The year 2012 marks the 30th anniversary of the 1982 British joint forces operations to recover the Falklands Islands in the South Atlantic Ocean from their Argentinean occupiers. Beginning as principally limited single-service operations by British air, naval, and marine elements, the campaign ended up as a major joint air-sea-land endeavor that turned out to be a “close run thing.”

A review of this campaign merits a retrospective because of many factors—geographic, political, military, and even economic. But it is particularly salient from the perspective of how a successful joint military operation was conducted by the United Kingdom’s armed forces over a vast distance with limited resources. This article revisits, in light of problems encountered and lessons learned, how the country’s military establishment and its civilian counterparts were able on short notice to reoccupy a tiny British dependency.
in a time-constrained, oncoming-winter operation. The focus must be on joint ground force combat while recognizing that the aerial and sea elements also played significant roles in obtaining the campaign’s overall success.

**Joint Participation**

Combat began on April 25 with Royal Marine commando, Special Air Service, and Special Boat Squadron forces retaking Argentine-occupied South Georgia Island, located to the east of the Falkland Islands. This action was followed by the May 1 Royal Air Force (RAF) Vulcan bomber attack on Port Stanley’s airfield; then on May 2, the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano. Battle escalated as a British fleet consisting of some hundred ships to include frigates, destroyers, and two aircraft carriers sailed south and established a 200-mile Total Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands. The zone’s purpose was to prevent further reinforcement of the Argentine force occupying East Falkland Island and to protect the British combat and logistics ships supporting the campaign.

The carriers with their helicopters and Harrier aircraft took up position well to the east of the islands to avoid attack by land-based Argentine naval and air force aircraft. British picket ships stood off the islands themselves both to shield the carriers and to intercept any Argentine aircraft that might try to interfere with ground operations on East Falkland Island where the bulk of Argentine forces were located.

In the meantime, diplomatic efforts to provide a peaceful solution to the crisis having failed, a British ground force had embarked in Great Britain and begun the 8,000-mile trek south to retake the islands. It was to be a major undertaking for a military establishment that was in the process of downsizing its expeditionary forces to concentrate on its North Atlantic Treaty Organization responsibilities.

Despite the turmoil engendered by the revamping of the British armed forces, in just over 3 weeks, from May 21 to June 14, a force of Royal Marine commandos, Army parachute troops, Nepalese Gurkha infantry, Special Air Service special forces, and guardsmen from Her Majesty’s Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards, as components of Royal Marine 3 Commando and 5 Infantry Brigade, “put boots on the ground” and retook the Falklands. The Royal Navy provided picket boat service, aerial coverage of the logistic support area, and gun support to the ground battle. The RAF, having sent long-range bombers against the islands’ principal airfield, flew the Chinook helicopters transporting troops about the battle zone. The ground forces were staunchly backed by a joint combat and service support force. In addition to interservice aviation, artillery, and engineer participation, the service support establishment consisted of all manner of army, navy, and marine logistic elements to include Chinese-manned, contractor-operated logistics vessels. Backing the whole enterprise was the myriad of Royal Navy and commercially contracted ships, which often went in harm’s way.

**The Core Force**

Initially led by Royal Marine Brigadier Julian Thompson commanding the Royal Marine commando brigade, and followed by the army brigade’s commander Brigadier Anthony Wilson, the ground contingent had its task to oust the Argentineans occupying East Falkland Island cut out for it. The joint force slogget its way across peat bogs, flew over fields of rock, traversed craggy hills, and skirted the island by watercraft under abysmal weather conditions to confront a tenacious opponent entrenched around the island's capital and airfield at Port Stanley. The terrain combined with weather characterized by blowing snow, constant drizzle, squalls of freezing rain, and gusting wind to sorely try all combatants. Just as winter was setting in, the expeditionary force overcame Argentine resistance and the Falkland Islanders were able to assert their British affiliation once again.

