containment policy, thereby hardening Beijing’s competitive resolve and potentially provoking an antagonistic strategic response—increasing the likelihood of tensions between the PLAN and the U.S. Navy. The correct balance will remain difficult to find.

While outright Chinese aggression appears unlikely in the next decade or so, Chinese carriers operating in the South China Sea and the Pacific will encounter ships from Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, and the United States. These nations have competing interests and maintain surveillance on each others’ activities. The new carriers would increase suspicion and amplify tensions.

A series of attempts to build confidence and develop Chinese and American bilateral agreements have met with little success. None has delivered enduring or effective means of managing crises between the two countries. Some are concerned that no “Incident at Sea”—type of agreement exists between the United States and China, as existed to defuse tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1972. Whether future naval tensions arise from longstanding disputes, from CCP exploitation of nationalistic sentiments, or from some apparently trivial event, a Chinese carrier group could raise the stakes (and emotions) and increase the possibility of an incident escalating unintentionally.

The unintended consequences of Chinese carriers pose the greatest threat to regional harmony in the decades ahead. Without an agreement to moderate sea incidents, it may be impossible to realize a “harmonious ocean” between a Chinese carrier-capable navy and other regional navies in the South China Sea and Pacific.

The Australian Context

Australia shifted its security reliance from Great Britain to the United States after the sinking of HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales on December 10, 1941, just days after Pearl Harbor. A lack of air cover and arguably the absence of a carrier permitted this catastrophe. The loss of these two British ships effectively destroyed Singapore’s naval protection, just when Australia feared a Japanese attack if Singapore fell. This shook Australia and exposed Britain’s inadequate commitment to defending its former colony. Ever since, Australia has looked to the United States as its principal security ally.

Cultural ties with and a debt of gratitude to the United States run deep in Australia. The Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. Security Treaty of 1951 is a military alliance on defense matters in the Pacific region. It binds Australia and the United States to common defense in the event of an attack on either country. The treaty has dominated Australian strategic thought since World War II and has, in effect, allowed Australia to forsake a strategy of defense self-sufficiency. Canberra has faithfully supported U.S. security endeavors from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan, and benefited by maintaining a relatively small, albeit professional, defense force.

Once a British colonial outpost, Australia has gradually drawn closer to Asia in population composition and economic focus. At present, Japan and China are Australia’s major export markets, and it actively seeks a closer relationship with regional organizations such as ASEAN. Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was the first Western leader fluent in Mandarin. Regardless, recent Australian-Sino relations have been mixed, largely due to Chinese resentment over Australian rules for foreign investment and the tone of Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper, which sets out strategy and military spending priorities until 2030.

The White Paper identifies China’s rise as a challenge but falls short of describing it as a direct threat. However, the inference is not difficult to draw, as the paper cautions China that the “pace, scope and structure” of its military buildup appears “beyond that required for a conflict over Taiwan” and cause for regional concern in the absence of further explanation. The paper also announces a surprising addition of 12 submarines, effectively doubling the presently undermanned Australian fleet. No precise role is offered for these submarines other than “sea control including freedom of navigation and the protection of shipping.”

These submarines appear intended to deny the maritime approaches to Australia, to protect Australian trade routes and shipping, and, if required, to contribute usefully.
to a U.S.-led coalition against a maritime force. The tenor of the White Paper and the submarine fleet expansion angered China while underscoring the enduring centrality of the Australia-U.S. alliance. Former Prime Minister Rudd had further reinforced Australia's ongoing security reliance on the United States by describing China as a partner and the United States as a strategic ally.

Australia’s conundrum is now two-fold: how to avoid U.S. policy drawing China (and by default Australia) into conflict, and how to accommodate Chinese interests without undermining the U.S. alliance. An additional challenge is moderating Australian coordination with the United States to avoid losing an independent voice with China.

In the event of escalating U.S.-China tensions, Australia could assume different roles. One is trusted middleman, working to achieve accommodation over conflict between the two great powers. Australia’s close historical and cultural relationship with the United States and its growing independent trade and regional ties with China have it uniquely placed to mediate if U.S.-China relations should sour to the point of an incommunicative posture. Evidence of the developing strength of Australia’s relationship was recently seen in Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang lavishing “extraordinary praise” on Australia as a partner and friend during a visit in October 2009, despite the recent frictions.

Alternatively, Australia could become marginalized as tensions rise, losing the ear of both nations, particularly if it is perceived as militarily irrelevant or a military minion of the United States. Australia requires a sufficiently independent defense policy and an effective level of military deterrence to retain Chinese respect. At present, Australia does not maintain adequate deterrent capability against a nation of China’s might without U.S. backing and will remain dependent on support from U.S. capabilities until at least 2030 under the financial constraints of the current White Paper. True defense self-sufficiency poses significant challenges to Australian policymakers. And of failing to account for how an eclipse of U.S. primacy might reshape Australia’s strategic objectives and operational capabilities. His concern is that self-reliance is not realistically considered, nor are preparations adequate for escalating tensions between the United States and China. Of course, budgetary considerations have guided Australia’s present strategy.

White asked, “Do we stay with the U.S. as it becomes drawn deeper into a competitive relationship with China? I think the answer is quite probably not.” His answer is heretical to many, suggesting the almost unthinkable: that Australia might remain neutral—or perhaps even side with China—if a conflict with the United States were to emerge. While this possibility seems remote in the current political context, other regional nations may choose to take that path (particularly if it is paved with Chinese largesse). In these circumstances, either neutrality or an alternative alliance offers other options for Australia.

An alliance with another regional nation such as Japan or possibly India might support a neutral stance but could still result in Australia being drawn into a broadening U.S.-China conflict. A new alliance would also struggle to replicate the trust and surety associated with the well-tested U.S. alliance, at least for many decades. Australian full neutrality could not be considered without actual defense self-reliance.

Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper notes that U.S. nuclear protection has removed the need for Australia to consider more “significant and expensive defense options.” Although not named, these options could include aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons. Australia relinquished its carrier capability (HMAS Melbourne) in 1982 and has never pursued nuclear weapons. There is currently no Australian intention or public debate to acquire either. These capability options could require prominent consideration if China becomes militarily aggressive or the United States signals a withdrawal from the Pacific.

Australia is well positioned to act as middleman during rising tensions between China and the United States despite the risk of marginalization. It should reinforce its status as a trusted interlocutor and valued independent agent (as evidenced by its regional leadership roles in East Timor and Solomon Islands) and continue to play a leading regional role in encouraging Chinese transparency. Australia can also champion an Incident at Sea-style agreement between China and other regional nations while continuing to develop military capabilities useful to both U.S.-led coalitions and regional security more broadly.

In the event of an open conflict between China and the United States, Australia lacks the ability to provide air cover to a maritime force deployed away from its shores and has no independently credible deterrent to a major power, in isolation from the U.S. alliance. To mitigate these risks, Australia requires a more thorough consideration of the underpinnings of defense self-sufficiency, including a carrier capability and nuclear deterrence.

Announcements about China’s carrier intentions are the latest manifestation of a growing military and maritime capability that is difficult to interpret but impossible to ignore. As ever, China remains enigmatic. What is certain is that the CCP faces a complex set of challenges to maintain China’s rise, meet its growing trade and energy requirements, and retain political power. China’s expanding interests, and its aircraft carriers, will unavoidably affect Australia’s
strategic circumstances in the coming decades. Notwithstanding the military capabilities that carriers will afford China, miscalculations or misunderstandings from incidents at sea are the most significant threat to the peaceful inclusion of a carrier-capable Chinese navy in the Pacific.

Each of the Pacific nations will manage China’s carrier ambitions differently, but the U.S. response will set the regional tone. For Australia, the choices include retaining U.S. security dependence, thereby risking a form of martyrdom, or pursuing greater defense self-sufficiency. The debate about genuine self-sufficiency has not been held in any substantial sense. Therefore, by default, the U.S. alliance will retain its primacy in Canberra’s strategic thought, and Australian military capabilities will evolve in accordance with the intent of the 2009 Defence White Paper—at least until the time that Chinese carriers are likely to appear.

Despite any good intentions, it appears unlikely that Chinese aircraft carriers could enhance harmony in the Pacific Ocean. There are still at least 5 years before China’s carriers appear on the horizon of its Pacific neighbors. Australia must consider not only the military implication of these carriers but also the perceptions they will create in terms of relative U.S.-China preeminence. It is best that this thinking is done before the carriers materialize in the Pacific. Developing an understanding of the regional perceptions of Chinese carriers will be important to achieving accommodation rather than conflict and to maintaining stability and confidence in the Asia-Pacific. JFQ

NOTES


5. Medeiros, 251.


12. Erickson and Wilson, 29; Ross, 75.


16. Friedberg and Ross.

17. Friedberg and Ross.


20. Ibid.


22. Evans, 6.


27. Evans, 1.


32. Erickson and Wilson, 28.


34. Lei, 3.

35. In 2008, Admiral Timothy Keating, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, reported a conversation, seemingly in jest, in which a senior Chinese naval officer suggested drawing a line down the middle of the Pacific: “You guys can have the east part of the Pacific, Hawaii to the states. We’ll take the west part of the Pacific, from Hawaii to China.” Discussed in Friedberg and Ross.


38. Weitz, 394.

39. Ibid., 382–387.

40. See Andrew Scobell, “Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China’s Peaceful Rise?” Parameters 39, no. 2 (Summer 2009), 19.

41. Defending Australia, 34.

42. Ibid., 70.

43. Ibid., 60.


45. O’Connor.

46. Ibid.

47. Defending Australia, 50.
On March 25, 2010, hundreds of residents of Marjah looked on as the red and green national flag of Afghanistan was raised by the governor of Helmand Province in a small ceremony in the center of town. Despite pockets of continued resistance, the Taliban had largely been evicted from Marjah, where, until recently, the group was considered to be too strong for the underresourced International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to defeat. This military victory was the result of events set in motion nearly 3 months earlier by President Barack Obama. On December 1, 2009, the President addressed the Nation regarding efforts in Afghanistan. He outlined the administration’s strategy in a concise manner, clearly identifying national interests and the ends, ways, and means of a strategy that would send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan by the end of 2010.

This article examines the strategic environment both generically and as a backdrop against which the administration’s Afghan strategy was developed. It leverages both domestic and international contexts in evaluating the flawed assumptions conceived by the administration that ultimately resulted in a strategy poorly suited to support the national interest it is purported to serve. Finally, this article suggests a template for refining the objectives of the strategy in order to reconnect them to national interests and increase the likelihood of a successful outcome.

The Essential Elements of Strategy

Before assessing the Obama administration’s strategy, it is useful both to define strategy and to agree upon its purpose.
National War College Professor Terry Deibel defines foreign affairs strategy as a “plan for the coordinated use of all the instruments of state power to pursue objectives that protect and promote the national interest.” The objectives, or output, of a successful foreign policy strategy must be crafted such that their achievement creates a strategic effect that supports a designated national interest. A strategy that achieves its given objectives but fails to support the associated national interest is at best a waste of resources and national power and at worst a threat to the national security of the country.

Formulation of effective foreign policy strategy is a complex undertaking. As Deibel points out, “The heart of the strategist’s work is to see clearly the extraordinarily complex interrelationships among the elements of strategy.” Unfortunately, before strategists can begin to contemplate the ends, ways, means, and national interests described above, they must first assess their assumptions regarding the strategic environment, for it is these assumptions that identify the threats, opportunities, and values that define interests, and also the extent and availability of resources (power) needed to achieve objectives. Put another way, strategy built on flawed assumptions is doomed to failure.

The West Point Speech

On December 1, 2009, President Obama delivered a speech at West Point that articulated the new U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. This speech identified national interests and the ends, ways, and means of a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, making special mention of his specific goals regarding al Qaeda. During the laborious deliberations and planning that went into the development of this strategy, it is likely that the administration made several erroneous assumptions that will negatively affect success. Before examining these assumptions, however, we must first review the core elements of the strategy.

The President clearly articulated the national interest that would be supported by this strategy: “The security and safety of the American people are at stake in Afghanistan.” He then detailed several al Qaeda attacks in support of his reiteration of the same overarching goal described in March: “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and prevent its capacity to threaten America and its Allies in the future.” With the national interest identified and a regional goal specified, President Obama presented four specific objectives, or ends, for the administration’s strategy: deny al Qaeda a safe haven, reverse the Taliban’s momentum, deny it the ability to overthrow the government, and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so they can take responsibility for the country’s future.

To achieve these objectives, President Obama identified three core elements the strategy would employ: the military, a civilian surge,” and an effective partnership with Pakistan. Although not specified as the “way” of the strategy, the method for applying the instruments can best be summarized as counterinsurgency. The tasks specified by the President—defeat of the Taliban, training Afghan security forces, improving governance, and growing the Afghan economy—are critical elements of a COIN operation. Additionally, the identification of Pakistan as a safe haven and source of external support for the Taliban suggests the need for a strengthened U.S. alliance with Pakistan bolstered by security and economic assistance, as well as a promise of increased cooperation in matters above and beyond the Taliban insurgency.

Assumptions

Having reviewed the administration’s strategy, we must return to the critical assumptions that underpin this strategy. Deibel tells us that assumptions are “of primary importance to the outcomes of strategic analysis” and that the “importance of such assumptions means that the battle for sound strategy can often be lost right there, at the very beginning.” The current strategy is based on at least four critical assumptions regarding both domestic and international context. The first is that al Qaeda is still a threat to the United States and its citizens. The second, and perhaps most important, is that Afghanistan is of vital importance to al Qaeda. (Given the disproportionate amount of capital being expended, it must also be assumed that Afghanistan is of far greater value to al Qaeda than any other geographic location.) The third significant assumption is that a favorable outcome requires a COIN strategy. Finally, acceptance of the third assumption leads to the final assumption, that the United States has sufficient popular support and resources (and a willingness to commit them) to conduct a counterinsurgency and that it can be brought to a successful conclusion before the required support and resources are exhausted.
In many ways, the current administration “inherited” these assumptions from the previous administration. But whether the assumptions were inherited or formed independently as part of the strategic review, history suggests that “foreign affairs strategy that does not start out with realistic assumptions or that fails to alter them as reality changes has little hope of success.” To evaluate the administration’s Afghanistan strategy, it is important to explore each of these assumptions and examine their relationship with, and impact on, the key elements of strategy.

Understanding the Threat

Understanding the threat is critical to the strategist because it is this understanding that determines the seriousness of the threat and its relationship to national interests (if any). Only then can an informed prioritization of interests and determination of the appropriate resources (and methods of employing them) be performed. While there are many ways that a threat can be evaluated, any assessment should address seriousness, likelihood, and imminence. Since the primary purpose of terrorism is to inspire fear in order to achieve a political goal, it follows that a serious strategic attack would be one that “results in a significant geopolitical policy shift by the target. An attack that destroys a strategic-level target such as the U.S. Capitol or that causes mass casualties—kills 1,000 people or more—would certainly rise to this level.” We must consider then that al Qaeda has the intention and has, on one occasion, demonstrated the capability to carry out a serious attack.

Likelihood and imminence are difficult to measure but must be considered nonetheless. A comprehensive survey of terrorism in the West conducted by forensic psychiatrist Marc Sageman shows that “there were 60 plots over the past 20 years perpetrated by over 46 different networks. Of these only 14 successfully inflicted any casualty, and only 2 were perpetrated by Al Qaeda proper in the last 20 years.” Sageman also points out that there has not been a single terrorist casualty in the West in the last 4 years and none in the United States in the last 8 years.

A terrorist threat requires both intention to do harm and the capability to inflict harm. While the rhetoric from al Qaeda confirms the intent to inflict harm on the United States and other Western countries, careful analysis reveals a fractured extremist group whose core leadership has been significantly attrited and whose capabilities have been vastly degraded. John Brennan, President Obama’s most senior counterterrorism expert, suggests that “[al Qaeda] has been consumed with trying to ensure its security and stay out of the way in northern Pakistan . . . which has thankfully helped distract it from terrorist activities.” Overestimation of a threat can lead strategists to grossly misjudge a capability. John Mueller suggests that extreme events such as 9/11 are often seen as harbingers of events to come but that these events rarely materialize. In a strategic environment that holds significantly reduced domestic means, it is critical that we apply resources in a quantity and scope commensurate with the threat that is actually present rather than the one we infer

Linking Objectives to National Interest

When President Obama stated, “If I did not think that the security of the United States and the safety of the American people were at stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our troops home,” he was clearly defining the national interest supported by the Afghan strategy as physical security of the United States and its citizens. The President translates that national interest into an actionable goal: “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.” Yet just moments after stating the overarching goal, the President presented the four actual objectives of the Afghanistan strategy, only one of which directly addressed al Qaeda (the other three address the Taliban, specifically the Taliban in Afghanistan). While this is not necessarily counterintuitive, it does rely on a significant assumption (or more specifically, several significant assumptions) that must somehow link al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the country of Afghanistan.

In an article in Joint Force Quarterly, Ralph Peters refers to Afghanistan as both “a worthless piece of dirt” and “a strategic booby prize.” While these brash statements are likely overly dismissive of the role Afghanistan should play in a U.S. strategy regarding al Qaeda, the fact remains that the current strategy suggests an inextricable relationship among Afghanistan, the Taliban, and al Qaeda that simply has not been substantiated. The overarching assumption is that “the return to power by the Taliban will automatically allow Al Qaeda to reconstitute in Afghanistan, complete with training camps and resurgence of Al Qaeda’s ability to project
to the West and threaten the homeland.” To address this assumption regarding the return to power by the Taliban, we must examine three subassumptions that break the problem down for deeper analysis.

The first subassumption regarding Afghanistan is that a withdrawal of ISAF forces will result in Taliban control of Afghanistan. While General Stanley McChrystal’s grim prognosis for the future of Afghanistan was likely warranted, it must also be noted that the Taliban of today is quite different from the Taliban that took over Kabul in 1996. Rather than a monolithic entity able to generate a unity of effort, the current Taliban might be better characterized as a loose group of local insurgencies. While the Taliban has demonstrated the ability to assert some semblance of regional control, it would be a significant stretch to assert that it could “coalesce in the near future into an offensive force capable of marching on Kabul.”

The second subassumption is that al Qaeda’s relocation to Afghanistan would automatically follow a Taliban return to power. This assumption overlooks two important facts: there is no real reason for al Qaeda to return, and there is no guarantee that it would be welcomed by the Taliban. Until the recent crackdown in Pakistan, al Qaeda enjoyed a viable sanctuary in this country. It should be noted that although the Taliban regained significant portions of Afghanistan after its ouster by coalition forces in 2001, there is little evidence that al Qaeda actually moved back into these Taliban-controlled areas.

Al Qaeda is an extremist organization that will seek sanctuary in any location that suits its needs. There is certainly no shortage of potential sanctuaries for core al Qaeda in areas inhabited by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Certainly these areas would seem preferable to anywhere in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are likely the most scrutinized areas on the face of the Earth when it comes to Western pursuit of terrorism and terrorist havens.

The final subassumption regarding Afghanistan is that if al Qaeda does return, Afghanistan would rapidly devolve into the “pre-9/11” repository for terrorist planning and training camps. As with the previous two assumptions regarding Afghanistan, this one simply does not stand up to scrutiny. As Sageman points out, the “presence of large sanctuaries in Afghanistan was predicated on Western not so benign neglect of Al Qaeda funded camps there.” The assumption that these camps will return under any circumstance misreads both past and present actions. Sageman continues, “Vigilance through electronic monitoring, spatial surveillance, networks of informants in contested territory, exploitation of Afghan rivalries, combined with the nearby stationing of a small force dedicated to physically eradicate any visible presence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, will prevent the return of Al Qaeda to Afghanistan.”

Given the fallacies in these subassumptions, it follows that the overarching assumption—that Afghanistan is of vital importance to al Qaeda—is not valid. This, in turn, has huge implications for the Obama administration’s strategy. The singular purpose of this strategy must be to ensure that the overarching goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda is met. It is conceivable, however, that the United States and its coalition partners could reverse the Taliban’s momentum, deny it the ability to overthrow the government, and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces such that al Qaeda is denied sanctuary in Afghanistan, yet also fail to meet any of the overarching goals simply because al Qaeda did not need Afghanistan.

The objectives of the administration’s strategy have, at best, a dubious link to the President’s overarching goal. Despite questions regarding both the source and the scope of the primary threat from al Qaeda, the group’s inflammatory and threatening rhetoric suggests that the disruption, dismantling, and ultimate defeat of the network are still a viable goal. So the question remains: how is it possible that the administration could develop a strategy that is so disconnected from the goals and interests it was designed to support? The answer likely lies in the third flawed assumption: that success requires a counterinsurgency. It appears that the administration selected counterinsurgency as the “ways” portion of the strategy first and then worked backward to determine what “ends” (objectives) this “way” could produce and what “means” (resources) would be required to achieve these ends.
The process of developing foreign policy strategy is complex and comprises a vast number of interrelated elements; it should not be viewed as a process with a singular start point that walks through a set of rigid, linear steps to reach an endstate. Despite this fact, selecting the ways to apply resources without at least considering necessary objectives and available resources is akin to deciding to buy a Mercedes-Benz without considering transportation needs or budget. Similarly, for U.S. policymakers and strategists, the allure of COIN, despite its limitations and insatiable resource requirements, appears to have been too hard to resist. Opting for a counterinsurgency strategy may prove to be particularly troublesome not only because a successful outcome would only affect the Taliban (not al Qaeda), but also, and perhaps even more importantly, for ISAF is that the Afghan security forces are likely years from achieving both the capability and capacity to provide security to their own people. In the interim, the security provided by ISAF is accepted only grudgingly by the insular Afghan population, which has historically despised the intervention of outsiders for any reason. Until Afghan security forces are able to provide security autonomously to the citizens, it is unlikely the Hamid Karzai government will achieve the legitimacy required to sustain effective governance. Although security is of the utmost importance to ISAF and the Karzai government, it is just one of many obstacles that stand in the way of attaining legitimacy in the eyes of the people and establishing effective governance. The tribal nature and diverse mix of ethnic groups create a unique challenge because conducting successful COIN operations usually requires the commitment of vast resources and generally takes years.

While myriad factors make COIN operations difficult, the cornerstones of COIN, security and governance, will likely prove most problematic in Afghanistan. The COIN manual of the Army and Marine Corps offers that the “cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace” but also warns that it is better for the host nation to provide this security. The problem for anyone attempting to unite the people under a strong central government. Compounding the complex demographic issues is the problem of corruption. As recently as 2009, Afghanistan was ranked as the second most corrupt nation on the planet. President Karzai has been linked with nearly every type of corruption imaginable from election fraud, to bribery and extortion, to drug trafficking (along with his brother Ahmed Wali Karzai). When the abysmal literacy rate, harsh geography, and antiquated infrastructure are factored in, the barriers that impede effective governance seem insurmountable.

Unfortunately, a COIN strategy in Afghanistan is at best “irrelevant to the goal of disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda, which is located in Pakistan.” Even if the Taliban is defeated, will America be any safer? Given the demonstrated reluctance of al Qaeda to return to Afghanistan since 9/11, defeating the Taliban amounts to nothing more than defeating the Afghans, whose goals are parochial and local. As it turns out, it is terrorism in America that proved a threat to Americans, not insurgency in Afghanistan.

High Cost of Achieving Objectives

Given the complex nature of COIN, and the vast resources it requires, it seems only logical that the administration’s Afghanistan strategy should have been evaluated before being finalized and put into execution. There are myriad ways to evaluate a strategy; however, at a minimum the strategist must determine whether the instruments as applied will have an impact that leads to the successful accomplishment of the stated goals at an acceptable cost (desirability). Additionally, the strategist must determine if the required level of resources and support can be maintained over the time required to accomplish the goals (sustainability). Sustainability is difficult.
to gauge but is of particular importance in assessing the decision to use counterinsurgency, since it normally requires vast resources and long-term commitment.

Sustainment of COIN operations in Afghanistan will likely face at least three significant challenges: maintaining the support of the American people, maintaining funding from Congress in the face of the ongoing budget crisis, and maintaining the support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other coalition partners. Shortly after the President’s West Point speech, 51 percent of Americans supported his plan. However, in that same survey, an overwhelming majority (73 percent) worried that the costs of the war will make it more difficult to deal with problems close to home.36 Unless the U.S. economy begins a dramatic recovery, support for counterinsurgency will be hard to sustain, especially when little tangible progress is made. The apparent (and widely reported) success of the drone strikes against members of al Qaeda may begin to persuade the American people (and, by extension, Congress) that a new strategy may be required.

Although somewhat tenuous, support within the United States appears to be far less problematic than sustained support from NATO Allies and other coalition partners. NATO commitment in Afghanistan continues to wane as evidenced by the recent collapse of the Dutch government over a proposal to extend the use of its nation’s forces beyond August 2010. The Alliance’s failure to provide requested troop levels and the significant caveats that accompany committed troops have proven frustrating to senior U.S. military officials. In a recent speech to the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates suggested that a large portion of the European public and political class have grown so averse to “the use of military force and the risks that go with it” that “it has become a real impediment to achieving security and lasting peace in the 21st century.”37

President Karzai has stated that “it will be at least five years before Afghan forces can take the lead in the fight against Taliban insurgents,” and he further predicted that “it would be at least 15 years before his government could pay for its own forces.”38 These predictions seem consistent with noted experts who generally agree that it will take no less than 5 years for Afghan forces to have sufficient capability and capacity to operate autonomously and that defeat of the Taliban will likely take 10 to 15 years even with U.S. assistance.39 There seems, however, a significant disconnect between current U.S. strategy and the common timeframes espoused by U.S. COIN doctrine, noted experts, and Afghan leaders. President Obama suggests that “additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July 2011.”40 The effect of a timetable on the Afghan people will likely be disastrous, however, since it is a basic tenet of COIN that the “population must have confidence in the staying power of both the counterinsurgents and the Host Nation government.”41

Even if counterinsurgency operations defeat the Taliban, will the cost of this campaign be worth the prevention of a fractured and weakened al Qaeda potentially returning to Afghanistan? The monetary costs alone are staggering. To date, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that $345 billion has been spent on Afghanistan since September 11, 2001.42 Despite the cost, the continued willingness of the United States and its allies to bear these burdens suggests that the current strategy is feasible.43 Whether or not it is sustainable depends largely on how much longer it will take to achieve success. Feasibility and sustainability are not the only tests because they only measure whether the
 objectives can be accomplished. Perhaps the more important question is should accomplishment be attempted (that is, are the objectives desirable?). Even if strategists agree that a goal is attainable and in accord with the national interest, they must also determine if it is worth the resources it consumes. To accurately assess this strategy, it is necessary to add up not only hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of American lives, but also the social disruption at home, damage to the Nation's financial stability, injury to the Nation's prestige abroad, and opportunity costs of other foreign and domestic policy goals that were not achieved because of the ongoing struggles in Afghanistan. Successful national strategy demands that these costs be weighed against the threat of al Qaeda returning to Afghanistan.

Can We Fix the Problem?

President Obama has promised to review the current strategy in December of this year, his third review in 22 months. The administration must adjust flawed assumptions to facilitate a refinement of the current strategy. This review should begin with an honest assessment of the current threat posed by al Qaeda. Simply deciding that al Qaeda is still dangerous is not enough. Rigorous analysis would likely reveal the “growing consensus among analysts that al Qaeda is increasingly isolated and starved of funds.”46 It should recognize that al Qaeda remains a threat but one that has been degraded and dispersed, with perhaps the most serious threat now coming from al Qaeda offshoots in Yemen or Somalia. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this evaluation should recognize al Qaeda as a fungible network that is not beholden to any geographic ties, noting especially that “the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan does not seem to have bolstered al Qaeda’s fortunes.”47

A better understanding of the nature of the threat will allow for minor adjustments to the President’s goals regarding al Qaeda and a major adjustment to the objectives of this strategy. “Disrupt” is a good task and arguably one we are already accomplishing. “Dismantle” should be discarded if for no other reason than it is ambiguous and nearly impossible to assess. “Defeat” is a worthy goal but is not required to ensure security, nor is it feasible given the networked nature of al Qaeda and the vast resources and time that this task requires. A better goal might be to continue efforts to disrupt al Qaeda to degrade its capability to attack the United States and its allies from anywhere in the world.

While the overarching goal requires only minor adjustment, the objectives of the strategy must be completely revised to reestablish a linkage with the goal. Defeating the Taliban does not affect al Qaeda, and it does not make America safer. Our objective should be to strengthen the capacity of the security forces and governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan so they can ensure stability and safety in their countries and deny al Qaeda safe havens within their borders. The means to achieve these objectives are essentially the same as those used in the current strategy: the military, a civilian surge, and an effective partnership with Pakistan. The major difference would be in the scope and role of the military instrument. A revised strategy would rapidly draw down the number of troops required and refocus the remaining troops solely on training Afghan security forces.

the administration must adjust flawed assumptions to facilitate a refinement of the current strategy

This change in methodology regarding the employment of the military immediately suggests a return to the question: Should we do counterinsurgency or counterterrorism (CT)? Yet this represents a false dichotomy. The real question to ask is, should we do COIN in addition to CT? In other words, what is the added value of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan to a necessary and continuing CT strategy worldwide? To date, the administration has failed to adequately answer this all-important question.

Rather than juxtaposing COIN and CT, perhaps a better way to evaluate the policy choices available to the administration would be to decide on whether to use a direct or an indirect approach. The use of a direct approach means “achieves security objectives through the U.S.-led application of military power.”48 This is the approach currently in use in Afghanistan. ISAF has had some limited successes such as the recent operations in Marjah; however, these successes have been few in number, have questionable long-term impact, and have resulted only in the defeat of Taliban forces, not al Qaeda. In contrast, an indirect approach means “security objectives by working with and through foreign partners.”49 This approach is typified by current efforts in Pakistan and Yemen. These operations have been highly successful in targeting al Qaeda and disrupting its operations.50 The indirect approach yields some degree of control over operations, but its recent successes are undeniable and have the added advantages of being cost effective and of keeping a relatively low profile of American involvement in a region that widely opposes Western intervention.

Washington Post columnist David Ignatius points out that the Pentagon “has adopted this proxy strategy of training ‘friendly’ countries (meaning ones that share with us the enemy of Islamic extremism) from North Africa to the Philippines.”51 It is time for the Obama administration to adopt this strategy in both its global and regional policies on combating the terrorist threats posed by al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups. Even countries such as Pakistan, which historically have been skeptical of partnering with the United States, have recently proven to be significant success stories in the indirect approach to disrupting terrorist threats.52 Any future review of strategy must acknowledge the immense progress that has been made employing host nation forces in a leading role.

For a strategy to be desirable, its objectives must be both necessary and worth the cost required to achieve them. If the Obama administration would eliminate unnecessary objectives and refocus solely on goals that impact al Qaeda, it would be possible to develop a strategy that not only uses fewer resources, but also is more effective at achieving the President’s goals.

With each passing day, the United States and its allies maintain a massive force in Afghanistan. As the image of Western occupation of a Muslim country takes root, it fuels a radical Islamic backlash against the United States. After 10 years of fruitless fighting and an immeasurable squandering of U.S. treasure and blood, it is not al Qaeda that will remain in Afghanistan. What will remain are generations of frustrated Afghan citizens who will harbor a hatred of the West, and specifically the United States, for generations to come.
NOTES

2 Ibid., 24.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. See also Deibel, 206–210.
8 Deibel, 36.
9 Ibid., 37.
10 Ibid., 144–145.
13 Ibid., 22.
14 Many experts suggest that al Qaeda has fragmented considerably since 9/11 into a number of regional organizations that vary in intention, capability, and even ideology. For more information on the evolving nature of al Qaeda, see James Blitz, “Al Qaeda: A Threat Transformed,” January 18, 2010, available at <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/173635a6-046f-11df-8603-70177635a5d6.html?catId=176&SID=google>.
15 Ibid., 22.
17 The White House.
18 Ibid.
20 Sageman, 21.
21 Unless otherwise specified, the discussion of the following three subassumptions draws on Sageman, 21–22.
22 Ibid., 21.
23 Ibid., 22.
24 Sageman also points out that “while the focus has long been on Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must remember that Al Qaeda was deeply entrenched in the Sudan from 1992–1996,” and it was during this time that “Al Qaeda developed its strategy to target the West, and especially the United States and trained potential terrorists there.” He goes on to suggest that had al Qaeda not been ousted from Sudan, we would likely be discussing strategy options for Sudan instead of Afghanistan.
25 Ibid., 22.
26 Ibid.
28 FM 3–24, chapter 1. See especially page 1–24: “COIN operations always demand considerable expenditure of time and resources.”
29 Ibid., 1–23. See also pages 1–27 and 1–28 for a discussion on the importance of the host nation taking over responsibility for security as soon as possible.
30 The challenges facing rebuilding and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan are staggering. The Government Accountability Office (GAO), Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight (Washington, DC: GAO, May 2007), provides an excellent overview of these challenges.
31 For a particularly personal look at the tribal nature of Afghanistan, see Jim Gant, One Tribe at a Time (Los Angeles: Nine Sisters Imports, Inc., 2009).
37 From Secretary Gates’s speech to the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar, National Defense University, February 23, 2010, available at <www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1423>. It is especially noteworthy that only 3 of 28 NATO member nations (including the United States) meet the 2 percent of gross domestic product per year mark.
39 For further discussion on the time it will take for Afghan security forces to become self-sufficient, see, for example, Seth Jones, Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008). 10. See also David Kilcullen’s testimony to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Afghanistan, February 5, 2009, available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/02/ crunch-time-in-afghanistan/>.
40 Kilcullen suggests that a “Protect, Prevent, Build, Hand-Off” strategy similar to the one proposed by the Obama administration will take “ten to fifteen years.”
41 The White House. See also Con Coughlin, “Has the West Got the Will to Carry on Shedding Blood for the Afghans?” London Daily Telegraph, January 29, 2010, for an even rosier projection by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who claimed that Afghans would be able to start taking charge of their own security by 2010.
42 FM 3–24, 1–24.
44 For a strategy to be feasible, the Nation must have sufficient resources on hand and be willing and able to commit them in the quantity required to achieve the stated objective. See Deibel, 297, for the importance of feasibility and desirability in setting objectives and also chapter eight, “Evaluating Courses of Action.”
45 Ibid., 299. These considerations are adapted from an example Deibel uses when discussing U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
47 These regional subsidiaries are dangerous not only as organized entities capable of projecting violence to the West, but also for their demonstrated desire to recruit and train Westerners to carry out terrorist acts in their home countries.
48 Bartolf and Finel, 3.
49 Sageman, 20.
51 Ibid.
52 For more information on recent U.S. operations with Yemen, see Dana Priest, “U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding Yemen on Strikes,” The Washington Post, January 27, 2010.
Information Strategy
The Missing Link

Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior.
—Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

Information operations are “the planning and integrated employment of capabilities in the information environment across the phases of joint military operations.” This new definition avoids the major pitfall of its predecessors—a rice-bowl approach that actually discouraged integration of efforts. But this article is not about whether that new definition is right, or even good. It is about how the door is now open for a fresh look at an even more significant issue.

