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By R.D. Hooker, Jr.
By R.D. Hooker, Jr.
Chapter 1 | American Grand Stratregy
By R.D. Hooker, Jr.
Chapter 2 | The Future of Conflict
By T.X. Hammes
Chapter 3 | U.S. Defense Policy and Strategy
By F.G. Hoffman
Chapter 4 | The American Defense Budget 2017–2020
By Michael J. Meese
Chapter 5 | National Security Reform
By Christopher J. Lamb
Chapter 6 | Weapons of Mass Destruction
By John P. Caves, Jr.
Chapter 7 | Countering Terrorism
By R. Kim Cragin
Chapter 8 | Cyber Policy
By Janice M. Hamby and Thomas C. Wingfield
Chapter 9 | Asia Pacific
By James J. Przystup and Phillip C. Saunders
Chapter 10 | The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Europe
By Charles L. Barry and Julian Lindley-French
Chapter 11 | Russia
By Peter B. Zwack
Chapter 12 | The Middle East
By Denise Natali
Chapter 13 | South Asia
By Thomas F. Lynch III
Chapter 14 | Africa
By Hilary Matfess
Chapter 15 | Latin America
By Craig A. Deare
Chapter 16 | Central Asia
By Theresa Sabonis-Helf
Chapter 17 | The High North
By David Auerswald
By NDU Press
By Janice M. Hamby and Thomas C. Wingfield
Charting a Course
The effective use of the informational instrument of national power in all
domains, and the use of all the instruments of national power in the cyber
domain, will be a serious and growing challenge for the United States. The
next U.S. President must have a clear understanding of the relationship of
technology, law, and policy in formulating options. Centralized but not
procrustean, leadership at the highest level, providing a clear and rational
delineation of authorities, will be needed to coordinate and effectively employ
U.S. cyber and information capabilities. Internationally, engaging with allies
and partners will be vital to our defense; engaging with adversaries will require
a new understanding of deterrence and counter-espionage in cyberspace.
Domestically, new approaches to public-private partnerships will be key to
addressing threats, preserving civil liberties, and unleashing our potential for
improved governance and expanded commerce.
By any measure, the United States leads the world as a cyber power in
terms of its cyberspace-related leadership and capabilities, research
and development, innovation, and commercialization of leading-edge
hardware and software, as well as more specialized products for military
and scientific applications. This is also true for the world of information.
Without any whole-of-government coordination, the United States produces
and exports the lion’s share of globally consumed television, film,
music, and games, as well as data, information, and knowledge systems.
Its advances in mobile communications and social media have revolutionized
the way the global community communicates, learns, and even
With this largely unplanned success has come a series of challenges,
many of which require a more deliberate approach and a national-level
strategic effort with Presidential leadership to resolve. This chapter
provides summary views of many of these challenges and offers recommendations by which the administration
could gain traction over
even the most daunting issues in
the information and cyberspace
From the perspective of the
Department of Defense (DOD),
the term cyberspace is defined as
a global domain within the information
of interdependent networks of information
and resident data, including
the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.1 Protecting this domain is a national priority. It underpins U.S. and
global commerce, governmental and private discourse, innovation, and
creativity. It has evolved into an essential enabler of governance, business,
and personal transactions. It has elevated the impact of information
in all its forms and provides both opportunities for and limitations to the
way we conduct our national security strategy.
The actors with whom the United States must engage (and sometimes
counter) include capable nation-states, criminals, and nonstate actors.
Many of these are not bound by the same norms and restraints that the
United States observes. The complex motives and methods, combined
with a low barrier to entry, heighten the potential for damaging effects
caused by competitor and adversary actions.
The need to ensure that we both leverage the potential of cyberspace
for U.S. national and global advantage and protect our systems and information
to ensure our prosperity and security as a nation demands
a comprehensive, integrated strategy that provides coherence of action
and synchronizes Federal, state, and local initiatives in cooperation with
our partners in industry as well as with foreign governments.
Because cyberspace is a domain of near-infinite complexity, we need
models to allow us to build common theoretical frameworks to help us
synchronize our academic research, operational planning, and high-level
policymaking. Nowhere is such a common operating picture more
important than in explaining the relational positions of technology, law,
In figure 1, the outermost box represents technology—the range of
the possible. As the largest box, it consists of everything that technologists
have delivered or can deliver without violating the laws of physics.
