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## Key Points

- ◆ Fifteen years into the era of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, U.S. influence on his inner circle and support base, the new generation of Turkish strategic thinkers, and the Turkish public at large has diminished rather than improved. American Turkey watchers have grown frustrated with perceived divergence of interests, values, and agendas. A growing number consider Erdoğan and his inner circle autocratic, difficult, ideologically extreme, and dangerous.
- ◆ U.S. interests would be better served by avoiding confrontation and maintaining close military-to-military cooperation while also pressing for democratization in a patient, low-profile manner. The emerging Turkish think tank sector offers opportunities for doing just that. The sector has grown dramatically over the past 20 years and offers a window for better understanding the revolution in Turkish strategic thinking that now perplexes many American observers. Engaging Turkey's think tanks would support democratization.
- ◆ The United States should participate in Turkish think tank events, invite their leaders to the United States, use microgrants to strengthen liberal think tanks, and collaborate on some studies. This would improve understanding of Turkish strategic thought, broaden Turkish policy debate, and encourage democratization.

# Supporting Democracy in Erdoğan's Turkey: The Role of Think Tanks

by Richard H.M. Outzen and Ryan Schwing

**T**his paper examines the Turkish think tank sector as part of a strategy to invest in Turkish democratization in a manner that does not prejudice security cooperation or the broader bilateral relationship. The United States for over 60 years has promoted a Turkey that is politically stable, economically prosperous, militarily capable, and democratically mature.<sup>1</sup> As we head into 2016, the good news is that Turkey has had a party capable of ruling and winning elections for 14 years, is a G20 economy, retains one of the strongest military and security establishments in the world, and has established civilian authority over the military in a durable manner. The bad news is that this substantial progress has not resulted in a more transparent government fully committed to Western democratic norms. Instead the result has been a frequently unpredictable ally led by an increasingly authoritarian, albeit popular President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who flouts Western norms with relish and deviates from Western strategic consensus with ease. The sustained dialogue, mutual understanding, consultation, and compromise that mark good partnerships are noticeably absent—and the formerly substantial American influence over Turkish policymaking is greatly diminished. At the same time, the United States has an image problem to accompany its influence deficit, having experienced a sustained loss of trust among the Turkish public.<sup>2</sup>

The inescapable fact is that Turkey is a far less dependent and far less tractable partner for the United States today than at any time during their bilateral relationship. The Turks have clearly laid out a more independent foreign policy doctrine and done their best to implement it; American audiences have not fully appreciated this paradigm shift. Some observers—even long-time Turkey watchers—wrongly attribute divergence of interest or policy to Islamist ideology, or Erdoğan's ego and caprice. Moreover, they fail to appreciate the fundamental

changes in Turkish strategic thinking, which are perhaps best exemplified by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's best-selling 2001 work *Strategic Depth*.<sup>3</sup> Davutoğlu argued that Turkey's longstanding foreign policy identification with the West and aloofness from its neighbors badly needed revision and that Turkey could improve the impact of its trade, diplomacy, and security efforts by pursuing a more independent and multilateral approach. That fundamental shift has occurred, and is unlikely to revert even when Erdoğan is no longer running the country. U.S. policymakers have three options with Erdoğan's more powerful, less predictable, and imperfectly democratic Turkey: stop treating it as an ally, move to a fully

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## Turkey is too important to simply walk away from—on Syria, Iraq, the Ukraine, energy corridors, and a host of other issues

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transactional relationship, or exercise some patience on the reform path while building on common interests.

Turkey, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ally with an important geostrategic position, is too important to simply walk away from—on Syria, Iraq, the Ukraine, energy corridors, and a host of other issues. Europe seems to have chosen the second option, by acceding to Erdoğan's requests for financial support and reopening European Union (EU) accession talks in exchange for more cooperation on refugees.<sup>4</sup> The United States could pursue the third option of building a better partnership based on common interests because it has the advantage of robust military-to-military ties undergirding the relationship, and new opportunities have opened up for engaging Turkish policy actors and the broader population. The growing prominence of the Turkish think tank sector presents one such opportunity to engage with and invest in organizations that produce thoughtful and professional analysis, that are insulated from the polarizing currents of domestic politics, which

create friction at the government-to-government level, and that are trying to understand and explain the bilateral relationship to Turkish readers in ways that might be instructive for American audiences, too.<sup>5</sup>

## Erdoğan Firmly in Control

Turkey's November 1, 2015, elections mark an important turning point in Turkish politics: for the first time since coming to power in 2003, President Erdoğan now has full control over the state apparatus that he has reshaped for over a decade.<sup>6</sup> A variety of checks and balances restrained him over the years: a staunchly secular president (Ahmet Necdet Sezer) until 2007; antagonists in the military, bureaucracy, and press through 2012; street protests in 2013; a challenge from Fethullah Gülen's *hizmet* movement in 2013 and 2014; and finally the threat of a countervailing political coalition in 2015.<sup>7</sup> He has now surmounted these obstacles through a combination of patience, strategic bargaining, manipulation of judicial and tax systems, an increasingly heavy hand in security matters, diffusion of his supporters throughout state institutions, and successful populist appeals.<sup>8</sup> With a presidential term and parliamentary majority through 2019, he now enjoys a level of authority unprecedented in Turkey since the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, virtually free from internal challenge.

Having a strong leader without serious domestic challenges might appeal to Turkish voters in uncertain times, and it undoubtedly affords Erdoğan a freer hand in shaping economic and security policies.<sup>9</sup> It is mixed news for Turkey's partners in Washington, though, since the further maturation of Turkey's democracy remains an American interest, and Erdoğan seems most comfortable sustaining an illiberal democracy.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, regional events have made Turkey's strategic cooperation with the United States more indispensable than ever, with the Syrian civil war, counter-Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant campaign, stability in Iraq, refugees in Europe, and deterrence of Russia comprising an illustrative short list. The dilemma for American policymakers is how to maximize strategic cooperation without ignoring or condoning authoritarian tendencies.