The world of IO has always had a weakness: the endless doctrinal debate about “who owns what” has distracted from useful discussion on how to orchestrate those pieces to actually accomplish something—in other words, strategy. Just what are the ends, ways, and means of IO, and how do we align them to defeat an enemy? The Department of Defense (DOD)—in fact, the U.S. Government as a whole—desperately needs a construct for designing interagency offensive information strategy that will enable leaders to employ the information element of national power in military operations. To build one, we first look at where current thought on “information power” is lacking. Then we use a new construct for binning the means: hard and soft tools. Finally, we bridge the gap between those two with the ways—using the soft tools to influence, and the hard tools to disrupt, enemy action. We start with some basics.

Information Power
While information power is well accepted as one of the four elements of national power, neither the term nor the concept appeared in the 2006 National Security Strategy. It is strangely absent from the “full array of political, economic, diplomatic, and other tools at our disposal” that is the basis of the document. Nor does information power appear in the 2008 National Defense Strategy. Moreover, although there is no vetted definition of information power, the concept is understood and the link to how the military should exercise it is obvious: information operations. Considerable attention has

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already been given to the “defensive” side of the information domain. What is still lacking is the offense. The problem with the current IO model is that it fails to orchestrate the tools of information power toward a common goal. One reason is that the legal and bureaucratic limits on who can do certain things have caused an almost irrational phobia against integrated efforts. For example, fear of cross-contamination of public affairs (PA), public diplomacy (PD), and strategic communication with psychological operations (PSYOP) actively opposes effective coordination of these obviously interdependent tools of information strategy.

Similarly, while military doctrine does recognize the existence of tools such as PD, it essentially stiff-arms them: “Their primary purpose and rules under which they operate must not be compromised by IO.” In this way, current doctrine only guarantees that whatever plan comes out will lack interagency collaboration—the recipe for strategic failure. Information power is multiagency. The State Department does slightly better. State’s U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication at least recognizes that “key influencers” include “military personnel” and that PD efforts must make use of them. While that is a nice nod to recognizing the issue, it is not a solution. In neither DOD doctrine nor State Department “strategy” do we find a concept for linking IO ends, ways, and means.

To accomplish that, we should first define the target. The target of offensive IO is the mind of the adversary. During conflict, especially during phases two (deter) and three (seize initiative) of a campaign, the primary target is the mind of the enemy commander at every level, from the national dictator down to the infantry company commander. Other targets may include the minds of lesser officials, the local populace, and outside actors. During other phases, the relative importance of each of those targets will vary. For instance, during phase four (dominate), the minds of the populace may be more important than the minds of any remaining militant commanders. Given that target—the adversary mind—we can now devise strategy.

Offensive Information Strategy
Contrary to standard assumptions about how complicated IO is, there are just two basic ends for any offensive information strategy: the adversary’s behavior has changed, or further coordinated resistance by that adversary is impossible. All interagency plans and actions in the information domain must be aligned to accomplish one of those ends. In the first case, the desired end is for adversary decisionmakers, commanders, and populations to voluntarily capitulate to or implement our demands. Defining precisely what specific adversary behavior change (often “cessation of aggression” or “surrender”) will vary from conflict to conflict, but in all cases it is the crucial first step.

When approached in this way, it becomes clear that this end of information operations is actually the supported, not a supporting, operation, around which the other diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements must be aligned. In the second case, the desired end is that the adversary’s ability to command and control forces and effectively resist will have collapsed. Seeking this end normally implies that the first end has not been achieved, making it a supporting, rather than supported, operation. The situation and phase of operations will dictate which of those two ends has primacy. But before we look at how, let us first look at the available means.

Means, Ways, and Ends
The means of IO are comprised of two sets of tools: the hard tools that (probably) constitute acts of war, and the soft tools that (probably) do not. The hard tools include computer network attack (CNA), electronic attack (EA), and kinetic attack. The soft tools include not only the traditional military capabilities of PSYOP and military deception, but also strategic communication, PA, and PD. While some may feel uncomfortable about putting these all together into one strategy, not doing so is precisely what has been getting in the way. Until we put all the tools on the table and force interagency collaboration, IO will remain forever fragmented.

This brings us to the ways: how to link the means to the ends. The existing doctrinal diagrams, with their “pillars” and “capabilities,” do nothing to show how to align them...
efforts with our actions—the “diplomacy of the deed.”

As far as disruption, we find a model readily available in John Boyd’s oft-trivialized “OODA Loop” (observe, orient, decide, act). In fact, Boyd’s entire concept—of late, usually misunderstood to mean that we simply need to speed up our own decision processes to guarantee victory—argued that by disrupting the enemy’s ability to make decisions, we would cause complete collapse of effective command.11 By applying the hard tools of CNA, EA, and kinetic attack, supplemented by the soft tools, to disrupt the adversary’s OODA loops and command and control systems at appropriate points (see figure 2), we can quickly render organized resistance impossible.

Overcoming more than a decade of IO inability to deliver will take some new thought and direction. The proposed new definition of IO is a helpful start, but it does not fill the need for an offensive information strategy model. For that we must reorganize strategy along the lines of ends, ways, and means. The ends are simple: adversary behavior has changed, or further adversary resistance is impossible. The means bin nicely into two groups, the hard and soft tools. Finally, the ways tie them all together using the soft tools to influence and the hard tools to disrupt the adversary. Using this model, we will finally be able to effectively apply the information element of power in offensive operations.

\[\text{Figure 1. Orchestrating the Ends, Ways, and Means of Information Operations Strategy}\]

\[\text{Figure 2. Using Information Operations Tools to Disrupt OODA Loop}\]

\[\text{NOTES}\]


3 “Information Operations” (Washington, DC: Staff action package, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense [Intelligence], 2009), 1. The six phases of joint military operations are one—shape; two—deter; three—seize the initiative; four—dominate; five—stabilize; six—enable civil authority.


7 Sharp, x.


10 When applied to an actual operation, clear goals and objectives of influence must be specified early on: who must be influenced to do or think what?

11 John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and Losing (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1987).
In his farewell address, President Dwight Eisenhower warned the Nation against “the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.” Many have more accurately referred to this as a military-industrial-congressional complex (MICC). The problems surrounding the Air Force’s KC–135 tanker replacement program dramatically highlight the importance of Eisenhower’s warning. This program, along with multiple others, has been besieged and delayed by political efforts driven by the economic benefits of a home-state industry win. Political grandstanding, contract protests, and congressional infighting all lead to delays in military procurement—delays that are even more costly in this time of war. As history shows, waiting until a time of conflict to develop the industrial base to build needed equipment can result in dire consequences. The military-industrial-congressional complex, then, while necessary, must have its influence curtailed to ensure that national policy, not the complex, dictates the materiel acquisition process.

Eisenhower described the military-industrial complex as the “conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry” and warned that the Nation “must not fail to comprehend its grave implications.” He had initially called it the military-industrial-congressional complex, but removed congressional from the final version of his address to avoid upsetting his colleagues. Actually, his final version may have been more accurate since, when Eisenhower made his speech, Congress had little direct control over how the military Services spent their money. Prior to the 1960s, Congress authorized lump-sum budgets for the Armed Forces. In 1961, Congress had spending oversight over only 2 percent (military construction), which grew to 100 percent by 1983. Today, Congress is heavily involved in approving all expenditures requested by the Department of Defense (DOD), which,
in turn, has approval authority over military Service requests. Eisenhower’s complex has evolved into a congressional-defense industry complex that almost exclusively directs how hundreds of billions are spent annually.

Adding congressional to the military-industrial complex presupposes that the MICC has achieved more than influence—it controls the process and makes all of the decisions. Congressman David Obey (D–WI), chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, was asked about the mindset of individuals in charge of the defense budget. He replied, “They come from areas where it is their number one political requirement to preserve the status quo in the military. . . . I don’t see Congress as being part of the solution” to making the right choices regarding prioritizing defense spending. 

Franklin C. Spinney, a (legendary) former senior analyst with DOD, maintains that the defense industry understands this, and engages in two practices to ensure success: front-loading and political engineering. Front-loading is the practice of grossly underestimating cost and over-selling capabilities to win a contract. Political engineering then follows, as the contractor spreads the program’s subcontracts to as many congressional districts as possible (providing money and jobs in those districts), making the program impossible to kill once the true costs become known. Because program costs have risen, fewer items (that is, replacement aircraft) can be purchased. This leads to an aging fleet, whose operation and maintenance costs soar, increasing DOD budget requirements. It is a truly vicious cycle that shows no sign of ending.

Because politicians are not keen to kill programs that employ their constituents, this political engineering wields tremendous political influence. The C–17 transport aircraft is a perfect example. Since 2006, DOD has not requested funds to continue building new C–17s, yet every year Congress authorizes funds for more planes. A likely but unspoken reason is that Boeing has spread the manufacturing of this plane to 30,000 jobs across 43 states, in both Democratic and Republican districts. The impact of the MICC is most evident in the Air Force’s ongoing efforts to acquire a replacement refueling tanker for its 50-year-old KC–135. The replacement program clearly demonstrates how Congress, industry, and DOD all play a role in the damaging effects of the MICC.

**Birth of the KC–135**

The initial acquisition of the KC–135 is an interesting tale. The post–World War II era saw the Air Force, specifically Strategic Air Command (SAC), embracing its strategic bombing role in the nuclear age as part of Eisenhower’s New Look. These long-distance jet-propelled bombers needed aerial refueling, and the propeller-driven KC–97 would soon be obsolete. The B–47 Stratojet bomber had to perform tricky and slightly dangerous maneuvers to link up with the slower, prop-driven KC–97. The development of the more capable B–52 bomber would further exacerbate this problem.

Boeing, sensing a need for jet tankers, moved aggressively to fill the gap. In 1951, using $15 million of company money, Boeing began development of the 367–80, which would become the KC–135 and Model 707. In November 1953, General Curtis LeMay, SAC commander, called for the procurement of 200 jet tankers using fiscal year (FY) 1954 funds. The fact that he was asking for already programmed funds speaks to the urgency he felt about his request. In December, the Air Force directed a study to determine the jet tanker requirement, and announced a tanker competition the following May. Most competitors, however, felt Boeing already had the support of General LeMay, and it is not hard to understand why. In March 1954, a *Time* magazine article about the development of the Boeing 707 mentioned a visit to the plant by LeMay, quoting him as stating, “Quite an airplane,” after inspecting the prototype that was under development. Later that month, an *Aviation Week* article stated that Boeing’s president was confident that the Air Force would purchase the 707. Additionally, Boeing had built more than 600 B–47s for the Air Force and was building its B–52s as well.

Boeing’s perceived lead seemed to grow when in July 1954 a 367–80 test flight practiced rendezvous and refueling maneuvers with the B–52. Eight days later, the Air Research and Development Command recommended the purchase of 70 to 100 interim tankers (the 367–80) to provide an immediate source pending the selection process. The Air Force concurred and allocated $150 million for 29 aircraft in August. Two weeks later, 88 more were added for $240 million. In October, the Air Materiel Command recommended that Boeing produce the interim tanker, with Douglas or Lockheed building the full-production model. In February 1955, the Air Force named Lockheed the tanker design competition winner and told the company to build a prototype immediately. The Service also said that Boeing’s KC–135 orders would increase, adding 169 more planes to the 117 already requested. One can speculate that the Air Force wanted to give the appearance of being impartial while rapidly fulfilling a requirement using a ready-made system. If it purchased enough “interim” aircraft, by the time the winner’s plane was built it would not make any sense to begin buying from another manufacturer. The KC–135 would then be the de facto choice. In fact, of the 830 KC–135s purchased by the Air Force, 732 were identified as “interim.”

**The KC–135 Lease Deal**

The recent replacement efforts of the KC–135 have become a prime example of the influence of the MICC. As early as 1969, replacing the KC–135 became a hot topic. Then-SAC commander General Bruce K. Holloway stated, “To support the bombers, we will also need—with a few years—a larger tanker to replace some of the KC–135s, most of which have been in service since 1957.” (The Air Force does operate 59 more capable KC–10As, with an average age of 22 years.)

political engineering follows, as the contractor spreads the program’s subcontracts to as many congressional districts as possible, making the program impossible to kill once the true costs become known

A 1996 General Accounting Office (GAO) report stated that even though the aging tankers were becoming more costly to operate and maintain, Air Mobility Command had deferred their replacement until 2013. In a 2001 report, the Air Force stated that although there would be “significant cost increases” for the fleet between 2001 and 2040, “no economic crisis is on the horizon” and “the fleet is structurally viable to 2040.” Following model 767 tanker sales to Italy and Japan in 2000, Washington State–based Boeing offered to sell 36 to the Air Force as an interim measure while
it conducted studies for a future KC–135 replacement tanker. In June 2001 testimony, General Michael Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff, mentioned the offer but said, “We’re looking out in the next 15-year time frame to begin that replacement.” A late 2001 press report stated that Washington Representative Norm Dicks (D), member of the Defense Subcommittee on the House Appropriations Committee, was going to insert language into a defense appropriations bill to initiate an Air Force purchase of Boeing 767 tankers. Less than a month later, Air Force Secretary James Roche expressed support for leasing 100 of the 767 tankers, calling it a “unique business opportunity.” Language for the lease went into subsequent appropriations bills and was a topic of debate in Congress, especially when a GAO report found that leasing the planes would cost more than buying them outright. A compromise was eventually reached, and the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act gave the Air Force permission to lease 20 and purchase 80 KC–767s. In February 2004, the Air Force was directed to conduct an Aerial Refueling Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to determine the tanker requirement, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz directed the Defense Science Board (DSB) to conduct an independent analysis of the fleet. Prior to acting on the tanker lease/buy option, allegations of wrongdoing at Boeing surfaced, causing DOD to wait for the results of the DSB analysis and an Inspector General (IG) investigation prior to proceeding with the tanker acquisition.

Waiting turned out to be a smart move, as the DSB report found that the increase in KC–135 operational and maintenance costs was not as severe as previously thought, and that the oft-reported corrosion problems could be controlled. The report concluded that there was no pressing need to initiate a KC–135 replacement program prior to the completion of the AOA report, which would determine future requirements. The DOD IG found that a former Air Force lead negotiator for the tanker lease had been secretly negotiating for an executive position with Boeing while still overseeing the lease deal, leading to jail time for the negotiator and a Boeing executive. The IG also found that Secretary Roche misused his office while trying to gain support for the lease plan, and four other senior DOD officials were guilty of evading Office of Management and Budget and DOD regulations.15 The lease option was dead, due to the influence of the MICC, in this case characterized by politics, greed, and improper conduct overriding the existing process.

The KC–X Competition

The Air Force’s next attempt at a tanker replacement program was the KC–X competition. In April 2006, the Service released a draft Request for Proposal (RFP) to receive comments from the competition participants. Both the Boeing and Northrop–European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) camps were puzzled by the broad, lengthy list of wide-ranging requirements, especially an oddly political question requiring the competitors to explain “business arrangements that involve a financial contribution from government,” and interest in the effects of “retaliatory duties that may be imposed [by] the World Trade Organization [WTO].”16 This was a reference to a WTO investigation (initiated by complaints from Boeing and the United States) of possible illegal government “launch aid” received by Airbus (a subsidiary of EADS, which was a partner of Northrop in the tanker competition) in its commercial airline development program. Of course, the European Union and Airbus had lodged a similar complaint against Boeing and the United States. It seemed odd to some observers that such language would make it into an acquisition document, possibly betraying the influence of Boeing lobbyists or supporters in Congress.17 Northrop was unhappy with the draft RFP criteria, believing that cost was heavily weighted over capability, which would favor Boeing’s entry, the KC–767 that was part of the earlier lease deal. The Air Force initially decided it was not going to accept any of Northrop’s recommended changes to the RFP, leading to speculation that Northrop would drop out of the competition.18

The final KC–X RFP was released in late January 2007, and at stake was a $40 billion contract for 179 tankers to begin replacing the KC–135 at a rate of 12 to 18 per year. The Air Force stated it had made some changes to the RFP that addressed Northrop’s concerns and leveled the playing field.19 Northrop not only decided to stay in the competition, but also began building the first tanker (a modified A330) prior to winning the contract, promising delivery within 1 month of contract award. This was a challenge to Boeing, whose efforts to fill model 767 tanker orders for Italy and Japan were behind and experiencing problems.20 Leading up to the contract announcement, the posturing continued as the Boeing camp touted that it was the American-made alternative. Northrop dulled this argument by announcing that its tankers would be assembled in a new plant built in Mobile, Alabama, if it won.21 The surprise announcement came in late February 2008, as the Northrop A330 entry, known as the KC–45, won the competition. Some insiders believed that it was one of the RFP changes added to placate Northrop, known as “Factor 5,” that led to its victory.22

About 2 weeks later, Boeing filed an official protest. Northrop meanwhile lined up 240 suppliers in 49 states, which would result in 48,000 direct and indirect new jobs, none of which would move to Europe.23 What followed was an all-out propaganda war between the two competitors, featuring millions of dollars in full-page newspaper advertisements, letters to the Secretary of Defense, and Capitol Hill posturing from Congressmen on both sides. While the contract was on hold pending a GAO review, Boeing and Northrop were spending millions lobbying, with both hiring big name former politicians such as Dick Gephardt and Trent Lott to spearhead their efforts. In June 2008, the GAO announced that the Air Force had made “a number of significant errors that could have affected the outcome,” and sustained Boeing’s protest.

The GAO report sustaining the protest did not portray the Air Force in a positive light. According to the report, the Service did not weigh the relative merits of each submission according to the RFP; used a key performance parameter discriminator in direct contradiction to language in the RFP; did not ensure that the submissions could refuel all current Air Force fixed-wing, tanker–compatible aircraft as required in the RFP; conducted “misleading and unequal discussions with Boeing”; and did not evaluate the military construction costs of the proposals.24

The Air Force and its tanker replacement program were back at square one. But
the political jockeying never ceased. In a letter to the editor, Senator Richard Shelby, a Republican from Alabama, where Northrop was going to assemble its tankers, stated, “One place we should not see politics is in our Department of Defense acquisition process.” Never mind that his letter was entitled “Rigged in Boeing’s Favor,” and made no mention of the litany of Air Force errors outlined in the GAO report sustaining Boeing’s protest.25 Many, including the late Representative John Murtha (D–PA), chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, believed that the Pentagon should pursue a split-buy contract, with Murtha saying he did not think the Air Force could get by the protest process if it awarded the contract to one firm.26

Also supporting the split were Alabama Representatives Jo Bonner (R) and Arthur Davis (D), a position they outlined as part of a lengthy Washington Times editorial providing recommendations for how the Air Force should structure the new RFP and chiding Boeing for its “buy American” campaign (“The Northrop Grumman bid means nearly 50,000 American jobs in 50 states”). According to the editorial, Representative Neil Abercrombie (D–HI), chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on air and land forces, was also pro-split, as a dual-buy could save the government money by replacing the aging KC–135s faster than a single source.27 Opposing the split were Senator John McCain (R–AZ), Air Force Secretary Michael Donley, Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz, and perhaps the most important voice, Secretary Gates. They all cited increased operational and training costs associated with maintaining two different platforms and the fact that there was not enough money in the annual Air Force acquisition budget to purchase enough planes per year to keep two separate lines operational.

Another ever-present issue was the aforementioned WTO investigation of Airbus. A confidential preliminary ruling apparently found that Airbus received illegal developmental loans from European governments. Senator Patty Murray (D–WA) led the charge to ensure that the WTO ruling was considered in the tanker selection process. Congress, in language added to the 2009 defense authorization act, went so far as to require Secretary Gates to conduct a formal review of subsidies on the tanker program once the WTO reached a decision.28 Meanwhile, the Air Force released the draft RFP in late September 2009, giving lawmakers and contractors 60 days to review and comment.

Boeing and Northrop were spending millions lobbying, with both hiring big name former politicians such as Dick Gephardt and Trent Lott to spearhead their efforts.
Take Three

The RFP again called for 179 planes at a rate of 15 per year. Republican Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas (another state in which Boeing planes are built) stated that he would fight to have the WTO ruling considered as part of the RFP. Airbus maintained that any ruling could not be considered until it was final, which could take months.39 Northrop complained that the competition was unfair because Boeing had been given Northrop’s pricing information from the previous bid, while Northrop had not received similar information about its opponent. It was also noted that the RFP’s 373 mandatory requirements and 93 optional provisions left little room for competition, save cost.40 Senator Shelby felt that the competition was “already tilted toward Boeing. I believe it’s a sham.” Senator Jeff Sessions (R) of Alabama, also of Alabama, complained that cost would be the sole discriminator in the competition, and stated that Northrop said it may not compete if the process was not fair, a déjà vu moment for many familiar with the KC–X history.41 “This is tantamount to a cost shootout that accelerates the race to the bottom,” said Michael Waldman, a Northrop vice president. Boeing supporters said this was standard procedure for Northrop, making complaints and threatening to drop out unless the RFP was changed. “Let them pull out,” said Representative Dicks (D–WA), once again sounding the WTO findings: “In order to be fair, the request for proposals must be modified to neutralize the advantage that government subsidies give to one bidder.”42

The posturing continued into November, as both sides argued their case. In support of Boeing, 39 bipartisan lawmakers sent a letter to President Barack Obama asking the Air Force to include the WTO ruling in its RFP.23 The Pentagon was unmoved, stating that it would not consider any pending WTO findings in the tanker competition.24 Leaders from Alabama stormed Capitol Hill once again to make the case for Northrop, which repeated its threat to drop out of the competition unless revisions it had requested to the RFP were accepted. In December, the Air Force stated that it was unlikely to make changes to the RFP based on Northrop’s objections. This led Senator Sessions to put a hold on two nominations that would be involved in the tanker selection process: the Under Secretary of the Air Force and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.25 A week later, the WTO issue got even worse for Northrop when the WTO report on possible subsidies received by Boeing from the U.S. Government was delayed for 6 months.26

In January 2010, in a slight about-face, General Schwartz stated the final RFP release would be delayed as “modest” changes to the program were made to “lessen the financial risk” to competitors.27 During this delay, Senator Shelby placed a hold on 47 of President Obama’s nominations, eventually dropping the holds on all but 3: the 2 mentioned above being held up by Senator Sessions, and the nominee for Assistant Secretary of the Air Force.28 These holds were eventually lifted, without explanation, in the first week of March. The RFP was finally released in late February. Approximately 2 weeks later, Northrop withdrew from the competition, stating that it felt the solicitation was written to favor Boeing. Understandably, emotions ran high on both sides of the competition. “The new chairman of the Defense Subcommittee is happy,” stated Representative Dicks, who had replaced Murtha as the chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Alabama politicians were not pleased with the decision. “This so-called competition was not structured to produce the best outcome for our men and women in uniform; it was structured to produce the best outcome for Boeing,” said Senator Shelby. “The Air Force’s refusal to make substantive changes to level the playing field shows that once again politics trumps the needs of our military.”29 This did not signal the end of the drama, however, as Northrop’s partner, EADS, later made the decision to enter the competition on its own. This increased the focus on the WTO issue and led Representative Dicks to advise U.S. companies not to partner with EADS, resulting in accusations of U.S. protectionism. These claims were bolstered by a bill introduced in Congress that would require DOD to consider WTO rulings when deciding on defense contracts. More recently, Boeing briefly threatened to drop out of the competition, citing doubts that it could win or make money on the fixed-price contract.

It is interesting to note how Boeing’s political position has strengthened since the last competition. President Obama and many
of his top advisors are from Chicago, now Boeing’s headquarters. The state of Washington has received some additional clout as Representative Adam Smith (D) is assuming Representative Abercrombie’s subcommittee chair and, as stated earlier, Dicks replaced Murtha, who died February 8, 2010. Perhaps sensing this shift in Boeing’s clout, Northrop recently announced that it was moving its headquarters from Los Angeles to the Washington, DC, area.

It appears a KC–135 replacement program may be under way. However, at the rate of 15 planes a year, replacing the approximately 500 45-year-old KC–135s will take decades. The possible impacts of an aging KC–135 fleet make its rapid replacement all the more important and the years of delay all the more damaging. Tanker operations in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2004 to 2007 averaged over 13,000 sorties offloading over 833 million gallons of fuel per year.40 Clearly, these aircraft represent a significant capability, the absence of which would severely curtail the Nation’s ability to project power. As the fleet approaches an average age of 50 years, concern over its expected lifespan and possible catastrophic failure resulting in grounding naturally increases. These concerns may be warranted, as in September 2004 the Air Force grounded 29 KC–135Es (the oldest model then in use) for safety reasons. Repeated studies, however, have determined that KC–135Es were “structurally viable until 2040,” and the KC–135R variants could be flown until 2030.41

The earlier noted DSB report examined the grounding issue and determined that “although grounding is possible, the task force assesses the probability as no more likely than that of any other aircraft in the inventory.” The aforementioned AOA was less optimistic, stating that “the nation does not currently have sufficient knowledge about the state of the KC–135 fleet to project its technical condition over the next several decades with high confidence.” The bottom line, however, was summed up by then–Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne in testimony to Congress in October 2007:

One thing that’s for sure is that we have 44-year-old tankers. One thing for sure is that some of those tankers will go to age 75 before we can retire them, simply because of affordability—that we cannot afford the rate of growth. Even if we were to award today, we can forecast that they would be 75 years old.42

That statement was made 3 years ago and came 5 years after the initial attempt to replace the KC–135. And the Nation is no closer to that goal.

The MICC Influence

While the KC–135 replacement program is the perfect MICC case study, it is in no way the only recent example of its influence. The VH–71 Presidential Helicopter replacement program, the second F–35 Joint Strike Fighter engine, the C–17 cargo aircraft mentioned earlier, and efforts to move an aircraft carrier from Virginia to Florida have all been heavily influenced by the MICC. Perhaps the most public of all the examples was the fight over the F–22 fifth-generation fighter program. The jet, often referred to as a “Cold War relic” by Secretary Gates and in development for decades, suffered from skyrocketing production costs leading to ever smaller planned acquisition numbers (currently 187, down from the originally planned 750 in the 1980s).
Add to this the fact that an F–22 had not been used in either of the Nation’s current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the DOD desire to end the program would seem logical. Secretary Gates finally succeeded in capping production of the jet, but only after a long, contentious battle with its supporters.

In hard economic times, arguments to save a particular program inevitably center on job creation. Jobs are often used as justification to save the C–17 program, as mentioned earlier. The F–22 also attempted to benefit from this tactic, as Lockheed and the plane’s supporters warned that 25,000 jobs would be lost if the production line were shut down. So far, this has not been the case, as other planes have actually led to increased employment at Lockheed facilities.41 The F–35’s second engine would purportedly save 1,000 Massachusetts jobs.42 Many nonelected officials do not believe that jobs should be factored into decisions about national defense, however. Jacques Gansler, the Pentagon’s top weapons buyer during the Clinton administration, argues that DOD “is not a social-service organization. Its mission is providing national security for the nation. Its mission is not to provide subsidies for jobs. The DOD is not in the business of employing people for the sake of employing them.”43

It is somewhat difficult to assess with certainty the impact of the MICC beyond broad generalized statements based on the information presented above. Clearly, the Air Force still has no program to replace a 50-year-old KC–135 airframe 9 years after it first attempted to start one. The Nation’s contentious system has repeatedly led to delays in the acquisition process. In fact, the GAO recently found that Pentagon contract protests had increased 24 percent between 2007 and 2008, and 38 percent since 2001.44 Protests cause delays in contract execution, which in turn can prevent critical requirements from being fielded to the force. What is harder to determine is how much money the MICC has saved the country. Following World War II, the Services had run up a not-so-impressive record of acquisition waste, requiring congressional intervention such as the Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-McCurdy Acts.

Additionally, studies as early as the 1915 pre–World War I Treat Board determined that waiting until wartime to develop a military industry to produce the needed materiel will not work,45 a lesson hammered home, albeit unintentionally, by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his now-famous 2004 statement: “You go to war with the Army you have. They’re not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”46 DOD seems to have recognized the nature of this relationship, addressing the need for a “robust and capable defense industry” in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Pentagon could not resist a warning to the industry, however, stating, “Our engagement with industry does not mean the Department of Defense will underwrite sunset industries or prop up poor business models.”47

So it appears the Nation requires the MICC, and in any event its influence will not dissipate any time soon. In fact, the recent ruling by the Supreme Court allowing corporations to make unlimited campaign contributions would appear to increase MICC influence dramatically. What is needed, then, are ways to negate this influence when it comes time for important decisions to be made. One way to do this is through legislation that would make this type of influence completely transparent. For the larger programs such as the KC–135, transparency is hardly an issue, as Congressmen from states that benefit from the industry can be counted on to vote to the advantage of their state.

But for the smaller influence, known as earmarks, transparency becomes a problem. This issue was serious enough for President Obama to address in his 2010 State of the Union address, where he implored Congress to “publish all earmark requests to a single website before there is a vote.” Prior legislative attempts have not fared well. For example, in April 2009, Congressman Paul Hodes (D–NH) proposed legislation that would break the link between earmarks and campaign contributions. His bill would prohibit a Member of Congress from taking a contribution from any person or company that has received an earmark from that Member. His legislation stalled, having received only 10 cosponsors.

Legislation such as that, however, would not prevent a Congressman from voting for his constituents’ interests over national interests. A better system would be one of recusal, similar to what is spelled out in the “Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Personnel” executive order signed by President Obama in January 2009. In the order, all appointees entering government “will not for a period of 2 years from the date of [their] appointment participate in any particular matter involving specific parties that is directly and substantially related to [their] former employer or former clients, including regulations and contracts.” Likewise, a Congressman could be recused from voting on appropriation matters in which his constituents have a direct and unique stake in the outcome (that is, a tanker aircraft built in his state). Obviously, with the way industry politically engineers its contracts, this kind of law would lead to a considerable amount of recusals. It is possible, however, that such a rule could work to reverse the political engineering trend. This, of course, would not preclude quid pro quo maneuvering, filibustering, or nomination blocking by those recused, but perhaps it would be a start.

A third way is to have the rare individual at the helm who can achieve enough bipartisan trust, respect, and support to overcome the influence of the MICC. Secretary Gates appears to be such a person. He is the first Defense Secretary to serve under administrations of different parties, a defense outsider but government insider (having served a distinguished career in the intelligence arena), and is greatly respected by politicians and civilians alike. With the F–22 and other highly prized systems, he has shown that he can impose his will against difficult challenges and muster enough congressional support to enact the Pentagon’s desired program of materiel acquisition. This year will be both interesting and pivotal, as he takes on the C–17 (once again) and the second engine for the F–35, among other entrenched systems. The problem with relying on someone like this is that such a person does not enter the political arena often.

A fourth way is for DOD to better man, maintain, educate, and train its procurement workforce, both civilian and military. This includes reducing DOD reliance on contractors to oversee aspects of procurement activities. Since 2000, growth in procurement contracts has risen 155 percent, compared to a 10 percent growth in those professionals charged with oversight. Ensuring the health and future of the procurement workforce will allow the DOD to better construct RFPs, assess proposals, and oversee contract execution, and could preclude many of the issues that enable the
MICC to wield its influence in the first place. DOD is already making progress in this area, such as adding 20,000 acquisition personnel positions by 2015 and establishing an Army Contracting Command. This recommendation is especially important at a time when the civilian experience in DOD is dwindling at ever increasing rates as the baby-boomer generation retires.

The final way to reduce the influence of the MICC is also the most unlikely—term limits. Limiting the terms of our political leaders would make them far less worried about reelection, subsequently less beholden to campaign contributors, and more concerned with what is best for the Nation. At this time, however, the members of the voting public are the only ones able to limit the terms of our representatives, and scant few of them read the National Security Strategy or Quadrennial Defense Review.

While the military-industrial-congressional complex has allowed the United States to maintain a defense industry second to none, its influence in the acquisition decisionmaking process has reached damaging levels, as illustrated by the inability to replace the aging KC–135 tanker. This influence must be curtailed, either through legislation that ensures lobbying transparency, or recusals of congressional leaders with unique stakes in contract award outcomes. If nothing changes, the Nation will have to rely to campaign contributors, and more concerned with what is best for the Nation. At this time, however, the members of the voting public are the only ones able to limit the terms of our representatives, and scant few of them read the National Security Strategy or Quadrennial Defense Review.

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In 1908, the American short story writer O. Henry penned “The Clarion Call.” This title has become synonymous with a powerful request for action or an irresistible mandate. As the Nation looks to the institution of the U.S. Army during an era of persistent conflict and after 9 years of war, it is time to recapture professional military education (PME) as part of our profession.

The Army is arguably the largest and best educational and training institution in the United States. It has a strong, established educational program that seeks to provide the right Soldier with the right education at the right time. Without doubt, even as we have fought two wars, there have been laudable advances to include an expanded graduate school program, increased numbers of international fellows at our schools, and an effort led by the Chief of Staff of the Army to broaden the experiences of the officer corps with more opportunities to serve in think tanks, interagency positions, and world-class universities.

