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¹⁶ Scitutto, Crawford, and Carter.

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Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision (to be signed within 6 months)

JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*

JP 1-04, *Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation*

JP 1-06, *Financial Management Support in Joint Operations*

JP 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*

JP 3-13.3, *Operations Security*

JP 3-15, *Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare*

JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*

JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*

JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*

JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*

JP 4-01.2, *Sealift Support to Joint Operations*

JP 4-01.5, *Joint Terminal Operations*

JP 4-03, *Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine*

JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*

syria-iraq-hierarchy/index.html?hpt=hp_t1>.

¹⁹ ISIL’s foundation is based on al Qaeda’s ideology and follows well-known jihadist principles. This form of Islam is anti-Western and uses violence against those who do not agree with their views. This branch of Islam seeks to return to original thoughts and condemns new ideas, which are believed to be corrupt. See Michael Glint, *Can a War With ISIS Be Won? ISIL/Islamic State/Daesh* (ebook, Conceptual Kings, 2014), 5; *Violent Extremism Smartcard Compendium*, TRADOC Culture Center first draft, September 2012, 45–52.

²⁰ “Islamic State: An Assessment of Capabilities and the Effectiveness of International Intervention,” IHS Jane’s Intelligence Briefing, October 30, 2014.

²¹ Over the past 6 months, since the group began sweeping across eastern Syria and into Iraq, experts estimate that its leaders have gained access to 1.2 billion pounds in cash—more than the most recent recorded annual military expenditure of Ireland. ISIL is developing in a vital oil, gas, and trade area of the world. It can grab as it expands. It might earn up to 5 million pounds a month through extortion of local businesses. In the past year, it has been estimated that ISIL has made 40 million pounds from taking hostages, with each foreign hostage thought to be worth 3 million pounds. See Harriet Alexander and Alastair Beach, “How ISIL is Funded, Trained and Operating in Iraq and Syria,” *The Telegraph* (London), August 23, 2014, available at <[dileast/iraq/11052919/How-Isil-is-funded-trained-and-operating-in-Iraq-and-Syria.html>.](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/worldnews/mid-</p></div><div data-bbox=)

²² Eikmeier argued that leaders in World War II were not centers of gravity but were critical requirements as leaders for their respective nations and enablers for the actual centers of gravity. In a modernized military, Eikmeier would not identify soldiers as the operational COG. Depending on the military force, the COG could be armor formations, air forces, or some other component—whichever capability is critical for accomplishing the objectives. See Dale C. Eikmeier, “Center of Gravity Analysis,” *Military Review* (July–August 2004), 2–5.

²³ “ISIS Fast Facts,” *CNN.com*, October 9, 2014, available at <www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts>.

²⁴ “Islamic State.”

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Butler, 29.

²⁷ Milan Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2009), VII-16.

²⁸ Butler, 27.

²⁹ JOPP Workbook.

³⁰ “ISIS Fast Facts.”

³¹ JOPP Workbook.

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³³ Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” *International Security* 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008), 97.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 104.