Some of these options are lawful, some are not; others make good policy
sense, while others do not. To extend the metaphor, the top and sides
of the box can be extended with more time, more money, or smarter
scientists and engineers. The bottom, however, cannot be extended—it
represents those laws of physics and other barriers beyond our control
that limit our expansion to the other three directions.
The intermediate box represents the law—the limits of what is permissible.
Outside this box are options that are technically feasible but
legally impermissible; inside the box is the full range of lawful options
for policymakers to consider. Just as with technology, the top and sides
of this box can be expanded—domestically by an executive order, statute,
or court ruling. Internationally, we can expand (or contract) this
box with treaties or, more often, by concerted changes to state practice
with opinio juris (the stated position that international law requires or
permits a certain action), resulting in a reinforcement of, or change to,
customary international law. But just as with technology, there are virtually
unchangeable aspects of the law. Domestically, the best examples
are fundamental constitutional norms—freedom of speech, or freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure—that are unlikely to be altered,
even through another constitutional amendment. Internationally, we refer
to these near-unchangeable laws as jus cogens norms—prohibitions
accepted by so many states for such a great length of time that only other
jus cogens norms could displace them. Examples include the universal
bans on piracy, slavery, grave war crimes, and genocide. This is not to say
that these crimes do not exist but rather that their historical severity has
rendered them unlikely to ever be legalized. Their most important aspect
is their universal applicability, even in the face of a dissenting state. For
international lawyers, jus cogens norms are the equivalent of the laws of
The innermost, and smallest, box is policy—the realm of the preferable.
These are the policy options that make the most strategic sense,
aligning desired ends with available means most effectively. They make
the most political sense, whether in response to public opinion, media
coverage, or interest-group or thought-leader positions. They might
be the path of least resistance within a bureaucracy, the least common
denominator position adopted by a coalition of allies, a workable compromise
within a legislature, or an executive’s daring vision. In any case,
they are the product of the political forces operating at the time and
should be derived from the largest possible menu of lawful options. As with the other two boxes, we can imagine three sides that can be moved
with time, money, and political capital, just as we can imagine a fourth
side that cannot be—policy options that are considered so politically
toxic or strategically unfeasible as to be impossible.
Multiple partitions abound in the Federal Government’s design, reflecting
the economic and political priorities of the Industrial Age. One effect
is the pile-up of “cross-cutting” issues—particularly those generated
by the disruptive information/digital age—that fail to fit neatly within
outdated Federal agency/department boundaries. Figure 2 shows examples
of cyberspace issues that run across, over, under, and around these
This leads to costly dysfunctionality. Issues of cyberspace become too
fractured and segregated to fit within the logic of existing department/
agency mission areas. This limits responses to departmental or agency-
specific responsibilities, which rarely consider or incorporate all
the other parts of a cross-cutting issue. The results are solutions with a
higher risk of failure—for example, the persistent failure to share electronic
health records between DOD and the Veteran’s Administration.
Departments and agencies waste resources and duplicate efforts. Bureaucratic
barriers bound Federal work and employees within department and agency authority structures, which lose synergistic value. Moreover,
these arrangements cause unnecessary contestation for resources and arguments
over leadership, spending, and control at the expense of shared
best practice solutions.
Four reform strategies have been attempted thus far: grabbing agency
components to create an Industrial Age–style Department of Homeland
Security, designating lead agencies, appointing “supervisory czars”
over groups of agencies (for example, Director and Office of National
Intelligence), and building lower-level issue-specific fusion centers for
cross-agency information-sharing and coordination. Collectively, these
strategies have generated modest improvements in shared situational
awareness on the cross-cutting issues of cyberspace. They have been
handicapped by a narrow focus, inappropriate appropriations classifications,
and misaligned authorities and responsibilities, leading to continued
duplication of effort, poor exploration of unintended consequences
of policy actions, and constant work to address undiscovered feasibility,
affordability, and utility issues. We offer the following recommendations:
The U.S. Government has not clearly laid out the roles, responsibilities,
and authorities (RRA) of its components for cyberspace operations. As
a result, U.S. actions in cyberspace are nether coordinated nor synchronized,
and resources are not coordinated to reduce inefficiency and unintended
As identified in the 2016 Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP),
the Barack Obama administration’s cyber policy has been based on three
strategic pillars: raising the level of cybersecurity in American public, private,
and consumer sectors; taking steps to deter, disrupt, and interfere
with malicious cyber activity aimed at the United States or its allies; and
responding effectively to, and recovering from, cyber incidents.2 In addition
to the CNAP, areas previously addressed include information-sharing
(Executive Order 136913), improving government information technology
and information security, increasing public cyber awareness and education,
and increasing the size and quality of the military and civilian
cyber workforce. These initiatives are helping to address the tactical and
operational weaknesses of the United States. Unfortunately, what is missing
is a comprehensive framework that clearly articulates the RRA for
Federal, state, and local governments. There are several key documents
that address aspects of this problem, the most important of which are
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-20, PPD-21, and PPD-41.4 All address
important shortfalls, but greater synchronization and clearer authorities
and responsibilities are needed. We offer the following recommendations:
The United States must engage the international community regarding
Internet governance to ensure that information in cyberspace remains
free and accessible to U.S. citizens and the global community. Framing
this complex challenge requires understanding the roles that cyber
strategy, policy, regulation, and security play in Internet governance. It
is also important to assess whether our efforts to secure the Internet and
protect information and privacy rights are consistent with overarching
“governing” objectives (that is, information freedom and net neutrality)
and to ensure that our security efforts do not threaten the very liberties
they are intended to protect.