For the officer corps, this PME program is ingrained from precommissioning through promotion to general officer. Unfortunately, even with the advances mentioned above, what is presented in official policy as an espoused value does not always translate into what is valued within the Army in the real world. More importantly, the gap between espoused and enacted values is significant and growing. Without action to arrest this trend, the Army risks the professional development of its senior leaders as well as its competency.
as a force to meet the Nation’s needs in the years ahead.

Developing promising senior and strategic leaders is an obligation of the military profession. At a recent Military Education Coordination Council meeting in Washington, DC, several uniformed members asked questions about the types of conflict that we should prepare our senior officers for. In the contemporary operating environment, the focus has understandably been on the curriculum within the colleges: what is taught, how it is delivered, and by whom (faculty) in order to provide relevant education to senior officers. Two essays from the National War College and Naval War College, respectively, captured the discussion of the joint PME content and methodology in a recent issue of this journal.1 As important as curriculum and faculty are, they are moot issues if those officers who have the greatest potential to serve as strategic leaders deem attendance at one of our war colleges unnecessary and are allowed to bypass it.

Cautions from the Past

Ironically, today’s period of persistent conflict loosely parallels that of another time, when the Army was under a different kind of stress. The post-Vietnam era found the Army searching for identity within not only itself but also the Nation. With the end of the draft in 1973 and the transition to the Volunteer Army, the service faced a still formidable Soviet threat during the Cold War. As an integral part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States was required to provide competent and credible land forces for the defense of Western Europe. While not a “shooting war,” the attendant risk and consequences of conflict were extraordinarily high.

Having insufficient numbers of officers to fill company and field grade positions, the Army accelerated promotions. Commanders accepted risk and pressed on to accomplish missions with existing personnel. It was not uncommon to have lieutenants in command of companies, cavalry troops, and artillery batteries as well as captains serving as battalion S3 (responsible for planning, training, and executing tactical plans at the battalion and brigade levels) operations officers rather than the captains and majors, respectively, authorized to fill these critical company- and battalion-level positions. Those officers, though talented and motivated to lead, did not have the full benefit of what has become known as the pillars of leader development: experience, training, and education.

In those difficult days, company, troop, and battery commanders routinely assumed the responsibilities of command without attending the officers’ advanced courses. S3s did so before attending the Command and General Staff College, where they were to learn and develop such competencies. One of the great lessons of this period was that this formal process better prepared future leaders and was worth the investment in time, money, and infrastructure.

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It was the clarion call of the “Hollow Army” that Army Chief of Staff General E.C. Myers testified about to Congress in 1980. That phrase brought attention to an overstructured force that exhibited the symptoms of being inadequately equipped, undermanned, and lacking trained and educated leaders. To address the leader development problem, the Army instituted a program of professional military education and a specific subcomponent for its officers within the Officer Education System (OES). The goal of these initiatives was to prepare officers for future assignments by providing knowledge, developing essential skills and competencies, and motivating lifelong learning. Army policy shaped practice to ensure that officers met OES requirements before assuming company-level command or branch-qualifying positions as field grade officers.

Perhaps most importantly, the Army set clear guidance and established specific policy regarding the management of talent in its ranks. Those officers with the potential to advance were required to attend school, encouraged in their studies, and allowed the necessary time. Put another way, those who attended school were those with good reasons to attend, not merely those who were available to attend.

After experiencing another crisis of professional identity during the drawdown following Operation Desert Storm in the 1990s, Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan sounded the clarion call of “No More Task Force Smiths!” Task Force Smith was the first Army unit to engage in combat in the Korean War. As part of the constabulary force in Japan, it was woefully unprepared for combat with its minimal levels of equipment, manning, and training. General Sullivan was concerned that complacency and lack of focus would jeopardize the Army’s ability to accomplish its mission: to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Without a clearly defined threat and with great uncertainty regarding military capabilities required for the 21st century, Service leaders undertook several initiatives to develop programs for the Army of the future.

In 1998, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer implemented Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI (now referred to as OPMS 3) to balance the needs of the force in the 21st century with the aspirations and developmental requirements of the officer corps. A critical subsystem of OPMS 3 was officer development. Each branch, functional area, and officer skill proponent defined the appropriate mix of education, training, and sequential, progressive assignments needed by the officer corps for their branch at each grade.2 This has been the essence of talent management for a force required to identify, develop, properly utilize, and retain its best and brightest officers.

Current Challenges

The Army of 2010 finds itself with similar challenges: how to provide units and organizations with knowledgeable leaders who are capable of ensuring success. This is especially difficult when faced with the requirements to support the Army force generation (ARFORGEN) model in the current operating environment. It is critical that the Army balance the immediate need for officers in the operational force with the longer term imperative to develop the senior officers who will lead and shape the future Army. Those senior officers should necessarily be a product of a senior level college (SLC) experience. To do otherwise harkens to the assignment and education practices with junior officers of the Hollow Army.

Some may challenge the assertion that the current process is not providing officers capable of succeeding at the strategic level. Clearly, some defense analysts and advisors as
well as Members of Congress in their oversight role have made that assessment. Such are the findings of a recent congressional House Armed Services Committee study of professional military education. The Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee conveyed that “officers are serving in joint and service staff assignments without adequate educational preparation” and that “some operational commanders, including the Combatant Commanders, reportedly consider their staff officers lacking in certain critical abilities necessary to perform their jobs effectively.”

An expected challenge would be to question the value of senior level colleges as well as intermediate schools for those officers identified as high performers and possessing exceptional potential. If these officers are obviously talented and proven under the stresses of demanding assignments, it is worth asking what evidence exists that our schools would make them better. To answer such questions, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) conducts a biennial survey of general officers who receive its graduates. According to the 2008 survey:

Almost overwhelmingly, respondents indicated that USAWC graduates were well prepared to work in the strategic environment (96%). Further, they were prepared to address and plan for the future while executing in the present (96%) and prepared to address problems with no clear-cut solutions (96%). Respondents thought USAWC graduates were well prepared for senior officer assignments (97%). . . . The overwhelming majority of respondents (99%) said they would recommend attending the USAWC to officers in their commands.

While it may be the case that high-performing officers could be successful regardless of whether they attend a senior level college, it is difficult to dismiss the value of education in preparing for strategic level responsibilities. As additional evidence to support this claim, it is useful to remind ourselves of the role of continuing education in a myriad of professions—medicine, law, education, science, and public administration. It is therefore compelling that military professionals would benefit from advanced education, which places extensive training and experience in context and develops the faculty for judgment in ambiguous environments.

We have learned from the experiences of the 1970s, 1980s, and now in the 21st century that education is essential for developing officers and that timing the delivery of education assists in the development of competencies that ensure better performance in assignments requiring those abilities. It is important then to examine how these lessons are reflected in the current practices and culture of the Army. Much has been written about culture in recent studies. Organization theorist Edgar Schein’s definition of culture seems appropriate: "A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems . . . that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”

Following the Army’s participation in nearly a decade of simultaneous and continuous operations, the policies of OPMS 3 were
revised, and its implementation dramatically altered the demographics of SLC selectees and student body. Previously, the majority of selectees were from the combat arms branch, many having already served successfully as battalion commanders. To meet the intent of OPMS 3, Army policy modified this composition of SLC cohorts to provide a broader mix of officers from various career fields (for example, operations, operational support, and institutional support). Hence, traditional combat arms battalion commanders (now the minority attendees) share the SLC educational experience with other highly qualified officers from varied disciplines. In its latest policy for officer development, the Army directs senior Service college education for those who:

occup[ying] a leadership position (both command and staff) that requires a thorough knowledge of strategy and the art and science of developing and using instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) during peace and war. This knowledge is necessary in order to perform Army, Joint, or Defense Agency operations at the strategic level. 7

The “New Normal”

Further examination reveals a subtle but significant shift in the demographics of Active component Army students attending SLC in the years since 2001. While one former Army War College commandant noted that the Army was “too busy to learn,” the issue is more insidious.8 Today, promising leaders have learned through professional observation that SLC attendance is considered a luxury for high performing officers. Battalion commanders are routinely serving in excess of 30 months in command of deploying and deployed units. The most successful commanders are then “rewarded” with key billet assignments and positions in a combatant command, joint task force, or Army Service Component Command headquarters that they are wont to accept. Understandably, these officers are counseled by leaders and mentors to stay in the fight and seek assignments that will prepare them for future promotion and command—to go for “the brass ring.”

Similar to the Volunteer Army of the 1970s when inexperienced junior officers were company commanders and battalion staff members, senior officers (lieutenant colonels and above) today are assuming duties and responsibilities for which the Army has failed to provide them the requisite education for professional development. Remembering the contemporary survey of general officers, the author contends that officers with SLC experience are better prepared to face the challenges of senior and strategic leadership.

It is conventional wisdom among Army officers that it is more important to have made the “quality cut” evidenced by selection for a senior level college than to actually attend. This belief has become part of the culture, and it is now common practice that officers will defer attendance during the designated year of selection for senior level PME. Unless the officers do attend or have completed the 10-week Joint Professional Military Education
II course at Joint Forces Staff College, these high performers will not be legally eligible for flag ranks. The Army, therefore, will further restrict the bench from which its most senior leaders are drawn. The trend over the past 5 years shows that 50 percent of the principals will choose to defer, delaying an officer’s attendance by an average of 2 years. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Senior Level College selection list included officers with 4 and 5 years of deferrals, and the average age of Active-duty selectees exceeded 46 years of age in 2009. Given that the average SLC officer will graduate with 23 years of service and the majority of colonels will retire at the 26-year mark, this allows only 3 years, or one assignment, to use the strategic education gained from the SLC experience.

**Culture of Deferral**

The office that manages Army senior officer assignments categorizes the reasons for deferral as either policy or discretionary. Policy deferrals are accepted by the institution as the cost of doing business for a nation and an Army at war. Operational requirements to support joint and operational staffs or to meet Department of the Army priorities make up the preponderance of these deferrals. By-name deferral requests from general officers in tactical, operational, and strategic level organizations are approved to support the “warfighters.” What the military resisted in 2005 during Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s “snowflake” query about curtailing PME during a time of demand on the Armed Forces has become the “new normal” for many of our best officers. Army policies designed to support force generation requirements have the consequence of delaying the education of officers whose contributions would be most valuable at the strategic level.

While the majority of deferrals are routinely approved in accordance with policy decisions, about 10 percent are discretionary for either personal or extenuating circumstances. Before we decry personal desires, it is important to understand the impact of 9 years of war and the attendant deployments on the officer corps. Since 2001, the operational force has maintained a grueling pace, with many Soldiers having a minimum of two combat deployments—some have more. Operational commanders naturally seek to build and maintain effective units with leaders whom they know and trust. This has resulted in officers remaining in command well beyond the old standard of 24 months to see units through the preparation and deployment for operational missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. An unintended consequence of “rewarding” officers with extended command time and key assignments is that a number choose to decline SLC attendance and consideration for command. While these numbers are relatively low, we should rightly consider this a harbinger of things to come when the “best and brightest” no longer compete.

Demographics of USAWC students reflect that more than 25 percent of the resident attendees are “geographical bachelors”—students who do not bring their families with them so as to lessen impact on spouses and children. Given the pace of deployments, it is reasonable that officers do not want another year of separation from their families. This is especially salient when the likelihood of additional deployment within 2 years of graduation is relatively high. There is further anecdotal evidence to suggest that officers request discretionary deferrals while waiting to see if they are selected for promotion to colonel or, for those with the highest potential, selection for colonel-level command. Once selected, there are limited incentives to attend SLC, given the belief that officers have already “made it.” This is another indicator that officer attitudes related to deferments are reinforced as the practice has “worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore, [is] to be taught . . . as the correct way” and inculcated as part of the culture.

**Class Composition: Canary in the Mine**

Trends during past years are informative. There were approximately 240 deferments granted for the 641 FY09 SLC selectees across the various colleges and fellowships, with 27 officers declining attendance or choosing to retire. With 50 percent of the principal selectees deferring over the past 5 years, a recurring backlog of more than 250 officers exists. This has a significant impact on the composition of the USAWC student body. Alternates activated for senior level college cannot defer. They either attend the USAWC or decline with prejudice. In rare cases, an alternate selectee may attend another SLC venue, but the current policy assigns them to the USAWC to fill vacant seats.

In recent years, the final slate for the USAWC continued to adjust until late June. For the 2009–2010 academic year (AY10), the USAWC slate for Active Component Army officers changed by 33 percent from May 2009 until the class arrived in mid-July 2009. Additionally, 41 of the 155 Active Component students (26 percent) of AY10 were alternates. While this number has improved from 44 percent in 2009, the trend is consistent for May 2010 with over 60 of 185 (32 percent) student changes in the USAWC AY11 slate. These last-minute slating changes and the scramble to identify replacement students continue to create considerable turbulence. The impact is especially significant for the USAWC, where Active Component officer alternates, Army Reserve, Army National Guard officers, and government civilians fill vacant seats.

The last-minute slating of officers also dramatically affects the branch representation in the USAWC seminars. Under current policy, Active Component deferrals are replaced not by an alternate from the same branch or functional area, but by the next officer on the order of merit list. For AY10, out of a class of 338 U.S. students, there were only 3 armor officers and 13 infantry officers. These numbers mean that there were not enough ground maneuver officers to allocate one for each of the 20 seminars. This absence of a ground maneuver perspective may have an adverse effect on seminar learning in the topic areas of land power development and employment.

**PME Is Out of Balance**

In a number of forums over the past 2 years, Army Chief of Staff General George Casey has used the term _out of balance _to communicate his concern for the well-being of a force that is deploying frequently with little dwell time between operational missions. While this metaphor aptly describes General Casey’s assessment of the condition of Soldiers and their families, it also serves to highlight that professional military education is out of balance with the experience and training that our officers have garnered from numerous deployments. With the expectation of persistent conflict for the foreseeable future, it is now time to regain the balance between the educational development of senior leaders and the requirement of operational deployments. It is imperative to recapture that part of our profession so important to the growth of leaders who, in 6 to 10 years, will be charged with leading the military and advising senior government officials. A more appropriate balance of the two provides a greater
opportunity to prepare our leaders for service at the strategic level.

We should continue to examine whether the Army is meeting the challenge and responsibility of ensuring that the right officers receive the right education at the right time in their careers. Clearly, there is a pervasive conflict between our espoused and enacted values for attending PME institutions. Senior leaders need to understand the nature and magnitude of the problem. I have attempted to provide illumination and caution about the long-term consequences of this imbalance by observing what is published and what is actually happening within the Army.

In various policy documents and official statements, the Army’s senior leaders are saying the right things. Field Manual (FM) 6–22, Leader Development Strategy, and the Army Capstone Concept clearly emphasize the need for high-performing leaders who can effectively lead their organizations, develop themselves and others, and achieve organizational goals and missions. In practice, however, Army personnel (officer and enlisted) are not attending PME as programmed, with an increasingly significant backlog of selectees.

Who bears responsibility? Is it the officer (and prospective student) who has figured out what really is important in an Army career? Or is it the senior leader who requests a specific officer, rather than trusting the personnel system, to provide a qualified officer (top 20 percent of the cohort) to a key position on the Army or joint requirement document? Or could it be the institution responsible for balancing the long-term investment in people with the short-term demand for commanders and leaders? Perhaps there is no particular person or organization to hold responsible. Once again, Edgar Schein reminds us that culture is neither right nor wrong, but may be misaligned with the environment. At every level, decisions are made without malice in an attempt to resolve the problem or address the conditions at hand. But such decisions, as history often reminds, result in unintended consequences.

Realign the Culture

Just as many are involved and bear some responsibility for current conditions, many must play key parts in resolving this dilemma—it is part of the Army culture that we have to acknowledge while making change a priority. SLC students and senior officers alike view the current condition as a major challenge for the Service. Changing the culture requires the application of Schein’s concepts that have demonstrated efficacy.10

 Secretary Gates speaks to students at U.S. Army War College

Secretary Gates speaks to students at U.S. Army War College

U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison)
It is important to consider methods that establish the cultural assumptions of what is important for the Army while reinforcing those assumptions. Selection and application of these methods are the responsibility of the Service as the institution, and when properly applied they will modify the behavior and expectations of members of the profession. Appropriately, the first imperative of Army Leader Development Strategy is to “encourage an equal commitment by the institution, by leaders, and by individual members of the profession to life-long learning and development.”

The existing Army culture toward PME (that is, it is more important to be selected than to attend) is a direct result of the policies emplaced to support force generation requirements for a brigade-based force. The culture is reinforced by organization design and structure (brigade combat team–centric); organizational systems and procedures (ARFORGEN); and formal statements of organizational philosophy (to provide support to warfighters through ARFORGEN). The current effort to realign the culture toward PME has only employed reinforcing methods, which on their own are insufficient to change culture. While senior officer statements claim that leader development is first priority and that the backlog of PME will be reduced, the day-to-day practice, unfortunately, does not reflect those pronouncements. PME attendance is, across all levels of the officer corps, not reflective of the espoused value of education.

Specific application of targeted leader actions is needed to convey to the officer corps that education is a necessary and valued component of leader development. To effectively change the culture, the Army’s behaviors should demonstrate what it values. Key actions are what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis. They are also observed criteria by which leaders allocate scarce resources and select and promote organizational members. Accordingly, Army leaders should track attendance at PME and focus attention to ensure that leaders are receiving relevant education for their professional development. PME venues need to receive resources—scheduled time in an officer’s career, adequate funding and facilities, and most important, quality faculty to provide the best educational experience to students. Finally, the reward of promotion and key billet assignment based on completion of required PME may be the strongest lever to change the culture. To paraphrase one general officer, “once the path to success passes through [SLC] and not around it, the system will fix itself.”

A variety of factors contributed to PME and, in particular, SLC becoming out of balance. The Army, however, is at a critical point where it needs to acknowledge this imbalance. It needs to make the required changes to be successful in rebalancing the emphasis placed on education to complement the experience and training required of leaders in the modern era. If it fails to do so, it risks allowing the current status of PME to become permanently embedded in the Army culture.

Once again, a look to history provides context. During mobilization for World War II, the U.S. Army War College and the Army Industrial College were discontinued. The analysis of that action seems hauntingly familiar:

"The shortage of officers trained for high staff and command assignment became acute before the first year of the war was over. Corps, armies, theaters, and the War Department were to suffer increasingly from the shortage of staff officers trained for higher levels. It is difficult to state positively that the products of the Army War College and the Army Industrial College would have had a beneficial effect on high level planning during and following the war, but on the basis of the influences of those two schools . . . it is reasonable to infer that their sudden elimination in 1940 was an error of judgment in which the current need for officers was allowed to outweigh the eventual greater need for officers trained for higher staff levels." 14

While opportunities for senior PME and attendance at the various SLC venues remain, the parallels of World War II are clear. The clarion may not have sounded yet for the Army of the 21st century, but we know the tune that it will play; it is professionally imprudent to wait for its mournful notes.
BREAKING RANKS
Dissent and the Military Professional

By ANDREW R. MILBURN

There are circumstances under which a military officer is not only justified but also obligated to disobey a legal order. In supporting this assertion, I discuss where the tipping point lies between the military officer’s customary obligation to obey and his moral obligation to dissent. This topic defies black-and-white specificity but is nevertheless fundamental to an understanding of the military professional’s role in the execution of policy. It involves complex issues—among them, the question of balance between strategy and policy, and between military leaders and their civilian masters.

Any member of the military has a commonly understood obligation to disobey an illegal order; such cases are not controversial and therefore do not fall within the purview of this article. Instead, the focus is on orders that present military professionals with moral dilemmas, decisions wherein the needs of the institution appear to weigh on both sides of the equation. Whether the issuer of the order is a superior officer or a civilian leader, the same principles apply. However, because...

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issues at the strategic level of decisionmaking have greater consequences and raise wider issues, I focus on dissent at this level.

In the face of such a dilemma, the military professional must make a decision, which cannot simply owe its justification to the principle of obedience, and must take responsibility for that decision. But when and on what grounds should the officer dissent? And how should he do so? I offer three propositions:

1. The military officer belongs to a profession upon whose members are conferred great responsibility, a code of ethics, and an oath of office. These grant him moral autonomy and obligate him to disobey an order he deems immoral; that is, an order that is likely to harm the institution writ large—the Nation, military, and subordinates—in a manner not clearly outweighed by its likely benefits.

2. This obligation is not confined to effects purely military against those related to policy: the complex nature of contemporary operations no longer permits a clear distinction between the two. Indeed, the military professional’s obligation to disobey is an important check and balance in the execution of policy.

3. In deciding how to dissent, the military officer must understand that this dilemma demands either acceptance of responsibility or wholehearted disobedience.

Before supporting these propositions, I discuss the “traditional” view of civil-military relations, which owes much to Samuel Huntington and his theory of objective control.

Obedience as Virtue

Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State remains the touchstone for the study of civil-military relations. However, the book should be viewed in its historical context, written as it was over 50 years ago at the height of the Cold War when the obvious need to centralize decision authority for the use of nuclear weapons lent support to a strict interpretation of civilian control. No doubt also fresh in Huntington’s mind was General Douglas MacArthur’s narrowly averted threat to cross the Yalu River and thus escalate the Korean War. Huntington’s concept of “objective control” delineates clear boundaries between the realm of the soldier and statesman; the former is afforded some functional autonomy within his area of expertise but very little moral autonomy. Huntington argues that the military professional is on thin ice if he dissents on any grounds other than purely military or legal—and that ultimately, his overriding obligation is loyalty to his civilian masters. For Huntington, there is no middle ground: “When the military man receives a legal order from an authorized superior, he does not hesitate, he does not substitute his own views; he obeys instantly.”

Huntington’s views still have strong influence on U.S. civil-military relations today, and this may explain why, despite some ruffled feathers at the nexus between policy and military operations, there have been few recent cases of U.S. military leaders protesting the orders of their civilian masters. As General Richard Myers and Dr. Richard Kohn point out, “There is no tradition of military resignation in the United States, no precedent—and for good reason.”

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This “good reason” is the principle of civilian control that is embedded in the U.S. Constitution. It gives Congress authority to raise the military, to set the rules for military conduct, and to decide whether to authorize war. It also makes the President...
the Commander in Chief of the military. Traditionalists argue that this principle is incompatible with any theory of civil-military relations that does not obligate the military professional to absolute obedience. In their view, dissent is justified only under the most exceptional circumstances and must be confined to the purely military aspects of a decision. The Nation’s civilian leadership, they argue, has the “right to be wrong.”

The comments of General Myers and Dr. Kohn about resignation are quoted from an article entitled “Salute and Disobey?” An impassioned and ostensibly well-reasoned defense of the traditional view of civil-military relations, the article was published in response to accusations of excessive docility among the Nation’s military leadership in the conduct of the war in Iraq. The authors object to the idea that a military officer should refuse an order on moral grounds because “one individual’s definition of what is moral, ethical, and even professional can differ from someone else’s.” This claim appears to let the military officer off the hook from making any moral decisions. That argument, by logical extension, would deny the existence of a military profession at all—by relegating its role to the bureaucratic function of executing instructions. It also reflects a weakness in the traditionalist argument by denying moral autonomy to a profession with a clearly defined code of ethics and an oath of allegiance not to any one person, but to the Constitution. I argue that these obligate members of the military profession to exercise moral autonomy beyond its commonly accepted responsibilities to proffer the executive branch candid advice and speak truth to Congress.

The Military Profession

A survey conducted among students at the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) in January 2010 reveals a view of the military profession that contrasts sharply with the Huntingtonian model espoused in “Salute and Disobey?” The sample is admittedly small; nevertheless, it represents a cross section of 20 senior field-grade officers from all Services and two foreign countries. Without exception, they agreed that there are circumstances under which they would disobey a lawful order. Their criteria vary little, as these excerpts illustrate:

- “If the officer cannot live with obeying the order, then he must disobey and accept the consequences.”
- “When I cannot look at myself in the mirror afterwards.”
- “When I deem the order to be immoral.”
- “When it is going to lead to mission failure.”
- “When it will get someone injured or killed needlessly.”
- “When it will cause military or institutional disaster.”

These comments reflect the view that the military professional has moral obligations more fundamental than obedience and loyalty to their leaders, civilian or military. Myers and Kohn imply that the term moral is too subjective to be defensible. However, I argue that the military profession is founded on clearly defined moral principles.

For the purposes of this article, I use the term military professional to apply to military officers. I make this distinction based on the nature of the officer’s professional military education, which focuses on developing an abstract body of knowledge; his code of ethics, which reflect the “special trust and confidence” conferred on him by the President and Congress in his commission; and his oath of office, which differs in an important aspect from the enlisted oath. These defining characteristics of the military profession impose on him obligations beyond obedience.

traditionalists argue that the Nation’s civilian leadership has the “right to be wrong”

Code of Ethics

How a profession views itself does much to shape its identity, and U.S. military officers take pride in belonging to a profession centered on high ethical standards. This belief, inculcated upon entry and constantly reinforced, appears within the profession to be self-evident. Indeed, each Service uses the term core values to describe ethical tenets that it regards as fundamental. The emphasis on values reflects an institutional understanding that it is a profession wherein the potential cost of bad decisionmaking is especially high.

The concept of integrity, defined as doing what is right both legally and morally, is enshrined in the professional ethics of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. The Army lists among its values Selfless Service, defined as “Putting the welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own.” Although Loyalty is also one of the Army values, it is defined as an obligation to safeguard the welfare of subordinates. Obedience is not listed among any Service’s core values or code of ethics—nor does it appear as an area of evaluation on fitness reports, although moral courage does.

The Oath of Office

While enlisted Servicemembers take an oath in which they promise to “obey the orders of the officers appointed over me,” officers do not undertake any such obligation to obey, but rather to support and defend the Constitution. This difference is significant because it confers on the officer a weighty responsibility to, as Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold put it, “give voice to those who can’t—or don’t have the opportunity—to speak.” The obligation to nation and subordinates cannot conceivably be interpreted as meaning blind obedience to civilian masters. This obligation is given legal codification in the United States Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, which charges commanding officers to “safeguard the morale, the physical well being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.”

The military professional’s core values and oath of office demand the exercise of moral autonomy in carrying out orders. He has sworn to defend the Constitution and safeguard the welfare of his subordinates. Implicit is the obligation to challenge orders whose consequences threaten either without apparent good reason.

Check and Balance

In Supreme Command, Elliott Cohen’s central theme is one of unequal dialogue—a term he uses to describe the method by which civilian leaders must supervise military operations to ensure that force is being used in consonance with policy objectives. I agree with this argument, but not with Cohen’s parallel contention that the military officer has no business making decisions in the realm of policy. Significantly, Cohen’s discussion focuses on four statesmen renowned for both their strategic acumen and their skill in handling their military commanders. His theory does not recognize the possibility that, at the blurred nexus between strategy and policy, the military professional plays a valuable and constitutionally defendable role as a check on the potentially disastrous decisions.
The traditionalists, of course, balk at the suggestion that the military professional has an important role to play as a check and balance: “In a democracy, the military is not the one assigned to ensure that civilian politicians are not shirking,” commented Peter Feaver, a professor of political science at Duke University.10 Prima facie, this statement appears true. But when the results of bad decisionmaking are wasted lives and damage to the Nation; when the customary checks laid down in the Constitution—the electoral voice of the people, Congress, or the Supreme Court—are powerless to act in time; and when the military professional alone is in a position to prevent calamity, it makes little sense to argue that he should not exercise his discretion.

Take, for instance, the decisions by the Coalition Provisional Authority in May 2003 to disband all Iraqi security institutions and to impose a policy of de-Ba’athification without any corresponding caveats permitting reconciliation. Assume, for the sake of argument, that these were bad policies that fueled the nascent insurgency with thousands of armed, trained, and disgruntled young men with drastic consequences for American forces and U.S. efforts in Iraq. Assume, too, that these consequences can be deemed predictable by the reasonable man. With these assumptions in mind, would not the military chain of command have been justified in refusing the order? The traditional argument would deny military leaders this recourse simply because the orders reflected policy decisions.

Or consider a recent case in which senior military officers complied with an executive decision that violated the Geneva Conventions. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, June 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that Guantánamo detainees were entitled to the protections provided under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This meant that the U.S. Government had violated the Geneva Conventions for over 4 years. It is hard to see this ruling as being anything less than a serious blow to national prestige, undermining U.S. efforts in the all-important arena of strategic communication. But it was more than that—for those who believe that national values are important, it appeared to undermine the very cause that the Nation professed to represent. This point was not lost on the Supreme Court; as Justice Anthony Kennedy observed, “Violations of Common Article 3 are considered war crimes.”11

The Bush administration’s decisions vis-à-vis the Guantánamo detainees also infringed on the Constitution, which military professionals have sworn to support and defend. So decided the Supreme Court in the case of Boumediene v. Bush, in which the Justices ruled that the government did not have the constitutional authority to suspend habeas corpus indefinitely.12 The Constitution declares that “the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” The executive branch had asserted broad authority to detain without trial without claiming either caveat.

My point in discussing the habeas corpus issue is not to debate the rights and wrongs of the case or to argue that the transgression should have been obvious to the military officers involved. Instead, I cite it to exemplify a situation in which an officer would have been justified in refusing an order even though it was a policy decision. In so doing, he would have been upholding his oath by opposing the unconstitutional exercise of executive authority.

There is another facet to this case that emphasizes the military professional’s important role as a check and balance. The clause in the Constitution pertaining to the suspension of habeas corpus is under Article I, which deals with Congress, as opposed to Article II, which covers the powers of the President. And yet it was the executive branch that in this case assumed the role granted Congress. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this incident was that Congress raised no objection, thus shrinking its constitutional role.

In a February 2010 article, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, USA, accused Congress of “all but abdicating many of its war powers.”13 He is correct. In recent years, Congress has proven less than vigorous in carrying out its constitutional duties pertaining to the military, creating what is essentially a constitutional void. For instance, the function of declaring war is vested in Congress with good

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Gen. McChrystal was relieved of command in Afghanistan for allegedly making comments critical of administration in magazine article

obedience is not listed among any Service’s core values or code of ethics—nor does it appear as an area of evaluation on fitness reports, although moral courage does
reason. It is an expression of public support for the most momentous decision a nation will make; it ensures that the rationale for going to war and the policy goals sought by this decision are clearly defined. And yet not since World War II has Congress exercised its constitutional duty of declaring war.

A congressionally approved declaration of war performs another important function by fulfilling the “public declaration” requirement of the universally accepted theory of just war. The United States and its allies are committed by treaty and policy to conduct military operations within the framework of just war theory. Just war criteria fall into two categories: *jus ad bellum*, the reasons for going to war, and *jus ad bello*, the manner in which war is conducted.

The traditionalist argument holds that military leaders are concerned only with *jus ad bello*; it regards *jus ad bellum* as outside their purview since the decision to go to war is one of policy. However, for reasons already advanced by this article, senior military leaders are obligated to make judgments that fall within the realm of *jus ad bellum*, especially if Congress appears to have neglected its responsibilities in this regard. Of course, this obligation applies only to military officers of the highest rank; subordinate leaders do not have the choice of resigning in preference to going to war. This means, for instance, that a military leader might be justified in insisting that Congress vote to declare war in order to ensure that the decision stems from legitimate authority. He might also be in possession of information not available to the public, indicating that the stated rationale for going to war is invalid, in which case he has an obligation to speak out.

Once war is declared, the power of the purse obligates Congress to oversee its conduct by ensuring that ways and means are matched to the stated ends. With the early years of U.S. involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq fresh in mind, it is hard to challenge the accusation that congressional oversight has not been zealous. Indeed, the wording of the 2002 authorization for the use of force in Iraq is so open-ended as to abdicate up front all congressional responsibility for subsequent oversight.

The Founding Fathers recognized the need for checks and balances to counteract the frailty of human nature. Yingling concludes his article by saying the only way to ensure that Congress exercises these checks and balances would be to bring back universal military service. Not so, I argue. If the country’s military leaders employ moral and intellectual rigor in adhering to their oath of office and professional ethics, there will be no need for so drastic a measure. That is not to say that the resignation of one or more senior leaders would always be enough to awaken the legislature to their constitutional duties, but it might at least gain the attention of the American people.

When the Constitution was written, the army was intended to be only a militia, soon to be disbanded and resurrected only in time of impending crisis. It names the judiciary as a check on both the executive and the legislature. The Supreme Court, however, will only catch those cases that are pushed to its jurisdiction, which may be after much damage has been done, as the Guantanamo cases bear witness. The court is unlikely to be called upon to decide whether a decision to go to war was justified, or whether its subsequent prosecution is in accordance with clearly defined goals, and matched with the necessary resources. In the face of congressional somnolence, the military professional has a duty to speak out in such cases.

The traditionalists need not worry. Recognition of the fact that military commanders have an obligation to make judgments involving policy is not tantamount to permitting politicization of the profession. The military professional cannot pick and choose courses of action that correspond to his political views. He must exercise careful discretion, basing his decision on his oath of office and professional ethics as opposed to a political agenda. The military officer belongs to a profession that demands the highest standards of conduct and that confers great responsibility, to include decisions literally involving life or death. He is entrusted with the Nation’s treasure. Surely he can be trusted to handle nuance.

My argument does not challenge civilian control of the military. Civilian leaders retain the authority to direct and fire military leaders who prove inept or disobedient. Nevertheless, the traditionalists appear to assume that allowing military professionals a degree of moral autonomy is a slippery slope culminating in loss of civilian control. To understand this argument, it is necessary to envision their concerns: a military pursuing its own agenda irrespective of civilian direction, and in doing so enacting a de facto coup whereby its leaders call the shots in matters ranging from acquisition programs to foreign policy. But given the highly professional nature of the U.S. military, is this fear realistic? A country’s system of government usually evolves with experience. Chile and Argentina now have embedded in their constitutions tight controls on the military—a consequence of recent history in which military juntas seized power in both countries. But the history of the United States is quite different. Not since the Newburgh Conspiracy in 1783 has the military overstepped its bounds by trying to influence Congress, and even then the goal was financial reimbursement rather than political power.

