Qaeda case study (chapter 7) is primarily a consideration of religious ideology and organizational resilience. Following the death of Osama bin Laden, predictions were rampant that his death foreshadowed the end of al Qaeda's operational capability. In part, that expectation never materialized because, Jordan argues, al Qaeda morphed into a meta-organization operating through autonomous groups bound by a common ideology and shared goals. Thus, al Qaeda is not a single unified terrorist organization but, rather, a system of loose affiliates each with functional bureaucracies, communal support, and deep adherence to Islamist principles and teachings.

Leadership Decapitation is as challenging as it is informative. The book is comprehensively packed, highly detailed, and supported by multivariate analyses, transition matrices, time series analyses, extensive chapter notes, and a substantial bibliography. Jordan's book will appeal to two modestly overlapping audiences: data analysts and quantitative researchers who study terror, and senior defense officials and joint force leaders who necessarily deal with it in the real world. Scholars and others familiar with sophisticated statistical modeling and analyses will find the work stimulating, insightful, and informative; yet, generally, that audience lacks the authority to shape counterterrorism policy and/or target terrorist leaders. Conversely, those who shape policy and are positioned to authorize lethal decisions may be skeptical of numerical data and analyses that appear to fly in the face of common sense and post-9/11 practice. Notwithstanding receptivity and accessibility issues, Jordan's book is an original and valuable contribution to understanding how terrorist organizations and insurgencies survive following the death or capture of senior leadership. **JFQ**

Larry D. Miller, Ph.D., directs The Inquiry Project for Communication Research, Cable Creek Publishing, and is a Faculty Instructor, Department of Distance Education, at the U.S. Army War College.

Resourcing the National Security Enterprise: Connecting the Ends and Means of U.S. National Security

Reviewed by Stephan Pikner

Books on strategy are often aspirational or theoretical, considering high-level questions, first principles, and general trends without delving deeply into the mechanics of implementation. Similarly, a parallel vein of literature focuses on a narrow range of tactical platforms or concepts in the implicit hope that someone somewhere will use these clever tools to build a future force from the bottom up. *Resourcing the National Security Enterprise: Connecting the Ends and Means of U.S. National Security* fits squarely between these two attractive yet unsatisfying poles; it is a practitioner's guide to programming and budgeting that aims to demystify the "invisible but very real web of processes and authorities [that] constitute the 'rules of the game' for

the bureaucracy"—"rules which often forestall the 'obvious solution'" to government workers' problems.

This edited volume draws on the expertise of 10 highly regarded contributors, all of whom bring deep familiarity with a specific corner of the larger national security enterprise to their chapters. Strongest of these is John Ferrari's chapter on programming strategic priorities, a topic covered in exhaustive, technical detail elsewhere that comes to life through sharp and insightful prose that returns to a common theme: "There are no shortcuts; only by understanding time and bounding the strategy to available resources can a strategist be effective." This is not a passive subordination of strategy to budget constraints: "A strategy can drive resource allocations, but only if it works effectively within the constraints of the decade-long national cycle of funding." *Resourcing the National Security Enterprise* shines brightest when it is outlining these constraints while highlighting where sustained progress can be made.

A discussion of the role of Congress in budget formation by Heidi Demarest opens a series of chapters that touch on different portions of the Federal government. Demarest focuses on congressional staffers, particularly the relative decline in their typical national security expertise since the end of the Cold War. Jason Galui's chapter on the National Security Council centers on the Office of Management and Budget's role in crafting the Presidential budget submission, an effort Galui calls "the structural support of the NSC strategy bridge." Importantly, these chapters (and the volume itself) sidestep personalities and partisanship and instead dive deeply into the mechanics "under the hood" of the programming and budgeting cycle.