The Falkland Islands (also known as the Malvinas) lay off the southeastern coast of Argentina within a relatively short distance of Antarctica and southern South America, where winter begins in June. Although ocean effects preclude much snow, other elements such as cold, fog, mist, and sleet are prevalent during winter. Any military operation involving combat on the islands requires a force habituated to fighting in harsh weather and on unforgiving terrain. British Royal Marine 3 Commando Brigade, around which the Falklands ground expeditionary task force was originally organized, frequently deployed to Norway on exercises and practiced in desolate regions in the United Kingdom. It was, of all British combat formations, the best suited for an expedition to the barren and inhospitable islands thousands of miles from the British Isles.

The primary elements of the commando brigade were three Royal Marine battalion-size infantry formations, 40, 42, and 45 Royal Marine Commandos. In support of these infantry organizations were commando-trained and -qualified personnel of the Royal Marines, Royal Navy, and British army. The Royal Marines contributed the brigade headquarters, signal squadron, and air squadron. Royal Navy doctors and medical technicians,
much as the U.S. Navy does for the Marine Corps, provided medical support as members of the Commando Logistic Regiment’s Medical Squadron. The British army made a major contribution to the commando brigade in the form of 29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery, with three firing batteries of light 105mm cannon, 59 Independent Commando Squadron Royal Engineers (sappers), and the bulk of the Commando Logistic Regiment with transport, maintenance, and supply elements.

Royal Marine 3 Commando Brigade, a self-sufficient combat element, thus had the ability to operate as a separate entity. The brigade, however, was not large enough by itself to engage and defeat a numerically superior force such as Argentina had in the Falklands. It was, nevertheless, the ideal base upon which to forge an appropriate expeditionary force for the campaign.

Initial Force Augmentation

It was recognized early, therefore, that the commando brigade would have to be augmented if it was to accomplish an involved mission conducted so far from the United Kingdom. The initial infantry augmentation came from the British Parachute Regiment’s 2nd and 3rd Parachute (2 and 3 Paras) Battalions. The airborne-qualified troops were also well conditioned to operate independently or as a component of a large force and had little trouble being integrated into the expeditionary commando brigade. The parachute unit leaders were resourceful and experienced, which made them a good match for their commando counterparts.

In support of the equivalent of five infantry battalions, the reinforced commando brigade included 3 and 4 Troops (platoons) of “B” Squadron, The Blues and Royals, with their light tracked-armored fighting vehicles. Each armored troop consisted of two Scimitars and two Scorpions, the former’s principal armament being the 30mm high-velocity Rarden gun and the latter’s a medium-velocity 76mm cannon. The armored troops came from one of Queen Elizabeth II’s two royal household cavalry regiments, which are also charged with ceremonial horse-mounted duties in London. It was initially felt that the terrain on East Falkland Island would be inappropriate for tracked fighting vehicles as they would have to contend with rocky riverbeds, marshy ground, and jagged heights. As the U.S. Army discovered in South Vietnam, however, armor, in this case what amounted to light tanks, proved its value when deployed to the Falklands. There was no tank-versus-tank action in the islands, but the effective firepower and cross-country mobility provided by the light armored vehicles established that the supported infantry could easily have employed additional armor.

Also included in the task force was an enhanced “T” Battery (Shah Shiyah’s Troop) 12 Air Defense Regiment, Royal Artillery, with Rapier and Blowpipe antiaircraft missiles. Rapier missiles were placed in the first landing waves to quickly protect the beachheads on the western shores of East Falkland Island against Argentine air activity. The task force leadership anticipated that the major threat to the initial landing would be by aircraft of the capable Argentine naval and air forces. The selected beachheads lay on the shores of Port San Carlos, Ajaz Bay, and San Carlos Water, which were surrounded by low-lying mountains. The missiles were emplaced on these heights so as to best engage any attacking enemy aircraft. Rapier effectiveness, however, was limited, although the gunners claimed 20 confirmed and probable Argentine aircraft kills. Argentine pilots attempted to bomb British ships and ground installations in the beachhead area from low altitudes, which meant the Rapiers launched from the mountaintops had to be fired down toward the water’s surface. The Rapiers, designed to fire up into the sky, had to fire at negative elevations and had the tendency to fall off their pedestal mounts.