The traditionalists may fear that allowing military leaders moral autonomy will open the floodgates, enabling generals to threaten resignation simply because they do not agree with a particular policy. Human nature, as well as professionalism, provides a bulwark against such an eventuality. It is fair to assume that generals like being generals, and thus would select judiciously those causes for which they were prepared to sacrifice their careers. Greater likelihood and worse consequences attend the other end of the spectrum where senior leaders refuse to make a stand on policy issues—cloaking their reluctance behind a Huntingtonian view of civil-military relations.

The military professional plays a key role as a check and balance at the indistinct juncture between policy and military strategy. He should not try to exclude himself from this role, even on issues that appear to involve policy, any more than the statesman should exclude himself from overseeing the conduct of military operations. He has a moral obligation to dissent rooted in his oath of office and his code of professional ethics. The question remains, how should he do so in a morally defensible manner?

**Dissent: What to Do?**

If an officer decides that an order is rendered unconscionable by its probable
consequences, it follows that he has a moral obligation to dispute the order and, if unsuccessful, to dissent in a manner that has the best chance of averting those consequences, or his dissent is rendered meaningless. Resignation is his ultimate option, but he may choose to take other steps prior to that (for instance, requesting an audience with the President or with the Senate Armed Service Committee). Following resignation, he may decide to “go public” by speaking to the media.

The circumstances surrounding these decisions are seldom clear-cut. The military professional has, as discussed, an obligation to his subordinates. He must consider how his public defiance could affect their morale. It may be that he would cause them to lose confidence at a critical time without changing the course of events. He must also consider what effect his resignation would have. Would it cause a stir sufficient to avert the feared consequences, or is it more likely that he would be replaced by someone who would carry out the order, perhaps in a manner likely to cause even greater harm?

This question raises a difficult issue. Should dissent be founded on the right action or the right effect? A third of the MCWAR officers surveyed argued that in the face of a moral dilemma, the military professional should focus on the effect desired: mitigation of the immoral order, rather than the conscience-salving but possibly ineffectual act of resignation. These officers advocated an indirect approach: addressing higher authority, leaking the story to trusted journalists or politicians, and dragging their feet in execution—“slow rolling” in military parlance. “What else can I do?” asked one officer rhetorically. “My only option is to conduct covert actions to reduce the risks of misfortune and of American casualties.” This approach is certainly not without precedent. As one Army colonel commented in response to the survey, “The most (commonly) used form of disobeying an order I’ve seen is slow-rolling.” This option does have some prima facie appeal, combining its own moral logic with a pragmatic focus on effects.

But a profession that values integrity and moral courage cannot at the same time justify a deceptive approach to dissent. By taking an open stand, the military professional displays the courage of his convictions but also implicitly accepts personal consequences, whether he is right or wrong. His stand may persuade the issuer of the order to reconsider or it may draw the attention of the legislature to the issue. On the other hand, it may be purely symbolic—and have no effect on the decision. Regardless, he has exercised his moral autonomy and taken the consequences. He may, after all, have been wrong in his predictions,

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U.S. Air Force Academy commandant of cadets administers oath of office to members of graduating class of 2010
and this point is key because the military professional, however well placed and intelligent, is always fallible. Allowing him moral autonomy to dissent benefits the process of policy execution overall; sanctioning the practice of “slow-rolling” orders deemed to be immoral ultimately sabotages this process. The truth of this statement becomes more apparent when, rather than looking to past examples of bad orders that were slow-rolled to good effect, one looks at a potential policy decision whose consequences could be highly controversial but are by no means predictable.

Suppose the current “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy with regard to homosexuals in the military is repealed and that the Service chiefs are ordered to integrate homosexuals in women previously. Considering all that I have discussed with reference to the military professional’s moral autonomy, could any Service chief—or subordinate unit commander—claim to be justified in dragging his feet in executing the policy? What if one did so, while the others executed the policy wholeheartedly, with consequences that proved that integration was the right thing to do? While open dissent is an act of professionalism, carrying with it an acceptance of personal responsibility, slow-rolling reflects hubris without moral courage. Its practice obfuscates rather than clarifies questions of policy and discredits the military profession.

Lastly, “silent” resignation is likely to accomplish little to divert the decisionmaker from his course. Criticism of policy from the haven of retirement lacks the same moral force as public dissent backed by the publicly announced tender of resignation. Moreover, the senior officer must bear in mind that his subordinates do not have the option to resign, for instance, going to war. This burdens the military professional with the responsibility to use this privilege to accomplish more than the personal, perhaps selfish, goal of conscience appeasement.

The question of how to dissent is not an easy one. Nevertheless, the military professional must exercise his moral autonomy when confronted by a dilemma. He cannot morally justify his subsequent decision on the basis that he was simply obeying orders, that he put up token resistance prior to obeying, or that he dragged his feet in execution.

The topic of military dissent raises issues of fundamental importance to the profession of arms. When faced with a moral dilemma, the military officer not only has grounds for dissent, but also, if his code of ethics and oath of office so guide, has a duty to disobey. He is obligated to exercise moral autonomy, and in so doing must use his professional ethics to guide him down a path that is by no means clearly defined.

Just as civilian leaders have an obligation to challenge military leaders if the latter appear to be pursuing a strategy that undermines policy, military leaders are committed to challenge their civilian masters if the policy appears to be unconstitutional, immoral, or otherwise detrimental to the institution. Civilian control of the military does not obviate this obligation and should not be viewed simply as a unilateral and hierarchical relationship with clear boundaries. This is especially important now in this era of complex operations that blur the boundaries between military strategy and policy.

For the military officer, this underscores the importance of understanding the nature of his profession and its role in executing national policy—both of which appear to have changed markedly since Huntington wrote his famous book a half century ago. JFQ

NOTES

4  Myers and Kohn.
5  The author conducted the MCWAR survey at the Marine Corps War College in early January 2010. The subjects were asked: 1) Under what circumstances (short of an illegal order) is a military professional justified in dissenting or disobeying an order; 2) What form should this dissent take?
7  United States Code, Title 10, Armed Forces (Sections 5883, 85831, 5947).
9  See U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force (Norfolk, VA: USJFCOM, 2008): “Above all, joint force commanders, their staffs, and their subordinates must have a clear understanding of the strategic and political goals for which they conduct military operations. In almost every case, they will find themselves working closely with partners, a factor which will demand not only a thorough understanding of U.S. political goals, but coalition goals as well.”
14  Just War theory is embodied in the United Nations Charter and the Law of War. Its intent is also reflected by the wording of the National Security Strategy.
17  The officers involved planned to march on Washington to lobby Congress to grant their request for back pay and pension.
18  A MCWAR student with the rank of colonel in response to the survey question, “What form should dissent take?”
19  Ibid.
Building a Potemkin Village
A Taliban Strategy to Reclaim the Homeland

By JEFF DONNITHORNE

The newly invigorated U.S. strategy to secure a stable Afghanistan faces hazards of its own creation. With a surge of troops and political capital, the United States hopes to achieve long-term stability with a short-term mandate for action. In light of Sun Tzu’s admonition to attack an opponent’s strategy, this article invokes the mindset of a hypothetical strategist in the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST). Its polemic opinions are apocryphal but represent a plausible line of action for the Taliban to attack U.S. strategy. By proposing this counterstrategy, the article attempts to discourage our belief in a potentially hollow success.

A Hypothetical Taliban Strategy

We are the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan, and we will prevail in planting our Islamic Emirate in its soil. Currently, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) is only a puppet on Kabul’s international stage, and its legitimacy is diplomatic fiction. Ultimately, the government of Hamid Karzai will collapse under the weight of its own irrelevance, and we shall assume the leadership the people deserve.

The GIROA survives on the life-support of foreign aid, protected by American bodyguards cloaked as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Our goal, therefore, is to secure the withdrawal of ISAF in the next 3 to 5 years, while setting the conditions to overwhelm the remnant Karzai regime. To reach this goal, we must employ a two-part strategy. First, we must give the Americans every reason to do what they want to do: leave. Through effective information control, we will convince them that their newly revised counterinsurgency strategy has worked brilliantly. Second, we must undermine the GIROA, granting it the appearance of viability without any substance. When the world looks for progress in Afghanistan, it must be seduced by a Potemkin village—an attractive facade masking a hollow reality. After the departure of the Americans, we will use our preserved strength and influence to brush aside the GIROA and establish the Emirate. We must therefore embark on a strategic offensive masquerading as a tactical retreat.

U.S. Departure Is a Shared Interest

The Americans are making a final token stand for Afghanistan. They have added troops and reformed their strategy, but the U.S. President has already announced that some of his forces will return home in the summer of 2011. From their experience in Iraq, the Americans believe that short-term surges can alter the landscape of a centuries-old battle. Let us reinforce their illusion. We should therefore quiet our struggle in the outlying provinces, recalling our foreign fighters to our safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), while dispersing our indigenous forces among the population. ISAF will be monitoring metrics sensationalized by Western media: roadside bombs, suicide attacks, and our clashes with ISAF and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). We must phase out our use of these tactics to convince ISAF that its surge has worked and that the GIROA is ready to assume full command of the country.

This reduction in large-scale military action must occur slowly to convince ISAF that its success is a strategic victory and not a tactical ruse. We should continue to attack and harass in small numbers, particularly in ways that invite force against the population by ISAF and ANSF. Our forces should tempt reprisals such as those carried out by the Marines in Haditha, Iraq—capture or kill single members of isolated units, plant intelligence to implicate the innocent populace, and inspire violent responses. The Americans will take the bait because any American Soldier would rather shoot a gun than win hearts and minds. As long as these American deaths are isolated and not en masse, we can convince...
the Americans of their strategic success while thwarting their true objective: the loyalty of the Afghan population.

As we deliberately grant tactical gains in the outlying provinces, the QST must solidify the security of its cross-border safe haven. The FATA sanctuary represents our competitive advantage in this struggle—the physical terrain is too imposing and the tribal terrain too complex for ISAF to penetrate. During this time, we must continue to organize, train, and equip a fighting force in our extensive FATA training camps. Furthermore, the QST must discontinue the recent pattern of terror and suicide attacks in Pakistan. These attacks invite an unwelcome military response by the Pakistani army against our stronghold in the border region. We must exercise greater discipline and patience, shoring up our safe haven and preparing for the opportunity that will surely come when ISAF departs.

Building the Potemkin Village

With its dependence on foreign aid, the GIRoA will take desperate steps to assert sound governance across Afghanistan. As our forces diminish their attacks to encourage ISAF withdrawal, we must actively sabotage the legitimacy of the GIRoA. ISAF will likely remain in Afghanistan if the GIRoA bears no evidence of viability; therefore, we must allow some evidence of progress while ensuring that no national legitimacy is attained. Through infiltration and deception, we can discredit the central government, confine any administrative effectiveness to Kabul, and hamstring the protective role of the ANSF.

The Karzai regime seeks to consolidate power in a Western-style central government—a system foreign to the tribal landscape of Afghanistan. Therefore, the QST should encourage this centralization, reinforcing the government’s isolation from the rural populace and its tribal architecture. We must entice GIRoA leaders with vice and corruption, bribing them to spend on services and infrastructure in and around Kabul. To further this corruption, the QST should infiltrate the ranks of government by appearing to shift loyalties as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has done. We should become part of the problem, choking the flow of support to the countryside while polishing Kabul as the lone jewel in a crown of thorns. Meanwhile, our indigenous loyalists must sow discontent among the Afghan majority outside of Kabul’s influence, bleating the government’s failures and the inevitable departure of ISAF bodyguards. Through our propaganda, we can render the central government irrelevant to the countryside, severing any links to the tribal structure that the GI RoA attempts to forge.

A functioning and robust ANSF is an essential requirement for ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan—we must foster the appearance of good health while implanting a cancer. As we diminish our attacks across the country, we should leak stories to the media hailing the effectiveness of the ANSF. A portion of QST fighters should infiltrate its ranks, and seek leadership positions across the force. Our embedded fighters should cooperate with ISAF trainers to create a token capability, while manipulating tribal connections to make the ANSF the slave of dueling masters. Once embedded, QST loyalists can erode ANSF effectiveness by fostering tribal loyalties instead of national ones, giving and accepting bribes, and encouraging factionalism. ISAF will not depart until the ANSF appears sufficiently robust—as with the rest of the GI RoA, we must ensure that its perceived success is an actual failure.

Accepting Strategic Risk

The QST has an overwhelming shared interest with the Americans—we both want them to leave. Our strategy manipulates this shared interest, encourages their withdrawal, and keeps us in position to capitalize on the inevitable vacuum of power. Nevertheless, there is a risk: by encouraging the appearance of national stability, we could be ceding its reality. If ISAF can couple its local security gains to a comprehensive administrative effort from Kabul, the unwitting populace could believe that the Karzai regime is meeting its legitimate needs. If ISAF can clear large numbers of our QST fighters from the local villages, its strategy of “clear, hold, and build” could take root, and we could find it profoundly more difficult to reside in the Afghan countryside. Finally, we incur the risk that our efforts to undermine the GI RoA will be too effective, and the Americans may not be convinced they can leave. In 3 to 5 years, Karzai’s government may still be so inept that not even Kabul shows signs of progress; ISAF could feel compelled to stay even longer.

Ultimately, the weight of history accumulates in our favor and suggests that these risks are worth taking. Foreign occupiers have never succeeded in our land, and there is no evidence that the Americans have the patience or will to be the first. Their fondness for nationbuilding is limited, and their mandate for action will expire. We must flatten the Americans and encourage their surge narrative. Likewise, we must polish Kabul as the lone jewel of evidence to suggest that the GI RoA puppet can dance on its own. The weary Americans will believe the good news they create and begin to withdraw—and we will tear down the farcical Potemkin village and establish the rightful Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in its place. JFQ

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When the world looks for progress in Afghanistan, it must be seduced by an attractive facade masking a hollow reality

Afghan President Karzai and Secretary of State Clinton address conference at State Department concerning Afghanistan
The U.S. Government continues to seek a comprehensive, effective communication strategy through which it may project and promote American interests, policies, and objectives abroad. Many believe that the government and military have been outcommunicated since 9/11. A primary cause of this alleged deficiency is failure to recognize that strategic communication through traditional media and through the new media are not the same thing. There are fundamental differences between traditional and new media spheres. Hence, using conventional methods for new media strategic communication is decidedly less productive than developing a communication strategy appropriate for the new media universe.

Successful strategic communication in the new media sphere cannot remain the exclusive domain of professional strategic communicators insulated from most aspects of mission execution. To compete for attention with the proliferation of messages exchanged...
Many see new media as compromising the efficacy of the message they intend to convey. However, strategic communicators, in reality, never controlled the messages they sent into the media universe. Print and broadcast media outlets and other “mediators” have always interpreted and reframed messages for media consumers. Communication models that identify message senders and message receivers as the sole agents involved in communication were as invalid in the traditional media universe of 1950 as they are in the contemporary new media universe.

Through new media, communicators now have a direct line of sight with their audience, namely media prosumers. Ironically, the removal of the message gatekeeper has only made strategic communication more complex, as there is now an even greater number of credible interlocutors within a prosumer’s social network who shape and influence how and within what context an individual decodes and interprets a message.

strategic communicators never controlled the messages they sent into the media universe

To reiterate, the paradigm of the U.S. Government as message sender and the New York Times or CNN as mediator or gatekeeper applies only to the traditional media sphere. In the new media universe, communicators engage directly with message receivers who are in their own right message senders. These prosumers reuse, repackage, and repurpose the information that a communicator has conveyed to them for their own message-sending activities. The message originator cannot control which modified message is exchanged, or how, among prosumers at an organic level. The originator may only purposefully attempt to control initial message input(s), and thereby influence thematically a conversation taking place in the new media sphere.

A discrete media conversation taking place within a complex communication environment will continually evolve, be subsumed by, or converge with other discrete media conversations, and overall will take on a life of its own—a life that the message originator cannot predict. That is, questions, conclusions, actions, behaviors, and other activities by and among participants in the new media universe will emerge during the flow of the conversation that extend well beyond the intent of the originator’s initial message input.

And herein lies perhaps the biggest problem with military and government leaders who still view press conferences and press releases as the primary means with which to convey a message to either a general or target audience. The act of conveying a message through a press conference or press release is an incomplete action. If an initial message-sending activity altogether neglects the follow-on conversation that takes place in the new media sphere once the press conference has concluded or the press release has been widely disseminated, the activity has failed from a new media standpoint.

To say it another way, press conferences, press releases, blog entries, and Facebook posts as discrete acts that do not account for the message as it moves and evolves in the new media universe are of limited value. A press conference, press release, blog entry, or Facebook post represents a single message input. If further inputs or contributions are not made as the message evolves within a larger media conversation, then the effectiveness of the communication activity has been compromised, and there is little chance that the objectives associated with a strategic communication effort will be realized.

Official press conferences may last 30 minutes. The intended messages are conveyed to mediators (correspondents from, say, al Jazeera or ABC News) who will package the messages into 5- to 10-second sound bites and impart meanings ("spins") as they convey the messages to media consumers. Those 5- to 10-second segments are all that the vast majority of media consumers will know of the original messages communicated by American officials at the press conferences.

But in the new media sphere, prosumers will repackag and repurpose the original messages conveyed at the press conferences (as well as the messages as spun by disparate traditional media), and the conversations on specific topics will continue. If the message originators (say, the International Security Assistance Force, Department of Defense, or Department of State) do not participate in the conversations taking place in the new media sphere, then the message originators have surrendered the ability to influence the media conversations, let alone to attempt to control them. A press conference, press release, blog entry, or Facebook post is a first act—a necessary but insufficient undertaking.
points not only to the *inadequacy* of these models for contemporary strategic communication, but also, more fundamentally, to the complete *absence* of feedback mechanisms in the traditional media universe itself. It is not simply that the models are no longer universally valid; given their inability to generate feedback, the traditional media themselves are wholly deficient for the unique brand of strategic communication conducted in the new media sphere. Feedback is a form of dialogue, and dialogue is the currency of new media strategic communication. If the goal of strategic communication is to change perceptions, opinions, and ultimately behavior, then without feedback it is difficult to gauge in any meaningful way if a specific strategic communication endeavor has succeeded.

An alternative framework for communicating strategically—and one more suited to new media strategic communication—Involves distributing the workflow among all individuals charged with executing policy or plans. That is, the practice of strategic communication would be performed in a distributed work environment; it would be the responsibility not of professional strategic communicators insulated from the policy execution process, but of those individuals directly charged with executing policy or carrying out a plan. The delegation of control in this context is conceived more properly as *delegation through distribution*.

The case for delegation through distribution is twofold. First, strategic communication performed by disparate small groups or individuals responsible for carrying out different aspects of policy or planning injects humanness and transparency into the work being performed by, for instance, a PRT. No longer is a faceless, distant institution—the Defense Department or U.S. Government generically—seen as coordinating the construction of a new school in a specific province. Instead, prosumers see and engage with a small team of in-country human beings sharing information and insights with a self-identified community of interest through the new media. In some contexts, this

**How Must We Adapt?**

Strategic communication as envisioned by most military and civilian agency leaders is a responsibility delegated primarily to a cadre of professionals charged with communicating messages and information to the general public or to a specific audience. The pervading notion of who “does” strategic communication is responsible for the structure and composition of groups involved in strategic communication through the new media, such as the Defense Department’s Digital Engagement Team and the State Department’s Digital Outreach Team. While both of these undertakings serve as important first steps toward a more comprehensive approach to new media strategic communication, they are largely insulated from the formulation and/or execution of policy or plans.

The examination of the role of feedback. New York University communication professor Douglas Rushkoff writes that effective communicators today utilize the new media to generate feedback, arguing that “from phones to blogs to podcasts—we have gained the capacity to generate feedback, and as a result our ideas are exchanged more organically, rapidly, unpredictably, and—most important—uncontrollably than ever before.”

Feedback mechanisms in most traditional communication models are wholly absent. Therefore, strategic communication efforts tethered to these models do not allow feedback from message prosumers. This

**USPACOM commander speaks to media in Vietnam about medical community service project during Pacific Partnership 2010**

Granted, many traditional media outlets have begun integrating some feedback and other content from new media outlets into their reporting streams, but traditional media outlets will continue to be primarily focused on conveying messages to message consumers, not engaging in dialogue with message prosumers. Adopting many-to-many communication practices would go against the nature of their role as “authoritative” mediators in the contemporary media universe.

**Given their inability to generate feedback, the traditional media are wholly deficient for the unique brand of strategic communication conducted in the new media sphere**
community of interest will be global in nature (a Facebook group formed around the issue of Afghan reconstruction, for example), while in other contexts this community of interest will be more localized (a mobile messaging group—which is essentially the Short Message Service version of an email distribution list—that allows interested locals to receive or send group messages about the progress of local school construction or reconstruction more generally in the province, district, or village).

Second, as already discussed, one of the chief advantages of leveraging the new media for strategic communication is the ability to solicit feedback. From the prosumer’s perspective, the whole point of providing feedback is to tangibly influence or directly affect how policy or plans are executed. The work of the professional strategic communicator is typically wholly separate from the functions performed by individuals charged with implementing various facets of policy. Therefore, the feedback provided through new media is not readily sent from prosumer to policy executor, but to a mediator or middleman who will often not be able to relay the feedback to the appropriate individual or group laterally (in an organization such as the Defense Department, the individual charged with a specific function or responsible for plan execution may not be identifiable or reachable) or vertically (it may not be appropriate to send feedback to higher level officers in many situations).

Some effort has been made by those integrally involved in formulating (as opposed to simply executing) policy to employ new media for strategic communication purposes. Admiral Michael Mullen’s Twitter feed is but one example. While laudable for the example it has set, individual policymakers cannot reasonably seek feedback for the purpose of informing policy given the limited time they have to engage through a given new media outlet. Thousands of prosumers are following Admiral Mullen’s feed, but are not able to provide feedback to his posts because the Chairman is not following their feeds. (How could he follow them all?) Thus, Admiral Mullen’s feed is still operating under the auspices of the traditional influence model of communication, whereby one-to-many message projection is the predominant form of communication. Utilizing the new media in this manner is certainly acceptable, but leaders should not delude themselves into believing that the replication of one-to-many communication practices in the new media sphere is evidence that they or their respective organizations are adequately harnessing the power of the communication revolution.

A dialogic new media communication strategy must be persistent and adaptive over time. It represents at a conceptual level a war without end, although it is a war waged in the information sphere. In the globalized new media universe, there are no termination criteria for strategic communication campaigns. In fact, there is no such thing as a “campaign” because the conversation taking place among members of the “Always On” generation is persistent and without end. The narrative will evolve—even significantly—but the media conversation does not end. Nine years after al Qaeda succeeded in projecting its message loud and clear to a global prime-time audience, the organization’s media operatives are still very much engaged in a never-ending strategic communication effort with a worldwide network of sympathetic amateur prosumers who interpret, repurpose, and in some form or fashion proliferate the organization’s messages.

Communicators “can’t take a stop-start approach,” as one social networking executive has put it. They must shift away from the campaign mindset. With campaigns, methods based on successive “campaigns” with defined beginnings and ends are not applicable to strategic communication conducted in the new media sphere and may, in fact, even betray the fundamental nature of strategic communication as conceived by luminaries such as Edward Bernays, who in 1928 described the virtues of effective discourse as a “consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea, or group.” One obvious difficulty for military and civilian leaders is to develop persistent and congruent strategic communication
efforts given the limited length of soldiers’
tours and the impermanent nature of func-
tional assignments.

**What’s Next?**

If there is one word to encapsulate
today’s media environment, it is *engagement*.
Engagement through dialogic communication
is now at least as important as information-
sending activities in the traditional media
sphere utilizing monologic communication
practices.

But as military and civilian leaders
adapt strategic communication efforts to the
contemporary media universe, they should
also be looking ahead to how the media universe
will continue to evolve. The traditional
media universe is about information. Today’s
new media universe is about engagement.
Tomorrow’s media universe will be about
immersion and experience. Put another way,
leaders should recognize that in designing
strategic communication efforts, they must
now account for yesterday’s informational
media and today’s engagist media, and will
soon need to address tomorrow’s immersive
or experiential media.

Immersive media is a fascinating and
complex topic beyond the scope of this article,
but suffice it to say that the development of
ubiquitous computing technologies—from
semacodes and Near Field Communication to
mirror worlds and advanced haptic devices—
will have a profound effect on what we today
call strategic communication. The advent of
newer and different communication technolo-
gies has the potential not only to disrupt our
business-as-usual approach to strategic com-
munication, but also to overwhelm it. We have
*adopted* new media tools for strategic com-
munication purposes but have not yet *adapted*
to the new media universe itself. We are using
new media tools to replicate the same mono-
logic communication practices of yesterday.
With few exceptions, there is no dialogue,
there is no feedback, and there is no authentic
engagement taking place.

Adoption without adaptation will not
be possible as tomorrow’s immersive media
universe unfolds. Ubiquitous computing and
the immersive media universe that it will help
create will mean that strategic communicators
will need to be in the Internet rather than on
the Internet. Either we are in—or we are out.
There will be no communicating from the
sidelines, much as we are doing today.

To meet the exigencies of tomorrow’s
highly complex communication environment,
there can be no distinction between actor and
communicator and no separation between
functions. In other words, those doing the
communicating must be the same persons
acting in a given operational environment.
In a real contemporary context, the process
of changing how strategic communication is
done can be catalyzed by encouraging, even
requiring, individual members of PRTs and
dSTs in theater to engage and converse with
other prosumers through an array of new
media outlets, particularly those popular with
specific prosumer segments (for instance,
young Iraqi males and Afghan mobile users).
Obviously, not all members of a PRT or DST
will be capable of engagement in a foreign lan-
guage, but even engagement through English-
language new media on a much wider scale by
military and civilian personnel will inject trans-
parency into American reconstruction efforts
and go a long way in fostering support in allied
countries and raising morale at home.

None of this is to suggest that military
and civilian leaders and communication
professionals have no role to play in the
contemporary or future strategic communica-
tion environment. Strategic communica-
tion through traditional media will remain
important well into the future and is most
appropriately conducted by a cadre of commu-
nication professionals. However, we must
reconceptualize the breadth and scope of how
we conceive of and define strategic communi-
cation by understanding the new media and
how it is evolving. The imperative that we face
is to adapt to the changing media universe by
pursuing a course of action that utilizes the
skills and abilities of nearly all military and
civilian personnel in order to compete and
succeed in the communication environment
of today and prepare for the environment of
tomorrow.

Indeed, broad guidelines to ensure
operational security must be established—and
continually refined and updated—before
any step to delegate strategic communication
responsibilities more broadly is taken, but
operational security does not justify inaction.
Either America’s strategic communication
efforts adapt and advance, or our participa-
tion in the media conversation will dissipate
until we face total obsolescence in the immer-
sive media environment of tomorrow and
beyond. **JFQ**

**Notes**

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What U.S. Cyber Command Must Do

By WESLEY R. ANDRUES

In June 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced the creation of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), a new subunified command to be led by the director of the National Security Agency (NSA). While the press colored the announcement with Big Brother undertones and hints of civil liberties surrendered, the real story lies in the intriguing legal landscape of USCYBERCOM and what it could mean for the security, efficiency, and economy of the military’s networks. The Department of Defense (DOD), the largest single consumer of Federal information technology dollars, has struggled for decades to bring a singular voice and management process to its communications infrastructure. Although this is not the stated intent of the new command, USCYBERCOM must ultimately reconcile its role in information technology “ownership” and draw clear operational boundaries if it is to administer cyber security through unified standards and procedures.

As USCYBERCOM now has its first commander and begins shaping its core functions, fundamental changes in the legal landscape must occur in parallel with the new organizational structure if the command hopes to effect a “comprehensive approach to Cyberspace Operations.” In short, it must go beyond cosmetic organizational change and set to work on a campaign that genuinely reduces interdepartmental friction, repairs ailing processes, and truly empowers it to meet its mission, both specified and implied.

Step One: Establish Priorities

To compel its components to organize confidently and appropriately, USCYBERCOM must provide solid, intuitive operational imperatives and priorities. What tangible problem does the command seek to solve, and how does the formation of this single entity contribute to the integrity of DOD networks? One of the main impediments to answering this question is the lack of any meaningful cyberspace doctrine, or at least a serious consideration of how cyberspace operations differs from the closely related computer network operations, which is itself a key component of information operations. How does the emerging rubric of cyber now fit against the
broad operational backdrop of information operations as a whole? This is an elemental question that demands top-down clarification if USCYBERCOM expects to contain its mission space and lead decisively. The question must be answered: Is it about securing the network itself, or achieving military effects through the targeted application of information in all its forms? To call it both takes a middle road that complicates the identity of this new command and makes task organization exceedingly difficult.

It is not that DOD has failed to invest intellectual capital toward defining cyberspace. On the contrary, a good deal of self-examination is under way across all the Services, yet precious little substance has emerged signifying a strong, novel environmental foundation. To its credit, the Joint Staff devoted significant effort toward articulating broad cyberspace priorities in its National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (2006). The basic premise echoed the notion that the United States must secure freedom of action in a “contested domain” and deny the same to its adversaries, yet its ambitious goal of achieving “military strategic superiority in cyberspace” glosses over the vast complexity of such an all-consuming endstate.

While the initial overtures at shaping USCYBERCOM have been well intentioned, it seems much of the doctrinal preamble has been disregarded in favor of organization for organization’s sake. Although cyberspace proponents would argue that indeed there is enough basis to begin marshaling forces in earnest, the questions remain: what forces, where, and how? The standard litany of network threats and corresponding vulnerabilities sounds a familiar rally call, and while

failed DOD thus far and how a subunified command would distill them into a respon-

sive and value-added operational art.

Perhaps real cyberspace doctrine should do little more than paint a gap analysis, demonstrating in meaningful terms how the existing ingredients of cyber security would be more effective under a central commander than distributed to those with a custodial responsibility for the network. Depicting the mission space with appreciable detail and articulating a handful of clear employment principles unique to USCYBERCOM may be the most important doctrinal first steps.

Step Two: Come to Consensus

While the cyberspace landscape is composed of innumerable stakeholders, there are at least two key positions to consider as

although cyberspace proponents would argue that there is enough basis to begin marshaling forces in earnest, the questions remain: what forces, where, and how? 

it is certainly true that bad people seek to do bad things to DOD networks, the best defense may lie in some decidedly familiar tactics. Information assurance, computer network defense, and computer network response actions have long been the weapons of choice in safeguarding DOD information, yet they have become upstaged by the new if not ill-defined focus on cyber. Cyberspace doctrine must demonstrate why those separate but complementary families of activities have

USCYBERCOM begins to coalesce: the director of the NSA and the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO). Both carry network security responsibilities born from law, and each controls a vast apparatus that validates the integrity of the military’s networks; however, unless they can complement one another’s mission areas, their overlapping responsibilities may hobble the effectiveness of a new command devoted exclusively to cyberspace operations and security.

At the heart of the overlap lies the working definition of DOD information systems. Are they no more than a collection of assets under a Federal manager, or do they assume the collective importance of a National Security System (NSS)? This blurred relationship has dogged the office of the CIO for some time. For example, in 2005 the DOD Inspector General declared that DOD “has not established a complete inventory of its information systems or consistently defined an information system.” This lack of a culminating definition stems more from the copious actors in the organizational soup than the inability to objectively define a box on a desk. For as elementary as it may seem to manage all military information technology (IT) as a commodity, the model is somewhat cleaved by the CIO’s fiscal responsibility and NSA’s de facto role as the guardian of the NSS. USCYBERCOM may well find itself working to suture this divide as it mandates security writ large and advocates for a homogenous set of protections. A case in point is the DOD planned IT capital investments for fiscal year 2010, which consist of nearly 6,000 line items, totaling over $33 billion. With program titles running the gamut from Army Food Management Information System to DOD Pharmacy Data Transaction Service, there is a staggering amount of network and computing space to be considered as USCYBERCOM weighs its operational reach. If the network is viewed as a distributed series of Federal systems, then the central themes of the Federal Information Security Management Act arguably apply, and the
DOD CIO (under the Office of Management and Budget) need only “provide information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm resulting from unauthorized access.” This formula seeks to reduce risk to an “acceptable level,” applying fiscal tradeoffs based on the importance of the information system at hand.

Conversely, if the entire network is looked upon as an NSS (or perhaps even a “weapons system,” as some now have come to describe it), then a more exclusive set of protections is called for, meaning the network “shall be secured by such means as are necessary to prevent compromise, denial, or exploitation.”

This nuance would favor a more pivotal role for NSA, whose influence on planning and programming information systems could feasibly eclipse that of the CIO. The Army Food Management Information System potentially becomes more than a mere line item among other disembodied enclaves; rather, it would become an integral part of a security system whose compromise is deemed unacceptable.

Although accreditation processes exist today that establish nominal protections for all of these systems, they are little more than one-time approval events or periodic inspections with no long-term defense structures included. Under USCYBERCOM, each activity must ask itself the standing question, “Do I have the capability to validate the integrity of my network or application and increase the security of this system on demand?”

While certain checks and balances will, by legal necessity, continue to underlie the funding and administration of the military’s networks, a new comprehensive charter must put to rest any confusion over how the overall network is defined and stratified by importance. Where CIO policies allow for a continuum of cost-appropriate security controls associated with the importance of the information, a new USCYBERCOM charter may, by necessity, impose more draconian protections and interoperability standards. By virtue of its advertised mission alone, USCYBERCOM must become the de facto network architect and chief advocate, for it cannot direct defensive action on a network incapable of executing its commands. One seemingly innocuous configuration change can introduce a bow wave of costly and lengthy implementation challenges among components. This is due largely to the fact that Service acquisition channels are diffuse and decentralized, and network enclaves can vary widely even within a single military branch.