This is not to suggest that U.S. engagement can wait. The pace and
scope of the Internet’s growth and the infinite ways it is evolving (with
economic, political, and social implications) necessitate a deliberate and
decisive engagement. While the Internet has ushered in great societal
benefits, it has also introduced new risks, such as crime, terrorism, and
warfare, that threaten the critical infrastructure and services on which
societies depend. The risk borne by individuals and societies continues
to expand as complex and tightly coupled systems5 such as electrical
power grids, services such as health care, and the emerging “Internet of
things” are increasingly interconnected, moving us from the information
age to a “network society.”6 As with any technology, there are intended
and unintended uses and users. There are some who desire to leverage the Internet to bring local, national, and global services and benefits.7
There are others with nefarious intentions, introducing crime, exploitation,
and terrorism into cyberspace. We offer the following recommendations:
Performance management has been required of Federal agencies since
passage of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. However,
the integration of performance information into agency decisionmaking
is not well advanced.8 Despite efforts by the George W. Bush and
Obama administrations, the Government Accountability Office noted
that reported use of performance information for high-level objectives
did not improve between 2007 and 2013.9 Since cyber is a relatively
new field, cyber performance management is still a fairly undefined term.
During this developmental stage, the cyber world must embrace performance
measures that link organizational strategic goals and objectives
with strategic initiatives in order to assist government agency–level leaders
or executives with organizational decisionmaking.
Traditional information technology (IT) services, those commonly
found under the domain of Federal chief information officers (CIOs), do
have performance metrics. These existing metrics (for example, network
availability, number of trouble tickets resolved) do not address cyber performance management. As a result, organizational cultures inappropriately
place responsibility for gains from cyberspace on technicians alone.
We offer the following recommendations:
Cyber deterrence is a critical component of overall strategic deterrence,
but it is far less developed conceptually. Some see a parallel between
nuclear weapons and cyber weapons and posit that nuclear deterrence
models could therefore be usefully applied to cyberspace. One critical
difference is the scalability of cyber weapons, which allows for cyber deterrence
at the operational and tactical levels. The table highlights some
of the differences between nuclear and cyber weapons. These differences
illuminate the need to develop a new model that incorporates the unique
aspects of cyber deterrence.
Table. Differences Between Nuclear and Cyber Weapons
Target of Deterrence
Effects of Use
Immediate overt destruction
State Nonstate Individuals
Individuals to state, but also self-creating
Widely variable breadth, depth, and time
The target of deterrence needs to believe the deterring state has the
capability to impose an unacceptable cost for an attack, coupled with the
will to use that capability, or the capability to defend against or immediately
recover from an attack, rendering it ineffective. The highly secretive
nature of our offensive cyber capabilities and the many restrictions
placed on their use limit their deterrent effect. Additionally, cyber attacks
are often difficult to trace. This lack of attribution means attackers need
not fear retribution. Finally, leaders who feel vulnerable to retaliation or find an attack to be pointless due to resilience may also hesitate to act
or to escalate.