First Battle

The initial intent of the joint British ground effort was to establish a major presence in the form of a base of operations on East Falkland Island. Then through diplomatic efforts, the British government would try to persuade the large Argentine contingent on the island to return to the mainland. It quickly became evident that the Argentine force was going to stay on the Falklands, because Buenos Aires insistently claimed sovereignty over the islands, which were so much closer to mainland Argentina than to Great Britain.

Once established on shore on May 21 and encountering minimum resistance, however, the British government quickly decided to launch an offensive against their foe, which was emplaced in great strength around Port Stanley on the east coast of East Falkland Island. For almost a week, Brigadier Thompson sought to build up an adequate logistical base to support anticipated ground operations. But in the meantime, the Royal Navy was suffering significant combat ship losses to Argentine air attacks, which made for bad press in the United Kingdom. All

Goose Green’s capture caused a serious drawdown on the already limited supplies at the beachhead

landing facility at the small community of Goose Green, a few kilometers southeast of the British beachhead, presented what appeared on the surface to be an easy objective to take. The capture of the installation could thus ease the pressure on Thompson to take the action demanded by the MOD and provide breathing space until the army brigade arrived. Two Para, with a minimum backup of fire and logistic support, was to perform the mission on May 27.

The army parachute battalion was led by Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, who had prepared his men well for battle. For example, he doubled the number of light machineguns assigned to each section (squad), thereby greatly increasing his battalion’s organic firepower. He also recognized that excellent
troop physical condition would be necessary in the islands’ bleak environment, and on the trip south he saw to it that there was a great deal of conditioning in spite of cramped space on the ships.

Jones also stressed first-aid self-help for the wounded. In addition to the commando brigade’s standard operating procedure of first-aid self-help, he issued a “puncture repair kit” made up of several elastic crepe field dressings used to put pressure on wounds to stop bleeding from exiting projectiles. With limited manpower he and other unit commanders did not want to detail men to carry litters or divert his paratroopers to assist their comrades when the troops could take limited care of themselves.

The May 28–29 attack on Goose Green was a success—but a costly one—and had an unfortunate impact on upcoming operations. Probably most importantly, Goose Green’s capture exacerbated the logistic situation. It caused a serious drawdown on the already limited supplies at the beachhead. A special shortage was of larger caliber ammunition.

Lieutenant Colonel Jones, while personally leading a stalled attack to get it moving again, was killed by an Argentine machine-gunner. The foe’s garrison with more than 1,400 men proved to be much larger than expected and was well dug in to resist an attack. Jones’s death thus deprived the British of one of their most effective commanders.

An unforeseen challenge presented itself in the form of the large numbers of enemy prisoners taken at the objective. They became a major burden because they had to be taken care of properly according to the Geneva Convention. A large number of British personnel therefore had to be assigned prisoner-of-war duty, which tended to degrade overall operational effectiveness. There was also no place to keep the prisoners out of harm’s way in the limited beach logistics area. As a result, they had to be evacuated to ships, which in turn were subject to Argentine bombing.

In the final analysis, the Argentine garrison at Goose Green represented no appreciable offensive threat to the British beachhead since the garrison’s primary function was to service Argentine helicopters and light fixed-wing aircraft, not be a base for offensive operations.

The “Yomp” East and Reinforcements

Once the Goose Green garrison surrendered on May 29 and the additional British army infantry brigade was under way from Great Britain, Brigadier Thompson gave up ground command of the operation to Royal Marine Major General Jeremy Moore. On May 27, Thompson had dispatched 45 Royal Marine Commando and 3 Para east on foot over the tortuous terrain on what became known as the “yomp.” Forty-two Royal Marine Commando was to be transported by Chinook helicopter, but the sinking of the modified container ship Atlantic Conveyor and the loss of three RAF heavy lift aircraft initially prevented the move. On May 31, however, a commando company was airlifted to Mount Kent in the center of East Falkland Island. On June 1, the remainder of the commando unit was flown by helicopter to nearby Mount Challenger, both mountains being unoccupied by the Argentineans.