In short, if USCYBERCOM is to engineer responsive processes and dictate universal protective measures on demand, there cannot be several versions of a network or multiple flavors of information security—one for the NSS and one for other “Federal” systems. Unless formally reconciled, this dichotomy potentially undermines USCYBERCOM unity of command, clouds resourcing decisions, and dilutes operational outcomes.

**Step Three: Resolve Classic Tensions**

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 sought to meld the DOD tectonic divide between operational and administrative control of military forces. The same kind of studied treatment must be given to cyberspace and the way it is fielded, maintained, commanded, and controlled. The opinions and political implications are likely to be as contentious as those surrounding Goldwater-Nichols itself, but the Gordian knot of “who controls the network” must be put to high-level debate and codified in law, policy, or both. How USCYBERCOM organizes and executes its mission will be largely reliant on how DOD regards cyberspace—whether or not it is a single, ubiquitous, centrally managed entity, or a distributed network conjoined through diffuse pockets of geographic responsibility.

While both are feasible, they must support the USCYBERCOM commander’s most basic litmus test: Can I confidently, on demand, determine the identity and extent of the network, and can I make objective assessments on the state of its integrity? Can I then implement configuration changes to appreciably enhance security from end to end?

Building an apparatus to answer these elemental questions would bring unprecedented organizational pressure onto DOD, as configuring for that capability would take the measured commitment and cooperation of everyone who touches a computer or radio set. If the commander of USCYBERCOM is ostensibly the sole recognized individual to make risk assessments for the network, a shared sense of urgency and a set of uniform response measures must exist for all components, regardless of the real estate they occupy or the organizational patch they display.

What cannot be ignored is that, once fully operationally capable, USCYBERCOM will be legitimized by a base execute order from the Secretary of Defense that will bestow it with the authorities needed to empower it on some global level. The question remains, however, of who will be required to abide by those authorities, and whether this party will recognize a command structure that straddles both Service and geographic concerns.
Other core professions beside cyberspace wrestle with this murky equation, namely the logistics community, which continues to proclaim that split authorities fundamentally impair mission effectiveness. Possible avenues of compromise for logistics, cyber, and any other global function include recharacterizing the Service Title 10 “sustain” contribution. Specifically, could computer security be considered a legitimate sustainment activity that is rightfully Service-owned to a predetermined point? Are there patently “operational” network activities that become the province of the theater commander when Service sustainment ends? Unless and until USCYBERCOM can draw these synthetic dividing lines and provide added value to the theater commander’s mission, it is unlikely any significant progress will occur, and the tension between regional and global will remain for some time.

This may be yet another case where definitions of the network require a full makeover. Perhaps, like the NSS or an information system, a definition can be created that satisfies the theater commander and the assets within the geographic region while still supporting Service reach. The notion of a “global network” briefs well, but articulating the complex relationships within such a network will be nothing short of mapping the human genome, an arduous but necessary step in managing expectations and empowering a single commander to operate on a nominal level.

**Step Four: Define Cyber Forces**

Despite the relative immaturity of the USCYBERCOM mission space, the term cyber forces is beginning to enjoy common use as though its meaning is intuitive. Yet because of the novelty of USCYBERCOM and its still evolving mission, cyber forces are far from readily understood or objectively applied. In fact, the term’s use adds a dimension of complexity to an already years-old initiative to define an information operations career force. Sculpting an IO career force has been a department-wide mandate since DOD Instruction 3608.11 charged the military with creating a force to “plan and execute fully integrated IO.” Although USCYBERCOM—of the greater IO talent pool, an objective and clearly understood cyber career force is likely to be just as elusive in its definition. It could be argued, after all, that everyone who touches a keyboard, from Servicemember to contractor, is a default member of the cyberspace rank and file. Even those who possess the rightful credentials to be part of a distinctive “cyber force”—for example, an Air Force communications officer or a civilian who manages IT acquisition—may at times serve in fringe positions unhitched from any mainstream association with “cyberspace operations.” The scope of cyberspace goes well beyond an isolated segment of DOD’s vast Active, Reserve, civilian, and contracted population, and in order to develop a workable training and sustaining framework, USCYBERCOM must articulate who exactly makes up the fraternity of “cyberwarriors” operating and defending the network. Will an entirely new skill set inform the development of a new kind of work force, or will age-old specialties continue to exist, separate but equal, under the loose but unifying banner of cyber?

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*U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison)*

Deputy Secretary of Defense makes presentation at cyberspace symposium

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no all-inclusive IO career structure has been codified, due largely to a lack of Service consensus on the extent and makeup of core IO skills and force composition
Step Five: New Rules of Engagement

Closely related to the underlying Service/combatant command schism, DOD standing rules of engagement (SROE) present a host of procedural and organizational challenges for USCYBERCOM. At its heart, the SROE advocate for the inherent right of self-defense for all geographic combatant commanders, thus giving them the autonomy to plan and conduct cyber operations as conditions dictate, theoretically free from USCYBERCOM control. While the creation of USCYBERCOM alone will not compel a rewrite of the SROE, this new command is nonetheless an element to be considered in the next iteration of the Chairman’s instruction, and emerging relationships must carefully consider the command’s span of control, especially in terms of operational preparation of the environment (OPE).

This notion of OPE is a nontrivial element in determining how USCYBERCOM will integrate with other combatant commands, particularly for intelligence-gathering. Where geographic combatant commands enjoy legitimate latitude under OPE to assess regional adversaries, the same may not legally hold true for USCYBERCOM, even though its commander must, at any given moment, possess a cohesive and decisive state of the battlespace. Any claim by the commander of USCYBERCOM to this OPE privilege, however, begins to suffer when one considers that he also wears the hat of the NSA director. Prevailing thought, however, wants to ascribe classic command authorities to USCYBERCOM regardless. The commander of USSTRATCOM, General Kevin Chilton, USAF, explains on the subject of computer attack: “Most of the work that needs to be done before the [cyber] attack is [intelligence-centric], and it’s very critical to it. But in my view, this is not an [intelligence] mission. This is a combat operation that requires exquisite [intelligence] support, just like every other combat operation.” Several questions then follow: Which combatant commander would take on this “combat operation,” and how would it be synchronized globally? And what of U.S. Northern Command? Would it fit traditional combatant command model within the continental United States, or be trumped by the laws governing the military and domestic intelligence?

Despite the creation of USCYBERCOM as a command entity, joint rules of engagement may remain one of its most vexing operational challenges. Nothing should be imposed that dilutes the authority of the geographic combatant commands, yet at the same time, something must be promulgated to account for and to instantiate USCYBERCOM’s global role, especially as it relates to intelligence.

Step Six: Avoid Escalation of Hostilities

More than the nefarious appearance of the government’s impact on civil liberties, the real concern with USCYBERCOM should be in the way it is perceived by world partners at large. This public and deliberate creation of a new command presents a host of procedural and organizational issues for some time, their efforts should.

LTG Carroll Pollett, director, Defense Information Systems Agency, addresses audience

USCYBERCOM efforts should be guided by a sound body of rules and a deterrence policy rooted in an international construct

be guided by a sound body of rules and a deterrence policy rooted in an international construct. Some of the hallmarks of Cold War deterrence hold up to the medium of cyberspace deterrence, particularly in terms of the “general” and “immediate” approach. For instance, a general deterrence posture seeks to dissuade anyone with the fundamental capability to attack, while immediate deterrence singles out those with the presumed intent to carry out the attack. Of course, this blunt
policy construct is only a starting point for deeper discussion and may not withstand the innumerable caveats that will permeate the debate as it relates specifically to cyber.

Although there are some noteworthy first steps toward establishing an international set of cyber norms—evident in bodies such as the Convention on Cybercrime—any global framework governing military response actions in cyberspace will surely materialize at an onerous pace. After all, how can the rules of war, built upon the tactile presence of combatants and weapons and sovereign territory, be retooled for a world where “troops” can be dispatched in milliseconds from a multitude of nation-states?

The commander will enjoy sizable influence in network configuration and the interoperability of network components

Logistics power that the commander wields legitimately presents him with a possible means for optimizing resources and prevents duplication of effort among Service components. In the context of cyberspace, this may mean the commander carries a significant influence over resourcing activities that occur well upstream of new technologies and acquisitions. Though he is perhaps not the sole recognized chief architect, the commander of USCYBERCOM may at least evolve into the “chief aggregation officer” for DOD networks.

To that end, the commander will enjoy sizable influence in network configuration and the interoperability of network components, especially as USCYBERCOM’s mandate to gain situational awareness into the networks looms large. An interesting analogue to this scenario can be seen, again, with the logistics community. Although U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) bears the overall responsibility for in-transit visibility of logistics, it has not yet delivered on this critical task. A recent Government Accountability Office report states, “Because DOD has lacked a coordinated and comprehensive approach to managing joint theater logistics, efforts to advance joint theater logistics across the department have been fragmented.”

Much like USCYBERCOM, this fragmentation in materiel delivery has caused many to advocate for a U.S. Joint Logistics Command that would consume the gamut of logistics missions that currently straddle USTRANSCOM, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Service logistics entities. Ultimately, this command would assume responsibility for the global end-to-end supply chain. Thus, it is not without precedent that USCYBERCOM should be heralded as an emerging solution for the military’s continuing shortfalls in operating and securing its information systems. And as USTRANSCOM controls the crosscutting $10 billion Transportation Working Capital Fund, so too should USCYBERCOM control a segment of funds devoted exclusively to cyberspace operations. Although this premise is tenuous at best—especially as it applies to the ethereal world of cyberspace—it offers an area of further study that may well pay literal dividends for the USCYBERCOM commander.

In the end, there is potential for a subunified command to make a tangible impact on a functional area such as cyberspace, but until there is constituent change in the fabric of cyberspace doctrine, policy, and resource control, USCYBERCOM may emerge as a well-intended office whose real authorities prove negligible in the long run.

NOTES


3 DOD Information Technology Budget Exhibit, Fiscal Year 2010, President’s Budget Request, May 2009.


8 General Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, remarks delivered to the LandWarNet Conference, Fort Lauderdale, FL, August 21, 2008.


China’s Ace in the Hole

Rare Earth Elements

By CINDY A. HURST
On February 4, 2010, nearly 2 weeks after the Obama administration unveiled a $6.4 billion arms deal with Taiwan, a Chinese article posted on an online Chinese Communist Party–connected daily newspaper site, as well as on many Chinese blogs and military news sources, suggested banning the sale of rare earth elements (REEs) to U.S. companies as retribution.1 There was already ample Western concern about potential diminishing access to supplies of REEs, particularly after a 2009 draft report written by China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology called for a total ban on foreign shipments of terbium, dysprosium, ytterbium, thulium, and lutetium, and a restriction of neodymium, europium, cerium, and lanthanum exports.2 The report immediately caused an uproar among rare earth buyers because China produces approximately 97 percent of the world’s REEs. While there are sources of rare earth around the world, it could take anywhere from 10 to 15 years from the time of discovery to begin a full-scale rare earth operation.

REEs are important to hundreds of high-tech applications, including critical military-based technologies such as precision-guided weapons and night-vision goggles. In exploring the idea of global military might, China appears to be holding an unlikely trump card. The country’s grasp on the rare earth element industry could one day give China a strong technological advantage and increase its military superiority. This article focuses on rare earth elements and their importance to military technology. It also demonstrates how China’s research and development programs, coupled with its vast reserves of REEs, have the potential to make the country a dominant force in the world.

Background

REEs are those chemical elements on the periodic table having atomic numbers 57 through 71 (known as the lanthanides), scandium, and yttrium (atomic numbers 21 and 39). Scandium and yttrium are generally grouped with the lanthanides because of their similar properties and because they are normally found within the same deposits when mined.

The term rare earth is actually a misnomer; these elements are not rare at all, being found in low concentrations throughout the Earth’s crust and in higher concentrations in certain minerals. REEs can be found in almost all massive rock formations. However, their concentrations range from ten to a few hundred parts per million by weight. Therefore, finding them where they can be economically mined and processed presents a challenge.

For at least the past five decades, international scientists and engineers have understood the importance of REEs to military technology. For some, the topic of rare earth has even been shrouded in secrecy. For example, in Russia, REEs were once considered a national secret, with little mention being made about them prior to 1993. Their secret applications were long confined to those organizations, such as the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, Ministry of Nuclear Energy, and Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy, that were responsible for the research, design, and production of military equipment and weapons systems. The reason for their secrecy was simple. More than 80 percent of the rare earth industry went into the former Soviet Union’s defense systems.3

Today, many foreign and domestic analysts view REEs as a key factor in developing modern military technology. For example, one Chinese article attributed “night vision instruments with the REE lanthanum” as a “source of the overwhelming dominance of U.S. military tanks during the Gulf War.”4 In China, REEs have been described as a “treasure trove” of new material and the “vitamins of modern industry.”5 REEs have also been described as “materials of the future.”6

In 1993, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, first deputy director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, reportedly sent a letter about REEs to Oleg Sokovets, the Russian Federation’s first vice premier, saying, “We have been receiving information indicating that advanced industrial countries are making increasing use of REEs due to progress in creating and developing qualitatively new, specialized materials with them that increase the critical parameter values of high technology products in the fields of rocket-space and aviation, microelectronics, and electrical engineering.”7

Not only are REEs used to greatly improve the qualities and properties in the metallurgy industry, they are also used in the fields of lasers, fluorescents, magnets, fiber optic communications, hydrogen energy storage, and superconducting materials—all key technologies that have been successfully applied to modern militaries.8

Military Applications

Of course, not all REEs are created equal. Some experts predict that by 2015 there...
be substitutes, the tradeoff would diminish military superiority. According to George Hadjipanayis, a Richard B. Murray Chair Professor of Physics at the University of Delaware, the alnico and ferrite magnets, the first two permanent magnets ever produced, do not have rare earth in them and their performance is much lower. Hadjipanayis is currently working with a group of researchers to develop a “next generation magnet” that will be stronger than either the NdFeB or SmCo magnets. The project is being conducted using a three-tiered approach:\textsuperscript{15}

- The University of Nebraska is striving to develop a permanent magnet that does not require rare earth.
- The U.S. Department of Energy’s Ames Laboratory in Iowa is pursuing options that might use new materials based on combinations of rare earths, transition metals, and possibly other elements that have not been used with magnets before.
- The University of Delaware is striving to create a new magnetic material that is based on an idea of “nano-composite” magnets. It is a complex process that could slash the use of neodymium or samarium in magnets by 30 or 40 percent.\textsuperscript{16}

Since the discovery of the NdFeB magnet in 1983, research and development in the United States has been relatively flat.

Some scientists argue that in many cases, while there may be a shortage of neodymium, terbium, and dysprosium, while supplies of europium, erbium, and yttrium could become tight.\textsuperscript{7} The neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets are so strong that they are ideal for the miniaturization of a variety of technologies, including possible nanotechnologies. Many solid state lasers use neodymium due to its optimal selection of absorption and emitting wavelengths. Consumption of neodymium is expected to increase significantly as more wind turbines come online. Wind may be “free,” but some of the newer generation wind turbines use up to two tons of these magnets. Terbium and dysprosium can be additives to enhance the coercivity in NdFeB magnets.\textsuperscript{10} Yttrium is used, along with neodymium, in lasers. Europium is the most reactive of the REEs. Along with its current use in phosphors for fluorescent lamps and television/computer screens, it is being studied for possible use in nuclear reactors.\textsuperscript{11} Erbium is used as an amplifier for fiber optic data transmission. It has also been finding uses in nuclear applications and metallurgy. For example, adding erbium to vanadium, a metal used in nuclear applications and high-speed tools, lowers the hardness and improves the workability of the metal.

Samarium is another REE used in military applications. Samarium is combined with cobalt to create a permanent magnet with the highest resistance to demagnetization of any material known. Because of its ability to withstand higher temperatures without losing its magnetism, it is essential in both aerospace and military applications. Precision-guided munitions use samarium-cobalt (SmCo) permanent magnet motors to direct the flight control surfaces (fins). SmCo can also be used as part of stealth technology in helicopters to create white noise to cancel or hide the sound of the rotor blades. These magnets are used in defense radar systems as well as in several types of electronic countermeasure equipment, such as the Tail Warning Function.\textsuperscript{12}

According to the U.S. Geological Survey, substitutes are available for many rare earth applications, but they are generally less effective.\textsuperscript{13} Steven Duclos, chief scientist with General Electric Global Research asserts, “There’s no question that rare earths do have some properties that are fairly unique, but for many applications these properties are not so unique that you cannot find similar properties in other materials. [REEs] are just better, from either a weight, strength, or optical property and that’s why people have moved to them.” Duclos went on to explain, “It always comes down to a tradeoff. You can build a motor that does not have rare earth permanent magnets in it. It will be bigger and heavier for a given amount of power or torque that you want.”\textsuperscript{14}

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Rare earth permanent magnets constitute the widest use of REEs. In the 1960s, the United States was number one in the research and development of magnets. The Nation enjoyed many technological breakthroughs until about the early 1980s. Since the discovery of the NdFeB magnet in 1983, research and development in the United States has been relatively flat.

Chinese Influence
The Mountain Pass rare earth mine in California, owned by Molycorp Minerals, was once the largest rare earth supplier in the world. Through the 1990s, however, China’s exports of rare earth elements grew, causing prices worldwide to plunge. This undercut business for Molycorp and other producers around the world, and eventually either drove them out of business or significantly reduced production efforts. According to sources within the industry, rare earth deposits in the United States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa could be mined by 2014.

Some experts, such as Professor Jean-Claude Bunzli from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, argue that the quantities of rare earth in military technology are low enough that diminishing supplies from China should not be an issue due to Western mining operations coming on line soon. Still, even if plans to open up new and renewed Western operations do come through, the bigger issue may well be China’s growing emphasis in the research and development of REEs, as compared to U.S. efforts, which have decreased dramatically.

The United States paved the way for many of today’s modern technologies that China is now capable of exploiting. Part of that effort has entailed scientists focusing on and dissecting the properties and uses of REEs. From about the 1940s to the 1990s, REEs attracted interest in both the U.S. and Chinese academic and scientific communities. Today, however, there are only a small handful of scientists who truly focus on REEs in the United States.

China, on the other hand, has established entire laboratories and teams devoted to the study of REEs. It has various high-profile national programs, such as Program 863 (National High-tech Research and Development) and Program 973 (National Basic Research). While these programs were not put into place to specifically support rare earth–based projects, they are important to China’s rare earth industry. These programs offer millions of dollars of government funding for military and civilian research projects that are meant to narrow the technological gap between China and the rest of the world and to give China a foothold in the world arena.

China has a keen forward thinking ability. Its planners pinpoint a potential problem or strength years in advance. Then over time, the country begins to build a strong foundation to achieve its end goal. In 1992, during his visit to Bayan Obo, China’s largest rare earth mine, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping declared, “There is oil in the Middle East; there is rare earth in China.” Seven years later, President Jiang Zemin wrote, “Improve the development and application of rare earth, and change the resource advantage into economic superiority.”

Wang Minggin and Dou Xuehong, both from the China Rare Earth Information Center at the Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earth in Inner Mongolia, published a paper in 1996 entitled “The History of China’s Rare Earth Industry.” They wrote, “China’s abrupt rise in its status as a major producer, consumer, and supplier of rare earths and rare earth products is the most important event of the 1980s in terms of development of rare earths.”

China knew what it had even before the 1990s. The country established the General
Research Institute for Nonferrous Metals in 1952. In the 1950s, the Bayan Obo mine was built and operated as the iron ore base of the Baotou Iron and Steel Company. In the late 1950s, China began recovering rare earths during the process of producing iron and steel. Since the 1960s, China has emphasized maximizing the use of Bayan Obo, which is located in Inner Mongolia, 80 miles north of Baotou. This effort included employing people to find more effective ways to recover the rare earths. Along with trying to improve separation techniques, China also began other research and development efforts. In 1963, they established the Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths.

There are two state key laboratories in China: the State Key Laboratory of Rare Earth Materials Chemistry and Applications, which is affiliated with Peking University in Beijing; and the State Key Laboratory of Rare Earth Resource Utilization, in Changchun, in the northern province of Jilin.

Globally, there are two journals dedicated to the research and study of REEs: the Journal of Rare Earth and China Rare Earth Information (CREI) Journal, both put out by the Chinese Society of Rare Earths. The society was founded in 1980 and comprises tens of thousands of registered scientific and technical researchers of rare earths.

The number of U.S. scientists devoted to the research and study of REEs today pales in comparison to the vast number in China.

Meanwhile, China had been looking at ways to effectively use REEs in military applications as far back as the early 1960s, when its weapons industry began applied research in the areas of armor and artillery steel. The country produced special rare earth armor steels that became beneficial in manufacturing tanks. In the mid-1960s, China created rare earth carbon steel, the transverse impact value of which was a 70 to 100 percent improvement over the raw carbon steel originally used. Firing tests on the shooting range proved that large-caliber cartridges made with the rare earth armor steels were able to fully meet technical requirements.

Since 1963, China has been using rare earth ductile iron in mortar projectiles, which was said to have doubled or tripled the dynamic properties of the projectiles, increasing the number of effective kill fragments several times over and sharpening the fragment edges, which greatly improved the kill power. Prior to using the rare earth ductile iron in mortar projectiles, China used semi-steel made from high-quality pig iron with 30 to 40 percent scrap steel as the material for pre-chambers of projectile bodies. These older projectile body pre-chambers proved to be much lower in strength, were highly brittle, and produced few effective kill fragments after detonation. In addition, they were not sharp.

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Rare earth magnesium alloys are fairly strong and lightweight, making them ideal for aircraft. The China Aviation Industry Corporation (AVIC) has reportedly developed 10 brands of rare earth magnesium alloys.

For example, the “ZM,” cast magnesium alloy, which has neodymium as the main rare earth additive, is being used extensively in such functions as the casings for rear brakes on helicopters, ribs for fighter wings, and rotor lead plates for 30-kilowatt generators. Another high-strength rare earth magnesium alloy, known as “BM25,” which was jointly developed by AVIC and China’s Nonferrous Metal Corporation, has replaced some medium-strength aluminum alloys and is being used for attack aircraft.

Along with creating more efficient metal alloys, China has carefully studied numerous other uses of REEs, many of which have been used and developed in the United States and by some U.S. allies. These technologies include rare earths as combustibles in bombs; nuclear applications, including military defense, nuclear radiation shielding, and tank thermal radiation shielding technologies; permanent magnets with magnetic properties that are “a hundred times stronger than the magnetic steel used in military equipment in the 1970s”; lasers, including laser rangefinders, laser guidance, and laser communication systems; superconducting materials; sonar; and others.

In April 2006, Li Zhonghua, a senior engineer, along with Zhang Weiping and Liu Jiaxiang, all from China’s Hunan Rare Earth Materials Research Academy, published a paper entitled “Application and Development Trends of Rare Earth Materials in Modern Military Technology.” After giving a point-by-point narration on the special roles REEs play in modern technology, the authors concluded that there is a close relationship between rare earths and modern military technology. They also noted that the development of the rare earth industry has greatly pushed forward the overall progress of modern military technology, and the heightening of military technology has in turn driven the flourishing growth of the rare earth industry.

Most press reports today express concern about the future supply and demand of REEs and China’s tightening supplies due to the country’s own growing domestic needs. Yet there is little mention made regarding China’s research and development efforts, which probably deserve the most attention since research and development is the driving force behind China’s increasing success.

More Players

Seeing the potential that REEs hold in modern technologies has likely fueled research and development in other countries, such as North Korea and Iran. For example, in 1988, North Korea formed the Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company (other names include Chosun or Choson) International Chemicals Joint Operation Company) to produce REEs from the mineral monazite. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the plant was reportedly designed to use solvent extraction technology acquired from China’s Yue Long Chemical Corporation, has replaced some medium-strength aluminum alloys and is being used in high-tech products.
Plant near Shanghai. Production began in 1991. The monazite is said to come from the Ch’olsan Uranium Mine near Ch’olsan-kun in P’yŏng’an Province. The Hamhung plant reportedly has the capacity to process 1,500 tons per year of monazite, from which 400 tons of rare earth metals and oxides can be processed.

In June 2009, North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il visited the Hamhung Semiconductor Materials Factory and the Hamhung Branch of the State Academy of Sciences, where he stressed the need to boost production capacity and the need to accelerate technical updating of the factory to increase the production of rare earth metals. During a campaign to build up the country’s research efforts, Kim visited several areas and spoke to the scientists and technicians of the Hamhung Branch.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il stressed the need to increase the production of rare earth metals

was accompanied by members of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea, including Ju Kyu Chang, a member of the National Defense Commission and First Vice Director of the Ministry of Defense Industry, and the department directors in Organization and Instruction, Financial Planning, and Administration.

Iran has also embarked on research and development efforts. As early as 1998, its Laser Research Center is believed to have been producing indigenous neodyn [neodymium] yttrium-aluminum (Nd:YAG) lasers, using laser crystals.

In Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Alexander Portnov, a professor specializing in geological and mineral sciences, wrote, “There can be no talk of developing nanotechnology if the country does not produce and use rare elements.” Portnov argues that a country’s extraction, production, and use of rare metals needed for technological innovation are “a precise indicator of its scientific and technical development.”

It is possible that suitable alternatives to REEs could one day be discovered. In the meantime, however, REEs are critical to many modern technologies. China has recognized the value of REEs for over five decades. While the United States today leads in technological innovation, China’s position in the rare earth industry and its vast reserves and ability to mine and produce them, coupled with its intense research and development efforts, could one day give it a decisive advantage in military-based technologies. The U.S. military must plan for this eventuality and take appropriate actions today if it expects to maintain its lead in military technology.

NOTES

2 Articles discussing the report stated that yttrium was one of the elements expected to be banned. This is likely an error. Ytterbium is much less abundant than yttrium. See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “World Faces Hi-Tech Crunch as China Eyes Ban on Rare Metal Exports,” Telegraph, August 24, 2009.
3 “Russia’s Rare Earth, By Way of Prologue: Two Quotes from One Letter,” Interfax AIF, January 29, 1999.
6 “Russia’s Rare Earth, By Way of Prologue.”
7 Ibid.
8 Li, Zhang, and Liu.
10 Magnets will lose their magnetism at certain elevated temperatures. Neodymium can only be used at near room temperatures. Adding the terbium or dysprosium gives it a higher coercivity, which allows the magnet to withstand higher temperatures before losing magnetism.
11 Europium sesquiouioxide (Eu$_2$O$_3$) has been tested as neutron absorbers for control rods in (fast breeder) nuclear reactors. Jean-Claude Bunzli, email correspondence with author, April 29, 2010.
14 Steven Duclos, telephone interview with author, March 2, 2010.
16 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
22 According to the China’s Society of Rare Earths Web site, there are more than 100,000 “registered experts.” However, approximately one-quarter to one-third of these “experts” are likely administrative personnel.
23 Li, Zhang, and Liu.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Solvent extraction technology was originally developed in the United States, then bettered by the French company Rhône Poulenc, which became Rhodia. In the 1980s and 1990s, this was the best separation technology available. Eventually, after much hesitation, Rhodia transferred the technology to Baotou under the form of a joint venture in Baotou, China.
31 The original source of this information breaks out Nd:YAG as neodymium:ytterbium-aluminum garnet lasers. This is likely inaccurately described since the Nd:YAG is produced with yttrium, and not ytterbium. See Charles D. Ferguson and Jack Boureston, “IAEA Pubs Iranian Laser-Enrichment Technology in the Spotlight,” Jane’s Regional Security Issues, June 18, 2004.
When in human history has an armed force ever enjoyed the quality of logistical support that our forces in Iraq do today? The U.S. military possesses the capacity, budget, organization, and doctrine to keep personnel in the field well stocked with food, water, ammunition, vehicle parts, and anything else they need to accomplish their mission. Although our processes are not perfect, most would agree that our efforts to supply our fielded forces deserve high praise, especially when comparing the current system either to foreign armed forces’ capabilities or to our own historical record.

Our doctrine empowers that logistical competence. Joint Publication (JP) 4–0, Joint Logistics,1 guides our headquarters staff officers and sustainment formation commanders in efforts to plan and execute joint logistical support of operations. It spells out the roles and responsibilities of each organization in the joint sustainment chain of command. The Army’s guidance, Field Manual 4–0, Sustainment,2 likewise clearly delineates functions and informs decisionmakers about how they should prioritize and carry out the various tasks associated with logistics support to a fielded force. But when it comes to guidance for our most recent logistics challenge—responsibly withdrawing equipment and personnel from Iraq—our existing doctrine falls short of the target. In fact, only a few pages of doctrine address what might be considered the most difficult task in logistics planning: partially redeploying a large military force in the midst of an extremely fluid political and security environment.3

On November 17, 2008, Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari signed what has come to be known as the Security Agreement between the United States and Iraq, setting the stage for an immense logistical challenge. This historic document spells out numerous requirements and expectations for the signatory parties, but perhaps the most complex one for the U.S. military is Article 24, which states that “All . . . United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.”

Wisconsin Army National Guardsmen return home from 8-month deployment in Iraq

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logistics capabilities, and then leveraged supporting enabling agencies to achieve the desired velocity and precision.

Furthermore, once MNC–I understood the tasks across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, staff officers linked them to deliverables to produce the synchronization framework that defined the desired effects, identified how they were to be achieved, and decided which products needed to be published to achieve the retrograde goals. In this manner, we dissected each major drawdown task and produced a comprehensive plan that enabled MNC–I to simultaneously execute several complex activities. They included retrograding non–mission essential equipment from Iraq; sourcing the follow-on Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) to 100 percent of their authorized equipment requirements; providing badly needed combat power to Operation Enduring Freedom to meet the growing equipment needs of the surge forces in Afghanistan; and finally beginning the long overdue return of equipment to the Army inventory for reset.

**Figure 1. Core Logistics Capabilities**

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<th>Core Capabilities</th>
<th>Functional Capabilities</th>
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<td>• Manage supplier networks</td>
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<td><strong>Deployment and Distribution</strong></td>
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Since November 15, 2009, the Multi-national Corps, Multi-national Force, and Multi-national Security Transition Command logistics directorates have been combined to form the U.S. Forces–Iraq Joint Logistics Directorate (J4), and this vital synchronization continues under the USF–I Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics J4 and the USF–I sustainment leadership. To further illustrate the challenges of the RDoF in Iraq, we must consider each of the JP 4–0 joint logistics capabilities and highlight a few of the major synchronization issues theater logisticians faced.

**Supply**

Joint doctrine identifies supply as a core capability that includes right-sizing commodity and equipment stockages, facilitating inventory management, and managing supplier networks. The supply capability became critical during RDoF as MNC–I reduced stocks and trimmed equipment numbers to the precise levels required for the footprint of 50,000 troops by August 2010 and eliminated unnecessary inflow of commodities to match endstate force requirements. As the drawdown commenced, it immediately became apparent that without adequate synchronization across all levels of operation, the simultaneous goals of right-sizing the equipment and commodity stockpile in Iraq, maintaining regional engagement, and beginning to balance ongoing combat operations with Army equipment reset could not be achieved.

Theater management of fuel stockage levels provides a clear example of the link between supply acquisition and theater engagement. As the drawdown of forces proceeded, the requirement for fuel at the tactical level was naturally reduced by a significant margin. Additionally, at the operational level, the availability of convoy security force (SECFOR) units was reduced by such an extent that U.S. forces no longer had enough SECFOR to secure fuel convoys traveling over the western ground line of communication (WGLOC) from Jordan. The troop-to-task ratio simply did not permit the smaller number of U.S. forces in Anbar Province to accomplish their primary mission of advising and assisting their ISF counterparts as well as perform the WGLOC SECFOR taskings.

Consequently, the initial assessment based on the tactical and operational dynamics was to discontinue the fuel shipment from the west and to compensate for this loss by increasing the fuel shipment into Iraq from the north and south. However, at the strategic level, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) had leveraged the economic
benefits of shipping fuel over the WGLOC to reward Iraq’s neighbors for active and passive support of U.S. efforts in Iraq. Although the final decision was in fact to halt the shipment of fuel over the WGLOC, MNC–I and then USF–I worked with USCENTCOM to offset that loss of commercial revenue generated by the fuel shipments by increasing the commercial shipment of retrograde equipment over the WGLOC to the United States.

Balancing Class VII (end use items) requirements also provides an example of the careful supply synchronization planning essential across all levels of warfare and throughout the joint operations area. Logisticians in Iraq had to balance the requirements of completing the sourcing of AAB equipment sets with 100 percent of the mission essential equipment lists, sourcing critical pieces of combat equipment for the Enduring Freedom buildup, and retrograding all non–mission essential equipment to Kuwait for induction into reset programs in both Kuwait and the United States. At the tactical and operational levels, we clearly understood the necessity of retaining operational flexibility within Iraq throughout the drawdown. Consequently, planners developed flexible division and separate brigade monthly rolling stock and nonrolling stock retrograde goals that allowed commanders to choose the types and quantities of excess equipment to retrograde, as long as they met their minimum goals. This allowed commanders the ability to both right-size and shape their equipment sets based on their assigned operational mission and battlespace conditions.

After the headquarters merger on January 1, 2010, USF–I had to consider the strategic requirement of sourcing the Enduring Freedom buildup with critical combat power (to include coalition requirements in Afghanistan), as well as retrograding as much equipment as possible to seed the depot reset programs and to relieve critical shortages of equipment in the Army inventory. Consequently, logisticians planners synchronized the tactical, operational, and strategic equipment requirements, and, using the base plan of flexible monthly retrograde goals, USF–I increased the retrograde of equipment from theater. However, on a case by case basis, the headquarters deviated from its policy of flexible retrograde selection and directed the transfer or retrograde of specific excess equipment—either by line item number or capability—to meet strategic requirements. These two examples, importing fuel and exporting retrograde equipment, clearly illustrate how expeditious supply transactions, synchronized across the theater, helped us retain operational capability while also meeting the RDoF and theater engagement goals. However, as each month of retrograde passed, the operational readiness of the remaining equipment became increasingly important.