It is not an entirely new dilemma. Turkey has been a NATO Ally of the United States since 1952, and even in the better times bilateral relations were marked by tension and misalignment over Cyprus, the Kurds, human rights, and a host of other issues. It only seems worse this time because many observers saw Erdoğan and his Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, or AKP) as a way to end, not update, the endemic tension between strategic partnership and democratic deficits.<sup>11</sup> Turkey's increasing regional and global weight in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has complicated rather than simplified relations with the United States.<sup>12</sup> With Erdoğan's increasingly autocratic style exacerbating fundamental differences on regional strategy, the U.S.-Turkish relationship has been increasingly tense in tone and short on trust, at least beyond the fairly narrow bounds of security cooperation.<sup>13</sup> While it is revealing that President Barack Obama went from counting Erdoğan among his five closest counterparts in 2012 to barely speaking to him by the middle of his second term, it may be even more telling that numerous observers have begun to doubt whether Turkey remains or should be an Ally at all.<sup>14</sup>

There would be significant costs associated with either giving up on Turkey as an ally or giving up hope for greater democratization to preserve cooperation. The stakes are potentially quite high if the United States seeks to sideline Turkey altogether—such a move could weaken NATO, destabilize the region further, and make the likelihood of a democratic resurgence even more remote. The fact is that Turkey is a G20 economy, still a functioning Muslim-majority democracy, and has the ability to partner with or help frustrate the United States and its other allies on a host of regional issues. Furthermore, some argue that Erdoğan now has a far more secure domestic power base and political clout than his military predecessors ever enjoyed, making it even less advisable to antagonize him and less feasible to sideline him.<sup>15</sup>

It is hard to see how high-profile political snubs, public censure, positioning the Kurds as our primary regional ally, and other measures likely to disrupt the bilateral relationship might contribute to our goals in the re-

gion. On the other hand, it might be possible to conduct bilateral relations on a dual track: sustain robust partnership with Turkey on regional security and diplomatic matters, while pushing for democratization indirectly by expanding outreach to Turkey's business and civil society sectors. By broadening engagement with these sectors, it might be possible to lay the groundwork for greater commitment to pluralism in the generation of leaders that will follow Erdoğan.

Economic liberalization in the 1980s and political reforms in the 1990s opened the door to new players and new voices in Turkish society, a liberalization that occurred despite the authoritarian traditions of the political

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and military elites of the day. Late-stage Turkish military tutelage allowed civil society to flourish; the Turkish case shows that continued engagement and incentives can affect the process. If civil society could emerge as an engine of democratic broadening under a watchful military, it stands to reason that certain components of that sector can develop greater influence and political effectiveness under Erdoğan's evolving illiberalism as well. Turkey's think tank sector has the potential to be the next locus of democratic development even during a period of increasing authoritarianism within the organs of state.

## **Democratizing Under Watchful Eyes**

Traditionally, political decisionmaking in Turkey has been consolidated in the hands of political elites, and political participation has remained relatively narrow.<sup>16</sup>

Deference to centralized authority continued as a main theme in Turkish politics well after the advent of competitive elections in 1950 and was long accepted as a necessary or natural characteristic of Turkish politics by significant portions of the civilian population.<sup>17</sup>

A fundamental change occurred following the 1980 coup, after which the military ceded authority to the elected government over economic matters and foreign policy.<sup>18</sup> The economic liberalization during the Turgut Özal years (1983–1993) led not only to a greater voice in policy matters for influential business leaders but also to the rise of a new class of businessmen with a fundamentally different outlook on governance and the nature of the state.<sup>19</sup> There followed a restrained struggle for power between the military-supported state institutions and the rising “pious” businessmen, a struggle that

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moderated the Islamists while prying reforms out of the government gradually.<sup>20</sup>

The process was accelerated by Turkey’s drive for membership in the European Union, which required that the military accede to a number of political reforms to limit its own power and reform state institutions. The reforms ultimately stalled but not before a significant number were implemented.<sup>21</sup> Before Erdoğan entered national-level politics, the military had already agreed to measures that significantly scaled back its powers to shape national policy. This process demonstrates that authoritarianism in the Turkish context was far from absolute and could be rolled back with the proper incentives and manner of engagement.<sup>22</sup>

The rise of the AKP in 2002 marked a more decisive phase in the end to military-led authoritarianism, but

it depended directly on two key preceding events during the 1997–1999 period. During this period the AKP explicitly disavowed Islamic politics in favor of conservative democratic politics and pluralism and began assembling a broader coalition that drew in non-Islamist groups—Islamists, pious businessmen, anti-militarist liberals, moderate Kurds, and others seeking to end the era of military tutelage by working within the electoral system as it had been constructed and enforced by the Kemalist elites.<sup>23</sup> In a sense, the party had been forced by the military-imposed restrictions to transform from a truly Islamist party such as its immediate predecessors (Fazilet Partisi and Refah Partisi) into a more pious version of previous center-right parties (Doğru Yol, Anavatan, Adalet, and Demokrat parties of the 1990s, 1980s, 1960s–1970s, and 1950s, respectively).<sup>24</sup>

Under Erdoğan’s leadership, the AKP presided over a decade of political reform, economic resurgence, and foreign policy dynamism. Some observers believed that Turkey was on the road to a permanent democratic consolidation, with Erdoğan destined to be remembered as the great democratizer in Turkish history. Then a series of events in 2011–2012 changed his approach—some might say allowed him to revert to type.<sup>25</sup> The war in Syria, pressure from Gülen’s movement, and the failure of his peace initiative with the Kurdish Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) all played a role in Erdoğan’s increasing intolerance of dissent in the press or in the streets. Skeptics believe that democracy was in any case never more than instrumental to Erdoğan and AKP, a way to hegemonize a conservative Muslim order rather than an end unto itself.<sup>26</sup> After 2012 he made peace with the military, consolidated control over the bureaucracy by rooting out Gülenists, and turned to the business of transforming Turkey in accordance with his vision for the centennial of the republic in 2023.<sup>27</sup>

Turkey’s stop-and-go democratization and Erdoğan’s evolution from Islamist to democrat to popular authoritarian have been disappointing. The United States, however, has not been left without options. Democratization from the 1990s through 2011 left Turkey with a far more

robust civil society than during previous authoritarian turns or other crises in bilateral relations. It may be fair that critics question whether Turkey is a predictable or reliable ally, but it is ahistorical to portray Turkish intractability as unique to the Erdoğan era. Turkey has always been a difficult and highly suspicious Ally, albeit one worth the investment. For the Turks, the enduring central dilemma of their relationship with the United States has been how to maintain cooperation in critical areas without becoming dependent or subordinating their own interests to American ones.<sup>28</sup>

Some observers are making the case that the United States should significantly downgrade ties with Erdoğan's Turkey, but the results would be counterproductive.<sup>29</sup> We have seen how that plays out to the detriment of both parties, as it did after the Cyprus arms embargo of the 1970s. On the other hand, simply continuing business as usual with an increasingly autocratic regime, as the United States arguably did after the 1997 "postmodern coup," gives short shrift to American values.<sup>30</sup> Our policy options need not be restricted to punish or ignore, however.

Faced with two separate and sometimes conflicting interests—fostering democratization and seamless security cooperation—U.S. interests might be better served by developing a two-track approach that neither antagonizes nor lionizes Turkey's increasingly authoritarian but increasingly well-entrenched leader. The first track is continued close military-to-military cooperation and consultation with Erdoğan and his key advisors, especially National Intelligence Organization (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı) chief Hakan Fidan, Prime Minister Davutoğlu, and the military leadership.<sup>31</sup> The second track is to continue to pressure for democratization in a more patient, low-profile manner—that is, through the business and civil society sectors.