Cyber weapons are part of a larger arsenal of national power that the
United States could bring to bear to deter or, should deterrence fail, to
defeat our enemies. While cyber weapons may be the most appropriate
means to achieve a specified effect, other sources of national power are
also clearly relevant to both cyber deterrence and cyber operations in
conflict scenarios. We offer the following recommendations:
The loss of critical infrastructure “would have a debilitating impact on
security, national economic security, national public health or safety.”10
The majority (about 85 percent) of critical infrastructure is privately
owned and operated, requiring a public-private partnership to provide
its security.11 Operating alone, the private sector is incentivized by profit
and is averse to liability. This puts the resiliency of national critical infrastructure
The current strategy of promoting and facilitating best practices and
information-sharing with the government is necessary but insufficient
to addressing sophisticated threats of organized crime, terrorists, and
nation-states. National interests traditionally handled through law enforcement
or national defense are not aligned with the financial and reputational
interests of the private sector. As the United Kingdom Cyber
Security Strategy states, “Just as in the 19th century we had to secure the
seas for our national safety and prosperity, and in the 20th century we had
to secure the air, in the 21st century we also have to secure our advantage
in cyber space.”12 We offer the following recommendations:
The laws, regulations, and standards that govern the protection of personal
information and the release, mandatory or otherwise, of data collected
or maintained by the U.S. Government are undergoing a period of
review. The triple challenges of IT advances, the globalized flow of data
for trade and other purposes, and the value, both legal and illegal, of
individually identifiable information have caused this relook. Advances
in IT have included an exponential increase in collection, storage, and
processing capabilities, including the development of machine learning
algorithms that greatly surpass human ability in pattern matching and
discovery. The globalized flow of data is fueled by electronic commerce,
off-shoring, and transnational workforces enabling 24/7 operations that
flow from time zone to time zone. Finally, the value of individually identifiable
information enables both good and bad things: it can not only assist
law enforcement and intelligence activities and enable better service,
but it also fuels identity theft, fraud, and blackmail.
This situation is exacerbated by the reality that different cultures approach
the definition and protection of privacy very differently. This difference
has complicated global commerce and international legal structures,
but solutions such as the European Union–U.S. Privacy Shield
have been developed to bridge such divides. Challenges remain. Existing
controls are structured for legacy structures and technologies. Emerging
technologies present new challenges. This new and evolving state of affairs
requires careful consideration to ensure that government activities
are consistent with social values, international trade agreements, and reality.
Several important initiatives are emerging to create a foundation for a
solid path forward. The creation of the Federal Privacy Council is critical
to these efforts and signals the importance with which the problems
associated with privacy and technology are considered. Similarly, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has begun twin
efforts in developing guidance and standards for privacy and de-identification
processes. Emerging research from academia and industry in
topics such as privacy labeling and management, database privacy, and
differential privacy is critical to the development of tools and practices for privacy problems. There is an emerging community of practice of
privacy officers, mathematicians, computer scientists, and civil libertarians
that provides fora for the discussion and presentation of research.
Building on these initiatives provides a way forward to address privacy
and data release concerns. We offer these recommendations:
Concepts of identity are evolving in ways that are difficult to predict. In
the past, identity elements were defined through elements of personhood
(name, eye color), job (title, responsibilities), profession (lawyer,
doctor), relationship (family or network member), interests (hobbies,
habits), culture (values and belief systems, heritage, citizenship), and
political structures. Layering on those established identity elements are
new, cyber-enabled identities, which may or may not relate closely (or at
all) to physical reality.
Cyber identities may be expressed through a variety of means, including
avatars in artificial worlds, software bots that execute behaviors (such
as troll armies), affiliation with ad hoc communities (such as Anonymous),
or as social media characters. Besides being new ways to create
or express identity, these cyber-enabled identity elements can be difficult to relate to real people and thus cause challenges in realms as diverse as
national security and mental health. As cyber-innovation continues at
its breakneck pace, cyber-enabled identities and identity elements will
continue to evolve and mutate in ways that are difficult to predict, including
allowing people to “live” or express themselves through multiple
different identities or even many cloned identities.
There are important implications for this emerging fluidity in identity.