Maintenance Operations

In conjunction with right-sizing our inventory, we faced the next hurdle of ensuring that the smaller set of equipment was maintained appropriately to preserve operational capability over time. Maintenance, the second core logistics capability, links maintenance activities from field through sustainment (depot) levels—across the life cycle of systems—to preserve equipment availability and operability. For the tactical and operational level, the headquarters sought to set systems in place to maintain the operational readiness of U.S. combat power as well as to ensure that all equipment being transferred to the ISF met minimum operability standards. The U.S. Equipment Transfer to Iraq program was designed to transfer selected pieces of non–mission essential equipment to the ISF in order to ensure they possessed the equipment required to reach a minimum essential capability prior to the departure of U.S. forces. Obviously, the last thing the U.S. military wanted to do was to transfer non–mission capable equipment to the ISF. Consequently, logistics planners established systems to monitor the readiness of equipment identified for transfer and to establish maintenance processes both before and after the ISF signed for the equipment.

While these maintenance systems ensured the operability of potential ISF equipment, there were greater strategic maintenance considerations to consider. Much of the Army’s theater–provided equipment had been in Iraq for up to 6 years and had seen extensive use in an unforgiving environment. Additionally, until the drawdown of units occurred, this equipment could not be released to leave theater for reset maintenance.

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Understanding this, logistics planners in Iraq coordinated with Army Materiel Command (AMC) to determine the projected location for reset or refurbishment of the retrograde equipment—whether in Iraq, in Kuwait, or in the continental United States. Using this process, the headquarters leveraged AMC maintenance capabilities within Iraq to reset equipment for Enduring Freedom, seeded the Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT)
reset capability in Kuwait for both Enduring Freedom and theater reserve stocks, and retrograded equipment to the United States for induction into stateside depots for long overdue reset.

**Deployment and Distribution**

The deployment and distribution joint logistics capability directs the efficient use of the joint deployment and distribution enterprise to both move and sustain the force. USF–I achieved increasing levels of velocity and precision to balance the competing movement demands for retrograde, sustainment, and operational mission movement requirements. Additionally, through innovative software developments, USF–I was able to identify excess equipment by line item number and serial number, determine the ultimate disposition of that equipment, and then rapidly ship the equipment to its final destination. Of the 3.4 million pieces of equipment in Iraq in May 2009, roughly 2.2 million were pieces of organizational equipment that would redeploy with the units back to home station. USF–I had to determine the disposition of the remainder of the equipment, both military and commercial, and to move it to its final destination.

As of March 2010, we had provided disposition instructions for over 150,000 pieces of equipment in Iraq. Ultimately, by the time the drawdown from Iraq is complete, logisticians from USF–I and ARCENT will provide disposition instructions for approximately 650,000 pieces of Army gear and 650,000 pieces of commercial equipment. Additionally, U.S. forces will transfer hundreds of thousands of pieces of commercial equipment in conjunction with base transfers from U.S. control to Iraqi control under the Foreign Excess Personal Property Program. In each case, the potential transfer required logisticians to screen the equipment for conflicting requirements among U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, reserve equipment stocks in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, home station modified table of organization and equipment requirements, and even individual state and local agencies under the National Association of State Agencies for Surplus Property Program.

Clearly defining the equipment requirements within Iraq was the start point for the screening process. After 7 years of conflict, one would think that it would be easy to define those requirements. However, this was not the case, as the drawdown coincided with the transition from full spectrum operations using Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) to a more training- and partnership-oriented mission set using newly formed units, the AABs, as the baseline modular force in theater. The AABs had some distinct personnel and equipment differences from the traditional BCT structure. Consequently, USF–I identified equipment shortages across all AABs and enabled force formations in theater and laterally transferred equipment as it was nominated for retrograde to fill shortfalls within the AABs. USF–I leveraged the AMC theater property book teams and doubled the number of asset visibility personnel within the logistics staff to achieve the volume and velocity of disposition instructions required to set the AABs while simultaneously retrograding thousands of pieces of equipment each day.

Equipment retrograde to Kuwait, lateral transfers internal to Iraq, and sustainment flowing both in and out of the country taxed an already heavily burdened distribution network in theater. To orchestrate movement requirements, the sustainment staff hosted daily synchronization videoteleconferences that were attended by transportation officers from the USCENTCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, ARCENT, USF–I staff, U.S. divisions in Iraq, and the 13th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC). In this forum, staff officers coordinated strategic distribution concerns about inter-theater airlift and sea port workloading with the operational level movement plan and the tactical concept of support with the 13th ESC. USF–I logisticians used this daily meeting to orchestrate large and complex milestone events such as the removal of U.S. forces from inside Iraqi cities, securing polling stations in advance of the Iraqi national elections, closing hundreds of bases across Iraq and removing all evidence of U.S. presence, and moving the more than 100 convoys per night required to sustain the force and support the retrograde of equipment.

**Health Service Support**

Health service support is vital to maintaining “the individual and group health needed to accomplish a military mission.” However, within the current environment in Iraq, it actually means much more than that. The health service support capability provides the doctrinal template to provide world-class care to casualties, synchronize medical logistics into the larger sustainment construct, and leverage the drawdown of medical capability to simultaneously build Iraqi medical capacity. Contrary to public perception, the President’s 50,000 force cap did not leave much room for enabling forces in support of the AABs within Iraq. Accordingly, the drawdown plan included a proportional reduction of medical assets such as medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters, combat hospitals, and associated medical logistics footprint. The robust medical footprint Operation Iraqi Freedom enjoyed over the preceding 7 years was reduced over time to a minimum essential capability with strategic reachback to clinical services provided by Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany and in some cases medical facilities in the continental United States.

With the surge of troops flowing into Afghanistan, medical units and assets were at a premium. Medical planners retained only the minimum number of medical assets within Iraq to provide emergency lifesaving care to casualties, routine healthcare to uniformed personnel, and limited clinical services to U.S. forces within the country. The MEDEVAC coverage plan across Iraq garnered greater attention, and while the map rings depicting the “golden hour” did not cover the entire country, they did cover 98 percent of the American troop concentration inside the country. The limited number of forward operating bases (FOBs) outside the golden hour of MEDEVAC coverage was reinforced with medical personnel and equipment to compensate for the additional flight time to Level III medical care.

Operationally, as the medical footprint was right-sized to support the force density within Iraq, medical logisticians integrated their planning into the larger sustainment construct. As USF–I adjusted the overall U.S. base footprint across Iraq, medical planners had to position both MEDEVAC assets and medical units to support the changing force

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U.S. forces will transfer hundreds of thousands of pieces of commercial equipment in conjunction with base transfers from U.S. control to Iraqi control
This required the medical logisticians and sustainment planners to work in unison to synchronize medical capability locations, FOB infrastructure requirements, and MEDEVAC aircraft basing and support requirements. Staffers achieved this level of coordination by fully integrating the medical support planning into the sustainment critical path that synchronized all aspects of the basing, property accountability, and the support planning across all levels of operations.

As daunting as the medical drawdown was, there were strategic opportunities that surfaced that allowed the United States to assist Iraqi citizens as the drawdown progressed. One of these opportunities was the ability to transfer desperately needed medical facilities and equipment to the Iraqi Ministry of Health. One facility was Ibn Sina Hospital, located in the International Zone close to the current site of the U.S. Embassy. Ibn Sina was Saddam Hussein’s personal hospital that, after the 2003 invasion, had been transformed into a first-class American hospital with a state-of-the-art emergency room capability (featured in the HBO documentary film Baghdad E.R.). As U.S. forces complied with the Security Agreement and left the cities, the troop density and corresponding casualty rates in downtown Baghdad dropped significantly. Consequently, transferring a fully functioning Ibn Sina Hospital with all associated equipment to the government of Iraq not only right-sized U.S. medical capability within the Baghdad city limits, but also reinforced a positive information operations effort by transferring one of the last remaining visible reminders of Saddam’s regime back to the Iraqi people. Lastly, and most importantly, the transfer of Ibn Sina Hospital provided badly needed medical capability to the Iraqi people within the heart of their capital city. Ultimately, our headquarters worked closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to receive the appropriate authorities to legally transfer the hospital, and on October 1, 2009, the hospital and all of its equipment were transferred to the Iraqi Ministry of Health.

**Engineering**

Just as the medical drawdown was integrated into the larger sustainment planning construct to build synergy between the U.S. drawdown and buildup of Iraqi civil capacity, so too was the concept of engineering support. Engineering planners integrated all aspects of base planning, route clearance, and U.S. engineering capability into operational and civil capacity planning. This ensured that as the drawdown proceeded, U.S. forces were preserving the necessary critical engineering capability within the USF–I force structure, as well as providing much-needed equipment and expertise to American forces in Enduring Freedom, the government of Iraq, the Iraqi civil sector, and the ISF. More than any other joint logistics capability, engineering became the area where the American tactical military capabilities, operational level civil capacity and environmental planning expertise, and strategic level plans to regenerate the Iraqi infrastructure intersected into a unified campaign plan. Consequently, American engineers were required to balance U.S. regulatory guidance, operational command directives to build both ISF and Enduring Freedom engineering capability simultaneously, and the Joint Campaign Plan that required the United States to rebuild the Iraqi civil sector in an effort to bolster the fledgling democratically elected government by showing the Iraqi people tangible proof of how the quality of life was improving over time.

At the tactical level, ongoing operations and civil capacity-building efforts necessitated the movement of U.S. military forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) across the country. Unfortunately, as the drawdown commenced, there were fewer U.S. forces providing counter-improvised explosive device coverage on U.S. supply routes. Consequently, USF–I was careful to preserve route clearance capability throughout the drawdown to ensure freedom of movement for AABs and the associated enablers during stability operations. The route clearance equipment required for this effort was in high demand throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, particularly with the surge of forces into Afghanistan. Accordingly, USF–I assessed the amount of specialized engineering equipment against tactical and operational requirements, our ability to replace the engineering equipment with a similar, nonstandard capability using AAB equipment, and the threat in each of the divisional areas of operation. Ultimately, all nonessential equipment was dispositioned for release to Enduring Freedom for immediate employment in Afghanistan.
Some pieces of tactical engineering equipment and projects became operationally and strategically important. For example, as U.S. forces began to rebuild the country after the initial invasion of 2003, they placed “temporary” military bridges until permanent bridges could be rebuilt by commercial contractors. Unfortunately, as the insurgency continued from 2004 to 2008, many of the bridges were never rebuilt. As U.S. forces began to remove equipment, USF–I was faced with the quandary of crippling the limited recovery in economically depressed areas of Iraq by removing the bridges and severing the economically critical road networks into those areas. In short, the tactical recovery of U.S. engineering equipment and bridges quickly turned into a strategic level economic problem for the Iraqis. Engineering planners conducted a thorough analysis of the economic impact of removing each temporary bridge and determined that many of the bridges needed to remain in order to preserve the economic revitalization of the surrounding areas and freedom of movement of military forces in the area.

Similarly, some tactical engineering projects took on strategic level importance. Very early in Iraqi Freedom, senior American leaders identified the port of Umm Qasr and the city of Basrah as future economic lifelines for the Iraqi economy, leading to a great effort to develop infrastructure in southern Iraq. Simultaneous to this rejuvenation effort was the proposed turnover of FOB Bucca to the government of Iraq.

FOB Bucca, which at one time held a large population of Iraqi detainees, was the site of a large and functional sewage treatment plant. Although underutilized and on the verge of being shut down after the detainee population was either transferred to the Iraqi government or released as a part of the reconciliation process, the sewage treatment plant on Bucca offered an incredible capability and economic stimulus to both the port of Umm Qasr and the city of Basra. By connecting the sewage plant at Bucca to both areas, the plant became the logical place to begin to trim life for U.S. forces in theater. Intuitively, sustainment planners initially considered these two goals as mutually exclusive. However, as logisticians and contracting specialists within the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq (JCC–I) looked at logistics services in a holistic manner, USF–I leadership discovered ways to preserve the high quality of life for U.S. forces while realizing a significant reduction in contracting costs, contractors, and their equipment in theater. As the largest contracted service provider in theater, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) became the logical place to begin to trim excess capability. The key to the success of this effort, however, was to link any reduction in LOGCAP services to a corresponding reduction of forces at each site, as well as to integrate this reduction to a potential expansion of capabilities provided by smaller contracts administered under JCC–I using the local national workforce.

Although the timing of the potential transition from one LOGCAP provider to another was problematic, given the volume of contractor-managed, government-owned equipment and military units leaving theater during the same timeframe, we needed to ensure continuity of service despite the volatility created by the wave of departing units. Although we are just beginning this process, logisticians and contract specialists put the pieces in place for a smooth transition. Clearly defining all tasks associated with LOGCAP services was a key requirement in our analysis, as well as integrating the transition plan within the overall RDoF planning effort and identifying selected services that could be off-ramped to local contracts administered by JCC–I. By linking the descope of LOGCAP services to the expansion of Iraqi business capability, USF–I built the foundation of economic revitalization using contracted logistical services to drive this development.

Not all services were migrated to local contracts, and USF–I looked at innovative ways of trimming the amount and cost of LOGCAP and other services. Rejuvenated sustainment-related synchronization meetings such as the Contract Review Board (initially chaired by the MNC–I chief of staff and C8, later by the USF–I deputy chief of staff and J8), the Base Management Working Group (chairied by the J7), and the Joint Sustainment Integration Board (chairied by the J4), helped the sustainment staff to significantly reduce the amount of contracted services on FOBs without a corresponding reduction in quality of life at each base. In short, planners nested the contracted services plan within the overarching drawdown design to realize significant cost avoidances while preserving essential capability. In fact, MNC–I was so successful at trimming unnecessary expenditures and services during I Corps’ tenure that the cost of Iraqi Freedom operations in fiscal year 2009 (FY09) was $5 billion less than FY08. USF–I continued this initiative by teaming with AMC’s Team LOGCAP and Defense Contract Management Agency and realized a cost avoidance of $60 million in LOGCAP costs alone during the first half of FY10.

Since contractors provide a substantial portion of logistical services in the Iraq joint operations area, contracting is obviously a key
Operational Contract Support

Operational contract support is a capability integral to providing alternative sources of logistics and services, such as the Iraqi Transportation Network (ITN) transportation capability in support of U.S. forces in Iraq. Contracting expertise to develop and execute individual contracts is primarily provided by the JCC–I, which is fully integrated in all planning efforts. Also, the JCC–I commander co-chairs several of the key synchronization meetings within the USF–I battle rhythm. With JCC–I assistance, units are able to fill critical shortages in force structure with contracted capability, to leverage local contracts to help build the Iraqi commercial sector, and to use money as a weapons system to achieve specific battlefield effects such as blunting the effectiveness of insurgent recruiters by offering military-age citizens an alternative to violence to earn a living.

For example, in some cases MNC–I accepted a higher cost for logistics services if the higher cost was required to support stability operations. The commercial transportation sector was an excellent area where U.S. forces could link a requirement for logistical services with an abundance of semi-skilled and unemployed Iraqi laborers to produce a program that provided U.S. forces with mission critical support while simultaneously building an essential Iraqi civil capacity. The ITN was organized around a consortium of sheikhs willing to work with the United States to carry American cargo on commercial trucks. Initially, ITN was not cost competitive with LOGCAP trucking costs. However, USF–I and the Department of Defense ensured the program was funded at a baseline level to guarantee the survival of the Iraqi commercial transportation network and to build commercial capacity. ITN had the additional benefit of keeping local military-age males employed and in support of the U.S. military and ISF activities. Over time, the ITN sheikhs were persuaded to reduce costs in order to begin reducing their dependence on military cargo and to prepare the consortium for transition to commercial business. By using ITN as a model for future efforts, MNC–I discovered the synergy and potential of integrating logistics and contract planning in support of the drawdown.

Although the potential benefits of timely contracted support are great, these contracts come at a cost in manpower to our units. Unfortunately, the complexity and magnitude of the mission in Iraq left few military personnel available for contracting officer representative (COR) duties to adequately monitor and ensure proper execution of contracts. Although CORs are an essential part of maintaining adequate performance of local contracts, USF–I units were often short of trained personnel. The limited number of COR-trained personnel within the units often accomplished contract oversight functions as a secondary or additional duty. Although JCC–I recommends that contract oversight responsibility be the primary (only) task assigned to the COR, it became nearly impossible to achieve this based on the unit’s tactical mission and the shortage of school-trained CORs. Consequently, both sustainment planners and contracting specialists had to take this into consideration as they developed the concept of support in the post-drawdown environment.

Plans Integration and Synchronization

Although JP 4–0 provides a sufficient doctrinal foundation to develop functional plans based on individual logistics capabilities, it does not adequately address what arguably is the most important part of drawdown planning: plans integration and synchronization. Immediately upon arrival in theater, I Corps realized that although an operational battle rhythm already existed, it failed to address key sustainment issues critical to the success of responsible drawdown. The operational battle rhythm included a series of synchronization meetings where issues were vetted for adequate development and synchronization prior to presentation to the I Corps commander for decision. This series of synchronization meetings was labeled as the Critical Path, and all briefings requiring command group decision were pushed through the Critical Path.

As MNC–I, I Corps developed a parallel sustainment critical path that quickly became an effective method of not only integrating the planning efforts across the USF–I staff, but also synchronizing plans across the theater. This Sustainment Critical Path consisted of three primary general officer decisionmaking forums:

- The Joint Sustainment Synchronization Board (JSIB) focused on integrating all planning efforts across the USF–I staff and with divisions and the ESC.
- The Executive Sustainment Synchronization Board (ESSB) focused on synchronizing Operation Enduring Freedom plans across the USCENTCOM theater of operations.
- The Joint Logistics Procurement Synchronization Board (JLPSB) focused on synchronizing joint contracting efforts with the concept of support and responsible drawdown.

In other words, the JSIB integrated our planning efforts across and down, the ESSB focused up and out, and the JLPSB supported the first two.
The JSIB was a multifunctional sustainment board that highlighted and socialized planning efforts from the entire logistics planning community, and it developed into the workhorse of critical path meetings where the MNC–I leadership orchestrated the specifics of the drawdown.

The JSIB was not a stand-alone entity. Each functional staff directorate had its own series of meetings designed to feed the JSIB. Some notable feeder meetings were those of the daily Sustainment Synchronization Board, Base Management Working Group, Contract Review Board, and Operational Needs Statement Review Board.

Once the topics were vetted at the individual feeder boards at the colonel/captain level, they were placed in a queue for the JSIB. Ultimately, this board grew into the single most important synchronization event at the USF–I level and normally had numerous topics on the agenda for presentation and decision.

The ESSB was also an important synchronization meeting that had a slightly different focus and audience than the JSIB. The ESSB was the premier communications tool USF–I used to present information to the larger sustainment community across the theater and to synchronize the drawdown efforts with external support agencies and to coordinate equipment transfers between theaters with logisticians located in Afghanistan. The coordination conducted in the ESSB enabled USF–I to identify needed equipment for Enduring Freedom, coordinate refurbishment with AMC and the 402d Army Field Support Brigade, and organize intratheater transportation from Iraq or Kuwait to Afghanistan.

Lastly, the JLPSB was the newest key meeting in the Sustainment Critical Path. This meeting was JCC–I’s premier coordination event that ensured all contracting initiatives were synchronized with and in support of the concept of operations. As the requirement for contracted capability in Iraq grew commensurate with the drawdown of forces, the JLPSB became increasingly important to efforts to bridge the gap between force structure shortfalls and required operational capability.

The joint logistics doctrine outlined in JP 4–0, when combined with a Sustainment Critical path that integrates and synchronizes responsible drawdown planning across all concerned agencies within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, becomes a powerful mechanism to plan, organize, and execute all aspects of operational sustainment. I Corps used this joint doctrine not only to frame the concept of sustainment in Iraq but also to plan and orchestrate the responsible drawdown from Iraq. Although not all inclusive, joint doctrine does in fact provide a viable construct for tactical, operational, and strategic level logistics planning, and I Corps used this doctrine with great success.

Over the course of a year, the I Corps team sustained ongoing combat and security operations and helped orchestrate successful Iraqi national elections, while simultaneously managing to retrograde over 30,000 vehicles and 150,000 pieces of equipment. We produced cost avoidances of over $5.5 billion from previous years, returned repair parts valued at $1.1 billion to the wholesale system, and set the conditions for U.S. Forces–Iraq to withdraw from Iraq “with Success and Honor.”

**NOTES**

2 Field Manual (FM) 4–0, Sustainment (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, April 30, 2009).
3 Although JP 4–0 barely mentions redeployment, JP 3–35, Deployment and Redeployment (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, May 7, 2007), devotes a 10-page chapter to this task. It includes a generally useful list of factors to consider during planning and executing a redeployment operation, but as we will show, it misses a significant number of key considerations. FM 4–0 devotes a half-page (page 4–18) to “retrograde of materiel.”
5 JP 4–0, x.
6 Including 2.8 million pieces of Army standard and nonstandard equipment plus 651,000 pieces of contractor-managed, government-owned property.
7 Through the ARCENT Support Element–Iraq, forward deployed in support of USF–I J4.
8 JP 4–0, xii.
FORCE PLANNING IN THE 2010 QDR

By Kathleen H. Hicks and Samuel J. Brannen

Special Operations Soldiers conduct premission planning during exercise Emerald Warrior 2010

U.S. Air Force (Clay Lancaster)
The use of Integrated Security Constructs—overlapping, detailed sets of planning scenarios and associated assessment tools—in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provides the United States with a clean break from Cold War–era force planning.

Although we maintained the longstanding measure of succeeding in two substantial conventional conflicts overseas, we also tested the force against a broader set of projected threats, many of them inconceivable to the prior generation of defense planners.

Moreover, to meet the unique demands of our changing security environment, the 2010 QDR provides differentiated force planning guidance for the near term—unequivocally emphasizing the Nation’s intention and capability to prevail in current conflicts—as well as guidance over the mid to long term—ensuring the U.S. military’s preparations for the wide range of challenges lying over the horizon.

How did we get here?

In 1991, just after the end of the Cold War, Iraqi forces seized Kuwait. In response, the United States and its coalition partners undertook a massive deployment of military might. Over 3.7 million tons of cargo, 112,500 vehicles, and 697,000 U.S. military personnel moved into Southwest Asia from Europe, the United States, and the Pacific. The fight to remove Iraq from Kuwait began with an air campaign on January 17, 1991. Just over a month later, the ground campaign commenced with a combined arms left hook across the northern Saudi border.

One hundred hours into the campaign, the U.S-led coalition had routed Iraqi forces and liberated Kuwait.

Force planners in the 1990s referred to operations such as Desert Storm as “major regional contingencies” and later as “major theater wars” (MTWs). The ability to conduct two nearly simultaneous operations became the gold standard for measuring U.S. force capacity and capability. Planners held that U.S. forces should be able not only to prevail against the next Saddam Hussein, but also to stave off an opportunist Kim Jong-II while doing so.

From almost the beginning, MTW-centered force planning came crashing into the reality of how U.S. forces were deployed across an evolving threat spectrum that defied easily categorized forms of conflict. Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, the 9/11 attacks, and more recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate clearly that the post–Cold War world demands vigilance and, when necessary and appropriate, a willingness to act, adapt, and prove flexible across a wide range of military operations.

The most recent QDR builds on its predecessors by acknowledging these facts. At the time of the report’s release, the United States was operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti; fighting a war against al Qaeda and its allies around the world; providing ready and capable forces postured to maintain access to the global commons and deter and defeat threats in key regions of the world; and standing ready to defend the Nation and support civil authorities at home.

The 2010 QDR makes clear that the nature of future threats and their likely overlap is far more important than simplistic numbering formulas can convey. From state and nonstate actors poised to threaten nuclear attack, to fragile states that may engender terrorism, nuclear insecurity, civil strife, or even genocide, to the rapid growth in advanced antiaccess, area-denial capabilities that could threaten U.S. allies abroad and access to the global commons on which our economy—and the world’s economy—depends, the range of likely future conflicts can neither be wholly captured in MTW scenarios nor met with Desert Storm–like capabilities.

Prior Constructs

The DOD systematic approach to defense planning is rooted in systems analysis institutionalized during the term of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. His approach enabled force planning that was informed by budgetary realities but designed to uphold global deterrence by meeting the challenge posed by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.

That McNamara’s Pentagon famously failed to develop a strategy and the capabilities appropriate for the Vietnam War illustrates the importance of testing the force against a wide range of plausible challenges—including prevailing in ongoing operations.

With the end of the Cold War, large-scale conventional war with the Soviet Union and its allies could no longer serve as the focus for U.S. force planning. Pressure mounted to reduce the defense spending that had, in part, broken the Soviet Union. During his command of U.S. Army Forces Command

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and then as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell developed a force planning concept that cut personnel numbers while seeking to maintain overall force capacity as well as the forward-basing and rotational presence of U.S. personnel. General Powell argued that the United States still had global security commitments and needed the ability to respond to a range of contingencies—few, if any, of which would be predictable. His planning framework centered on the capability to conduct two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs) anywhere in the world, while preparing the additional capabilities to deal with several lesser regional contingencies. Both types of contingencies were modeled on earlier U.S. conventional engagements including Operations Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, and Just Cause.

Powell’s force planning construct, dubbed the Base Force (a base beneath which the force should not go), called for a reduction of total U.S. force structure by 25 percent during fiscal years 1991–1995. Initially, Powell’s construct was resisted by the George H.W. Bush administration as cutting too deeply and taking too much future risk. By 1990, however, President Bush and his Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney adopted Powell’s construct in response to broad congressional pressure for the United States and its allies to cash in a “peace dividend” from victory in the Cold War.

Democratic Members of the House Armed Services Committee, led by Chairman Les Aspin, charged that the Base Force was merely “defense by subtraction.” Aspin argued that U.S. military forces should be sized against real threats in real places. He invoked the use of “sizing scenarios” that examined the likeliest contingencies in greater detail than had the Joint Staff in producing the Base Force. Aspin and his staff created four illustrative options that included equivalents of recent smaller-scale operations, with overlapping operations “stacked” on one another. Each operation and its required force structure were binned as a “contingency-based building block.”

House Democrats backed Aspin’s Illustrative Option C: a “Basic Desert Storm Equivalent,” a regional contingency/Korea operation, a Provide Comfort—type “Humanitarian or Evacuation Action,” and a Panama-type operation, with bases for long-duration rotation, appropriate lift, and prepositioning. Beneath these options were a range of activities and force capacities called the “Defense Foundation.”

As Secretary of Defense under President Bill Clinton, Aspin sought to refine and institutionalize his Option C through a Pentagon internal review. The 1993 Bottom-Up Review investigated several potential “paths” (much like the illustrative options), among which it selected Path 3, the capability to “first halt and then defeat” two nearly simultaneous MRCs in two different theaters. All other potential operations were thought to be “lesser-included cases” that the existing force would handle whenever possible.

The 1997 QDR was the first required by law. Its force-sizing template echoed that of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, but recognized the increasing demands of smaller-scale contingencies from Somalia to Bosnia. The 1997 QDR echoed the logic of the Base Force in justifying the need to maintain a broad, capable U.S. military:

As a global power with worldwide interests, it is imperative that the United States now and for the foreseeable future be able to deter and defeat large-scale cross-border aggression in two distant theaters [MTWs] in overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies.

It emphasized deploying forces for forward presence to deter aggression and coercion by regional actors, including those armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It also noted that a key challenge to fighting and winning major theater wars was the ability “to transition to fighting major theater wars from a posture of global engagement—that is, from substantial levels of peacetime engagement overseas as well as multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations.”

The 2001 QDR was the first of the George W. Bush administration, and it announced a “paradigm shift in force planning” that emphasized global flexibility and a so-called capabilities-based approach to planning centered around two MRCs (dropping the short-lived reference to MTWs). It sought to clarify the force planning construct, derived in no small part from the lessons of Kosovo, during which the Air Force discovered that a seemingly smaller-scale contingency could produce an operational tempo and force demand far closer to an MRC. The 2001 QDR instructed that forces should be prepared around a “1–4–2–1” construct:

1: organize, train, and equip sufficient military forces to defend the U.S. homeland
2: swiftly defeat adversaries in two overlapping military campaigns
3: operate in and from four forward regions
4: one of the swift defeats of adversaries in two overlapping military campaigns should be a “win decisive.”

The events of 9/11 and the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom posed significant challenges in maintaining this construct.
First, the construct and DOD analysis of the time did not account for counterinsurgency operations or for extended duration operations. Second, Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, begun only a month after the 2001 QDR’s publication, took place outside of the four forward regions referenced in the strategy document. The 2001 QDR provided a listing of major force elements—such as Army divisions, Marine Corps expeditionary forces, Air Force fighter squadrons, and naval surface combatants—but it did not tie these to the defense strategy or the force planning construct.

Though best known for its diagram illustrating key mission areas, which earned the nickname “The Michelin Man,” the 2006 QDR largely continued on the course of the 2001 QDR (see figure). An important change, however, was the recognition that so-called irregular wars posed unique demands on both the force’s structure and its capabilities. The 2006 QDR’s planning construct called for the following items:

- ability to contribute to the Federal response to and consequence management of WMD attacks or a natural disaster on the scale of Hurricane Katrina, with the ability to raise defense responsiveness across domains (including cyberspace)\(^9\)
- irregular warfare capacity at “the current level of effort associated with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan”\(^11\)
- capacity to conduct “two simultaneous conventional campaigns (or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large-scale, long-duration irregular campaign)” while maintaining the capacity “in one of the two campaigns to remove a hostile regime, destroy its military capacity, and set conditions for the transition to, or for the restoration of, civil society.”\(^12\)

The construct also aimed to differentiate force demand from “steady-state” activities (previously forward presence, shaping, or deterrence) and “surge” activities (previously MRC/MTW operations). Published without a list of major force structure components, the 2006 review failed to anticipate the increased end strength that DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps would require in early 2007.

**Bridging to the Future**

In preparing for the 2010 QDR, DOD identified three instructive trends in this evolution of force planning.

The first is the need to balance current operational readiness with the requirement to develop forces for future contingencies. In the 1997 QDR, this concept was demonstrated in the tension between our readiness to “respond” and our imperative to “prepare now.” More recently, the concept of balance was introduced by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in the 2008 National Defense Strategy.

The second is an increasing recognition that future operations are less predictable than we would like. Planning against a specific threat in a specific place would leave the United States vulnerable to the wide range of operations that history has proven we unexpectedly find ourselves involved in. There was false comfort in believing that to prevail in the future we could simply look to past successes.

The third trend, tied in many ways to the second, is the increasing difficulty of neatly or reliably categorizing potential contingency types (for example, as conventional or irregular warfare). The hybrid approaches to warfare that adversaries are likely to employ demand that U.S. forces prepare for a much broader challenge set and be ready to move quickly from one “type” of warfare to another, often converging in time and place. We have been routinely surprised by our inability to predict the course or costs of the employment of our military. Even after the tide of conflict is turned and the United States and its allies and partners prevail in combat, there is often

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**Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, begun only a month after the 2001 QDR’s publication, took place outside of the four forward regions referenced**

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**Key Mission Area Diagram (“The Michelin Man”) in 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review**

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a decades-long requirement for security force assistance or follow-on activities in the theater to maintain deterrence or military balance. Likewise, so-called small-scale conflicts, such as counterinsurgency and stability operations, can pose significant demands on the force and call for capabilities that may be quite different from those employed in combat.

These lessons substantially informed the 2010 QDR defense strategy and its associated near-term and mid- to long-term force planning and sizing approach. Taking past experience into account, and casting our vision forward 20 years, the defense strategy focuses on fulfilling four key defense objectives:

- We must be able to prevail in today’s conflicts.
- We must look for ways to prevent and deter further conflict.
- We must prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of future challenges.
- We must preserve and enhance our force, including making necessary improvements in our defense institutions to ensure we honor the commitment and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform. This strategic priority includes caring for our wounded warriors, supporting families, recruiting and retaining personnel (including development of present and future military leaders), and seeking ways to rebalance reliance on the Reserve Component as the operational environment allows.

As in 2006, DOD undertook the 2010 QDR in a time of war. Unlike its predecessors, however, the most recent QDR explicitly addresses the sizing construct to be used in the near term (5 to 7 years) while describing how that construct shifts over the mid to long term (7 to 20 years).

**Near-term Force Sizing (5 to 7 Years).** This year’s review leaves no doubt that as long as substantial numbers of U.S. forces are operating in Afghanistan and we are conducting a responsible drawdown of forces in Iraq, U.S. force sizing and shaping will be driven by the need to ensure success for the men and women serving in both theaters. Success in these operations significantly enhances our long-term security outlook.

At the same time, the QDR requires U.S. forces to be capable of executing other elements of the defense strategy today. This includes limited prevent and deter missions focused on ensuring a defense in depth of the United States, preventing the emergence or reemergence of transnational terrorist threats. It also includes being prepared to defend the United States and to support civil authorities in the case of an emergency and defeating threats to U.S. allies and interests that might arise, such as on the Korean Peninsula.

Finally, the QDR requires the force to begin transitioning to sustainable personnel rotation rates that encourage the vitality and long-term health of America’s All-Volunteer Force.

**Long-term Force Sizing (7 to 20 Years).** Looking out along the long-term security horizon, we see an even more complex environment with a greater opportunity and need to address our prevention, preparation, and preservation (prevent, prepare, preserve) defense objectives. Some of the particularly stressing operational challenges we face include:

- lower barriers to entry for dangerous actors attempting to acquire an increasingly lethal array of technologies, including WMD—more actors are more dangerous and can directly threaten America’s interests and its ability to operate
- incentives for nonstate and state adversaries to challenge us asymmetrically—this would likely occur at the low and high ends of potential lethality and/or technology, and we should expect future conflicts to combine these approaches
- potential for state collapse or chronically fragile states to pose a range of complex challenges.