## The Long View on Democratic Maturation

There are strong reasons to think that the United States will have better luck fostering democratic maturity in Turkey through the two-track approach rather than a

more direct, punitive, or demonstrative approach. One reason is economic: stability sustains economic growth, and research shows that countries experiencing rapid economic growth under authoritarian leaders tend to experience significant democratization once those leaders pass from the scene. Turkey fits this model, and unless Erdoğan finds and grooms a successor who equals his blend of personal popularity, political savvy, and timing, the constricting grip on rights and liberties is destined to slip.<sup>32</sup>

Meanwhile, the period of remarkable economic growth Turkey has experienced since 2002 has *not* been reflected in bilateral trade and cooperation with the United States. For instance, the American share of Turkish trade dropped from 8.2 percent in 1999 to 5.5 percent in 2010. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has cited a number of steps that could improve the scope and quality of U.S.-Turkey trade and investment flows, such as a comprehensive trade framework agreement.<sup>33</sup> Vesting the United States and Turkey in one another's economic success will not only reinforce the virtuous cycle of prosperity and democratization but also offset somewhat the weight of policy considerations driven by Turkey's close economic ties with Iran, Russia, and other nondemocratic states. A punishment-oriented response to Erdoğan forecloses that possibility.

On the other hand, a long-term perspective on Turkey's democratic evolution would allow the United States to take advantage of the growing market for policy analysis that has accompanied Turkey's economic and political liberalization over the past several decades. As the bounds of public discourse on regional and security matters broadened, Turkish public opinion responded more energetically on issues such as the Iraq War and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, prompting scholars and experts to form organizations focused on policy analysis.<sup>34</sup> Islamist intellectuals and other supporters of the AKP were particularly active in the expansion of this sector:

*The AKP's ten years in power has created the new technocratic elite embracing a realist discourse which is best exemplified by the rising status of the*

*foreign policy experts. It is not a coincidence that many young Muslims are now driven toward such strategic areas as the international relations and security studies in tandem with the AKP's increasing search for being a regional power. The mushrooming of many think tanks close to the government is a recent phenomenon in Turkey that exemplifies [the] increasing preponderance of an intellectual current that can be referred [to] as "strategism." These intellectuals have turned [out] to be very crucial in producing significant domestic legitimacy for the AKP around a discourse emphasizing Turkey's increasing regional power.<sup>35</sup>*

Turkish think tanks are indicative of these trends in Turkish public discourse. They do not currently exercise the sort of influence they do in the United States or certain European countries, but they do represent and help explain the marketplace of policy and strategy thought in Turkey, which is a good starting point for better understanding where the United States could partner with voices that would strengthen pluralism in the Turkish political environment.

## Why Think Tanks?

Civil society is a crucial aspect of overall democratic development, but think tanks are a uniquely valuable and important type of civil society organization in this regard. In modern democracies, think tanks serve as an important bridge between academia and the political system. They serve as incubators for both young scholars to develop their skills before moving into the government or academic spheres and experts leaving those establishments to use their skills and experience to further think tank research. The idea of a revolving door system of experts switching between think tanks, academia, and government is now better accepted in the United States than movement between private industry and government. Publications produced by think tanks convey expert insights without taint of profit motive or the constraints imposed by elected or appointed

office. This marketplace of ideas frequently informs or presages development of policy and strategy within government.<sup>36</sup>

Think tanks are a global and increasingly interconnected phenomenon. By bridging the gaps between citizens and governments, and by exercising influence in regional and global networks, they have become integral participants in policy processes in virtually every nation.<sup>37</sup> There are over 6,000 active think tanks in 182 countries as of 2015, and trends indicate they will continue to grow both in number and influence. That growth makes them an unavoidable dimension in understanding and managing bilateral and regional relationships in an increasingly complex, information-flooded world.<sup>38</sup>

In countries with developing democratic systems, think tanks play a somewhat different but still important role. They serve as an important indicator of democratization, fostering debate and increasing public understanding of political developments. The independent analysis and policy suggestions of think tanks encourage further accountable and pluralistic governance, helping keep developing democracies on track.<sup>39</sup> Think tanks both reflect democratic opening and change when they proliferate and help sustain and mature democratic culture by stimulating public debate and improving public understanding of national political issues. As the National Endowment for the Development of Democracy notes, the proliferation of think tanks representing a variety of intellectual and political viewpoints can play an important role in deepening democratic culture.<sup>40</sup>

The first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century saw a dramatic expansion in the size of Turkey's think tank sector.<sup>41</sup> The "explosive growth" in the number and productivity of Turkish think tanks (*düşünce kuruluşları*) in the 2000s reflects growing pluralism.<sup>42</sup> As Erdoğan and the AKP party have increasingly come to dominate state institutions, and have disarmed the traditional restraining features of the press and military, civil society could be the

most formidable check on authoritarianism left in the Turkish body politic.<sup>43</sup>

## Strengths and Weaknesses of the Turkish Think Tank Sector

The birth and expansion of a Turkish think tank sector have not produced a uniform standard of intellectually rigorous and constructive policy debate, but this is not surprising in what amounts to a startup sector for Turks. At this stage many Turkish think tanks still serve instrumental purposes for competing elites within Turkey's highly polarized political system rather than generating independent ideas.<sup>44</sup> Self-censorship of media due to political co-optation of ownership was a factor in Freedom House moving Turkey's press freedom ranking from "Partially Free" to "Not Free" in the past several years, and the nascent think tank sector faces a similar challenge in terms of separating policy analysis from sponsor funding.<sup>45</sup> Turkey's think tanks provide important venues for discussing and debating policy but have been used more to provide access to decisionmakers and policy shapers rather than centers for the production of independent thought.<sup>46</sup> Turkey's think tank sector is a potential force for positive democratic development, but most organizations struggle with insufficient resources, ambivalence from business and government circles, and immature publishing and outreach capabilities. That status seems certain to be upgraded in the coming decade.

An early 2013 comment by Prime Minister Erdoğan was the first official recognition of the importance of think tanks to Turkish foreign policy. He stated that government officials should be involved in the creation of think tanks with the purpose of promoting Turkish policy to the rest of the world.<sup>47</sup> It is notable that he identifies the purpose of think tanks as support of government policies rather than objective input to the same.