The Blues and Royals armored fighting vehicles and the commando brigade’s few light tracked vehicles accompanied the infantry in its trek across East Falkland Island. The armor proved fully capable of operating in the unfavorable terrain and greatly assisted in moving unit equipment, supplies, and weapons with their ammunition as well as personnel. The weather did not cooperate as the season advanced toward winter, but
the trek was made without serious incident. Supply of the columns, nevertheless, was a major challenge, and small watercraft from the British fleet skirted the island’s shore bringing food and ammunition to forward logistic nodes. The first of these was established at Teal Inlet Settlement. Helicopters also moved the light artillery pieces, their crews, and ammunition to firing positions within range of the entrenched Argentineans.

While Thompson’s Royal Marine 3 Commando Brigade, minus 40 Royal Marine Commando left behind to protect the beachhead, was in motion, 5 Infantry Brigade arrived in the battle zone. The brigade had a unique composition as it consisted of two battalions of Her Majesty’s foot guards, the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, and the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, as well as the 1st Battalion 7th Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles. The foot guard battalions, however, were not normal components of 5 Infantry Brigade as were the Gurkhas. Two and 3 Paras usually comprised the army brigade’s combat elements so the brigade deployed to the Falklands as essentially an ad hoc organization.

The Gurkha riflemen were citizens of Nepal, and their participation in the British campaign had to be approved by the Nepalese government. Small in stature and tough in demeanor, the Nepalese had a ferocious reputation and were skilled with the curved native knife called the kukri. Word of their coming and their use of the kukri struck fear in the Argentine soldiers even before the Gurkhas arrived. The Gurkhas are known as世界级 fighters and had fought for the British for decades. In World War II, Gurkha battalions fought on such battlefields as Burma. Over the postwar years, however, the number of battalions serving the British government declined significantly. Interestingly, the inclusion of the Gurkhas in the brigade added another dimension to the organization of the expeditionary force which was now not only a “joint” entity, but in reality a “combined” one as well.

Logistic Complications

The two foot guard infantry battalions were, along with the paratroopers and commandos, considered among the elite of British troop formations. For the guardsmen, it seemed almost a right instead of merely a duty to participate in the campaign. Unfortunately, from a logistic point of view, the foot guards’ participation raised complications well before they arrived in the combat zone. Regardless of supply deficiencies and lack of physical condition readiness, rolled into battle determined to excel.

The British battle plan was relatively straightforward—move as quickly and directly as possible to engage and defeat the Argentine forces in the Falklands. But a definitive logistics plan, however well conceived, could not take into proper account the execution challenges ahead that haste and poor management above brigade level were to cause. The result was near-chaos, and but for the resourcefulness and determination of logisticians, especially those in direct support of the troops on the ground, the final result can best be described as a “close run thing.” The logistic operators of the British merchant marine, commercial entities, Royal Air Force, Royal Navy, British army, and Royal Marines had to overcome significant obstacles of terrain, weather, and mismanagement of resources more than effective and tenacious enemy opposition.

Right from the beginning of the campaign, haste resulted in guaranteed confusion. Had some tracking mechanism akin to present day bar coding been employed, identification of items required for combat operations such as ammunition, critical weapons and Blowpipe antiaircraft missiles emplaced to protect the ships and logistic nodes failed to receive high marks because of design features, sensitivity to climatic conditions, and tactical employment. As luck would have it, many of the attacking Argentine fighters were active over the beachhead during the day and the ships were inadequately armed to protect themselves. At the same time, Rapier

The guardsmen’s physical condition was adversely influenced by duty in ceremonial events around London and in a less demanding environment than the Falklands

systems, and food might have saved many hours of untangling the contents of loads on the various commandeered merchant ships. As it was, ships were loaded helter-skelter with items needing first on the battlefield being loaded first instead of last on the transports, making supplies and equipment, much of it being on the vessels’ bottoms, not readily accessible. There was no organized manifest system, so logisticians seldom knew what was on what merchant ships when they arrived at the East Falkland Island beachhead for unloading. There were incidents where ships arriving to be unloaded had to be returned fully loaded to the logistics marshaling area because there was no need for their cargo at the time. Often complicating the situation was that the discharge of stores had to be made at night because Argentine aircraft were active over the beachhead during the day and the ships were inadequately armed to protect themselves.
The worst loss of personnel did not occur on the battlefield but in Bluff Cove at a supply distribution point behind the frontlines. Argentine aircraft attacked the two landing ships logistic Sir Galahad and Sir Tristam, which were carrying ammunition, vehicles, supplies, and soldiers of the Welsh Guards and medical personnel of 16 Field Ambulance. The sudden arrival of the Argentine aircraft caught Chinese crewman, many Welsh guardsmen, and medics on board Sir Galahad as the troops prepared to be ferried ashore. The loss of life, supplies, vehicles, and equipment was profound.