One is in governance: when one person can have multiple identities,
that person can opt in to multiple governance structures, ranging from
political to practice to commercial. Another is in security: identities can
be used to disguise or hide subversive activities, but may also be used
effectively to discover and understand alternative ways of thinking and
acting. There is benefit and worry; the balance between the two requires
significant understanding and structural philosophical approaches. We
offer the following recommendations:
Explosive growth of unstructured data demands solutions to the challenge
of information management. As the use of mobile devices and sensors
grows and evolves, experts expect data volume to grow to over 4,300 percent
of 2009 levels by the year 2020. The Federal Government faces a need
to shift from collecting data to gaining new insights, identifying unexpected
patterns and trends, and using data analytics to find new solutions to
complex problems—an analysis best conducted using data visualization
techniques. Unfortunately, correctly interpreting trends and patterns hidden
in the data requires special skills in information and computing technologies
that are lacking in the current cyber workforce. Additionally, appropriate investment in the underlying technologies themselves lags well
behind need. Ultimately, information processing and visualization must be
improved for national leadership to make sense of the proliferation of data
in order to inform policy and decisionmaking.
Visual analytics is an especially compelling technology because of its potential to facilitate leadership’s ability to understand a situation quickly
and clearly and to make better decisions. However, a major challenge, in
addition to a very small talent pool, is the level of funding required for
high-end visualization resources and machine learning capability. Google
researchers note that machine learning can solve problems that no other
methods can but that the cost of the technology and maintenance of the
algorithms is significant and may be out of reach for individual organizations.13 A collective approach to develop capabilities that could then be
further customized for individual organizational use is warranted to make
these technologies affordable. We offer the following recommendations:
The Nation faces the risk that our adversaries’ use of encryption technologies
to “go dark” will cause the loss of the ability to surveil their actions
in cyberspace.14 Terrorists are using the Dark Web and strong encryption
technologies to plan and execute their operations protected from government
surveillance.15 National security and law enforcement entities
desire a backdoor or master key built into the encryption algorithms or
legislation compelling companies to engineer their software allowing for
searches to surveil terrorists and investigate criminals.
The cryptographic, scientific, and technologic communities are united
in saying strong encryption is an all-or-nothing position and that
weaker encryption jeopardizes the global infrastructure of trust. Encryption
is founded in mathematical principles and is considered strong only
when it is subjected to rigorous public scrutiny. A weakness—whether
accidental or legislative—is a globally exploitable feature.
Strong encryption is important to national security. Critical infrastructure,
banking, commerce, and communications all rely on strong encryption
for security. Encryption protects and enables national defense, commercial activities, and freedom of speech. Public and private entities
use strong encryption to fulfill their obligations to protect personal information
under legislation (for example, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act and the Privacy Act of 1974).
Recent attacks in the United States, France, Belgium, and Turkey aided
by secret communications using strong encryption provide a case to
limit it. This, however, would not be effective. Encryption technologies
used by criminals and terrorists are not controlled solely by U.S. companies
or interests and cannot be effectively curtailed though U.S. legislation.
Additionally, methods to surveil and apprehend criminal and
terrorist actors who use encrypted technologies do exist. These methods
exploit how the actors build and use encryption technologies and the
infrastructures of the Dark Web. Additional research is needed, as many
methods and techniques were exposed and rendered ineffective by the
Edward Snowden leaks of 2013, but others can be developed. We offer
the following recommendations:
Between May and July 2016, the U.S. Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) completed four public workshops on artificial intelligence
(AI) to “identify challenges and opportunities related to this emerging
technology.”16 Focus areas included legal and governance, use for public
good, safety and control, and social and economic implications. Additionally,
OSTP created a new National Science and Technology Council
(NSTC) Subcommittee on Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence
to coordinate Federal Government activities in these areas. These two
initiatives demonstrate that AI is gaining attention, but they do not constitute
a strategy for assessing the associated benefits and risks in a comprehensive
With the imminent arrival of self-driving vehicles and precision
autonomous weapons systems, it is imperative that the United States
advance a coherent AI agenda addressing the technological, legal, and policy implications of this technological revolution. Failure to do so
threatens to leave the Nation incapable of benefiting from AI use for the
government or influencing responsible AI use in the private sector. We
offer the following recommendations:
The White House and Congress must continue to reform IT acquisition
practices in order to meet modernization goals and objectives. Numerous
studies and congressional testimonies have highlighted the need for a synchronized
and cohesive strategy to plan, program, budget, and execute
modernization of IT. A May 2016 report by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) found that Federal agencies are spending almost 75 percent
of the $88 billion IT budget to maintain legacy systems.17 The report
specifically identified that 5,233 of approximately 7,000 Federal IT systems
are spending all of their funds on operations and maintenance costs.