The Turkish think tank community faces common startup problems, such as difficulty securing and retaining funding, establishing influence within the political environment, and earning the recognition and trust of the public. High personnel turnover is another problem;

most Turkish think tank researchers are not careerists and see think tank work as a temporary position after a political or military career or as a part-time position for academics.<sup>48</sup>

It is also true that given Turkey's authoritarian history, society—including academia—has a less well-established tradition of questioning and criticizing authority. This contributes to a perception that think tanks are a tool to augment or propagate Turkish policy rather than create it.<sup>49</sup> There is similarly no strong tradition or precedent for think tanks to offer clear alternative policy ideas to government, even less so for them to take those ideas to the public in efforts to persuade and influence. Historically, the government has been unreceptive to outside ideas. Government information and access to officials are

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usually closed to those outside of the government unless they have personal connections.<sup>50</sup>

Another major problem for the development of politically influential think tanks is funding. A number of Turkish think tanks, and nearly all the major Turkish media outlets, are owned by businessmen with interests in other fields. Many of these owners have business interests that benefit from government contracts. When a certain contract is open for bids, these owners try to limit antigovernment rhetoric of the publications under their control. A recent study of Turkish think tanks found few that were clearly critical of the established policies, and those that were typically did not offer constructive alternatives.<sup>51</sup> Sensitivity to funding and political access have led some Turkish organizations to blur the line between

## Turkey's Think Tanks: Where to Engage

Where the United States should engage is not self-evident. It depends on U.S. goals and an accurate understanding of the think tanks. For example, if the United States wanted to explore new areas of military cooperation, it might engage ORSAM, or for economic cooperation, TEPAV. If the goal is to plant a seed or gain deeper insights on current Turkish government priorities, SAM, SETA, or TASAM would be better choices. If the U.S. objective is to reinforce liberalizing trends, it might support TESEV, BILGESAM, or USAK. What follows in the table below is a brief summary of the current orientation of some likely contenders for U.S. attention.

Think Tank	Founded	Affiliation	Orientation	Status	Comment
ASE	2011	Independent	Policy	Low output	EU and governance focus
BILGESAM <sup>‡</sup>	2008	Independent	Policy	Low output	Independent, objective, and independent is the goal; includes both retired officials and professional academics
EDAM <sup>†</sup>	2008	Quasi-government	Policy	Major	Economic focus
GPoT <sup>‡</sup>	2009	University	Public scholarship	Active	Peace/reconciliation focus
LDT <sup>‡</sup>	1992	Independent	Public scholarship	Active	Liberal
ORSAM	2009	Independent	Public scholarship	Active	Conducts some joint studies with the military's in-house think tank; centrist; has exercised an "early warning function" for crises in the Caucasus and Middle East
SAM	1995	Government	Public scholarship	Active	Official think tank established by the Foreign Ministry; consistently follows line parallel to government; Davutoğlu's influence is heavy
SETA <sup>†</sup>	2005	Quasi-government	Public scholarship	Major	Foreign policy focus; founded shortly after the AKP took party in 2002; senior officials come to their events both in Turkey and at their U.S. office
TASAM <sup>†</sup>	2003	Quasi-government	Policy	Major	Close to government; follows a moderately nationalist line
TEPAV <sup>*</sup>	2004	Independent	Public scholarship	Major	Tied to the Turkish Chamber of Commerce; focuses on economics, foreign policy, governance, and Turkey's neighboring states
TESEV <sup>*</sup>	1994	Independent	Public scholarship	Major	Liberal inclination; bold commentary on current events, and libertarian on the Kurdish issue and constitutional reform



Think Tank	Founded	Affiliation	Orientation	Status	Comment
UKAM <sup>‡</sup>	2013	Independent	Policy	Active	Kurdish focus
USAK <sup>*</sup>	2004	Independent	Public scholarship	Major	Considered moderate, but nationalist for most of the past decade; under new management; taken a more liberal direction
YYTE <sup>‡</sup>	2006	Independent	Policy	Active	Secular nationalist

Key: <sup>\*</sup>Suitable partner for major U.S. think tanks; <sup>†</sup>High payoff for official engagement; <sup>‡</sup>Developmental interest  
ASE: Ankara Strateji Enstitüsü (Ankara Strategy Institute)  
BILGESAM: Bilgi Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies)  
EDAM: Ekonomi ve Dış Politika Araştırma Merkezi (Economic and Foreign Policy Research Center)  
GPoT: Global Political Trends Center  
LDT: Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu (Association for Liberal Thinking)  
ORSAM: Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Middle East Strategic Studies Center)  
SAM: Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Center for Strategic Research)  
SETA: Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research)  
TASAM: Türk Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies)  
TEPAV: Türk Ekonomi ve Politik Araştırma Vakfı (Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey)  
TESEV: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation)  
UKAM: Uluslararası Küresel Araştırmalar Merkezi (International Studies Center)  
USAK: Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu (International Strategic Research Organization)  
YYTE: Yirmibirinci Yüzyıl Türkiye Enstitüsü (21<sup>st</sup>-Century Turkey Institute)

think tanks, which engage in objective research for public policy, and so-called advocacy tanks, which embrace ideological biases in their research subjects and results.<sup>52</sup> While this can be a problem in any country, the problem in Turkey is exacerbated by the government's authoritarian bent.<sup>53</sup>

Despite their shortcomings, think tanks in Turkey matter a great deal more in 2016 than they did 10 or 20 years ago. The proliferation of think tanks is evidence of this, as is the fact that important political players have all sought to extend their voices into the think tank realm—including the dominant political parties, business organizations, and a wide spectrum of social and ideological interests. Increasingly these think tanks are able to influence or craft policy, and senior leaders from the political class and state bureaucracy have called for increased interaction with foreign think tanks and better integration of domestic think tanks in Turkish policymaking.<sup>54</sup> One example is the adoption of a “Turkey 2023” agenda for policy goals that was developed within a Turkish think tank and then adopted by the AKP gov-

ernment.<sup>55</sup> A second example is the use of think tanks as a forum for retired military and diplomatic officials to endorse a more conciliatory policy toward Turkey's Kurds, impossible a decade earlier due to both an operative taboo against such policy discussions and a previous lack of fora for such discussions.<sup>56</sup> While the Turkish bureaucracy, military, and political elites traditionally have been closed systems not inclined to incorporate advice from external actors, NATO membership and the EU accession process have opened these state sectors somewhat to outside advice and expertise. Turkey's EU accession strategy, for instance, endorses the consultative role of think tanks and civil society more generally. Turkey's think tank sector is poised to grow further, in both the number of entrants in the sector and the influence they exercise over policy and governmental strategies.<sup>57</sup>

Turkey's political leaders have a long-term vision for mature policy and strategy production that indicates solid commitment to developing the sector over time.<sup>58</sup> Prime Minister Davutoğlu highlighted the need to develop think tanks as a source of new policy ideas

and strategic outreach before the AKP's rise to power in 2001.<sup>59</sup> A broader network of partnerships between U.S. think tanks and Turkish counterparts could help move the sector in this direction. Even small amounts of funding and expertise from outside would help improve the quality of policy analysis and advice, freeing advocacy from the narrow confines of patronage politics and putting it at the service of rigorous policy debate.

## Survey of Turkish Think Tanks

There are now dozens of think tanks operating in Turkey—31 by count of the latest survey of global think tanks.<sup>60</sup> This could be an underestimate as a review of the list indicates omission of some small, marginal, and

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### the development of the sector in the United States in the 20<sup>th</sup> century can be seen as a milestone in the broadening and maturation of American democracy

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“startup” think tanks focused primarily on a Turkish-speaking audience. Though many Turkish think tanks are small, especially by Western standards, some have risen to national and even international prominence. In many countries it is common for think tanks to close or undergo restructuring fairly rapidly, and so it is in Turkey. Many think tanks appear to have operated for 5 years or less and then ceased regular publication and activity. However, some that have endured and made their mark on policy debate are worthy of note. There are clear differences in resources and output between the top-tier organizations, such as SETA (Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı, or Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research), USAK (Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu, or International Strategic Research Organization), and TESEV (Türkiye Ekonomik Ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı, or Turkish Economic

and Social Studies Foundation), and most of the smaller organizations.