At the same time, the medical support provided by surgical teams of the Royal Navy, both those integral to the Commando Medical Squadron and attached, and the Royal Army Medical Corps personnel to include the parachute medics, was truly outstanding. For example, surgeons working in a makeshift operating theater in the Ajax main field medical dressing station, with two exploded bombs lodged in the roof, managed to save the lives of all the wounded who reached the facility. Medical personnel led by Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly worked around the clock in the unsophisticated and grubby environment of an abandoned meat packing plant, as well as in rudimentary field locations. Of those initially treated ashore in the various medical field dressing stations only three died later on the hospital ship SS Uganda.

As the logisticians were bringing men, supplies, and ammunition while retrieving and treating the wounded, seven infantry battalions moved aggressively against their Argentinean foe. If their advance was hindered, it was less by Argentine resistance than by their own footwear. The government-issue direct molded sole boots, when immersed in salt water, retained the residual salt crystals, which became magnets for further moisture, so wet boots never dried out. The footwear failed to give personnel adequate protection and ended up causing many casualties. Ironically, the Argentinean troops were equipped with superb leather boots which became much sought after by British troops as spoils of war.

The resourceful British soldier and marine also learned to contend with the drinking water situation. Potable water was at a premium, and available groundwater had to be treated before it was drinkable. The fighting man soon learned that even when properly treated, his coffee mug often ended up with a bottom full of murky sludge. British combatants quickly learned to drink only the uppermost portion of fluid in a cup.

The combination of circumstances, physical environment, and mismanagement sorely tested all those men charged with...
The Phase I success of Royal Marine 3 Commando Brigade and 5 Infantry Brigade encouraged a fast implementation of a Phase II, but ammunition for the supporting artillery had become scarce. General Moore postponed the attack for a day, allowing the needed ammunition to be brought forward while unit commanders reconnoitered the terrain. The phase objectives were Wireless Ridge to be taken by 2 Para, Tumbledown Mountain by the Scots Guards, and Mount William by the Gurkha Rifles. The attacks went forward under harsh weather conditions of high winds and snow showers, which also hindered the helicopter evacuation of the wounded and the bringing up of ammunition and supplies. Capture of the terrain features placed the expeditionary force in commanding positions around the final Phase III objective of Port Stanley and its airfield.

The success of Phase III was assured by the Argentine defenders retreating into Port Stanley and its immediate environs. The final phase saw the British attacking from three directions in what became a rout. The Argentine resistance folded as the tank-supported infantry captured the last key defensive positions around the port town. That the collapse was quick was fortuitous because British supplies and especially readily available ammunition were becoming critical commodities. The Argentinean defenders had already begun to surrender in large numbers as the British advanced, and on June 14 the Argentine high command in the Falklands, with its troops hemmed in around Port Stanley, capitulated.

Lessons Learned

The campaign’s ground lessons learned were fundamental. There was a need for a well-established, sound, and flexible command and control system as well as adequate logistics planning at the division level. The inadequate combat and logistical organization brought forth the realization that it is logistics that drives the battle. Resource management requirements needed closer attention, especially in the supply and distribution of ammunition and the availability of sufficient helicopters. The performance of equipment—not only of adequate clothing to include such mundane yet important items as boots, but also the ability of weapons systems to deliver fire and traverse terrain—required more appropriate consideration. Finally, operational procedures, to include combat loading of ships, required refinement and inclusion in standard operating documents.

The Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands outnumbered the British expeditionary force. But the Argentineans turned out to be no match for a joint task organization which, despite the challenges it faced, prevailed decisively. The outcome of the campaign in the long run, however, was basically decided by the professionalism, sturdiness, and tenacity of the British serviceman and his international partners. As a result, the Falkland Islands remain inhabited today by citizens loyal to the British crown. JFQ