By comparison, development, modernization, and enhancement spending
for the same programs represents less than 25 percent of spending and
has declined $7.3 billion since 2010. The study also highlighted that numerous
systems were developed decades ago with parts and programming
languages that are now obsolete and pose significant risk. Some of the programs,
such as the DOD program that coordinates the operational functions
of the Nation’s nuclear forces, were developed over 50 years ago and
use 8-inch floppy disks that have long ceased being produced. In other
cases, agencies rely on outdated operating systems such as those from Microsoft
in the 1980s and 1990s that ceased vendor support long ago. As a
result, the GAO study found that agencies spend significantly more to hire
and maintain programmers who hold specific skill sets as well as expose
increased security risks. This comes at a time when more than $3 billion
worth of Federal IT investments will reach end-of-life in the next 3 years.
In response to these issues, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) developed the IT Modernization Fund (ITMF).18 The fund, as
part of the White House’s Cybersecurity National Action Plan, follows up
on the gains made from the Federal IT Acquisition Reform Act in 2014.19
The ITMF is in line with the recommendations from the May 2016 GAO
report and supports other modernization initiatives such as the General
Services Administration (GSA) 18F program.20 Success of the ITMF is at
risk unless several major weaknesses are addressed. We offer the following
U.S. national security, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the effective
functioning of the Federal Government require reliable and secure
cyber-based government assets supported by a professional cybersecurity
workforce that protects these assets from all types of threats, including
cyber attacks. Recent breaches, including those resulting in significant
data losses at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and Internal
Revenue Service, revealed that the cybersecurity workforce is significantly
challenged in protecting the government’s cyber-based assets against
attacks. Efforts to generate the numbers of personnel with the requisite
competencies have been unsuccessful. The government lacks a coherent
and comprehensive approach to improve the cybersecurity workforce.
OPM has a responsibility to develop a holistic and proactive approach
to improve the cybersecurity workforce. This approach must include, but not be limited to, recruiting, hiring, developing, and retaining. We
offer the following recommendations:
Information technologies now feed a swelling appetite for real-time information.
Citizens demand and rely on data from their mobile devices
to make decisions (such as travel routes or which consumer product to
buy) that can immediately disrupt markets or drive new behaviors. Private
industry recognizes this as part of doing business in the 21st century.
Governments have not realized this and have failed to find ways to use
it to drive innovations.
Failure to adopt a strategy to serve citizen needs for information that
leverages the opportunities of technology while avoiding the inherent
challenges (privacy concerns, information overload, and so forth) places
the government at risk of losing relevance, confidence, and trust in
the eyes of its citizenry. Citizens will find information elsewhere and
construct their own stories about particular experiences with government
entities based on their perceptions of the value realized from the interaction. Worse yet, citizens may find governance of no value or fill
any vacuum with information from untrustworthy or biased sources to
construct their perception of events and motivations.
These alternate sources have demonstrated their ability to seize opportunities
to sense public mood and provide the storylines that will
advance their cause by taking advantage of gaps in public information
and any signs of insecurity or fear. They feel no obligation to be truthful
or unbiased. The same dynamic has reduced the time allowed, from the
emergence of a public policy issue through the development and implementation
of policy to address it, such that the failure to immediately
address a problem is viewed as unresponsiveness. Civil movements rely
on cost-effective, instantly deployed social media platforms to engage
advocates and escalate favorable public opinion. These same platforms
can be used to cultivate public friction and hateful or counterproductive
civic positions that present obstacles to positive government initiatives.
In this context, government has also failed to seize the opportunity
to employ the same information technologies to develop a better sense
of how citizens perceive public good and how they find value in government
service delivery models. There is a need for the administration
to establish a sensing framework to develop insights regarding if it is
serving or failing to serve those to whom it is accountable. This applies
whether dealing with cyberspace or traditional governmental obligations
in establishing trust and engagement by the technology-enabled citizen.
A positive outcome of such an initiative would be the repackaging of
government data and information to proactively explain internal decision
factors, competing agendas, and crowdsourced data gaps to external
consumers. This could illuminate the complexity of governance activities
and decrease the need to seek substitute data sources. Effectively it offers
content for civic education and distributes responsibility for governance
to a community of interested people. This new vision embeds contemporary
consumer sense-making in the practices of the good governance.
We offer the following recommendations:
In a short time, cyber has emerged as both a warfighting domain, fully
as significant as the land, sea, air, and space domains, and an omnipresent
public-private operating universe. The potential opportunities
found within the domain of information and cyberspace are seemingly
limitless. The risks of this reliance are clear, as demonstrated by recent
highly publicized network breaches. It is important that these risks be
deliberately accounted for and addressed in the process of making decisions
about the use of cyberspace.