For the sake of comparison, in the United States there are over 1,800 think tanks.<sup>61</sup> American think tanks play several constructive roles in the political process in the United States: research, concept development, agenda-setting, advocacy and debate, and development of policy expertise. The development of the sector in the United States in the 20<sup>th</sup> century can be seen as a milestone in the broadening and maturation of American democracy.<sup>62</sup> Clearly Turkish think tanks have not matured to the same point, lagging those in neighboring countries such as Egypt, Israel, and even Palestine.<sup>63</sup>

Turkish think tanks can be broken down into several categories based on affiliation, level of productivity, primary audience, or ideological/social orientation. Typologies have been suggested based on the affiliation of think tanks (corporate, university, independent, and so forth) or on their mode of operation (advocacy oriented or teaching oriented, for instance).<sup>64</sup> The sidebar and table present a simplified typology of the most prominent Turkish think tanks, but is hardly exhaustive.

Those listed with an orientation toward public scholarship produce a broad array of publications and events addressing a fairly broad audience. Those listed under policy orientation tend to address a narrower audience on a narrower spectrum of topics, typically to reinforce or support certain ideological or interest positions. Those under low output maintain a Web presence and apparent schedule of activity but have had only irregular events and publications over several months or years. Several of the think tanks have been listed on the industry standard list of best global and regional think tanks.<sup>65</sup> Several have partnered with U.S. think tanks and governmental organizations to conduct research, publications, and conferences.<sup>66</sup>

In addition to those organizations listed on the chart, others bear mention. One is the DPE (Dışişleri Politika Enstitüsü, or Foreign Policy Institute), perhaps the earliest think tank, with a founding date of 1974. Another is ASAM (Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, or Eurasian Strategic Research Center), which

was created in the wake of the 1997 coup as an attempt to find common policy ground between the business, military, and Kemalist elites. Its funding became scarce once the AKP consolidated power. There have been nationalist think tanks with intermittent activities and production, such as TURKSAM (Türk Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Stratejik Araştırma Merkezi, or Turkish Center for International Relations and Strategic Analysis), and TURANSAM (Türk Dünyası Strateji Araştırma Merkezi, or Turkish World Strategic Research Center). TUSAM (Türk Ulusal Stratejik Araştırma Merkezi, or Turkish National Security Strategic Research Center) was a leftist-nationalist think tank closely linked with the secularist *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi* newspaper, through which it published a weekly “strategy” supplement in the late 2000s. TUSAM merits mention for its unusual sponsorship; it was financed by the management of the Turkish metal workers’ union, Metal-İş Sendikası. The center was closed after a change of union management in 2009. USTAD (Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmaları Derneği, or the International Strategic Research and Analysis Center) was founded in 2011 as a pro-AKP institute working on outreach toward Turkish Kurds.

One key lesson of the two-decade effervescence in Turkey’s think tank sector is that foreign policy analysis and advocacy have long since surpassed the span of control of a particular governing elite, secular or Islamist. Nonideological, geopolitics-based foreign policy debate has appeared among all major political groups since the 1990s, left, right, and center.<sup>67</sup> A second key lesson is that this breadth offers Turkey’s international partners an opportunity to engage in and encourage the competition of ideas regarding Turkey’s foreign and security policies on an academic and analytic level without directly challenging or confronting the AKP in a manner that might compromise sensitive regional interests and equities.

## Policy Recommendations

Despite Turkey’s many problems—the war in Syria, Erdoğan’s increasingly autocratic methods, and the lingering PKK insurgency—public support for democrati-

zation remains strong. Polling shows a solid majority of Turks support further democratization and indeed see it as the only way forward.<sup>68</sup> For perhaps the first time in Turkey’s history, there is a legitimate and realistic political alternative to insurgency for Kurds and leftists seeking greater rights from the Turkish state.<sup>69</sup> While it seems clear that Erdoğan has little appetite for more democratization, the think tank sector can serve as a key pillar of U.S. strategy to maintain momentum toward a more stable and open political society. Here are some ways the United States could broaden engagement with Turkish think tanks and help them contribute in substantive and helpful ways to the bilateral relationship:

- ◆ Increase direct engagement between the U.S. Government and leading Turkish think tanks. Senior visitors from the Departments of Defense and State, as well as Congress, should include Turkish think tanks on their itineraries during travel to Turkey. This would raise the profile and relevance of those think tanks on the Turkish political scene and would give more options for floating and exchanging ideas with the Turkish government through its trusted organizations. Visits to SETA, TASAM (Türk Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, or Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies), and EDAM (Ekonomi ve Dış Politika Araştırmalar Merkezi, or Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies) would be particularly useful in this regard.

- ◆ Funding for Turkish think tanks is sparse, and this is a major obstacle to development of opposition-aligned, smaller think tanks—liberal, secularist, and Kurdish. The largest Turkish think tank does only \$1 million of business annually, and the smaller ones generally operate on less than \$250,000.<sup>70</sup> Micro-grants of several hundred thousand dollars, preferably through the U.S. Agency for International Development, should be used to strengthen think tanks such as BILGESAM (Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, or Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies), UKAM (Uluslararası Kültürel Araştırmalar Merkezi, or International Cultural Research Center), GPoT (Global

Political Trends Center), LDT (Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu, or Association for Liberal Thinking), and YYTE (Yirmibirinci Yüzyil Türkiye Enstitüsü, or 21<sup>st</sup>-Century Turkey Institute).

◆ Congress should allocate study monies that specify collaboration with Turkish think tanks on a variety of topics: Turkey-related, bilateral, regional, or global. This could stimulate partnerships between large U.S. think tanks and some of the most professional Turkish organizations, such as TEPAV (Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı, or Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey), TESEV, and USAK.

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◆ Engage through visitor programs (such as the State Department's International Visitor Leadership Program) to bring Turkish think tank leaders and scholars to the United States to meet with officials and counterparts in the U.S. think tank sector.

◆ Support the establishment of American studies programs in Turkey and Turkish studies programs in the U.S. in conjunction with Turkish think tanks, either those affiliated with universities or independent institutes.

These steps would not remove all friction between the policies and strategies of the two states given the acknowledged, more independent turn in Turkey's international identity in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. But they would strengthen Turkish policy debate, encourage democratization over the long-term, and open a window for the United States on the nuances of evolving Turkish

strategic thought. There are other areas where we could improve bilateral ties: increasing the \$19 billion volume in annual trade, for instance, which is one of the lowest bilateral volumes among G20 nations.<sup>71</sup> Nor should we neglect the bedrock of the bilateral relationship, security cooperation within NATO and in several different regions of the world, which remains strong and active.