Given the broad spectrum of potential future conflicts, Secretary Gates has directed force planners to develop “an American military that must have the maximum possible flexibility to deal with the widest possible range of scenarios and conflicts.”

Although the U.S. Armed Forces must in aggregate be flexible, not all portions of the force must do everything equally well. Operations will affect each part of the joint force differently, including variations in the intensity and duration of use for land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace forces. Nor should we overspend by inflating threats. Indeed, as the QDR states, “Not all challenges pose the same degree of threat to national interests, rely on U.S. military capabilities equally, or have the same chance of occurrence.”

Ensuring our ability to meet defense objectives over the long term required us to move beyond a single, small set of scenarios against which to assess our future forces. For this reason, the QDR used multiple Integrated Security Constructs—scenario combinations designed to test the force’s capacity to manage plausible but highly stressing combinations of overlapping missions. For example, QDR analyses tested the capacity of U.S. forces to meet the following challenges in overlapping timeframes:

- conduct a large-scale stability operation, such as Operation Iraq Freedom
The 2010 QDR concretely identifies the size and composition of U.S. force structure appropriate for executing the defense strategy. It then goes beyond prior reviews to establish clear measures for further force evolution, ensuring that our force of the future includes:

- ground forces capable of full-spectrum operations
- naval forces capable of robust power projection and effective partnering
- survivable fifth-generation fighter aircraft with increased range, flexibility, and multimission versatility
- agile special operations forces with organic enablers and support from general purpose forces
- more and better enabling systems, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as electronic attack
- communications networks, more resilient base infrastructure, enhanced cyber defenses and missile defenses
- the right combination of joint persistent surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision-attack capabilities, including both penetrating platforms and standoff weapons, to support U.S. power projection operations.

Ensuring unparalleled U.S. military capability in the future is about much more than numbers of people and platforms. That is why the QDR places such strong emphasis on innovative concepts of operations. The joint air-sea battle concept being developed by the Navy and Air Force, for instance, will help knit together relationships, forward presence, global reach, and force development priorities in ways that maximize power projection in contested environments.

Likewise, the QDR stresses the importance of preserving and enhancing a skilled and forward-thinking military, civilian, and contractor workforce while adapting our defense institutions and processes to become more agile, from acquisition to security assistance to energy consumption. Secretary Gates has shone a bright light on the too often overlooked need for the right mix of key enablers—intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and lift and logistics lift capabilities, as well as linguists, engineers, civil affairs officers, and intelligence analysts—demanded by commanders in the field and applicable to a wide range of future contingencies.

A Post-QDR Force Planning Agenda

Operation Desert Storm taught us that America’s interests and role in the world required armed forces with unmatched capabilities and a willingness on the part of the Nation to employ them in defense of the common good. In the intervening 20 years, we have learned that no two major theater wars look alike and that the challenges to America’s long-term security will come in many forms.

Since 1997, QDRs have gradually moved DOD away from the simplistic two-MTW construct that seemed increasingly at odds with operational experience and projections of the threats and capabilities of future adversaries. Some observers continued to stress that
QDRs have not provided sufficient clarity on the force capacity to execute the defense strategy. Indeed, even the two-MTW construct required significant analytical interpretation by the Services and others to develop future forces and gauge their capacity. As our approach to force planning becomes more sophisticated, the challenge of explaining our approach to a general audience becomes more daunting. William Kaufman, the godfather of American force planning, faced this same struggle. One reviewer, writing of Kaufman’s force recommendations during the 1980s, noted:

The explanation for [Kaufman’s recommendations] must be sought in the details of the planning scenarios and the responses to them under the alternative forces. Herein lies both the value of the exercise and the problem for the general reader. The example demonstrates how many different assumptions and calculations are used in planning a military force structure, but to do so it embodies a degree of complexity that will overwhelm all but the most avid enthusiasts of military minutiae.  

Like Kaufman, modern force planners should give first priority to the rigor and accuracy of their analysis. We will continue to make needed improvements to the range and quality of our near-, mid-, and long-term analysis, including new or refined scenarios, concepts of operation, confounding operational factors, and readiness assumptions and goals.

As a defense community we can and should do better in explaining our approach and its implications. The 2010 QDR took a critical step in this direction. The publicly released QDR Report provided significant insight into U.S. force analysis, to include a detailed list of forces required out to 2015, a clear path for further evolution of the force 20 years hence, and exemplary scenario sets on which the force requirements were based. In addition, the QDR process was the first since 1997 to provide even further in-depth analytical briefings and materials to the legislative branch via the Congress, Government Accountability Office, and congressionally mandated QDR Independent Panel. DOD will continue to build on this new foundation of transparency to explain its approach while seeking input on ways to improve its planning and rationale.

For those outside the process, we need to improve our ability to explain planning to the men and women who execute the Nation’s military missions, as well as the American taxpayers who fund them.

DOD will continue to participate in the force planning efforts of interagency partners and overseas allies. The 2010 QDR was the first to draw early and often on the insights and expertise of colleagues on the National Security Staff, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S. Intelligence Community. It also opened itself up to scrutiny by a bipartisan set of security experts outside of government. Finally, this year’s QDR was the first to include extensive bilateral consultations and embedded staff from our European and Asian allies. These interactions mark only the beginning of changes toward a more transparent and comprehensive QDR process. Over the next several years, we will focus on how allied and partner, U.S. civilian, and U.S. military capabilities can complement each other to make the most of our collective expertise and capacity.

2 Ibid., 33–35, 44–45.
3 Insightful discussion of Aspin’s approach can be found in Richard A. Lacquement, Shaping America’s Military Capabilities after the Cold War (New York: Praeger, 2003), 84.
7 Ibid., 13.
8 This insight and many others on the purpose and history of force planning constructs are courtesy of Dr. Clark Murdock, senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, with whom coauthor Samuel Brannen worked on a limited circulation report on force planning constructs in 2009.
11 Ibid., 38.
12 Ibid.
A Patchwork Strategy of Consensus
Establishing Rule of Law in Afghanistan

By Mark R. Hagerott, Thomas J. Umberg, and Joseph A. Jackson

The gavel strike of justice in Kabul does not echo far in the Hindu Kush mountains. The need for rule of law and legal reform in Afghanistan could not be more urgent given the recent successful offensives in the southern provinces. Despite 9 years of efforts by a number of organizations and governments, however, the equitable dispensation of justice in the South and throughout Afghanistan remains an unattained aspiration. Not surprisingly, many Afghans believe that because of corruption, the national government is incapable of resolving disputes arising from the population. Most alarming is that while 67 percent of Kandaharians—a crucial population as capacity develops—believe that the government cannot provide justice because of corruption, 53 percent believe that the Taliban are incorruptible.1

Combined forces have successfully staged military operations but have not made much progress in establishing the rule of law because unifying leadership and comprehensive rule of law strategic plans are lacking. As a result, the rule of law remains elusive. Moreover, time is running short to effectively establish the principal elements of a system of justice—in particular, a criminal justice system with an integrated network of police, courts, and correctional institutions connected to traditional forms of justice. Without focused leadership and an overall strategic plan, sustained with increased numbers of advisors, the extension and credibility of a functional justice system both in and beyond Kabul will remain ephemeral. As a consequence, the Afghan people will continue to look elsewhere to obtain justice—even the ruthless but efficient justice administered by the Taliban.

Raising the Bar
On the surface, the history of Afghanistan is a narrative of invasion and internal strife among kings and warlords. The list of would-be rulers both internal and external is well known. Yet one aspect often overlooked—in the past as now—is that regardless of the application of arms, ruling Afghanistan and its mosaic of ethnicities hidden within a rugged landscape requires a firm establishment of the rule of law—that is, access to a dispute resolution process and a system of criminal justice that impartially determines guilt and imposes sentences. Without the establishment of the rule of law, force of arms can provide only temporary stability and the illusion of governmental legitimacy.

Despite the noticeable lack of leadership and a strategic plan in the larger sphere of legal reform, not all legal efforts are falling short in Afghanistan. Courts at various levels do function, if imperfectly, and a measure of formal justice is accessible to some of the population. One of the more promising areas of legal reform resides within the Afghan National Army (ANA). The military judicial system includes functioning courts, judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and appellate review. Furthermore, there exists the capacity for pretrial detention and long-term post-trial confinement. As a measure of the maturing military justice system, in the last 3 years, the ANA has adjudicated approximately 400 cases per year.2

The ANA military justice system has many of the advantages that the civilian justice system lacks—chiefly, the leadership and strategic planning support provided by the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A). In addition to the ANA prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges who exist in every ANA corps headquarters compound, courthouses built on secure ANA installations provide justice officials with a level of protection from attack that is lacking in most civilian courts. This security allows prosecutors and military judges to function with less concern for acts of retribution. Most important, the military legal system benefits from focused, well-resourced international advisors under an organized and unified command and control scheme. A direct result of this focused leadership is the ability to capitalize on indigenous training capacity: Afghans training Afghans.3

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U.S. Air Force (Brian M. Boisvert)
The ANA military justice system is operated and led by Afghans but places a strong emphasis on partnering with CSTC–A advisors. Presently, three full-time CSTC–A advisors are dedicated to the General Staff Legal Department in Kabul. Outside of Kabul, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Intermediate Joint Command, in cooperation with CSTC–A, provides U.S. and coalition military judge advocates to advise the ANA prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges at each of the corps headquarters. Focused, well-resourced partnering and training are evident in the ministries of defense and the interior.

Each day, CSTC–A sends hundreds of military and contract advisors to mentor their Afghan police and military counterparts in these security ministries. These advisors help their counterparts develop the support systems and institutions necessary for these ministries to function independently and well into the future. However, improvements in the police and army, without significant progress in the other sectors and ministries relevant to the overall rule of law, will not achieve the goal of ensuring that the government has the legitimacy and stability to survive without substantial foreign support. To achieve the overall rule of law goal, a nationwide rule of law strategy, under a unified command structure and with more resources, is needed in order for the attorney general’s office, ministry of justice, and supreme court to mature at the pace needed to win public trust and confidence.

**as a measure of the maturing military justice system, in the last 3 years, the ANA has adjudicated approximately 400 cases per year**

Analyzing the strides made in the past 3 years of manning, training, and equipping the remodeled ANA and to a lesser degree the police forces, it is clear that they benefited from one plan and the identification of a responsible lead agency—CSTC–A. That single, accountable lead agency guided development of the legal system within the narrow venue of the ANA. Likewise, aggressive, accountable leadership with a plan and resources can create change from Kabul to Kandahar.

In stark contrast to the CSTC–A effort, development of the civilian court system lacks a primary leader and a systematically applied strategy to develop a coherent structure to reach the vast majority of Afghans. In Afghanistan today, coordination meetings, with few accountability mechanisms, have been substituted for leadership. Moreover, whatever plans do exist do not establish or claim control over the entire problem in either geographic or conceptual terms. Rule of law development and execution are the responsibility of the Department of State. However, in Afghanistan, U.S. Government rule of law initiatives are carried out by a host of agencies with staffs in Kabul, but outside the purview of the Ambassador. While the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan may have ostensible authority for U.S. rule of law activities, Federal agencies often remain loyal to their respective funding sources, in part because agendas and funding are controlled largely from Washington rather than Kabul. To be most effective, agency personnel and budgets for Afghani-
The lack of problem ownership and planning contributes directly to the endemic problems in the Afghan courts. They suffer from the absence of competent and honest prosecutors to lead investigations, and a police force of multiple capabilities that is structured to support national defense efforts more than civil policing duties. The court system remains Kabul-centric, and it is difficult to move attorneys to the rural areas to establish a physical representation of law and order. Low pay for judges and prosecutors institutionalizes corruption. A court prosecutor earns approximately $70 per month. Not surprisingly, some officials take bribes to earn a subsistence living that the present Afghan administration cannot provide. In contrast, an Afghan National Police patrolman can (based on location and duty) earn up to $200 per month. With this disparity, the level of risk the patrolman faces and the quality of legal advice and service rendered by the courts vary widely.

**Bridge to the Future**

Afghanistan is at risk. The time for vigorous leadership in the civilian justice sector is long overdue. The development of the police continues in parallel with the detention and corrections systems. Meanwhile, the connecting institution between the police and the courts—languishes in a precarious gray zone. If no single leading entity steps up to oversee all the facets of the rule of law, a compromise or bridging effort will most likely be needed. Two options could provide a link to the future.

**if no single leading entity steps up to oversee all the facets of the rule of law, a compromise or bridging effort will most likely be needed**

One option would be to utilize the overall command structure provided by the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF), which contains the links to the command elements and civil institutions of the larger international community that participates in the coalition. In practical terms, ISAF has nationwide reach through its subordinate command and control structures: the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan and Intermediate Joint Command. These could serve as viable conduits to extend the central Afghan government’s ability to establish the law in remote and contested areas. Of equal importance, ISAF has access to the resources: financial and human capital. The current flagging efforts of the United Nations could be reinvigorated by the security provided by NATO forces. The intertwining of leadership, security, and an international effort of court establishment would do much to stabilize the country and provide needed credibility to the government. It would also ensure that all stakeholders in Afghanistan’s development are accountable and that it is not an exclusively American enterprise.

A second opportunity expands existing structures. The newly established Task Force 435 provides corrections oversight, in partnership with the Afghan National Security Forces, of the national security detention facilities for Afghanistan. This organization could provide a more tailored and systematic approach. Task Force 435 will eventually expand to become a combined joint interagency task force (CJIATF), and it could (if properly developed) provide the command and control that is lacking with regard to the court system. For U.S. efforts, a CJIATF would include senior civilian and military leadership accountable directly to the U.S. Ambassador as well as to the presidents of Afghanistan and the United States for progress in developing rule of law institutions.
joint interagency task force would address this shortfall by providing one commander—civilian or military—accountable to national leadership for success in this critical area. For international efforts, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan must assert more authority on donors to coordinate their efforts. The United Nations and government of Afghanistan must similarly be more assertive in demanding that international organizations unify their efforts in alignment with the priorities set forth in the Afghan National Development Strategy. Without concerted efforts effectively orchestrated, the tragic saga of Afghanistan’s violent history will continue.

**NOTES**


Since 2001, no fewer than four conferences have been held and at least one strategy has been created and published affirming the need for and the importance of the rule of law in Afghanistan. The United States has created a strategic plan for developing this rule of law. This strategy, however, does not have authority to force other organizations, groups, or nations to conform to one single effort. The United Nations (UN) initiatives include the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which was renewed by UN Security Council Resolution 1917 (March 22, 2010). The annual resolution by the Security Council forms the mandate for UNAMA and defines priorities. Additionally, Resolution 1917 (2010), which was unanimously adopted by the 15-member Security Council, mandated UNAMA to continue to lead international civilian efforts in areas such as rule of law, transitional justice, and combating corruption; to promote the country’s development and governance priorities through the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board; and to strengthen cooperation with International Security Assistance Force and NATO Senior Civilian Representatives to improve civil-military coordination. See UNAMA Web site, available at <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1742>. Resolution 1917 (2010) calls upon all international parties to coordinate with UNAMA in the implementation of its mandate (Resolution at 5). UNAMA, through the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board, has served as largely a coordinator, rather than a commander or firm director, of rule of law development.

2 See Afghan National Army (ANA) judicial records, 2006–2009. In addition to the Afghan army courts, others aligned with the security sector are more or less functioning under a heavy cloak of mentorship. They include courts such as the Counter Narcotics Court and the Anti-Corruption Tribunal.

3 The ANA have been full partners with the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (NTM–A/CSTC–A) in conducting a Basic Legal Officer Course, paralegal course, and criminal investigative training. A schoolhouse for legal instruction recently opened, with space planned for a law faculty in the new national defense university in 2012.

4 The NATO Intermediate Joint Command (IJC) is responsible for partnering with ANA units at the level of corps and below. However, the IJC currently lacks the judge advocates needed to partner/adviser at this level. Consequently, NTM–A/ CSTC–A has retained this mission until the IJC is properly resourced. CSTC–A attorneys have recently established training for ANA investigators, including contracting with experienced U.S. investigators to travel throughout Afghanistan as trainers and advisors of ANA criminal investigators. The ANA court system holds promise, but it too struggles to deal with crimes committed by senior officers (colonels and generals) who believe they are above the reach of the legal system. Changing the culture of entitlement, spoils, and cronyism will take time.

5 The Ministry of the Interior is charged with development and oversight of the National Police. This structure contains the locally fielded Afghan Uniform Police, Border Police, and Afghan Civil Order Police. In terms of defending and stabilizing Afghanistan, the police are intended to provide the stabilizing authority after targeted areas have been cleared by the army. However, in reality, the police often must fight in the role of light infantry to defend themselves in the isolated outposts scattered across Afghanistan. These postings make ideal targets for the Taliban.

6 Afghan law has both a formal and a traditional justice system that operate together. This article suggests ways to improve development of the formal justice system but recognizes that the traditional system is a legitimate part of Afghan justice that is relied upon by the population.

7 There is no overall coordinator, but rather a network approach by the international community. This approach is not unusual for developing countries. Given the rapid evolution of the Ministry of the Interior and the police forces, the developing country model is not sufficient to meet the legal reform needs of Afghanistan.


9 As of April 12, 2010, U.S. Ambassador and U.S. Senior Representative to Afghanistan Richard C. Holbrooke announced that Ambassador Hans Klemm (former Ambassador to Timor/Liste) would oversee the development of the rule of law.
Operation *Albion* and Joint Amphibious Doctrine

*By GREGORY A. THIELE*

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German troops prepare to land on Baltic Sea island of Saaremaa, 1917

German Federal Archive
attacks. The German high command had to contend with a stalemate in the west and a tottering, but still capable, opponent in the east.

Germany’s position was, however, much weaker than it seemed. The Entente had paid a heavy price during its offensives in the west, but so had the German army in turning back those offensives. On the Western Front, the German army was not strong enough to attack with any prospect of success against the numerically stronger Entente. In addition, Germany’s allies, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, were having difficulty sustaining the struggle after 3 years of war. The Entente, on the other hand, had a powerful new ally: the United States. The Germans estimated that it would take the Americans until the middle of 1918 to deploy a force large enough to be a major factor in the outcome of the war. If the German army could not achieve a decisive victory in the west before this time, then it would become impossible to prevail afterward.

Another concern was the British blockade. Soon after the war began in August 1914, Britain had blockaded German and German-occupied ports. The British wanted to prevent the importation of war materials, but their definition of contraband also included food. As a result, the German people were slowly starving to death. The Germans referred to the winter of 1916–1917 as the “turnip winter” due to the lack of food. The strain on the home front began to tell on the German soldiers at the front.

This was the situation facing Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff. These two men, empowered to act virtually as military dictators, believed that ultimate victory could only be achieved on the Western Front. Britain and France had to be forced to sue for peace if the war were to be ended on terms favorable for Germany. To achieve such a result would take far more troops than were currently available in the west. The question was how such a large number of troops could be freed for operations in the west. Ludendorff’s conclusion was that if Russia could be forced from the war, a million German troops could be transferred from the Eastern to the Western Front. The key factor was time. Russia had to be subdued as quickly as possible so German troops could be moved west in time for a spring offensive in 1918.

Culture of Cooperation

There were a number of obstacles that made an amphibious assault a difficult undertaking for the German army and navy. From the creation of the German Empire in 1871 until its demise in 1918, Germany was first and foremost a land power. The buildup of the German navy that occurred in the decades before World War I did not radically change this, nor did it cause the military services to seek to work more closely together. As a result, both before and during World War I, the army and navy had virtually no experience with joint operations. In fact, throughout the first 3 years of World War I, they had essentially conducted separate wars with little coordination. To add to the complexity of mounting an amphibious operation, the German armed forces had no amphibious doctrine. All lessons would be learned through hard experience. Moreover, there was no specialized equipment for conducting an amphibious assault; German troops would go ashore in

towed boats. The Germans were also under severe time constraints; poor weather in the Baltic Sea would make the operation impossible by the end of October.2

The Germans put the commander of the Eighth Army, General Oskar von Hutier, in charge of organizing the operation. Von Hutier was an extremely shrewd general best known to history for his later involvement in the 1918 offensives on the Western Front. He made the commander of the landing force and the commander of the Special Fleet coequals for planning. If there were any disagreements they could not work out themselves, they could then seek out the general for a decision. This mirrors the manner in which current U.S. amphibious doctrine places the com-
mander of the amphibious task force and the commander of the landing force on an equal footing during the planning phase of an operation. This is critical; it prevents the interests of either the landing force or the amphibious force from dominating the planning to the disadvantage of the operation as a whole.

The Germans also recognized that at certain times the landing force would support the Special Fleet and that at other times the fleet would support the landing force. The order from the commander of the Eighth Army established a “supporting-supported” relationship between the commander of the naval force and the commander of the landing force. This was an extremely important decision, and it was in keeping with the manner in which the Germans educated their officers. The Germans demanded an extremely high level of cooperation among their officers, even among those of different services. This culture of cooperation allowed the German army and navy to overcome any barriers posed by a lack of doctrine or experience in working together and helped to accomplish the mission in an exemplary fashion.

**Doctrinal Similarities**

Joint Publication (JP) 3–02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, codifies this supporting-supported relationship. Since an amphibious operation is a cooperative effort, requiring that the needs and capabilities of both the landing force and the naval element be recognized and addressed, such a relationship is an excellent method to ensure that the necessary coordination occurs. There are other similarities between Operation Albion and current U.S. doctrine. JP 3–02 establishes three tenets of amphibious planning: commander’s involvement and guidance, unity of effort, and integrated planning. Operation Albion provides valuable lessons regarding each of these tenets.

**Commander’s Involvement and Guidance.** There is a quotation often attributed to Marine Major General Mike Myatt, the commander of the 1st Marine Division during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, in which he described maneuver warfare as “centralized vision, decentralized decision-making.” The German planning for Operation Albion was an excellent illustration of this maxim. The high command created a special cell to conduct much of the initial planning. Once this had been completed, the planners were seconded to subordinate commands to assist with the detailed planning. Once General von Hutier outlined his vision for the operation, he left the detailed planning to his subordinates and supervised the operation. This supervision took several interesting forms. The Eighth Army required subordinate units to submit copies of their orders and planning documents. In addition, the Eighth Army sent General Staff officers to their subordinate units. The purpose of these officers was not only to assist with the planning, but also to act as the “eyes and ears” of the Eighth Army commander. The General Staff officers gained detailed knowledge of what was occurring in the unit to which they were assigned and their reports helped the army commander understand the challenges his subordinates faced. Von Hutier did not rely solely on these reports. He also traveled to Libau, the port of embarkation for the landing force, where he spent nearly 2 weeks “to make his personal influence felt.”

**Unity of Effort.** All of the planners were focused on mission accomplishment. The fact that there was no common amphibious doctrine or experience in joint operations made this a necessity. Instead of spending a great deal of time fighting over issues of interservice rivalry, army and navy planners spent time working on how to conduct the operation as efficiently as possible. A remarkable level of cooperation was required of, and achieved by, the staff officers. Such a harmonious effort was not a chance occurrence based on a fortunate mix of personalities. It was a product of German training, particularly for those who were part of the General Staff.

As a group, German officers were taught to focus on attaining the end result desired and accomplishing the assigned mission. This was particularly true for General Staff officers; an officer assigned to the General Staff was taught to think broadly and practically about war. This education was of inestimable value; it allowed the planners to conceptualize the operation within its broader context. As a result, they were able to rise above service parochialism and take advantage of the strengths of both the army and navy. Contrary to the typical characterization of Prussian officers, little stock was placed in doctrinaire approaches to problems. Every problem was unique and required a unique solution.

**Integrated Planning.** From the beginning, the German high command understood the need to create a planning group that contained both army and navy representation. It was apparent that whichever side, Russian or German, was better able to integrate the capabilities of its land and naval forces would have a nearly insurmountable advantage over its opponent. As a result of excellent planning
and initiative on the part of those tasked with executing the plan, the German army and navy did a remarkable job of cooperating throughout the operation. The requirements of both were considered, and a plan was created that harnessed the strengths of each in order to accomplish the mission. The success the Germans achieved was the direct result of the high level of cooperation throughout the planning process.

Characteristics of Amphibious Operations

JP 3–02 also establishes four vital characteristics of amphibious operations: integration of navy and landing forces, rapid buildup of combat power from the sea to the shore, task organized forces, and unity of effort. Each of these characteristics is clearly demonstrated in Operation Albion and is worthy of more detailed examination.

Integration of Navy and Landing Forces. The supporting-supported relationship mandated by General von Hutier forced the army and navy planners to determine how the Special Fleet and the landing force could best work together. The Germans knew the Russian army and navy forces defending the Baltic islands were roughly equivalent to their own in terms of size. The key to success, therefore, was to extract every advantage that cooperation could create. The level of integration achieved was clearly demonstrated as the operation unfolded. The landing force rapidly seized airfields and coastal batteries to facilitate naval action. For its part, the navy provided supporting fires to the landing force that played a key role in the German success.

Rapid Buildup of Combat Power from the Sea to the Shore. At sunrise on October 12, 1917, the German Special Fleet steamed into Tagga Bay on the northeastern side of Ösel. The fire from Russian coastal artillery was sporadic and was quickly silenced by fire from German ships. The Germans rapidly disembarked and began to ferry troops ashore. By 8:00 a.m., most of the advance guard (over 3,000 troops) was ashore. The Germans now turned their attention to striking inland to seize Russian airfields and to cut off the Russians’ escape route. Meanwhile, the remaining troops of the division-sized landing force continued to stream ashore along with their logistical support.

Task Organized Forces. The German planners had conducted extensive wargames to determine if the operation was feasible and, if so, what force would be required. The initial planning had been conducted utilizing a regimental-sized invasion force, but the force was increased to a division to ensure success. One other issue was discovered during planning: if the operation was to be decisive and have maximum psychological impact on the Russian leaders in Petrograd, the Russian division defending the Baltic islands had to be eliminated. How could the Germans prevent the division’s escape? The Russians would have a shorter distance to cover to the causeway that constituted their primary means of reinforcement or withdrawal than their German attackers. The decision was made to add a bicycle brigade to the landing force. Some of the bicyclists were to conduct a secondary landing northeast of Tagga Bay and race east to block the causeway to prevent the Russians from withdrawing from Ösel. The requirements of the mission played a key role in determining the scheme of maneuver ashore, which in turn determined the composition and organization of the landing force.

Unity of Effort. All of the German commanders understood the plan and that the goal of the operation was not only to seize the Baltic islands, but also to prevent the Russian garrison from escaping. All elements of the German army and navy contributed to this effort. A battalion of bicyclists blocked the causeway and attempted to prevent the Russians from leaving. The Russians, desperate to get off Ösel, attacked in strength and opened the causeway. The German navy then intervened with gunfire to support the bicyclists and to make movement along the causeway difficult. Not long afterward, German forces pursuing the Russians attacked their rear. Caught between two hostile elements, the Russians surrendered. Such cooperation was typical during Albion, and it was the decisive element that permitted the Germans to conduct an amphibious landing and defeat a numerically equivalent force.

Unity of effort is absolutely essential to the success of an amphibious operation. JP 3–02 clearly identifies this fact by including...
it as a planning tenet and a characteristic of amphibious operations. Without unity of effort, the capabilities of the landing force and the amphibious task force will not be maximized and the weaknesses of each may be exposed. As Erich von Tschischwitz, chief of staff to the corps commander responsible for the landing, wrote, “An overseas expedition will always be undertaken at great risk. In

cooperation was the decisive element that permitted the Germans to conduct an amphibious landing and defeat a numerically equivalent force

order to succeed, it will be necessary to make thorough preparations [and] to insure skilful and clear-headed leadership.”

Operation Albion was extremely successful. The Germans secured the islands of Ösel, Moon, and Dagö in little more than a week. For an operation of its size, the booty was immense. The Germans captured more than 20,000 Russian soldiers along with machineguns, artillery, and other impediments. The Russian army had been dealt a blow and the troops’ morale and confidence in their government reached its nadir. The Bolshevik Revolution occurred only 2 weeks after the conclusion of Albion. Although negotiations with the Russians would continue into early 1918, it soon became clear that the Russians wanted an end to the war. The Germans began to transfer troops to the Western Front.

Operation Albion is remarkable for a number of reasons. The operation was planned and conducted in approximately a month by a staff without experience in amphibious operations. Albion also demonstrates the high level of cooperation necessary for planners who are unfamiliar with the unique requirements of amphibious operations. In addition, it shows the contribution that excellent planning and staff work can make to the success of an operation. While JP 3–02 may not have come from a detailed examination of Albion, the operation clearly illustrates many important aspects of current U.S. amphibious doctrine. It is rich in lessons to be discovered and (given the fact that U.S. forces have not conducted large-scale amphibious operations in some time) rediscovered. For those interested in the conduct of amphibious operations, Albion is an example they would do well to consider.

NOTES

2 Adverse weather conditions did, in fact, slow German minesweeping efforts and delayed the amphibious landing for nearly a week. However, this may have contributed to the German success. Due to the size of the operation, the Germans were unable to prevent the Russians from learning of preparations for an amphibious operation. The Russians did not know the objective, although the Baltic islands protecting the Gulf of Riga were clearly a possibility. As the weather worsened, it is possible the Russians believed that any opportunity for the Germans to conduct an amphibious assault in the Baltic had passed.
6 Conversation between the author and William S. Lind.
7 von Tschischwitz, 23–25. This order is extremely interesting. In the Hossfeld translation, it takes only three pages. In spite of its brevity, it is a model of clarity. The order does an excellent job of establishing the guidelines within which Operation Albion was to be conducted.
8 Ibid., 35.
9 The strengths and weaknesses of the German General Staff have been more fully analyzed elsewhere and the subject is beyond the scope of this article. Regardless of their limitations at the strategic level or at the intersection of politics and war, officers of the German General Staff were the best educated officers in the world and were matchless campaign planners.
10 von Tschischwitz, 55.
12 Ibid., 102–103.
13 von Tschischwitz, 11.
14 Barrett, 229.
The Art of Command: Military Leadership from George Washington to Colin Powell
Edited by Harry S. Laver and Jeffrey J. Matthews
270 pp. $32.50

Reviewed by RIZWAN ALI

Trait-based leadership studies go in and out of vogue. These studies focus on a characteristic a leader possesses that the author of a study believes is a particularly desirable quality that should be examined and possibly emulated. Professional military schools find this technique useful for teaching leadership to officers and noncommissioned officers, and thus most military leaders have gone through volumes of these studies during their education. Unfortunately, many senior leaders shy away from such works, feeling they present leaders through a myopic lens that can distort individuals’ broader traits and obscure the richer array of techniques they employed that have contributed to their success.

Considering the potential limitations of trait-based leadership analysis, one may wonder if The Art of Command, which employs this technique, is really worth reading. The answer is a resounding yes. The authors of each chapter of this edited work not only bring out the leadership trait they have been charged to highlight, but also put the leader into a rich historical context. What results is a very satisfying read.

The compendium takes the reader through nine traits that the editors believe are some of the most important. Three studies that stand out above the others are Kerry Irish’s cross-cultural leadership study of General Dwight D. Eisenhower; Jon Hoffman’s study of Lieutenant General Lewis Burwell “Chesty” Puller’s charismatic leadership; and Jeffrey Matthews’s illustration of exemplary followership based on General Colin Powell.

The chapter on Eisenhower is particularly poignant when considered in conjunction with the multinational approach being employed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Irish believes that Eisenhower’s unwavering conviction that America’s future wars would be fought and won alongside its allies was a leadership trait that set him apart from his peers. To help prepare himself for the future, Eisenhower spent the interwar years studying military and cultural histories to understand potential allies and enemies.

When placed in charge of the European theater in World War II, Eisenhower’s historical and cultural understanding of the Allies allowed him to implement his vision of a cross-cultural command that was unified and that included Allies, not just as token advisors, but in a fully integrated command structure. Irish points out that despite strong disagreements within his command on the military utility of the Allied warfare, Eisenhower always found ways to meet his military objectives while satisfying the alliance partners.

In contrast to Eisenhower’s focus on building coalition partnerships, Puller focused his attention on building his internal Marine team. Puller, a larger-than-life hero to Marines, possessed many qualities that can be modeled, but Hoffman keys on Puller’s charismatic leadership style. This leadership trait is often written about, but many see it as very difficult to emulate because they believe charismatic leadership is something one possesses at a very early age. Hoffman shows that Puller’s charisma was something he developed though his valor, his genuine connection with his subordinates, and his lead-from-the-front style. He believes that one does not have to be born with this type of charisma; rather, it can be taught and emulated.

The strength of Puller’s personality comes through vividly in Hoffman’s essay. Hoffman relates several instances of how Puller used specific leadership skills to develop his version of charismatic leadership. In one example, Puller encountered a Marine who was saluting a lieutenant repeatedly and asked the officer why this was occurring. The lieutenant replied that the private was being taught a lesson for failing to render a salute. Puller told the officer that it was only proper for the lieutenant to return every one of the private’s salutes, and he remained to ensure his instructions were carried out correctly. It is unclear if this incident is apocryphal, but the fact that Puller’s subordinates believed that it could have happened showed the powerful effect he had on those he commanded.

The final chapter of the book addresses one of the most important aspects of effective leadership, namely the role of good followership. The editors note in their introduction that “too often, followership evokes a negative connotation. . . . To the contrary, the best and most effective followers share many characteristics with successful leaders.” To illustrate followership, an unlikely candidate, Colin Powell, is showcased.

Though Powell is a role model of an exceptionally gifted leader, Jeff Matthews shows that Powell’s leadership skills were enhanced by his exemplary followership. Tracing Powell’s life from being a lieutenant through his meteoric rise to become the Nation’s youngest Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Matthews cites numerous examples of Powell’s followership that helped him further develop his leadership skills. Even as a new major general, Powell drew upon his followership skills as the Secretary of Defense’s military assistant. Matthews notes that the “keys to his success as a follower were his willingness to assume responsibility, take the initiative, and work tactfully alongside other[s].” Powell himself noted that “leadership is all about followership.”