Cyber competence must be part of the skill set for all senior leaders in
the national security enterprise. Most senior leaders received their professional
educations at the beginning of the cyber age, and their understanding
of, and sensitivity to, the opportunities and vulnerabilities described
above may be limited. Nevertheless, mastery of the cyber domain
has now assumed critical importance because of our dependence on cyberspace.
Agency heads must be held accountable for their organization’s
employment of information technologies—abrogation of responsibility
to CIOs and other “cyber experts” is unacceptable.
Addressing the critical challenges of cyberspace must be approached
with an understanding of limitations and risks inherent in the use of the
technologies that underpin the domain’s potential. The authors here have
highlighted promising opportunities and areas of concern. Specific recommendations
are offered to contribute to a Presidency ready to embrace
both the risks and the opportunities facing the Nation in cyberspace.
The authors would like to thank the following contributors to their
chapter: William S. Boddie, James Churbuck, Cathryn Downes, Carl
J. Horn, Michael D. Love, Jenny Hall Mandula, Kenneth D. Rogers,
John L. O’Brien, Julie J.C.H. Ryan, Paul Shapiro, George Trawick, and
Veronica J. Wendt.
1 Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2014), available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf>.
2 White House Fact Sheet, “Cybersecurity National Action Plan,” February 9, 2016, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/fact-sheet-cybersecurity-national-action-plan>.
3 Executive Order 13691, “Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing,” February 13, 2015, available at <www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/02/20/2015-03714/promoting-private-sector-cybersecurity-information-sharing>.
4 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 20, “U.S. Cyber Operations Policy” (2012), is a classified document that provides a framework for the roles and responsibilities of the executive branch’s agencies in cyberspace as well as a framework for U.S. cybersecurity. PPD-21, “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience” (2013), provides a top-down risk management architecture and directed the creation of the national critical infrastructure centers for enhanced information-sharing and collaboration. Supporting PPD-21 is Executive Order 13636, “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” which focuses on the cyberspace security aspect of PPD-21. PPD-41, “United States Cyber Incident Coordination” (2016), articulates how the Federal Government coordinates its incident response activities to significant cyber incidents.
5 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
6 Manuel Castells, “Informationalism, Networks, and the Network Society: A Theoretical Blueprint,” in The Network Society: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, ed. Manuel Castells
(New York: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2004).
7 Laura DeNardis, Internet Points of Control as Global Governance, Internet Governance Paper No. 2 (Ontario, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2013).
8 John Kamensky, “Why Isn’t Performance Information Being Used?” Government Executive, October 14, 2014, available at <www.govexec.com/excellence/promising-practices/2014/10/why-isnt performance-information-being-used/96347/>.
9 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Managing for Results: Agencies’ Trends in the Use of Performance Information to Make Decisions, GAO 14-747 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2014).
11 Nathan E. Busch and Austin D. Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: Opportunities and Challenges,” Homeland Security Affairs 8, no. 18 (October 2012), available at <www.hsaj.org/articles/233>.
12 “Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Safety, Security and Resilience in Cyber Space,” 2009.
13 Zachary Chase Lipton, “The High Costs of Maintaining Machine Learning Systems,” KDNuggets News, 2015, available at <www.kdnuggets.com/2015/01/high-cost-machinelearning-technical-debt.html>.
14 Senate Hearing on Worldwide Threats, 2016.
15 The Dark Web is commonly defined as a sub-portion of the Internet that consists of Web sites, portals, and social media similar to the open Internet, but that is accessible only through specially designed Web browsers and using technologies that easily anonymizes the user and encrypts all of his traffic, data, and activities.
16 Ed Felton, “Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence,” WhiteHouse.gov, May 3, 2016, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/05/03/preparing-future-artificial-
17 “Federal Agencies Need to Address Aging Legacy Systems,” GAO.gov, May 25, 2016, available at <www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-696T>.
18 “Federal Agencies: Reliance on Outdated and Unsupported Information Technology: A Ticking Time Bomb,” hearings before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, 114th Cong., testimony of the Honorable Tony Scott, available at <https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2016-05-25-Scott-Testimony-OMB.pdf>.
19 White House Fact Sheet, “Cybersecurity National Action Plan.”
20 GAO, Building the 21st Century Digital Government, available at <https://18f.gsa.gov/>.