Think tanks are one way modern nations develop deeper understanding of their circumstances, broaden policy options, improve performance, and exercise influence, both at home and abroad. They are another front in the ongoing struggle to promote competing political visions. Vladimir Putin has targeted foreign and domestic think tanks in Russia as impediments to his absolute authority.<sup>72</sup> And on occasion U.S. think tanks have been vilified in Turkey for being overly critical of the Turks and being full of sinister plots against their country.<sup>73</sup> But for now Erdoğan and his government have not acted on that misperception. Instead, and as a matter of stated principle, they have made a commitment to seeing the Turkish think tank sector flourish. That leaves us an important opening and a way to gain insights on and strengthen pro-Western elements in Turkey's strategic debates. The outcome will be a clearer understanding of our shared interests and concerns and a broader set of options for how to ameliorate the areas in which we do not agree. Failure to do so risks perpetuation of a frustrating status quo and could lead us into sharper conflict with the Turks, conflict that would benefit neither party but would generate great satisfaction in Tehran and Moscow.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Remarks by the President at a Dinner Given in His Honor by President Bayar," December 6, 1959, available at <[www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11596](http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11596)>.

<sup>2</sup>Jacob Poushter, "The Turkish People Don't Look Favorably upon the U.S., or Any Other Country, Really," Pew Research Center, October 31, 2014, available at <[www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/31/the-turkish-people-dont-look-favorably-upon-the-u-s-or-any-other-country-really/](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/31/the-turkish-people-dont-look-favorably-upon-the-u-s-or-any-other-country-really/)>.

<sup>3</sup>Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik* [Strategic Depth] (Istanbul: Kure Yayınları, 2001). The current author's forthcoming article on *Strategic Depth* will present a detailed analysis of its descriptive and prescriptive approaches for Turkish foreign policy.

<sup>4</sup>"Germany Ready to Support Turkey's EU Accession Process, Says Merkel," *DW.com*, October 18, 2015, available at <[www.dw.com/](http://www.dw.com/)>

en/germany-ready-to-support-turkeys-eu-accession-process-says-merkel/a-18789797>.

<sup>5</sup> Mehmet Yegin and Eyup Ersoy, *Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri: Çok Boyutlu Bir Ortaklığa Doğru* [Turkey-US Relations: Toward a Multidimensional Relationship], Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu Report 13-05, May 2013.

<sup>6</sup> Soner Cagaptay, "Erdoğan's Next Act," *Wall Street Journal* (online), November 4, 2015, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/erdogans-next-act-1446668849>.

<sup>7</sup> Fetullah Gülen is the founder of a movement that refers to itself as *bizmet* (Service); others call it *cemaat* (the Community). It links a series of schools, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations that operate in Turkey and a number of other countries, bound by a moderate, somewhat secretive brand of Islam rooted in the early 20<sup>th</sup>-century writings of Said Nursî. The Erdoğan government was once aligned with the Gülenists but came to view the organization as subversive, working to establish a "parallel state."

<sup>8</sup> On Erdoğan's new bargain with the military, see Halil Karaveli, "Turkey's Military Rulers," *New York Times*, September 11, 2015, available at <www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/opinion/turkeys-military-rulers.html>; and Ceylan Yeginsu, "Turkish Officers Convicted in 2012 Coup Case Are Released," *New York Times*, June 19, 2014, available at <www.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/world/europe/turkish-court-orders-release-of-officers-convicted-of-plotting-coup.html?\_r=0>. On his intimidation and co-optation of the press, see Freedom House, *Freedom of the Press 2015: Turkey*, April 2015, available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/turkey>. Svante E. Cornell has discussed Erdoğan's gradual assertion of control over Turkey's education system. See "The Islamization of Turkey: Erdoğan's Education Reforms," *The Turkey Analyst* 8, no. 16 (September 2015), available at <www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/437-the-islamization-of-turkey-erdogan-s-education-reforms.html>. Others have discussed his control over the judiciary, local government, and the police. On his successful populist appeals, see Mustafa Akyol, "How the AKP Dominated Yesterday's Elections in Turkey," *al-Monitor.com*, November 2, 2015, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/turkey-elections-akp-unexpected-victory-erdogan.html#>.

<sup>9</sup> Avaneesh Pandey, "Turkey Election Victory Gives Erdoğan a Chance for Economic Reform, but Fears Linger," *International Business Times*, November 3, 2015, available at <www.ibtimes.com/turkey-election-victory-gives-erdogan-chance-economic-reform-fears-linger-2166303>; and Murat Yetkin, "Ankara Ready for Operations on Three Fronts," *Radikal.com.tr*, November 10, 2015, available at <www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/murat-yetkin/ankarada-uc-cephede-harekt-hazirligi-1469409/>.

<sup>10</sup> Mustafa Akyol, "Erdoğan's Path of Illiberal Democracy," *al-Monitor.com*, July 2, 2014, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/akyol-erdogan-presidential-elections-akp-latin-american.html#>.

<sup>11</sup> Cenap Cakmak and Gokhan Guneyusu, "Turkish-American Relations During Obama Era: Unfulfilled Expectations," *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 2 (June 2013), 193–211; and Simon Waldman and Emre Caliskan, "Turkey's Democratic Deficit," *OpenDemocracy.net*, June 5, 2015, available at <www.opendemocracy.net/simon-waldman-emre-caliskan/turkey%E2%80%99s-democratic-deficit>.

<sup>12</sup> Soner Cagaptay, *The Rise of Turkey* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 6–10, 64–69.

<sup>13</sup> Cengiz Candar, "Does the U.S. Trust Turkey?" *al-Monitor.com*, September 4, 2014, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/turkey-iraq-syria-west-nato-usa-isis.html#>. Meanwhile military-to-military cooperation remains robust, including U.S. deployment to Incirlik and other bases, support for Turkey's anti-missile concerns, defense industrial cooperation, and coordination between U.S.

European Command and the Turkish General Staff—as confirmed to author by two senior contacts, one Turkish and one American.

<sup>14</sup> On Barack Obama and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, see Fareed Zakaria, "Inside Obama's World," *Time*, January 19, 2012, available at <http://swampland.time.com/2012/01/19/inside-obamas-world-the-president-talks-to-time-about-the-changing-nature-of-american-power/>; Scott Peterson, "Why President Obama Stopped Calling Turkish Leader Erdoğan," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 7, 2014, available <www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Under-the-Radar/2014/0307/Why-President-Obama-stopped-calling-Turkish-leader-Erdogan>; and Jack Moore, "Turkey Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: 'I No Longer Talk to Barack Obama,'" *International Business Times*, July 22, 2014, available at <www.ibtimes.co.uk/turkey-prime-minister-recep-tayyip-erdogan-i-no-longer-talk-barack-obama-1457837>. On questioning the Alliance, see Eric Edelman and Morton Abramowitz, "Turkey: An Increasingly Undependable Ally," Bipartisan Policy Center, April 2015.