Overall, The Art of Command is an exceptional book. It can be read by leaders at all levels to learn more about some of the key traits they can try to cultivate within themselves. For senior leaders, the book offers many new ways of looking at prominent leaders, perspectives that are not often covered in even the larger biographies. Laver and Matthews have put together a thoughtful and inspirational book that should be part of the permanent collection of all leaders.

Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?
By Brian Michael Jenkins
457 pp. $26.98

Reviewed by JOHN D. BECKER

Condoleezza Rice will be known for many firsts, including being the first African-American woman to serve as National Security Advisor and as Secretary of State. Of the many comments attributed to her in those historic roles, none may have been more memorable than the one she made about nuclear terror in the run-up to the Iraq War. When asked about chief United Nations weapons inspector Hans Blix’s statement that no smoking gun had been found during inspections of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Rice said, “The problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.”

The comment itself, in context, is really a claim about nuclear terror and the concern that a mistake in judgment by the U.S. Government can lead to fear and tragedy. And that notion is what Brian Jenkins’s book, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? is all about—nuclear terror. Jenkins notes early that nuclear terror is distinguished from nuclear terrorism. Nuclear terror is about imagination or “what might be” scenarios. Nuclear terrorism, on the other hand, is about events. With this distinction made, the reader becomes aware that this will be a book about not just security studies, but also psychology.

The definition of terrorism in general is always a topic of debate. Jenkins defines it here as a core concept of “dramatic violence choreographed to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm, which causes people to exaggerate the threat” (p. 30). This violence is often effective, since our media-saturated society allows terrorists to leverage their threats into real anxiety among people. This notion is one we seem to see signs of daily. In Pakistan, with the march of a resurgent Taliban in the Swat Valley and to the outskirts of Islamabad, our biggest concern is what happens if this group gets its hands on the state’s nuclear weapons. Stories of al Qaeda’s search for nuclear technology and fuel from so-called rogue regimes like North Korea cause similar concern. Kim Jong-II’s threats to launch a long-range missile toward Hawaii are meant to cause fear about a possible nuclear attack on the United States. And, of course, Iran’s recent threatening steps to develop nuclear weapons cause dread among both Israel and the West, with the possibility of a preemptive nuclear strike.

Nuclear terrorism, it is noted, is not a new concern. Since the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the fear existed that malevolent actors might get their hands on a nuclear weapon and threaten destruction and attack, and villains with nuclear weapons have become the stuff of fiction. Yet despite the multitude of articles that have been written about nuclear terrorism, an extended discussion of the topic has been nonexistent until now; Jenkins’s text fills that gap. By nuclear terrorism, Jenkins means that there have been no instances of “the successful sabotage of an operating nuclear reactor, the deliberate release of a significant amount of radioactive material, or the detonation by terrorists of a nuclear bomb” (p. 29). In a broader sense, nuclear terrorism can be seen as comprising a spectrum of potential actions, from hoaxes by lunatics to a terrorist Hiroshima.

Jenkins explores terrorist motives and possible self-imposed constraints and what they portend in terms of coerced concessions or the simple infliction of mass destruction. He further looks at how the escalation of terrorism has propelled us as a society into an age of alarms. To determine why the American psyche seems particularly vulnerable to nuclear terror, he considers a number of potential scenarios ranging from black markets to red mercury to suitcase nukes, culminating in the possibility of al Qaeda as the world’s first terrorist nuclear power. Jenkins concludes his engaging text with a scenario that allows readers to war-game the worst-case situation—terrorists going nuclear—and forces them to think about the unthinkable. What ought we to do in this kind of future?

Jenkins forces us to grapple with the uncomfortable. He wants us to get our heads around what exists in our minds about nuclear weapons and, in doing so, make sure we can distinguish the fear from the reality. That is an important sanity check in our insecure world. While the U.S. Government is quite right to have concerns about nuclear weapons falling into terrorists’ hands, those concerns need to be kept in perspective. No actual incidents of nuclear terrorism have occurred. The efforts of the United States and the other United Nations Security Council members to keep nuclear weapons away from terrorists have been successful.

The security question that lies ahead for us is really about what steps we need to take in order to ensure that continued state of affairs. Currently, we have counterproliferation efforts focused on other states. We also have some intelligence and Special Forces resources directed toward counterproliferation efforts against terrorist organizations. And we have future studies efforts looking at the evolution of terrorist organizations into the 21st century. A forward-looking security strategy would take the lessons learned from all three of these independent efforts and combine them in a narrowly focused approach to Countering Future Terrorist Organizations’ Efforts at Nuclear Terrorism.

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Gregory F. Treverton first went to work in the intelligence area in the mid-1970s as a staffer for the Senate committee led by Idaho Senator Frank Church, investigating intelligence blunders that surfaced in the wake of the Watergate investigation. Now a RAND researcher with many publications in the intelligence field to his credit, Dr. Treverton offers this book as a prescription for intelligence work in the 21st century—focused on, but not exclusive to, the counterterrorism battle. With it, he makes an invaluable contribution to the discussion of the role of intelligence in the age of terror, and he asks urgent questions about what needs to be changed to respond to a fundamentally different threat from that of the Cold War—the conflict for which most U.S. intelligence organs were designed.

Treverton argues that the key to making the transition to 21st-century intelligence is in understanding the distinction between intelligence “puzzles” and “mysteries.” A “puzzle” is what U.S. intelligence agencies were accustomed to facing during the Cold War—“How many warheads does a Soviet missile carry?” This is a question that has a definitive answer that is known by relatively few people; hence, finding the answer becomes the focus of human and technological intelligence collection efforts. A “mystery,” by contrast, is about people and their intentions. Understanding possible terrorist intentions and targets is a much harder problem, and, as Treverton points out, “Cold War espionage practices will not work against terrorist targets because... Al Qaeda operatives do not go to embassy cocktail parties” (p. 9).

Another consequence of focusing on “mysteries” is the increased potential for “information overload.” The inability of the United States to foil the September 11 attacks was due not to too little information about the terrorists, but rather too much information compartmented in such a way as to frustrate attempts to connect the dots. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Federal Aviation Administration all had clues to parts of the 9/11 mystery but were unable to put the pieces together largely because of institutional restraints. And although the 2004 Terrorism Prevention and Intelligence Reform Act has made strides in breaking free from these institutional restraints, some still remain.

More problematic is the difficulty of separating the wheat from the chaff of intelligence data, which increasingly relies upon information in the public domain: “During the Cold War, the problem was too little (good) information; now, it is too much (unreliable) information. Then, intelligence’s secrets were deemed reliable; now, the plethora on the Web is a stew of fact, fancy, and disinformation” (p. 31).

Chapter 6, “The Special Challenge of Analysis,” and chapter 7, “Many Customers, Too Many Secrets,” and the tables therein, are especially incisive and useful. Analysis, the author argues, will become increasingly important as intelligence agencies attempt to wrestle with the wealth of good and bad information available. One table traces the transition of analysis from past and present to a possible future. A focus box proposes alternative future analysis techniques: Contrarian Analysis (consisting of Devil’s Advocacy, A Team/B Team Analysis, and Red Team Analysis) and Contingent Analysis (consisting of What-If Analysis, Low Probability/High Impact Analysis, and Alternative Scenarios).

Treverton also addresses the issue of politicization of intelligence in a balanced and judicious way. His conclusion, however, is somewhat pessimistic: “The temptations of leaders to either try to turn policy issues into intelligence questions or use intelligence to make the case for their preferred policies seem likely to grow” (p. 183).

Chapter 8, “Covert Action,” is the book’s most engaging chapter. Perhaps this is because Treverton had previously penned a book specifically on the subject (Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World [Basic Books, 1987]). Whenever covert action is suggested, the author proposes first answering three “what if” tests. The first is the New York Times test. As the name implies, it forces covert action planners to confront what the consequences might be of a front-page article in the New York Times revealing U.S. complicity in a covert action. The second “what if” test is answering the question, “What if the first intervention does not succeed? What then?” The third test relates to the larger consequences of attempted covert action: “What signal will be received, by whom, and with what result?”

In the final chapter, “Rebuilding the Social Contract,” the author returns to lessons he learned in the Church Committee and argues for an ethical intelligence collection and covert action policy for the Nation—“The United States must not adapt [sic] the tactics of its enemies. Means are as important as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that make men free. But each time we do so, each time the means we use are wrong, our inner strength, the strength which makes us free, is lessened” (p. 235). These words, taken from one of the Church Committee’s reports, ring just as true for the author today as they did when written in 1976.

And with these words, Treverton has shown himself to be a master of not only the content of the field of intelligence, but also its ultimately noble intent—to help us to remain both safe and free.

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Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces
By Steven R. Ward
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009
384 pp. $29.95
Reviewed by TODD M. MANYX

Prior to the 1978 overthrow of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, Iran maintained close military relations with the United States and served as a central partner in U.S. foreign policy. Under the Nixon doctrine, the United States supported Iran, one of its regional “twin pillars,” with significant quantities of modern weapons and training. In the three decades since the Islamic revolution and the debacle of the U.S. Embassy takeover, the two countries have had no significant relations. Accordingly, U.S. direct knowledge of Iran’s military capabilities and intentions since that time has been effectively nonexistent. Concurrent with that blindness, Iran has sought actively both to reestablish itself as a regional power and to increase its military capabilities. A natural question to ask in this situation is: What are Iran’s capabilities and intentions? Steven Ward seeks to offer insight into the historical trends of Iran’s military in Immortal, a timely examination of 2,500 years of Persian/Iranian military history. A senior Central Intelligence Agency analyst specializing in Iran, Ward served from 2005 to 2006 as the Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Near East on the National Intelligence Council as well as on the National Security Council from 1998 to 1999 and brings solid credentials and unquestioned regional expertise.

In a single-volume survey, Ward might be expected to present only the most cursory examination of such a vast period and to offer little in-depth analysis. In fact, the opposite is true. Each of its 10 chapters is dedicated to a significant period of Persian history. Beginning with the first great Persian dynasty, the Achaemenids, c. 550 BCE, the book focuses attention on the Safavids and the Qajars, the tumult of the 19th century, as well as both world wars, the Cold War, the Islamic Revolution, and the Iran-Iraq War, before concluding with an examination of where Iran is heading in the 21st century. Each chapter begins with a scene-setting map highlighting the respective dynasty’s borders as well as a summary of the forthcoming discussion. Ward then provides a review of the political and military situation pertinent to the period. Battles are discussed in surprising detail that deftly intertwines both relevant tactical details and strategic actions. The final chapter serves as both a summary and a predictive analysis of Iran’s way forward through an examination of the broad trends established in the previous sections.

Several noteworthy trends emerge that require appreciation by the outside observer. First, the country’s individual soldiers are valorous and dedicated and have “achieved … [great] success when … rulers pay attention” to their troop’s martial abilities. Praise for Persian soldiers comes from Herodotus in the 5th century BCE, Roman Emperor Maurice in the 6th century, and the British in the 18th century, who admired their “courage and hardiness” (p. 310). In fact, the book’s title refers to the Immortals, a celebrated royal guard of 10,000 men established by the Persian emperor Xerxes in the 5th century BCE. Their losses were immediately replaced to give the impression of invincibility. However, leaders throughout the centuries have frequently “failed to support their fighting man” (p. 301) and their poor leadership has repeatedly abused the noteworthy potential of Iran’s fighting men.

The next trend that Ward addresses is the establishment of dual militaries. Currently reflected in the Artesh (regular armed forces) and the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard Corps), the historical tendency of Iran’s leaders to establish dual militaries reflects the need to balance the defense of the country’s national interests with the political elite’s desire to have “competitive militaries to prevent challenges to central authority regardless of the cost to military effectiveness” (p. 301). In its present manifestation, this policy has granted primacy to the Pasdaran’s formalized role as “the preeminent service” (p. 302) and “guardians of the revolution” (p. 301), while the Artesh has accepted a decreased status as it focuses on “deterring, defending against, and defeating foreign aggressors” (p. 302). This divergence of roles, in which the traditional armed forces are not the preeminent military service, creates an internal fissure that can be exploited by external actors.

Ward also points out the constant tension that exists between religious and secular leaders over the military’s role in society. The goal of the traditionalist clergy is to “assert their conception of a conservative and idealized Islamic past without Western influences” (p. 302). Concurrently, nationalists seek “to restore Iran’s greatness by incorporating … benefits of Western science, technology, and political liberalism” (p. 302). The tension associated with these competing camps has culminated in the development and supremacy of the Revolutionary Guard Corps over the army.

Finally, Ward notes that the nation’s strategic location and the role of geography have repeatedly been a factor both in why outsiders invade and how Persia’s rulers have been able to defend their rule. The strategic depth offered by the country’s extensive natural defenses retains its importance in the modern era as it severely limits the potential invasion routes available to a challenger state while serving to reinforce the more than symbolic isolation that accompanies the country’s natural barriers.

Ward has produced an excellent book that should be read by anyone interested in the region. It will be especially useful for those wanting insight into Iran’s military capabilities and the role heritage plays in their development. It excels at being informative while lacking the dryness of a standard academic tome. No predictions are made as to specific courses of action that Iran might take in the coming years, but insights are offered into the “nationalist sentiments and xenophobia” (p. 3) that explain why Iran’s current efforts to develop nuclear weapons are directly tied to their heritage and why a nuanced approach will be necessary to effectively engage the legacy of the Peacock Throne.

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JFQ
Redefining the Center of Gravity

By Dale C. Eikmeier

It does not matter what Carl von Clausewitz said about the center of gravity (COG) in the 19th century. What matters is how we want to use the COG concept in the 21st century. Joint doctrine, specifically Joint Publication (JP) 5–0, Joint Operation Planning, is clear on the concept’s purpose and utility. However, its explanation on how to achieve that intent is handicapped because of a reliance on confusing and outdated definitions. To meet its own intent, joint doctrine needs to break from Clausewitz and develop new definitions of the center of gravity and its critical factors based on the criteria of clarity, logic, precision, and testability. New definitions would then allow for selection and validation methods based on logic and objectivity. What is not useful is a continued sentimental devotion to 19th-century military theory.

Joint doctrine’s intent for the COG concept is best stated in JP 5–0:

One of the most important tasks confronting the [joint force commander’s (JFC’s)] staff in the operational design process is the identification of friendly and adversary COGs. . . . The COG construct is useful as an analytical tool to help JFCs and staffs analyze friendly and adversary sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. This process cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost.¹

However, because definitions are not clear, logical, precise, or testable, and a doctrine does not provide a practical identification method, planners lack the understanding and focus needed to meet the intent of the COG concept.

Few debate the JP 5–0 description of COG value to campaign planning, so the concept is not the issue—the issue is the definition. I can think of no other term in military circles that generates so much debate. This debate alone is sufficient evidence that doctrine is putting planners in an unusual position of not really knowing what something is, but agreeing that it has tremendous value. This absurd situation can only be remedied by changing joint doctrine’s definition of the COG and its related critical factors.

The problem is twofold. The first is definitional; the second is methodological.

Because the current doctrinal definition of the center of gravity lacks precision, it generates confusion and endless debates that are distractions from critical planning tasks. Second, doctrine offers no practical method to identify the COG. It does suggest a confusing system of systems (SoS) approach combined with a political, economic, military, social, infrastructure, and information nodal analysis. This SoS method may have utility as a targeting tool, but for COG identification, it just does not work in the real world.

Because of the complex and time-consuming SoS method, planners typically revert to an easier but terribly flawed definitional method. For any method to work, the definition must be clear, based on logic, precise, and lead to answers that can be objectively validated. Unfortunately, the current definition lacks these qualities, which is why it must be replaced. Otherwise, the lack of clarity, precision, logic, and testability will prolong the current and wasteful “debating” state, where anything that can be argued to fit the definition can be made a center of gravity.

The lack of clarity, precision, logic, and testability will prolong the “debating” state, where anything that can be argued to fit the definition can be made a center of gravity

The solution to the first problem requires a definition that fits the purpose and intent of JP 5–0, not a slavish devotion to Clausewitz’s On War. After all, the Prussian did not hand down the COG concept from Mount Sinai, and the intent of JP 5–0 should trump his widely confused and misinterpreted words.

Any revised definition that fulfills JP 5–0’s intent should meet the following criteria:

- clarity: answers the question “what is it?” and is simple to understand with limited meaning
- based on logic: contains rules that allow for a valid inference
- precision: narrowly focused to exclude the extraneous
- testable: can be objectively tested using rules and logic.

Let’s test the current definition from JP 5–0 against these criteria: “A COG can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act.”²

Clarity. If the definition generates more questions than answers, it is not clear. If we have to read and study a definition multiple times, it is not clear. Or if we have to deconstruct the definition and analyze the parts to gain understanding, it is not clear. If, after study, we lack certainty as to what is and what is not a COG, it is not clear. If there is a cottage industry in publishing articles on what the true meaning is, it is not clear. What is not clear from the definition is the fact that we do not know if COG in this context is a thing (noun) or a capability (verb). Does the COG provide strength to a system, or is it the strength? What characteristics (adjectives or adverbs) distinguish a COG from something else? The definition lacks clarity because it has no basis in logic.

Logic. A good definition provides some principles and criteria on which a valid inference can be made. For example, a cat is a mammal because it meets the criteria in the

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¹ Mount Sinai, and the intent of JP 5–0 should trump his widely confused and misinterpreted words.
² Logic. A good definition provides some principles and criteria on which a valid inference can be made. For example, a cat is a mammal because it meets the criteria in the
definition of a mammal. Due to the joint definition’s lack of logic, rather than using criteria, it uses vague examples and nebulous characteristics that obfuscate and confuse rather than clarify and enlighten. For example, JP 5–0 lists 12 characteristics, but these are neither required characteristics nor are they exclusive characteristics. So they are of marginal use for making a logical inference. According to the definition, a COG has capabilities, but what capabilities, or capabilities to do what? Again, it is difficult to make a logical inference as to what capability would merit a COG to be defined as such. Moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act without a connecting purpose are just actions. The ability to act must be connected to a purpose; otherwise, there is no logic to the action.

**Precision.** When a definition lacks clarity and logic, it is difficult to achieve precision, and the joint definition has fallen into this trap. Clarity and logic allow for precision, which is necessary for identifying a COG and turning it into the useful analytical tool that was intended in JP 5–0. So in place of precision, joint doctrine can only offer examples:

> At the strategic level, a CoG could be a military force, an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level a CoG often is associated with the adversary’s military capabilities—such as a powerful element of the armed forces—but could include other capabilities in the operational environment.⁵

These examples suggest that at the strategic level, the COG can be just about anything, and at the operational level, it is usually a military capability but still could be anything—not a very precise definition. To achieve precision, we must exclude things based on logical criteria. However, the joint definition attempts to achieve precision by providing the examples above to illustrate what is not clear or logical. Not being able to logically exclude the extraneous, the examples attempt to cover all of the bases, just in case something might be left out. These examples even include the “just in case” catch-all phrases, such as “a set of critical capabilities or functions” and “but could include other capabilities in the operational environment.” This attempt to include rather than exclude obscures the identification of the real COG and devalues the overall concept.

As mentioned above, due to a poor definition lacking clarity and logic, JP 5–0 lists 12 characteristics that can be associated with a COG:

- exists at each level of war
- mostly physical at operational and tactical levels
- is a source of leverage
- allows or enhances freedom of action
- may be where the enemy’s force is most densely concentrated
- can endanger one’s own COGs
- may be transitory in nature
- linked to the objective(s)
- often intangible in limited contingency operations
- can shift over time or between phases
- often depends on factors of time and space
- contains many intangible elements at strategic level.⁴

The qualifying words may, can, often, and mostly. These word choices leave quite a bit of latitude. Any definition that cannot stand on its own but must use Justice Potter Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” method needs to be redefined.⁵

**Testable.** Since the current definition lacks clarity, logic, and precision, it is impossible to validate or test a COG selection. This is why students and planners debate, guess, and argue, and eventually grow frustrated with what JP 5–0 wants to be: a useful analytical tool.⁶

Since the current definition fails the clarity, logic, precision, and testable criteria, it must be replaced with one that does not. Only then will the endless debates cease and will planners be able to focus on campaign planning assisted by the COG concept rather than being distracted by it.

To fix the definitional problem, I propose this definition: The center of gravity is the primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve the objective.⁷

Let’s test this definition against the above criteria.

**Clarity.** This proposed definition is a simple declarative statement of what a COG is. It is the entity that can achieve the objective. Unlike the joint definition, it is not a list of characteristics or descriptions separated by commas. The words used in the proposed definition have limited meaning, unlike the phrase a source of power, which can have several meanings. Clarity is achieved, which then allows for logic.

**Logic.** This definition has two criteria built in that, if met, can lead to a valid inference. First, the COG is the primary entity, the key word being primary. Second, it has the capability to achieve the specified objective or purpose. The logic is A (primary entity) + B (capability to achieve the objective) = COG. Using these simple criteria, we can easily infer what is and what is not a COG. Note that the capability must be directly linked to what attains the objective. The COG is the primary possessor of that capability or power.

The logic is further illustrated by asking three questions: What is my objective? How can I achieve it (the required capability)? What do I need or have that can do it? The answer to the last question is the center of gravity. This logic then excludes other contenders, allowing for greater precision.

**Precision.** The clarity and logic of the definition allow for precision. Use of the word primary is meant to exclude the secondary, supporting, or extraneous. If something is secondary or supporting or even essential, it is a requirement, but it is not the COG. This will be discussed in more detail later. The COG is the primary actor; it has the capability required to achieve the objective. If an entity does not have that capability, it is not the COG, and the system needs to find or create one.

**Testable.** The logic in the definition provides for a validation method called the Doer and Used test.

**Doer**
- Only the center of gravity is inherently capable of achieving the purpose or objective.
- If something executes the primary action(s) (capability) that achieves the objective, it is the COG.
- The COG executes the action and uses or consumes resources to accomplish it.

**Used**
- If something is used or consumed to execute the primary action (capability), it is a requirement.
- If something contributes to, but does not actually perform, the action, it is a requirement, not a COG.
In the proposed definition, intangibles such as moral strength or public opinion cannot be COGs because they have no capability for action and require a tangible agent to perform an action. So how are intangibles accounted for? They are accounted for in the COG critical factors. But like the doctrinal definition of the COG, the definitions for the critical factors also need to be revised.

JP 5–0 states that planners should analyze COGs within a framework of three critical factors: capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. This would be sound advice if it were not for joint doctrine’s odd definition of critical capabilities.

In 1996, Dr. Joe Strange of the Marine Corps War College created the idea of critical factors and defined them as follows:

- Critical Capability: primary abilities, which merit a Center of Gravity to be identified as such in the context of a given scenario, situation, or mission
- Critical Requirements: essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operative
- Critical Vulnerabilities: critical requirements or components thereof that are deficient or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack in a manner achieving decisive results.

These factors and their definitions were a tremendous step forward in COG analysis because they created a logical hierarchy that helped separate the true COG, the doer, from other contenders, which may be requirements. Additionally, the factors provide planners insight on how to attack or defend a COG by showing what a COG does, what it needs to do it, and what is vulnerable. However, for some bizarre reason, joint doctrine significantly changed Dr. Strange’s definition of critical capability. Here is the joint definition: “Critical Capability—a means that is considered a crucial enabler for a COG to function as such, and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s).”

Dr. Strange, in his definition, refers to abilities, which are verbs. The joint definition refers to means and enablers, which can be thought of as things that are nouns. This ambiguity between abilities or things leaves room for confusion. If we believe that means and enablers are things, then the joint definition can be considered synonymous with the definition of critical requirements. One solution is to accept Dr. Strange’s wording for critical capability, which emphasizes primary abilities that cannot be confused with nouns and returns the focus to actions that accomplish the objective.

Fixing the definitions of both the center of gravity and critical capabilities is the first step toward achieving the intent of JP 5–0. The second is to provide a useful method for identifying the COG.

for some bizarre reason, joint doctrine significantly changed Dr. Strange’s definition of critical capability

SoS nodal analysis, while a useful technique for providing insights into understanding a system, is not a practical method for identifying the COG and should be replaced with the easier to use “ends, ways, and means” method. Indeed, no method, no matter how detailed, will produce truly scientific solutions. However, a disciplined and easily understood process such as the ends, ways, and means method can more efficiently meet the intent of JP 5–0.

The best way to determine a center of gravity involves a holistic viewpoint and systems theory. Without it, COG identification is just guesswork. However, the systems theory covers a lot of ground, and it is easy to get lost in a system’s networked forest of nodes and links. Arthur Lykke’s strategic framework offers a simple solution. The framework’s three simple questions—What is the desired endstate? How can it be achieved? What resources are required?—are systems theory boiled down to its essential elements in support of COG analysis.

This is how it works. There are six steps, four to identify the COG and two for critical and vulnerable requirements:

- Step 1: Identify the organization’s desired ends or objectives.
- Step 2: Identify the possible “ways” or actions that can achieve the desired ends. Select the way(s) that the evidence suggests the organization is most likely to use. Remember: Ways are actions and should be expressed as verbs. Then select the most elemental or essential action—that selection is the critical capability. Ways = critical capabilities.
- Step 3: List the organization’s means available or needed to execute the way/critical capability.
- Step 4: Select the entity (noun) from the list of means that inherently possesses the critical capability to achieve the end. This selection is the center of gravity. It is the doer of the action that achieves the ends.
- Step 5: From the remaining items on the means list, select those that are critical for execution of the critical capability. These are the critical requirements.
- Step 6: Complete the process by identifying those critical requirements vulnerable to adversary actions.

What this method provides is a simple and clear process for the identification and selection of a COG and the ability to differentiate between a true COG and other candidates that are actually critical requirements. This method with its objective rationale contributes to the intent of JP 5–0 by avoiding wasteful and pointless debates.

Joint doctrine is clear on the concept’s purpose and utility. However, it currently lacks a sound basis for achieving its own intent. If adopted, the proposed definition herein, combined with the ends, ways, and means COG identification method, would provide campaign planners a real analytical tool that fulfills the doctrinal intent. JFQ

NOTES

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., emphases in original.
4. Ibid., IV–9, figure IV–2.
5. Justice Potter Stewart made famous the phrase “I know it when I see it” when attempting to describe a threshold of obscenity in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964). It has since become a colloquial expression used when something cannot easily be defined or is subjective. See Paul Gewirtz, “On ‘I Know It When I See It,’” Yale Law Journal 105 (1996), 1023–1047.
7. The use of the word primary is attributed to Joe Strange and Richard Iron, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language, Perspectives on Warfighting, no. 4, 2nd ed. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1996), ix.
8. JP 5–0, IV–12.
10. JP 5–0, IV–12.
ALSA
Increasing Warfighter Interoperability

By Ray A. Zuniga

The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center produces multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publications that help Servicemembers every day, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Established at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, in 1975 just after the Vietnam War, ALSA is a joint organization that meets the immediate needs of the warfighter. The Chiefs of Staff of both the Army and Air Force identified the need to stand up an organization to increase Army/Air Force coordination and to cut through the “red tape” of the multi-Service doctrine development process. The idea of forming a joint organization to focus on this area emerged as an effort to fix Service interoperability. Then-Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Abrams and then-Chief of Staff of the Air Force General George Brown came together and directed the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) to establish the Air Land Forces Application (ALFA) Agency to meet those requirements.

The decision to place ALFA at Langley where TAC (now Air Combat Command) was headquartered gave it close proximity to Fort Monroe, home of TRADOC headquarters, and allowed ALFA to coordinate between the two Services in the days before email.

Some of ALFA’s original initiatives dealt with topics such as airspace management, air defense suppression, and close air support. In July 1985, ALFA produced the first version of the Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower, most commonly known as “JFIRE,” which is a pocket-sized quick-reference guide for requesting fire support still used today in Afghanistan and Iraq. The JFIRE publication has been continuously updated for almost 25 years, and it continues to be ALSA’s most widely distributed publication.

In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act reorganized the Armed Forces and mandated that all Services organize, train, and equip as a joint force. In a way, ALSA already had been “joint” for 10 years. The joint and coalition victory of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 convinced the other two Services of ALFA’s utility. The following year, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and the Navy’s U.S. Atlantic Fleet assigned permanent billets to ALFA, and the organization was renamed the Air Land Sea Application Center to incorporate all Services. Today, ALSA consists of a small group of officers from the four Services, five Civil Service employees, and one noncommissioned officer. The ALSA Center director and deputy director are O-6 positions that alternate between the Army and Air Force.

In keeping with its original charter, ALSA provides multi-Service solutions, so commanders and troops in the field have the latest best procedures; in effect, ALSA publications are developed with advice from subject matter experts (SMEs) across the Services. These experts often range from E-3s to O-5s, are recently returned from combat, and may have experienced any publication deficiencies firsthand or realized gaps that may require a common-ground multi-Service solution. They come together in two joint working groups to revise or create a publication, a process that typically only lasts a year and occurs every 3 years for revisions.

ALSA currently has a full workload of over 35 publications that are in various stages of development, assessment, and revision. ALSA gets its direction from the four Services’ doctrine chiefs (two generals, one admiral, and one member of the Senior Executive Service) and the J7 directors from U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and Joint Staff, who together make up the Joint Action Steering Committee (JASC). The JASC meets three times a year to provide guidance on new topics and set priorities on projects. Current operations, Service transformation, new equipment acquisitions, new strategies for fighting our nation’s wars, and new technology integration into weapons systems provide ALSA with a fertile ground of interoperability challenges to address.

A great example of a technological evolution to assist in command and control is Internet relay chat (IRC, commonly called mIRC). Warfighters were using it to support operations downrange, but without a standard set of TTPs. Some even referred to mIRC as the “Wild West,” and the lack of TTP often caused confusion and delays. To meet the need, ALSA developed a new publication titled Tactical Chat (TC), which has since been adopted by U.S. Central Command for use throughout the theater. The TC manual is now the standard for using IRC to “chat” or pass data as it established firm business rules for online collaboration.

Some other new projects that ALSA recently published are MTTPs on Advising Foreign Forces and Tactical Convoy Operations (TCO). The Advising Foreign Forces publication is designed to help
advisor team missions such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Coalition Air Force Transition Teams enhance the advisor activities and improve inter-Service coordination. TCO was created to help troops in Iraq who were finding their convoys coming under attack from improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms from insurgent forces. This publication provides a quick-reference guide for convoy commanders operating in theater who are using best practices and common procedures for convoy operations among the Services. All of these publications are designed to assist Servicemembers in accomplishing their missions.

In addition to developing MTTPs for the Warfighter, ALSA produces the Air Land Sea Bulletin (ALSB) three times a year. The ALSB usually has five to seven articles focused around a predetermined topic (such as unmanned aircraft or close air support) written by SMEs in the field. It offers warfighters the opportunity to share operational lessons learned and spread the word about recent developments in warfighting concepts, issues, and Service interoperability. The intent is good cross-Service flow of information among readers around the globe.

At present, ALSA is one of the many outstanding organizations contributing to the fight and helping our nation win its wars. For ALSA, there is always new work on the horizon due to the ever changing operational environment. To learn more about ALSA or to provide feedback, please see the ALSA CAC-enabled Web site at https://www.alsa.mil where you can download ALSA MTTPs and publications. These publications will soon be available on the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) Web portal to enable detailed browsing and advanced search.

For access to joint publications, go to the JDEIS Web portal at https://jdeis.js.mil (.mil users only). For those without access to .mil accounts, go to the Joint Electronic Library Web portal at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

**JP$s Revised or Under Review**

- JP 1–04, Legal Support to Military Operations
- JP 2–01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations
- JP 2.01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
- JP 3–0, Joint Operations
- JP 3–02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
- JP 3–02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation Operations
- JP 3–06, Joint Urban Operations
- JP 3–08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations
- JP 3–09, Joint Fire Support
- JP 3–09.3, Close Air Support
- JP 3–14, Space Operations
- JP 3–17, Air Mobility Operations
- JP 3–22, Foreign Internal Defense
- JP 3–24, Counterinsurgency Operations
- JP 3–26, Counterterrorism
- JP 3–34, Joint Engineer Operations
- JP 3–52, Joint Airspace Control
- JP 3–61, Public Affairs
- JP 4–03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine
- JP 4–09, Distribution Operations
- JP 6–0, Joint Communications System

**Africa Security Brief No. 5**

**Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean**

Davin O’Regan examines narcotics trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean for lessons that might be applied to Africa. He finds that the dollar value of cocaine trafficked through West Africa has risen rapidly, surpassing all other illicit commodities smuggled in the subregion. Experience from Latin America and the Caribbean shows that cocaine traffic contributes to dramatically higher levels of violence and instability. Given that co-opting government officials is the preferred method of Latin American traffickers, the author argues that African governments need to act urgently to protect the integrity of their counternarcotics institutions.

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A True Operational Reserve?

Prosecuting COIN
2010 Essay Winners

New Journal from NDU Press
PRISM

National Defense University is pleased to announce publication of issue 1, no. 4 (September 2010) of PRISM. This milestone issue—at 180 pages, the largest to date—marks the journal’s first complete year of existence. Feature articles cover topics such as diplomacy before and after conflict, an assessment of opportunities and risks as the war in Afghanistan enters a decisive phase, a call for a paradigm shift from nationbuilding to “netwar” in Afghanistan, as well as several other perspectives on the Afghanistan conflict. The “From the Field” article offers an upbeat view of Colombia’s successful irregular war against the FARC insurgency, while “Lessons Learned” presents the sobering experiences of an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq. Also included are enlightening interviews with the ambassadors to the United States of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The issue closes with a review essay on civil-military relations.

PRISM explores, promotes, and debates emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. Published by NDU Press for the Center for Complex Operations, PRISM welcomes articles on a broad range of complex operations issues, especially civil-military integration. Manuscript submissions should be between 2,500 and 6,000 words and sent via email to prism@ndu.edu.

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