In contrast to other works that focus narrowly on the military, *Resourcing the National Security Enterprise* takes a refreshingly broad view, extending beyond the Department of Defense (DOD). Particularly welcome in this regard are contributions by Geoffrey Odlum on funding U.S. diplomatic priorities, Rebecca Patterson on resourcing U.S. partners and allies, and Mark Troutman

on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Odlum offers a candid diagnosis of the bureaucratic and cultural impediments to effective strategic planning and programming in the State Department, which, though "sufficient to muddle through and with diplomatic tools and programs that remain planned and funded well enough to react" to an immediate, local crisis, can end in larger "policy failure [that] is most often the result of poor planning or poorly managed implementation or both." Patterson highlights the value to the United States of sustained funding for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations as an affordable hedge against instability in troubled regions. This argument, carried forward from the political science literature on post-conflict stability and reinforced with a detailed discussion of UN funding pathways and resourcing, is an intriguing direction that merits broader incorporation in discussions of force employment and competing operational demands. Troutman's chapter is equally illuminating, tracing the evolution of DHS since its founding nearly two decades ago. He diagnoses the fundamental challenge faced by the department clearly: "The DHS is neither a peripheral nor a temporary addition to U.S. national security. However, it is resourced and organized as though it were both." Of the various thoughtful recommendations for reform and process modernization across the volume, the succinct set of proposals that Troutman ends his chapter with hits the hardest.

Resourcing the National Security Enterprise is at its softest when it bemoans larger trends such as increased nondiscretionary spending, the expanding national debt, and the projected slowing of economic growth. Although these trends do matter, the cursory treatment they receive at several points oversimplifies the uncertainty and complexity in such projections, ignores the sound advice offered elsewhere to acknowledge that some things are beyond a security strategist's control, and distracts from the overall thrust of the chapter. Left underdeveloped is the argument that many of these same trends—namely,

rapidly increasing health care, higher education, housing, and pension costs—detract as much from the proportion of the military's overall budget spent narrowly on modernization and training as from DOD's overall relative share of the Nation's production. More narrowly, the book leaves unexplored the challenges facing the Navy as it balances tradeoffs between fleet size, emerging adversary capabilities, operational tempo, and modernization, all against the backdrop of limited shipyard capacity. The forces that led the sea Service to overinvest in some platforms at the expense of others in prior decades are worthy of separate, deep study, but (at a minimum) a nod to the dynamics driving the Navy's shipbuilding plans would have made *Resourcing the National Security Enterprise* a richer read.

Those minor critiques aside, a close reading of *Resourcing the National Security Enterprise* is a valuable starting point for the deeper understanding required to guide the fundamental processes that shape our national defense. As Ferrari, a retired Army major general, ends his contribution,

To have true positive influence on the process requires investing hundreds of hours in preparation and working multiple jobs in the Pentagon. High rank and position cannot shortcut the process. Part-time programming may alone account for the dismal outcomes associated with America's first battles.

This volume has earned a place on strategists' bookshelves and consideration for inclusion in higher-level professional military education curricula. Perhaps more important, its underlying message, that budgeting and programming experience is both invaluable and irreplaceable, should guide career managers and mentors as they steer promising officers toward assignments of greatest impact. **JFQ**

Lieutenant Colonel Stephan Pikner (FA59) is the Military Advisor to the Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Net Assessment.

Cyber Persistence Theory: Redefining National Security in Cyberspace
By Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett
Oxford University Press, 2022
266 pp. $28.45
ISBN: 9780197638262

Reviewed by Stafford A. Ward

Few books have been written in the recent past whose stated intent has been to influence and shape the perceptions of foreign and defense policymakers. In the spirit of the famed Stanford University political scientist Alexander George, who wrote *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Policy in Foreign Policy*, the authors of *Cyber Persistence Theory: Redefining National Security in Cyberspace* have successfully bridged the gap with a thought-provoking, accessible academic analysis. *Cyber Persistence Theory* holistically examines the current cyberspace environment in a way that is sure to be useful to U.S. cyberspace policymakers and operators.

The arguments advanced by the writers artfully explore the structure of the new cyberspace environment. The authors are a qualified mix of