<sup>15</sup> Halil Karaveli, "Turkey's Future: If Not a 'Big Finland,' Maybe a 'Small China?'" *The Turkey Analyst*, November 12, 2015, available at <http://turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/479-turkey-s-future-if-not-a-"big-finland"-maybe-a-"small-china">.

<sup>16</sup> Ira Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 597–600.

<sup>17</sup> Ihsan Dagı, "Democracy after Military Tutelage?" *TodaysZaman.com*, August 11, 2013, available at <www.todayszaman.com/columnists/ihsan-dagi\_323267-democracy-after-military-tutelage.html>. See also İlhan Uzgel, "Between Praetorianism and Democracy," *The Turkish Yearbook*, vol. 34 (2003), 177–211.

<sup>18</sup> The resignation of General Necip Torumtay, chief of the Turkish General Staff, was emblematic of this. See Mehmet Ali Birand and Soner Yalçın, *The Ozal: Bir Davanın Oyusu* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2001), 438–439.

<sup>19</sup> Uzgel, 208–211.

<sup>20</sup> Ömer Taşpınar, *Turkey: The New Model?* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, April 2012), available at <www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/04/24-turkey-new-model-taspinar>.

<sup>21</sup> David Capezza, "Turkey's Military Is a Catalyst for Reform," *Middle East Quarterly* 16, no. 3 (Summer 2009), 13–23, available at <www.meforum.org/2160/turkey-military-catalyst-for-reform>.

<sup>22</sup> Nil Satana, "Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy," *Armed Forces and Society* 34, no. 3 (April 2008), 357–388.

<sup>23</sup> Ziya Öniş, "Crises and Transformations in Turkish Political Economy," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (2009), 50–60.

<sup>24</sup> Ramazan Kilinc, "Critical Junctures, Catalysts, and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey," *Political Science Quarterly* 129, no. 2 (2014), 293–318.

<sup>25</sup> Birol Baskan, "News from the Turkish Front: Erdoğan's Gamble," *AlArabiya.com*, June 8, 2012, available at <www.alarabiya.net/views/2012/06/08/219404.html>.

<sup>26</sup> Yuksel Taskin, "Hegemonizing Conservative Democracy," *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 2 (2013), 292–310.

<sup>27</sup> Günter Seufert, *Erdoğan's "New Turkey": Restoring Authoritarianism in the Name of Democracy*, Stiftung Wirtschaft und Politik (SWP) Comments No. 44 (Berlin: SWP, October, 2014), available at <www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2014C44\_srt.pdf>.

<sup>28</sup> İlhan Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler," in *Türk Dis Politikası*, vol. 2, 1980–2001, ed. Baskin Oran, (Istanbul: İletişim Kitapları, 2001), 320–324.

<sup>29</sup> Eric Edelman and Morton Abramowitz, "Turkey: An Increasingly Unreliable Ally," Bipartisan Policy Center, April 2015, 29–32, available at <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/BPC-Turkey-Alliance.pdf>.

<sup>30</sup>The Cyprus arms embargo badly damaged bilateral ties and was lifted after several years without affecting the Turkish policy in question. See Murat Karagöz, "U.S. Arms Embargo Against Turkey—After 30 Years an Institutional Approach Toward U.S. Policy Making," *Perceptions* (Winter 2004–2005), 107–130, available at <<http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/MuratKaragoz1.pdf>>. The United States was silent enough about the postmodern coup of 1997 that some Turks believe America was behind it. See Hussein Gulerce, "Cengiz Çandar Said That . . .," *TodaysZaman.com*, April 30, 2014, available at <[www.todayszaman.com/columnists\\_cengiz-candar-said-that\\_346585.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists_cengiz-candar-said-that_346585.html)>.

<sup>31</sup>Adam Entous and Joe Parkinson, "Turkey's Spymaster Plots Own Course on Syria," *Wall Street Journal*, October 10, 2013, available at <<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303643304579107373585228330>>.

<sup>32</sup>Daniel Treisman, "Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover," *American Journal of Political Science* 59, no. 4 (October 2015), 927–942.

<sup>33</sup>Thomas Donohue and Umit Boyner, *U.S.–Turkish Economic Relations in a New Era: Analysis and Recommendations for a Stronger Strategic Partnership* (Washington, DC: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2012).

<sup>34</sup>Öniş.

<sup>35</sup>Taskin, 300–301.

<sup>36</sup>Richard N. Haass, "Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy Maker's Perspective," *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* 7, no. 3 (November 2002), available at <[http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271/dwoa\\_120909/ijpe1102.pdf](http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271/dwoa_120909/ijpe1102.pdf)>.

<sup>37</sup>James G. McGann, *2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, March 1, 2015), 8.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, 23–28.

<sup>39</sup>*Democracy Think Tanks in Action: Translating Research into Policy in Young and Emerging Democracies* (Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy, June 2013).

<sup>40</sup>Christopher Walker, "Democracy Think Tanks in Action: Translating Research into Policy in Young and Emerging Democracies," in *Democracy Think Tanks in Action*, 1–2.

<sup>41</sup>Özge Genç, "Enhancing the Policy Impact of Democracy Research: The Case of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation's Democratization Program," in *Democracy Think Tanks in Action*, 99–106.

<sup>42</sup>Serhat Güvenç, "Think Tanks and the Discipline of International Relations in Turkey," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* [International Relations] 4, no. 13 (Spring 2007), 137–144.

<sup>43</sup>Jeffrey Collins, "Troubles in Turkey Magnify Civil Society's Role," *WorldAffairs.org*, July 17, 2013, available at <[www.worldaffairs.org/blog/390-troubles-in-turkey-magnify-civil-societys-role](http://www.worldaffairs.org/blog/390-troubles-in-turkey-magnify-civil-societys-role)>.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 143.

<sup>45</sup>Karin Deutsch Karlekar and Jennifer Dunham, "Press Freedom in 2013: Media Freedom Hits Decade Low," *Freedom of the Press 2014* (Washington, DC: Freedom House, May 1, 2014), available at <<http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2014>>.

<sup>46</sup>Suat Kiniklioğlu, "Turkey's Think Tank Scene," *Hurriyet Daily News*, December 27, 2005, available at <[www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-think-tank-scene.aspx?pageID=438&n=turkeys-think-tank-scene-2005-12-27](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-think-tank-scene.aspx?pageID=438&n=turkeys-think-tank-scene-2005-12-27)>.

<sup>47</sup>Hasan Kanbolat, "Prime Minister Erdoğan and Turkish Think Tanks," *TodaysZaman.com*, February 18, 2013, available at <[www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail\\_getNewsById.action?newsId=307437](http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=307437)>.

<sup>48</sup>Mehmet Yegin, review of *Rise of Think Tanks: Foreign Policy and National Security Culture in Turkey*, by Bülent Aras, Şule Toktaş, and Ümit Kurt, *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 3 (2012), 203.

<sup>49</sup>Serhat Güvenç, "Seeking Influence in Foreign Policy-Making: Turkey's Experiment with Think-Tanks," conference paper presented

at the 21<sup>st</sup> IPSA World Congress of Political Science, July 16, 2009, 6. See also Şule Toktaş, "National Security Culture in Turkey: A Qualitative Study on Think Tanks," *Bilgi* 61 (Spring 2012), 245–264.

<sup>50</sup>Walker, 101–102.

<sup>51</sup>Toktaş.

<sup>52</sup>Andrew Rich, *Think-Tanks, Public Policy and the Politics of Expertise* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

<sup>53</sup>Kubilay Arin, "Turkish Think Tanks: The AKP's Policy Network from Neo-Gramscian and Neo-Ottoman Angles," *Portland State University Occasional Papers* 4, no. 1, (June 2015).

<sup>54</sup>Hasan Kanbolat, "Turkish Decision-Makers' Perceptions about Think Tanks," *TodaysZaman.com*, February 9, 2010, available at <[www.todayszaman.com/columnists\\_turkish-decision-makers-perceptions-about-think-tanks\\_200989.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists_turkish-decision-makers-perceptions-about-think-tanks_200989.html)>.

<sup>55</sup>Osman Nuri Aras, "Turkey's 2023 Goals: From Reality to Dream," *TodaysZaman.com*, August 21, 2014, available at <[www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa\\_turkeys-2023-goals-from-reality-to-dream\\_357254.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_turkeys-2023-goals-from-reality-to-dream_357254.html)>. See also "Turkey's Vision at its 100th Anniversary," *Tasam.org*, October 9, 2008, available at <[http://tasam.org/en/Icerik/3328/turkeys\\_vision\\_at\\_its\\_100th\\_anniversary](http://tasam.org/en/Icerik/3328/turkeys_vision_at_its_100th_anniversary)>.

<sup>56</sup>"More Cultural Rights for Kurds Argues Think Tank," *Hurriyet Daily News*, March 6, 2009, available at <[www.hurriyet.com.tr/more-cultural-rights-for-kurds-argues-think-tank-11146391](http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/more-cultural-rights-for-kurds-argues-think-tank-11146391)>.

<sup>57</sup>Nur Beler Levy, "A Brief Analysis of Think Tank Sector (Go to Think Tank Index Report) and the Turkish Case," *Tusiad.org.tr*, February 5, 2015.

<sup>58</sup>Aydin Nurhan, *Strategic Studies in Developing Countries* (Ankara: TASAM, 2014), available at <[http://tasam.org/Files/PDF/Raporlar/STR66\\_Strategic\\_Studies\\_in\\_Developing\\_Countries.pdf\\_63bcae09-e46f-463b-8083-1d2bf0dd5391.pdf](http://tasam.org/Files/PDF/Raporlar/STR66_Strategic_Studies_in_Developing_Countries.pdf_63bcae09-e46f-463b-8083-1d2bf0dd5391.pdf)>.

<sup>59</sup>Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, *Ahmet Davutoğlu: A New Era in Turkey's Foreign Policy? A Perspective from Cyprus* (Larnaca, Cyprus: European Rim Policy and Investment Council, July 28, 2009), available at <<http://erpic.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/erato-kozakou-marcoullis-ahmet-davutoglu-a-new-era-in-turkeys-foreign-policy.pdf>>. See also Davutoğlu, 48–50.

<sup>60</sup>Yusuf Çinar, "Think Tanks in Turkey: Insights for Success," *StrategicOutlook.org*, March 3, 2015, available at <[www.strategicoutlook.org/philosophy/news-think-tanks-in-turkey-insights-for-success.html](http://www.strategicoutlook.org/philosophy/news-think-tanks-in-turkey-insights-for-success.html)>.

<sup>61</sup>McGann, *2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report*, 54.

<sup>62</sup>James G. McGann, *Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the U.S.* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 2005), available at <[www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_7042-1522-1-30.pdf?050810140439](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_7042-1522-1-30.pdf?050810140439)>.

<sup>63</sup>Çinar.

<sup>64</sup>McGann, 9–10.

<sup>65</sup>"Global Go to Think Tank Rankings," Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, available at <<http://gotothinktank.com/rankings/>>.

<sup>66</sup>The U.S. Agency for International Development has supported the work of TEPAV (Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı, or Economic Policy Research Foundation). See, for example, Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, *Review of Legal Issues between Armenia and Turkey* (Ankara: TEPAV, 2012), available at <[www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1353684848-2.Review\\_of\\_Legal\\_Issues\\_between\\_Armenia\\_and\\_Turkey.pdf](http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1353684848-2.Review_of_Legal_Issues_between_Armenia_and_Turkey.pdf)>. For an example of partnering with U.S. think tanks, see Bulent Aliriza and Bulent Aras, *U.S.–Turkish Relations: A Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of the Post–Cold War Era* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2012), ii.

<sup>67</sup>Pinar Bilgin, "Turkey's Geopolitics Dogma," in *The Return of Geopolitics to Europe*, ed. Stefano Guzzini (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 151–173.

<sup>68</sup>Jacob Poushter, “Deep Divisions in Turkey as Elections Near,” Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends, October 15, 2015, available at <[www.pewglobal.org/2015/10/15/deep-divisions-in-turkey-as-election-nears/#most-prefer-democracy-but-divisions-over-how-it-is-working](http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/10/15/deep-divisions-in-turkey-as-election-nears/#most-prefer-democracy-but-divisions-over-how-it-is-working)>.

<sup>69</sup>Harriet Fildes, “The Rise of the HDP—Elections and Democracy in Turkey,” *OpenDemocracy.net*, June 3, 2015, available at <[www.opendemocracy.net/harriet-fildes/rise-of-hdp-elections-and-democracy-in-turkey](http://www.opendemocracy.net/harriet-fildes/rise-of-hdp-elections-and-democracy-in-turkey)>.

<sup>70</sup>Cansu Çamlıbel, “They Think, Imagine, and Shape Decisions,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, May 11, 2011.

<sup>71</sup>Khush Chosky, “The Commercial Potential,” *TheCipherBrief.com*, September 20, 2015, available at <[www.thecipherbrief.com/article/](http://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/)

commercial-potential>. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its Turkish counterpart have developed a framework concept to provide better incentives and incentives to stimulate trade and investment, with the ultimate goal of a Free Trade Agreement.

<sup>72</sup>Leonid Bershidsky, “Putin Hurts a Think Tank by not Banning It,” Bloomberg View, July 29, 2015, available at <[www.bloombergvie.com/articles/2015-07-28/how-putin-tarnishes-moscow-carnegie-center-by-omission](http://www.bloombergvie.com/articles/2015-07-28/how-putin-tarnishes-moscow-carnegie-center-by-omission)>.

<sup>73</sup>Soner Çağaptay, “Anti-Americanism in a Poisoned Tank,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, September 15, 2009.

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